整個(gè)9月份,美股市場的表現(xiàn)都極其慘淡,標(biāo)普500指數(shù)已由月初的4516點(diǎn)跌至9月26日午盤的4275點(diǎn),在短短18個(gè)交易日內(nèi)下跌了5.3%。
美股突然大跌的直接原因就是長期利率的突然飆升,特別是本月10年期美國國債的收益率飆升了近50個(gè)基點(diǎn),達(dá)到4.55%。不過到目前為止,不管是利率大漲,還是股市大跌,都沒有讓華爾街的多頭下調(diào)對2023年的預(yù)測,高盛預(yù)計(jì)標(biāo)普500指數(shù)年底將漲至4500點(diǎn),花旗集團(tuán)的預(yù)測則達(dá)到了4600點(diǎn)。
如果你相信分析師們對接下來幾個(gè)季度的預(yù)測,那么標(biāo)普500指數(shù)很有可能不久后重回今年8月份的高位,并且在明年繼續(xù)保持上漲。平均來看,市場分析師們預(yù)計(jì),美股的12個(gè)月GAAP利潤將從今年一季度的每股200美元漲至明年二季度的230美元。如果這種情況真的發(fā)生了,那么到明年夏天,美股大盤有望突破4800點(diǎn),而且多頭們認(rèn)為,屆時(shí)美股大盤仍將保持一個(gè)適度的市盈率(21倍)。如果情況真是這樣,我們還有什么好擔(dān)心的呢?
數(shù)學(xué)計(jì)算不支持“大牛市”
可問題是,目前的市場數(shù)據(jù)表明,即便20倍左右的大盤市盈率也還是太高了,而且市場收益很有可能從此大幅下降,而不是像多頭們預(yù)計(jì)的那樣大漲15%,達(dá)到230美元。
首先來看利潤。企業(yè)的收益是高度周期性和不穩(wěn)定的,它有時(shí)會(huì)突然高得離譜,有時(shí)又會(huì)下跌到極低的水平,但是過后又一定會(huì)反彈。目前,標(biāo)普500指數(shù)的每股收益就在經(jīng)歷第一種現(xiàn)象。諾貝爾獎(jiǎng)得主、耶魯大學(xué)教授羅伯特·席勒提到了一個(gè)名叫“周期性調(diào)整市盈率”(CAPE)的指標(biāo),該指標(biāo)剔除了過高和過低兩種極端情況,使數(shù)值變得平滑了,從而得到一個(gè)基礎(chǔ)的、具有重復(fù)性的利潤數(shù)據(jù)。它計(jì)算的是經(jīng)通脹調(diào)整后的每股收益的10年期平均值,然后再用這些數(shù)值評價(jià)股市究竟是被高估還是低估了。
按照席勒的計(jì)算方法,當(dāng)前CAPE的每股收益為145美元。據(jù)稱美國最大的量化對沖基金公司之一AQR為了得到最好的實(shí)時(shí)預(yù)測效果,還將CAPE提高了10%。這是因?yàn)镃APE考慮通脹因素而只提高了過去的利潤,而未考慮與經(jīng)濟(jì)增長相關(guān)的“實(shí)際”收益,所以AQR有意將CAPE估高了10%。在此基礎(chǔ)上,CAPE的每股收益將達(dá)到160美元左右(也就是席勒的149美元基礎(chǔ)上提高10%)。
因此,席勒的公式表明,隨著市場走向均值回歸,大盤的每股收益很可能不會(huì)繼續(xù)上漲,而是會(huì)滑向160美元的均值方向。現(xiàn)在,我們需要一個(gè)規(guī)范的市盈率對標(biāo)普500指數(shù)進(jìn)行合理化估值,這就是我們?yōu)槭裁幢仨毧紤]市場10年來的顯著增長。因?yàn)樵谟?jì)算投資者的股市回報(bào)時(shí),重要的不是“名義”收益率,而是“實(shí)際”收益率。企業(yè)會(huì)通過提高價(jià)格來彌補(bǔ)成本,因此他們的收益也應(yīng)該會(huì)隨著相對溫和的通脹同步增長。但不利的是,投資者可以通過購買債券而非股票來獲得顯著高于CPI的溢價(jià)。而當(dāng)實(shí)際利率上漲時(shí),固定收入對于投資者會(huì)變得更具吸引力,而股票就會(huì)失去誘惑力。
這正是今天美股面臨的情況——大盤的10年期收益率與10年期通脹保值債券的收益率幾乎持平。近期長期債券利率的飆升使通脹保值債券的利率已漲至2.37%,這也是近20年來的最高水平(這里不算全球金融危機(jī)期間通脹保值債券利率的暫時(shí)性大幅飆升)。通貨膨脹保值債券為個(gè)人和基金提供了比預(yù)期通脹率高2.37%的回報(bào)率,是一種完全安全的債券。這對于股票來說是很有競爭力的,因?yàn)楣善焙翢o安全性可言,有的只有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和更高的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
當(dāng)然,本著“風(fēng)浪越大魚越貴”的原則,投資者之所以選擇股票而不是債券,本身就是為了追逐與高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)相匹配的高收益。通常情況下,股票與債券的利差平均可以達(dá)到3.5個(gè)點(diǎn)左右,這個(gè)利差又稱證券風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)。因此,投資者對股市未來的最佳預(yù)期應(yīng)該是在5.9%左右,即2.37%的實(shí)際利益加上3.5%的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià),然后再加上通脹因素。
要想獲得5.9%的實(shí)際回報(bào),你的一籃子股票必須保證你每投進(jìn)去100美元,就能帶來5.9美元的回報(bào)。這就要求股市的市盈率在17倍左右。順便說一句,這正是過去150年間標(biāo)普指數(shù)的平均水平。只是在過去20年里,由于美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)采取了超低利率政策,因而導(dǎo)致了市盈率要比這個(gè)數(shù)值高得多。
如果將160美元的“規(guī)范”收益預(yù)期乘以17倍的市盈率,那么標(biāo)普指數(shù)將達(dá)到2720點(diǎn),比9月26日的水平低43%。
可以肯定的是,美股近期不太可能出現(xiàn)40%的跌幅,但是一定程度的大幅下跌還是有可能的,因?yàn)檫@正是實(shí)打?qū)嵉臄?shù)學(xué)計(jì)算告訴我們的結(jié)果。我們有理由相信,如果美國的經(jīng)濟(jì)依然保持后金融危機(jī)時(shí)代的低速增長,但么實(shí)際收益率甚至可能從2.37%降至1%。但即使發(fā)生這種情況,標(biāo)普市盈率也會(huì)徘徊在22倍左右,那它的合理區(qū)間應(yīng)該是3500點(diǎn),仍比9月26日的水平低18%。
簡而言之,近年來美國實(shí)行的超低利率甚至是負(fù)實(shí)際利率政策,導(dǎo)致了美股出現(xiàn)了超高的市盈率。華爾街的多頭們錯(cuò)誤地認(rèn)為這種高市盈率會(huì)繼續(xù)保持下去。然而與此同時(shí),美股的利潤率已經(jīng)達(dá)到了幾乎前所未見的高度,但也同樣到了強(qiáng)弩之末。實(shí)際收益率的泡沫是很容易被刺破的。比起多頭們吹出來的“大牛市”,我們最好還是相信數(shù)學(xué)才比較靠譜。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:樸成奎
整個(gè)9月份,美股市場的表現(xiàn)都極其慘淡,標(biāo)普500指數(shù)已由月初的4516點(diǎn)跌至9月26日午盤的4275點(diǎn),在短短18個(gè)交易日內(nèi)下跌了5.3%。
美股突然大跌的直接原因就是長期利率的突然飆升,特別是本月10年期美國國債的收益率飆升了近50個(gè)基點(diǎn),達(dá)到4.55%。不過到目前為止,不管是利率大漲,還是股市大跌,都沒有讓華爾街的多頭下調(diào)對2023年的預(yù)測,高盛預(yù)計(jì)標(biāo)普500指數(shù)年底將漲至4500點(diǎn),花旗集團(tuán)的預(yù)測則達(dá)到了4600點(diǎn)。
如果你相信分析師們對接下來幾個(gè)季度的預(yù)測,那么標(biāo)普500指數(shù)很有可能不久后重回今年8月份的高位,并且在明年繼續(xù)保持上漲。平均來看,市場分析師們預(yù)計(jì),美股的12個(gè)月GAAP利潤將從今年一季度的每股200美元漲至明年二季度的230美元。如果這種情況真的發(fā)生了,那么到明年夏天,美股大盤有望突破4800點(diǎn),而且多頭們認(rèn)為,屆時(shí)美股大盤仍將保持一個(gè)適度的市盈率(21倍)。如果情況真是這樣,我們還有什么好擔(dān)心的呢?
數(shù)學(xué)計(jì)算不支持“大牛市”
可問題是,目前的市場數(shù)據(jù)表明,即便20倍左右的大盤市盈率也還是太高了,而且市場收益很有可能從此大幅下降,而不是像多頭們預(yù)計(jì)的那樣大漲15%,達(dá)到230美元。
首先來看利潤。企業(yè)的收益是高度周期性和不穩(wěn)定的,它有時(shí)會(huì)突然高得離譜,有時(shí)又會(huì)下跌到極低的水平,但是過后又一定會(huì)反彈。目前,標(biāo)普500指數(shù)的每股收益就在經(jīng)歷第一種現(xiàn)象。諾貝爾獎(jiǎng)得主、耶魯大學(xué)教授羅伯特·席勒提到了一個(gè)名叫“周期性調(diào)整市盈率”(CAPE)的指標(biāo),該指標(biāo)剔除了過高和過低兩種極端情況,使數(shù)值變得平滑了,從而得到一個(gè)基礎(chǔ)的、具有重復(fù)性的利潤數(shù)據(jù)。它計(jì)算的是經(jīng)通脹調(diào)整后的每股收益的10年期平均值,然后再用這些數(shù)值評價(jià)股市究竟是被高估還是低估了。
按照席勒的計(jì)算方法,當(dāng)前CAPE的每股收益為145美元。據(jù)稱美國最大的量化對沖基金公司之一AQR為了得到最好的實(shí)時(shí)預(yù)測效果,還將CAPE提高了10%。這是因?yàn)镃APE考慮通脹因素而只提高了過去的利潤,而未考慮與經(jīng)濟(jì)增長相關(guān)的“實(shí)際”收益,所以AQR有意將CAPE估高了10%。在此基礎(chǔ)上,CAPE的每股收益將達(dá)到160美元左右(也就是席勒的149美元基礎(chǔ)上提高10%)。
因此,席勒的公式表明,隨著市場走向均值回歸,大盤的每股收益很可能不會(huì)繼續(xù)上漲,而是會(huì)滑向160美元的均值方向?,F(xiàn)在,我們需要一個(gè)規(guī)范的市盈率對標(biāo)普500指數(shù)進(jìn)行合理化估值,這就是我們?yōu)槭裁幢仨毧紤]市場10年來的顯著增長。因?yàn)樵谟?jì)算投資者的股市回報(bào)時(shí),重要的不是“名義”收益率,而是“實(shí)際”收益率。企業(yè)會(huì)通過提高價(jià)格來彌補(bǔ)成本,因此他們的收益也應(yīng)該會(huì)隨著相對溫和的通脹同步增長。但不利的是,投資者可以通過購買債券而非股票來獲得顯著高于CPI的溢價(jià)。而當(dāng)實(shí)際利率上漲時(shí),固定收入對于投資者會(huì)變得更具吸引力,而股票就會(huì)失去誘惑力。
這正是今天美股面臨的情況——大盤的10年期收益率與10年期通脹保值債券的收益率幾乎持平。近期長期債券利率的飆升使通脹保值債券的利率已漲至2.37%,這也是近20年來的最高水平(這里不算全球金融危機(jī)期間通脹保值債券利率的暫時(shí)性大幅飆升)。通貨膨脹保值債券為個(gè)人和基金提供了比預(yù)期通脹率高2.37%的回報(bào)率,是一種完全安全的債券。這對于股票來說是很有競爭力的,因?yàn)楣善焙翢o安全性可言,有的只有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和更高的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
當(dāng)然,本著“風(fēng)浪越大魚越貴”的原則,投資者之所以選擇股票而不是債券,本身就是為了追逐與高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)相匹配的高收益。通常情況下,股票與債券的利差平均可以達(dá)到3.5個(gè)點(diǎn)左右,這個(gè)利差又稱證券風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)。因此,投資者對股市未來的最佳預(yù)期應(yīng)該是在5.9%左右,即2.37%的實(shí)際利益加上3.5%的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià),然后再加上通脹因素。
要想獲得5.9%的實(shí)際回報(bào),你的一籃子股票必須保證你每投進(jìn)去100美元,就能帶來5.9美元的回報(bào)。這就要求股市的市盈率在17倍左右。順便說一句,這正是過去150年間標(biāo)普指數(shù)的平均水平。只是在過去20年里,由于美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)采取了超低利率政策,因而導(dǎo)致了市盈率要比這個(gè)數(shù)值高得多。
如果將160美元的“規(guī)范”收益預(yù)期乘以17倍的市盈率,那么標(biāo)普指數(shù)將達(dá)到2720點(diǎn),比9月26日的水平低43%。
可以肯定的是,美股近期不太可能出現(xiàn)40%的跌幅,但是一定程度的大幅下跌還是有可能的,因?yàn)檫@正是實(shí)打?qū)嵉臄?shù)學(xué)計(jì)算告訴我們的結(jié)果。我們有理由相信,如果美國的經(jīng)濟(jì)依然保持后金融危機(jī)時(shí)代的低速增長,但么實(shí)際收益率甚至可能從2.37%降至1%。但即使發(fā)生這種情況,標(biāo)普市盈率也會(huì)徘徊在22倍左右,那它的合理區(qū)間應(yīng)該是3500點(diǎn),仍比9月26日的水平低18%。
簡而言之,近年來美國實(shí)行的超低利率甚至是負(fù)實(shí)際利率政策,導(dǎo)致了美股出現(xiàn)了超高的市盈率。華爾街的多頭們錯(cuò)誤地認(rèn)為這種高市盈率會(huì)繼續(xù)保持下去。然而與此同時(shí),美股的利潤率已經(jīng)達(dá)到了幾乎前所未見的高度,但也同樣到了強(qiáng)弩之末。實(shí)際收益率的泡沫是很容易被刺破的。比起多頭們吹出來的“大牛市”,我們最好還是相信數(shù)學(xué)才比較靠譜。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:樸成奎
Stocks have suffered a rough September, with the S&P 500 dropping from 4,516 at the month’s start to 4,275 by midday on September 26, a drop of 5.3% in just 18 trading days.
Of course, the apparent cause is the sharp, sudden spike in long-term interest rates, epitomized by the month-to-date leap in the 10-year Treasury yield by almost 50 basis points to 4.55%. So far, neither the rise in rates nor the cratering in stocks has done much to stir the Wall Street bulls to lower their forecasts for 2023, with Goldman Sachs predicting a year-end number of 4,500, and Citigroup at 4,600.
In fact, if you believe the analysts’ earnings predictions for the next few quarters, an outcome where the index re-traces its August highs, then keeps chugging forward next year, appears plausible. On average, the market strategists forecast that trailing 12-month GAAP profits rise from $200 per share in the first quarter to $230 per share in the second quarter of next year. If that happens, America’s big caps could reach over 4,800 at what the bulls would consider a modest price-to-earnings ratio, or PE, of 21x by next summer. So why worry?
The bull case numbers don’t add up
The rub: The current market math suggests that a PE even in the low 20x range is too high, and earnings are more likely to drop substantially from here than wax by 15% in just four quarters to $230.
Let’s start with profits. Corporate earnings are highly cyclical and erratic. They regularly spike to unattainable heights or drop to levels from which they’re bound to rebound. Right now, S&P earnings per share are experiencing the former phenomenon. Nobel Prize laureate and Yale professor Robert Shiller offers a metric called the Cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio, or CAPE, that removes those steep peaks and deep valleys, and smoothes the numbers to get a figure for bedrock, repeatable profits. It calculates a 10-year average of inflation-adjusted EPS, then uses those recast earnings to judge if stocks are over or undervalued.
Right now, the CAPE EPS stands at $145. AQR, one of America’s great quant firms, is said to mark the CAPE up by 10% to get what they consider the best real-time estimate. That’s because the CAPE only increases past profits for inflation, not for “real” gains usually tied to economic growth. The 10% mark-up provides that lift. Add the premium, and the best measure of where earnings should settle is around $160 (Shiller’s $149 plus 10%).
Hence, the Shiller formula implies that by reverting to the mean, EPS will trend not upwards from here, but southwards toward $160. Now, we need a normalized PE multiple to attain a reasonable valuation for the S&P. Here’s where the stunning rise in the 10-year is so decisive. What matters in calculating how many dollars investors will pay for each sawbuck in earnings isn’t the “nominal” but the “real” yield. Companies raise prices to cover their costs, so their revenues should increase in tandem with relatively modest inflation. What’s punishing is a wide premium over and above the CPI that investors can get from purchasing bonds instead of stocks. When real rates are elevated, fixed income gets a lot more attractive, and equities lose their luster.
That’s precisely the threat today. The real 10-year rate equals the yield on 10-year TIPS, or treasury inflation protected securities. The recent jump in the long bond has driven the TIPS rate to 2.37%, the highest number in 20 years, excluding a brief explosion in the GFC. TIPS offers folks and funds a return of 2.37% points over projected inflation, on totally safe bonds. That’s a lot of competition from stocks, which are anything but safe, and seldom riskier than right now.
Of course, investors demand a premium over the risk-free real rate to choose equities, given their careening course, over the safety of Treasuries. Typically, that spread––known as the equity risk premium, or ERP––averages around 3.5 points. So the best estimate of the return investors expect from stocks going forward is 5.9%, which is the 3.5% ERP plus the real yield of 2.37%, plus inflation.
To get a 5.9% real return, a basket of stocks must pay you $5.90 for every $100 you invest. That’s a PE of roughly 17, which by the way, is around the S&P average over the past 150 years, though it’s been much higher in the last two decades of Fed-engineered, super-low rates.
A multiple of 17 times our “normalized” earnings estimate of $160 gives an S&P of 2,720. That’s 43% lower than the level on September 26.
To be sure, a 40% drop may not be in our future. But a big decline is certainly feasible, because that’s what the hard math implies. It’s reasonable to believe that the real rate could fall to 1% from 2.37% if economic growth remains at the subdued, post-Great Financial Crisis levels. But even if that happens, the PE would hover at 22, and a reasonable S&P reading would be 3,500, 18% below the mark on September 26.
Put simply, the super-low and even negative real rates in recent years led to super-high PE multiples that the bulls wrongly assumed would endure. At the same time, profit margins hit virtually never-before-seen heights that also couldn’t last. The liftoff in real rates is what could easily pop the balloon. You may want to put a lot more faith in the math than in the bull scenario that’s likely to prove bull.