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谷歌患上微軟綜合癥,產(chǎn)品集成管理埋隱患

谷歌患上微軟綜合癥,產(chǎn)品集成管理埋隱患

Ben Elowitz 2011-08-08
谷歌早期以對(duì)產(chǎn)品進(jìn)行分散化管理而聞名,Gmail和谷歌地圖即誕生于那段歲月。但是,現(xiàn)在它卻將越來(lái)越多的新產(chǎn)品集成到搜索引擎中,此舉頗有些重蹈微軟覆轍的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

????從建立之初,谷歌就決定不只做搜索業(yè)務(wù)。谷歌的業(yè)務(wù)結(jié)構(gòu)有不少可取之處,其中最了不起的一個(gè)是其分散化管理:經(jīng)過(guò)深思熟慮,谷歌決定放棄協(xié)同作業(yè),放權(quán)給各產(chǎn)品小組,使其擁有充分的思考和行動(dòng)的自由;正是本著這種管理理念,無(wú)論在產(chǎn)品變化還是產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新上它都取得了巨大的成功。在谷歌,不僅各產(chǎn)品小組定位清晰,而且公司重視并鼓勵(lì)新穎獨(dú)特的思維方式,并因此開(kāi)發(fā)出了Gmail、谷歌應(yīng)用(Google Apps)、和谷歌地圖(Google Maps)等杰出的產(chǎn)品。即使用戶開(kāi)始并不認(rèn)同各大公司鼓吹的協(xié)同作業(yè)的價(jià)值,他們卻由衷地喜愛(ài)這些谷歌產(chǎn)品。

????但是,谷歌高層卻日漸無(wú)法抵御強(qiáng)烈的誘惑,而將產(chǎn)新品開(kāi)發(fā)納入龐大的“協(xié)同”共同體中。按理說(shuō),將新產(chǎn)品集成到現(xiàn)有產(chǎn)品中,可以充分利用現(xiàn)成的用戶群和產(chǎn)品現(xiàn)有營(yíng)銷(xiāo)計(jì)劃,對(duì)新產(chǎn)品來(lái)說(shuō)這些優(yōu)勢(shì)不言而喻,更不用說(shuō),這么做還相應(yīng)增強(qiáng)了“戰(zhàn)略”和“平臺(tái)”價(jià)值,實(shí)際上就意味著鎖定了客戶。

????我理解這種做法的魅力所在,而且原則上說(shuō)也合情合理。但是,谷歌改變管理模式的趨勢(shì)令人擔(dān)憂,原因在于此舉犧牲的恰是谷歌最了不起的精髓所在:專(zhuān)注于以盡可能簡(jiǎn)單的產(chǎn)品滿足用戶需求。事實(shí)上,越來(lái)越多的谷歌產(chǎn)品正以附加功能包的形式,被整合到大型產(chǎn)品中。

????這種做法的弊端在于:新產(chǎn)品從一開(kāi)始就始終生存在核心產(chǎn)品的影響之下,有時(shí)這種影響并不恰當(dāng);有些新產(chǎn)品原本可以成為絕佳的的獨(dú)立產(chǎn)品,最終卻在集成模式下卻被淹沒(méi)了。因此,在如今的谷歌,原本杰出的思想最終產(chǎn)生結(jié)果往往只能算的上差強(qiáng)人意。如果延續(xù)這種削弱新產(chǎn)品的做法,谷歌的創(chuàng)新將難以為繼,谷歌在新興的社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)領(lǐng)域取得成功的難度也將日益增大。

????這方面的一個(gè)經(jīng)典案例是Google Buzz:它從誕生之初就沒(méi)有滿足互聯(lián)網(wǎng)用戶的實(shí)際需求。MG? 西格勒在科技博客TechCrunch上撰文稱(chēng):“Google Buzz跟Gmail同根生,恰是這種方式令人感到不舒服?!蔽夷赣H教導(dǎo)我,對(duì)于擁有高級(jí)學(xué)位的人要有崇敬之心,因此,眼見(jiàn)得無(wú)數(shù)谷歌博士們將Buzz集成到Gmail中而錯(cuò)失良機(jī),我只有目瞪口呆的份兒了。谷歌忘了多數(shù)在線的的人其實(shí)根本不會(huì)保持Gmail的登錄狀態(tài),這雖然聽(tīng)起來(lái)有些遺憾,但卻完全屬實(shí)。既然多數(shù)人并不時(shí)時(shí)在線,那Buzz的價(jià)值也隨之一落千丈。因此,它非但沒(méi)有成為了不起的、定位明確的社交產(chǎn)品,反而成為附加在Gmail上的一個(gè)目的不明且頗具爭(zhēng)議的特性而已。

????隨著谷歌正式推出Google+項(xiàng)目,這類(lèi)產(chǎn)品集成、協(xié)同、以及既有用戶群優(yōu)勢(shì)等問(wèn)題會(huì)比以往任何時(shí)候都更為突出。

????僅僅依托谷歌搜索產(chǎn)品,Google+無(wú)法取得成功。無(wú)論它能引得多少用戶趨之若鶩,到頭來(lái)仍會(huì)像Buzz和SearchWikis等谷歌搜索的其它特性一樣胎死腹中。谷歌首款新社交產(chǎn)品發(fā)布僅一個(gè)月,據(jù)報(bào)道就已經(jīng)有2,000多萬(wàn)注冊(cè)用戶,因而很容易被認(rèn)為已經(jīng)是個(gè)成功的開(kāi)始。但是,幾乎所有用戶之所以選擇使用該產(chǎn)品,原因都在于他們本身已經(jīng)是谷歌的用戶,而不是因?yàn)榻柚鶪oogle+,他們可以利用朋友網(wǎng)絡(luò)中的內(nèi)容改變自己的生活。

????盡管發(fā)揮現(xiàn)有業(yè)務(wù)和搜索用戶群的優(yōu)勢(shì)看似明智,但這種優(yōu)勢(shì)轉(zhuǎn)移戰(zhàn)略帶來(lái)的結(jié)果將極為有限。為了爭(zhēng)奪迅猛增長(zhǎng)的消費(fèi)者在線注意力,眼下一場(chǎng)社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)正在如火如荼地展開(kāi)。企圖將用戶的搜索體驗(yàn)延伸到社交領(lǐng)域的做法既不會(huì)有助于在Facebook即將發(fā)起的反擊中捍衛(wèi)谷歌已經(jīng)取得的地位,亦不會(huì)為谷歌捕獲各種新機(jī)會(huì)。因此,“發(fā)揮并增強(qiáng)核心產(chǎn)品優(yōu)勢(shì)”的戰(zhàn)略雖然執(zhí)行起來(lái)很容易,而且初期效果顯著,但著實(shí)短視。

????谷歌的這種模式并不新鮮,過(guò)去10年中,我在家鄉(xiāng)西雅圖,還曾在微軟(Microsoft)王國(guó)中親身體驗(yàn)過(guò)。雖然我在微軟的朋友們供職于不同的部門(mén),但他們知道自己每周都能按時(shí)領(lǐng)取薪水,而這均得益于Windows和Office產(chǎn)品的巨大銷(xiāo)量。無(wú)論他們開(kāi)發(fā)的是什么產(chǎn)品,無(wú)論是機(jī)頂盒還是手機(jī)操作系統(tǒng),所有目標(biāo)都必須讓位于刺激Windows和Office銷(xiāo)量這一需求。在微軟的各類(lèi)會(huì)議上,10幾名與會(huì)者的唯一目標(biāo)就是將自己的產(chǎn)品最大程度地成到Windows 和Office中。如今這已經(jīng)是無(wú)人不曉的事實(shí)。Office Web Apps和Windows Live SkyDrive等杰出的產(chǎn)品非但沒(méi)能獨(dú)立銷(xiāo)售,反而注定要成為那些賺錢(qián)的核心品牌的影子,也就是馬特?羅索夫最近所言的“戰(zhàn)略稅收”的犧牲品。

????隨著谷歌日漸成熟壯大,它是否愈來(lái)愈像微軟了?頗具諷刺意味的是,正是由于微軟彼時(shí)專(zhuān)注于協(xié)同,從而給谷歌和蘋(píng)果(Apple)等后來(lái)者留下了巨大的可乘之機(jī),并進(jìn)而獨(dú)占了應(yīng)用、音樂(lè)和設(shè)備等領(lǐng)域。微軟這一失敗綜合癥尤其令人不解,因?yàn)楹苊黠@,它當(dāng)時(shí)擁有足夠的人才和經(jīng)驗(yàn),能更快更好地在這些領(lǐng)域有所建樹(shù),除非如果甘愿脫離于時(shí)代。

????如果谷歌不重新解放自己,與外部現(xiàn)實(shí)世界展開(kāi)競(jìng)爭(zhēng),很快它便會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn),自己已心甘情愿地成了微軟綜合癥的犧牲品。很長(zhǎng)時(shí)間內(nèi),其業(yè)務(wù)可能依然龐大無(wú)比,但是從戰(zhàn)略上看,卻沒(méi)有出路可言;另一方面,它也可能發(fā)現(xiàn)自己正與下一波互聯(lián)網(wǎng)洪流——社交——失之交臂。

????谷歌需要做的是絕不僅僅是提供一套搜索引擎的附屬產(chǎn)品,相反,現(xiàn)在它恰恰需要發(fā)揮寬廣、深遠(yuǎn)、且分散的創(chuàng)新性,利用新興的社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)來(lái)滿足人們的潛在需求。谷歌需要確保,與之前的谷歌應(yīng)用、谷歌搜索、Gmail、以及谷歌地圖一樣,Google+項(xiàng)目也是個(gè)完整的、獨(dú)立的產(chǎn)品,有能力在開(kāi)放的網(wǎng)絡(luò)上與其他產(chǎn)品展開(kāi)競(jìng)爭(zhēng),并開(kāi)創(chuàng)出一片新天地。Facebook在社交領(lǐng)域占有絕對(duì)優(yōu)勢(shì),這點(diǎn)固然不假,但只要谷歌迅速采取行動(dòng),避免重蹈微軟覆轍,它在這一領(lǐng)域仍然有機(jī)會(huì)。

????艾羅維茲是媒體公司W(wǎng)etpaint的聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人兼首席執(zhí)行官。

????譯者:大海

????From early on, Google seemed determined to be more than a search company. And one of the most admirable traits of Google's structure has been its decentralization: The company's deliberate decision to forego synergies to give product groups the freedom of independent thought and action has created tremendous product variation and innovation. Distinct product groups and a culture that prized fresh original thinking created great products like Gmail, Google Apps, and Google Maps; and all of these products delighted users even as they initially passed up the value of synergies that big companies often tout.

????And yet, it seems that those at the Googleplex are increasingly giving in to the temptation to integrate new product development into a "synergistic," if monstrous, whole. Integrating new products into existing ones, the story goes, should give a new product a boost with a built-in user base and in-product feature merchandising, not to mention enhanced "strategic" and "platform" value, which basically translates to customer lock-in.

????I understand the attraction of this. And it makes sense in principle. But the trend is concerning, because it sacrifices the essence of Google's (GOOG) greatness: its focus on the simplest possible product to meet user needs. Instead, products are increasingly being morphed into tack-on feature sets of bigger products.

????But the downside here is that the influence of the core product consistently invades – even where it shouldn't – and this overwhelms what could be a terrific new stand-alone product. As a result, great now too often becomes good at Google. And, if this new-product dilution and diminution continues, it will be increasingly difficult for the company to successfully innovate and take advantage of the burgeoning social Web.

????One classic example: instead of solving a real need for all the Web's users, Google Buzz was, as MG Siegler noted at TechCrunch, "shoved in everyone's face by way of its somewhat unnatural home in Gmail." My mother has taught me to put people with advanced degrees on pedestals, so I can't help but be stunned that legions of Googly Ph.D.'s missed this by integrating Buzz into Gmail. It's pathetic, but true: Google forgot that most connected people aren't even on Gmail. And, obviously, the value of the network is far lower when most people aren't on it. So, instead of being a great social product with a clear use case, Google Buzz became a controversial feature with ambiguous purpose that was added on as an appendage to Gmail.

????With the launch of the Google+ Project, these questions of product integration, synergy, and installed-base leverage are more crucial than ever.

????Google+ will not succeed on the back of Google's search product alone. No matter how many users it may garner, it will turn out like the other stillborn features in Google's search, e.g. Buzz and SearchWikis. Already, it would be easy to consider Google's first new social product launch a success, based on the 20 million or more reported users who have signed up for it. But nearly all of those users have joined on the basis of their existing relationship with Google, rather than for the sake of any life-altering content from their friend networks.

????And, while leveraging its existing business and user base in search may sound like a smart corporate strategy, the results of such migration will be limited. The battle for the social Web is being waged for a prize of exploding consumer attention online. Adding line extensions to users' search experience will neither defend Google from Facebook's coming attack, nor offensively capture new and emerging opportunities for Google. So, the "leverage-and-enhance-the-core-product" strategy is an easy reach to execute, and offers appealing initial momentum, but it is short-sighted.

????We've all seen this pattern before; and I've lived it as part of the Microsoft (MSFT) world here in my home of Seattle for the last decade. No matter what part of the company they work in, my friends at Microsoft know their paycheck comes every week, thanks to product sales of Windows and Office. And no matter what product they work in, whether it's set-top boxes or mobile phones, their objectives are overwhelmed by the need to sell more copies of Windows and Office. Meetings at Microsoft have become famous for having a dozen-plus attendees – all in order to maximize integration with, you guessed it, Windows and Office. Rather than being marketed independently, great products like Office Web Apps and Windows Live SkyDrive seem destined to become mere shadows of their moneymaking core brands, victims of what Matt Rosoff recently referred to as the "strategy tax."

????As Google matures, is it becoming more and more like its original nemesis? Ironically, it's Microsoft's focus on synergy that has left such huge room for entrants like Google and Apple to come in and dominate sectors including apps, music and devices. Microsoft's failure syndrome was especially perplexing because it clearly had the talent and experience to build these categories better and faster – if it had been willing to obsolete itself.

????If Google doesn't give itself back the freedom to compete with the reality of the outside world, it will quickly find itself a self-imposed victim of the Microsoft Syndrome. It may ride its own large, but strategically dead-ending, business for a long time; but it could also find itself missing out on the huge next wave of the Internet -- social.

????The required response from Google is not just a set of adjunct products that build on search. Instead, this is exactly the time that Google needs broad, far-reaching, and decentralized creativity to solve real people's still-latent needs via the emerging social Web. Google needs to make sure its Google+ Project is a complete stand-alone product that – like Google Apps, Google Search, Gmail, and Google Maps before it – can compete on the open Web and break new ground. Facebook has outsize traction in the social sphere, but it's not too late for Google, as long as the company quickly takes action to avoid falling into the trap that has caught its first major rival.

????-- Elowitz is co-founder and CEO of media company Wetpaint.

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