如果問(wèn)霍華德·馬克斯是怎么賺到22億美元財(cái)富的,他可能會(huì)說(shuō)起在花旗公司(Citicorp,花旗集團(tuán)(Citigroup)的子公司)擔(dān)任分析師的數(shù)十年,20世紀(jì)80年代和90年代初領(lǐng)導(dǎo)TCW集團(tuán)(TCW Group)的高收益?zhèn)涂赊D(zhuǎn)換證券辦公室,也可能提到收益豐厚的豪宅投資。不過(guò)顯然,馬克斯的大部分收入來(lái)自其1995年創(chuàng)立橡樹(shù)資本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management)以后。其實(shí),他表示自己之所以成為華爾街傳奇,主要靠五次預(yù)言。
7月10日,這位七旬投資者在題為“把脈溫度”(Taking the Temperature)的備忘錄中詳細(xì)介紹了2000年至2020年間的五次市場(chǎng)預(yù)測(cè)。馬克斯大多采取反向操作,最終賺得數(shù)十億美元,不過(guò)從中汲取的經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)可能價(jià)值更大。
在馬克斯看來(lái),偉大的投資者能夠利用對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)史、金融市場(chǎng)內(nèi)部運(yùn)作和心理學(xué)的了解,掌控當(dāng)前投資者群體情緒或溫度。當(dāng)情緒變得過(guò)于樂(lè)觀(guān)時(shí),就應(yīng)該采取安全策略。如果情緒過(guò)分看空,就可以找找劃算的交易。這正是踐行沃倫·巴菲特名言的反向操作,“別人貪婪我恐懼,別人恐懼我貪婪。”
以下是五個(gè)詳細(xì)介紹的案例,其中包括全球金融危機(jī)和網(wǎng)絡(luò)泡沫破滅前他有先見(jiàn)之明的警告,馬克斯指出,“市場(chǎng)要么瘋狂上漲,要么嚴(yán)重蕭條”,所以“他建議采取更保守或更激進(jìn)的策略才有很大機(jī)會(huì)成功”,并且從中大賺一筆。他寫(xiě)道,回顧五次重大決定后也學(xué)到了一些經(jīng)驗(yàn),《財(cái)富》雜志選出了最重要的三點(diǎn)。
1 – 2000年,網(wǎng)絡(luò)泡沫
1999年,隨著網(wǎng)絡(luò)泡沫日益膨脹,傳奇財(cái)經(jīng)記者愛(ài)德華·錢(qián)塞勒出版了幫助他聲名鵲起的書(shū):《金融投機(jī)史》(Devil Take the Hindmost),詳細(xì)介紹了從古羅馬到19世紀(jì)鐵路狂熱的投機(jī)歷史。當(dāng)年馬克斯在讀到錢(qián)塞勒的書(shū)時(shí)寫(xiě)道,對(duì)之前投機(jī)泡沫和彼時(shí)科技股迅速崛起的“相似之處深感震驚”。
發(fā)現(xiàn)市場(chǎng)扭曲后,2000年1月也就是泡沫破裂兩個(gè)月前,馬克斯給客戶(hù)寫(xiě)了題目叫bubble.com的備忘錄,警告稱(chēng)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)相關(guān)股票被高估,投資者已經(jīng)陷入投機(jī)狂熱。
“輕松獲利的誘惑,為了賺快錢(qián)不惜辭去正常工作,再加上商業(yè)模式無(wú)法解釋的虧損公司還能輕松吸引資金——所有一切都讓人聯(lián)想到金融史上一再重復(fù)的主題,最終都是泡沫以及痛苦的破滅。隨著1999年臨近結(jié)束,投資者行為中泡沫的特征處處可見(jiàn)。”他寫(xiě)道。
馬克斯發(fā)出警告后,2000年3月至2002年10月期間,標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)(S&P 500)下跌了46%,以科技股為主的納斯達(dá)克綜合指數(shù)(NASDAQ Composite)跌去了約80%。
2 – 2007年2月,全球金融危機(jī)
2004年10月至2007年7月期間,馬克斯多次警告稱(chēng)“緩慢發(fā)展的火車(chē)事故”已經(jīng)不遠(yuǎn)。他指出,互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫破裂后美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Federal Reserve)轉(zhuǎn)向?qū)捤韶泿耪?,?dǎo)致儲(chǔ)蓄賬戶(hù)和典型的避險(xiǎn)資產(chǎn)回報(bào)率低,投資者只得選擇風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更高的投資。到最后,消費(fèi)者開(kāi)始相信“房?jī)r(jià)只會(huì)上漲”,這正是過(guò)去投機(jī)泡沫的重演。
2007年7月,馬克斯發(fā)表了一份諷刺口吻的備忘錄,標(biāo)題為《一切都很好》(It’s All Good)。他在備忘錄里警告稱(chēng)投資者過(guò)于樂(lè)觀(guān),忽視了風(fēng)險(xiǎn),意味著經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退可能即將到來(lái)。五個(gè)月后,全球金融危機(jī)(Global Financial Crisis)爆發(fā),貝爾斯登(Bear Stearns)和雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)倒閉,標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)從2007年高點(diǎn)下跌53%,2009年6月跌至底部。
馬克斯解釋說(shuō),對(duì)最終引發(fā)全球金融危機(jī)的次級(jí)抵押貸款市場(chǎng)問(wèn)題并不了解,之所以得出“慎重結(jié)論”只是因?yàn)椤鞍衙}市場(chǎng)溫度”。用美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)前主席艾倫·格林斯潘的話(huà)來(lái)說(shuō),就是發(fā)現(xiàn)投資者何時(shí)出現(xiàn)非理性熱情。
3 – 2008年,全球金融危機(jī)時(shí)買(mǎi)入
身為反向操作者,在次貸危機(jī)重創(chuàng)美國(guó)房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)并引發(fā)全球金融危機(jī)后,馬克斯認(rèn)為買(mǎi)入的時(shí)機(jī)已到。他介紹了2007年1月至2008年3月期間橡樹(shù)資本如何為買(mǎi)入不良債務(wù)籌集110億美元“儲(chǔ)備基金”,并于2008年9月開(kāi)始出手。
“我認(rèn)為要二元看待前景:世界會(huì)結(jié)束還是不會(huì)結(jié)束?”2008年市場(chǎng)悲觀(guān)情緒達(dá)到頂峰時(shí),馬克斯在一份備忘錄中寫(xiě)道?!拔覀円谑澜鐣?huì)繼續(xù)前進(jìn)的假設(shè)下投資,公司會(huì)賺錢(qián),各種資產(chǎn)都有價(jià)值,從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看,低價(jià)買(mǎi)入資產(chǎn)會(huì)獲得回報(bào)。還有什么選擇?”
當(dāng)然,他確實(shí)買(mǎi)入了大量不良資產(chǎn),賺得數(shù)十億美元。自全球金融危機(jī)低點(diǎn)以來(lái),標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)已經(jīng)飆升約500%。
4 – 2012年,無(wú)視夸大股票死亡的說(shuō)法
2012年,很多投資者仍在從全球金融危機(jī)中艱難復(fù)蘇。當(dāng)時(shí)馬克斯指出,金融危機(jī)對(duì)很多人心理造成了“沉重負(fù)擔(dān)”。過(guò)度空頭情緒讓他想起了1979年《商業(yè)周刊》(Businessweek)的一篇文章,題為《股票之死》(The Death of Equities)。他說(shuō),該篇文章在多年持續(xù)通脹和股市回報(bào)糟糕之后發(fā)表,并根據(jù)當(dāng)時(shí)環(huán)境做出前景悲觀(guān)的預(yù)測(cè)。然而1979年絕對(duì)不是股票末日。舉個(gè)例子,自1979年年底以來(lái),標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)已經(jīng)飆升近4,000%。
2012年,馬克斯發(fā)現(xiàn)投資者心理與20世紀(jì)70年代末非常相似,都對(duì)市場(chǎng)預(yù)測(cè)過(guò)于悲觀(guān),因此他寫(xiě)了一篇題為《往日重現(xiàn)》(Déjà Vu All Over Again)的文章,詳細(xì)闡述了股市出現(xiàn)“積極景象”比再次低迷可能性更大的觀(guān)點(diǎn)。
“從2012年也就是往日重現(xiàn)之年到2021年,標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)的年回報(bào)率達(dá)到16.5%,”他指出。“過(guò)度負(fù)面情緒再一次帶來(lái)高額收益。就這么簡(jiǎn)單。”
5 – 2020年,新冠疫情時(shí)買(mǎi)入
2020年年初,新冠病毒開(kāi)始在全球傳播時(shí),馬克斯和其他人一樣并不確定未來(lái)會(huì)怎樣。但當(dāng)股市暴跌,恐慌在華爾街蔓延時(shí),這位億萬(wàn)富翁感覺(jué)反向操作的時(shí)機(jī)又到了。他的樂(lè)觀(guān)觀(guān)點(diǎn)獲得了證實(shí),此前他團(tuán)隊(duì)的交易員賈斯汀·夸利亞表示,經(jīng)濟(jì)封鎖中不少需要現(xiàn)金維持經(jīng)營(yíng)的公司被迫出售債券。“橡皮筋終于能夠拉起來(lái)了?!辟Z斯汀表示。在馬克斯看來(lái),這是明確的反向買(mǎi)入信號(hào),也就是說(shuō)最糟糕的情況可能已經(jīng)過(guò)去。
“造成混亂的事件從來(lái)不會(huì)讓我們高興,尤其是當(dāng)前發(fā)生的事情?!苯衲?月底,他在一份備忘錄中寫(xiě)道?!暗琴Z斯汀上面提到的情緒推動(dòng)了情緒化拋售,我們才能享受最劃算的投資?!瘪R克斯又一次選擇正確,因?yàn)樽?020年3月新冠疫情低點(diǎn)以來(lái),標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)已經(jīng)上漲超過(guò)90%。
三個(gè)主要經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)
根據(jù)數(shù)十年的市場(chǎng)經(jīng)驗(yàn),馬克斯在備忘錄的最后總結(jié)了一些對(duì)投資者最重要的經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)。
這位億萬(wàn)富翁表示,首先也是最重要的一點(diǎn)便是投資者要認(rèn)真學(xué)習(xí)歷史,這樣才能“識(shí)別模式”,通過(guò)“把脈市場(chǎng)溫度”充分利用經(jīng)??深A(yù)測(cè)的商業(yè)周期。
“諷刺的是,從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看,投資者心理以及市場(chǎng)周期看似反復(fù)無(wú)常不可預(yù)測(cè),然而總是以相當(dāng)可靠的方式波動(dòng)?!彼麑?xiě)道。
馬克斯表示,學(xué)習(xí)經(jīng)濟(jì)和市場(chǎng)史后,投資者就能夠理解另一個(gè)重要的教訓(xùn),即所有商業(yè)周期都源于“過(guò)度和修正”。他認(rèn)為,市場(chǎng)主要由投資者情緒驅(qū)動(dòng),而不是機(jī)械的過(guò)程,這意味著有時(shí)人們會(huì)過(guò)于樂(lè)觀(guān),甚至想“證明‘沒(méi)有所謂價(jià)格太高’這一危險(xiǎn)說(shuō)法正確”。但在過(guò)度樂(lè)觀(guān)之后,投資者心理轉(zhuǎn)向恐懼,通常會(huì)出現(xiàn)調(diào)整。
“向某個(gè)方向大幅運(yùn)動(dòng)之后,遲早會(huì)出現(xiàn)反方向修正,并不會(huì)‘一直保持’?!彼忉尩?。
其次,在市場(chǎng)過(guò)熱或看跌修正時(shí)期,馬克斯認(rèn)為投資者要控制自己的情緒,避免受到同輩壓力影響。他指出,此類(lèi)時(shí)期往往會(huì)出現(xiàn)不合邏輯的敘事,比如“沒(méi)有所謂價(jià)格太高”或“股票跌到?jīng)]有人想買(mǎi)”。
“記住,在極端時(shí)期……賺錢(qián)的秘訣在于逆向主義,而不是從眾?!彼麑?xiě)道。“如果遇到?jīng)]有道理卻又被廣泛接受的觀(guān)點(diǎn),或者發(fā)現(xiàn)太理想到不真實(shí)(或太悲觀(guān)到不真實(shí))的觀(guān)點(diǎn)時(shí),可以適當(dāng)采取行動(dòng)。”
最后也許有點(diǎn)諷刺的是,馬克斯在長(zhǎng)篇備忘錄中一再?gòu)?qiáng)調(diào),哪怕對(duì)最優(yōu)秀的投資經(jīng)理來(lái)說(shuō),預(yù)測(cè)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的未來(lái)也是幾乎不可能完成的任務(wù),應(yīng)該極少?lài)L試。
“底線(xiàn)是,我們?cè)谙饦?shù)資本對(duì)待相關(guān)預(yù)測(cè)非常謙遜,只有在別無(wú)選擇的情況下才會(huì)偏離中立假設(shè)和正常行為。‘50年內(nèi)五次’能夠讓讀者了解本公司對(duì)把握市場(chǎng)的興趣。事實(shí)上,我們的行動(dòng)也很猶豫?!彼麑?xiě)道。
對(duì)體育迷來(lái)說(shuō),沃倫·巴菲特有個(gè)比喻能夠完美描述馬克斯的觀(guān)點(diǎn)。2017年HBO紀(jì)錄片《成為沃倫·巴菲特》(Becoming Warren Buffett)中,巴菲特曾經(jīng)表示投資就像在棒球比賽中當(dāng)擊球手,而且從不浪費(fèi)好球。“投資的訣竅就是坐在那,看著一球又一球投過(guò),等待最佳擊打位置的球。如果旁邊人們一直大喊:‘快擊球啊,懶鬼!’根本不必理會(huì)?!保ㄘ?cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:夏林
如果問(wèn)霍華德·馬克斯是怎么賺到22億美元財(cái)富的,他可能會(huì)說(shuō)起在花旗公司(Citicorp,花旗集團(tuán)(Citigroup)的子公司)擔(dān)任分析師的數(shù)十年,20世紀(jì)80年代和90年代初領(lǐng)導(dǎo)TCW集團(tuán)(TCW Group)的高收益?zhèn)涂赊D(zhuǎn)換證券辦公室,也可能提到收益豐厚的豪宅投資。不過(guò)顯然,馬克斯的大部分收入來(lái)自其1995年創(chuàng)立橡樹(shù)資本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management)以后。其實(shí),他表示自己之所以成為華爾街傳奇,主要靠五次預(yù)言。
7月10日,這位七旬投資者在題為“把脈溫度”(Taking the Temperature)的備忘錄中詳細(xì)介紹了2000年至2020年間的五次市場(chǎng)預(yù)測(cè)。馬克斯大多采取反向操作,最終賺得數(shù)十億美元,不過(guò)從中汲取的經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)可能價(jià)值更大。
在馬克斯看來(lái),偉大的投資者能夠利用對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)史、金融市場(chǎng)內(nèi)部運(yùn)作和心理學(xué)的了解,掌控當(dāng)前投資者群體情緒或溫度。當(dāng)情緒變得過(guò)于樂(lè)觀(guān)時(shí),就應(yīng)該采取安全策略。如果情緒過(guò)分看空,就可以找找劃算的交易。這正是踐行沃倫·巴菲特名言的反向操作,“別人貪婪我恐懼,別人恐懼我貪婪?!?/p>
以下是五個(gè)詳細(xì)介紹的案例,其中包括全球金融危機(jī)和網(wǎng)絡(luò)泡沫破滅前他有先見(jiàn)之明的警告,馬克斯指出,“市場(chǎng)要么瘋狂上漲,要么嚴(yán)重蕭條”,所以“他建議采取更保守或更激進(jìn)的策略才有很大機(jī)會(huì)成功”,并且從中大賺一筆。他寫(xiě)道,回顧五次重大決定后也學(xué)到了一些經(jīng)驗(yàn),《財(cái)富》雜志選出了最重要的三點(diǎn)。
1 – 2000年,網(wǎng)絡(luò)泡沫
1999年,隨著網(wǎng)絡(luò)泡沫日益膨脹,傳奇財(cái)經(jīng)記者愛(ài)德華·錢(qián)塞勒出版了幫助他聲名鵲起的書(shū):《金融投機(jī)史》(Devil Take the Hindmost),詳細(xì)介紹了從古羅馬到19世紀(jì)鐵路狂熱的投機(jī)歷史。當(dāng)年馬克斯在讀到錢(qián)塞勒的書(shū)時(shí)寫(xiě)道,對(duì)之前投機(jī)泡沫和彼時(shí)科技股迅速崛起的“相似之處深感震驚”。
發(fā)現(xiàn)市場(chǎng)扭曲后,2000年1月也就是泡沫破裂兩個(gè)月前,馬克斯給客戶(hù)寫(xiě)了題目叫bubble.com的備忘錄,警告稱(chēng)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)相關(guān)股票被高估,投資者已經(jīng)陷入投機(jī)狂熱。
“輕松獲利的誘惑,為了賺快錢(qián)不惜辭去正常工作,再加上商業(yè)模式無(wú)法解釋的虧損公司還能輕松吸引資金——所有一切都讓人聯(lián)想到金融史上一再重復(fù)的主題,最終都是泡沫以及痛苦的破滅。隨著1999年臨近結(jié)束,投資者行為中泡沫的特征處處可見(jiàn)?!彼麑?xiě)道。
馬克斯發(fā)出警告后,2000年3月至2002年10月期間,標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)(S&P 500)下跌了46%,以科技股為主的納斯達(dá)克綜合指數(shù)(NASDAQ Composite)跌去了約80%。
2 – 2007年2月,全球金融危機(jī)
2004年10月至2007年7月期間,馬克斯多次警告稱(chēng)“緩慢發(fā)展的火車(chē)事故”已經(jīng)不遠(yuǎn)。他指出,互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫破裂后美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Federal Reserve)轉(zhuǎn)向?qū)捤韶泿耪?,?dǎo)致儲(chǔ)蓄賬戶(hù)和典型的避險(xiǎn)資產(chǎn)回報(bào)率低,投資者只得選擇風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更高的投資。到最后,消費(fèi)者開(kāi)始相信“房?jī)r(jià)只會(huì)上漲”,這正是過(guò)去投機(jī)泡沫的重演。
2007年7月,馬克斯發(fā)表了一份諷刺口吻的備忘錄,標(biāo)題為《一切都很好》(It’s All Good)。他在備忘錄里警告稱(chēng)投資者過(guò)于樂(lè)觀(guān),忽視了風(fēng)險(xiǎn),意味著經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退可能即將到來(lái)。五個(gè)月后,全球金融危機(jī)(Global Financial Crisis)爆發(fā),貝爾斯登(Bear Stearns)和雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)倒閉,標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)從2007年高點(diǎn)下跌53%,2009年6月跌至底部。
馬克斯解釋說(shuō),對(duì)最終引發(fā)全球金融危機(jī)的次級(jí)抵押貸款市場(chǎng)問(wèn)題并不了解,之所以得出“慎重結(jié)論”只是因?yàn)椤鞍衙}市場(chǎng)溫度”。用美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)前主席艾倫·格林斯潘的話(huà)來(lái)說(shuō),就是發(fā)現(xiàn)投資者何時(shí)出現(xiàn)非理性熱情。
3 – 2008年,全球金融危機(jī)時(shí)買(mǎi)入
身為反向操作者,在次貸危機(jī)重創(chuàng)美國(guó)房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)并引發(fā)全球金融危機(jī)后,馬克斯認(rèn)為買(mǎi)入的時(shí)機(jī)已到。他介紹了2007年1月至2008年3月期間橡樹(shù)資本如何為買(mǎi)入不良債務(wù)籌集110億美元“儲(chǔ)備基金”,并于2008年9月開(kāi)始出手。
“我認(rèn)為要二元看待前景:世界會(huì)結(jié)束還是不會(huì)結(jié)束?”2008年市場(chǎng)悲觀(guān)情緒達(dá)到頂峰時(shí),馬克斯在一份備忘錄中寫(xiě)道?!拔覀円谑澜鐣?huì)繼續(xù)前進(jìn)的假設(shè)下投資,公司會(huì)賺錢(qián),各種資產(chǎn)都有價(jià)值,從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看,低價(jià)買(mǎi)入資產(chǎn)會(huì)獲得回報(bào)。還有什么選擇?”
當(dāng)然,他確實(shí)買(mǎi)入了大量不良資產(chǎn),賺得數(shù)十億美元。自全球金融危機(jī)低點(diǎn)以來(lái),標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)已經(jīng)飆升約500%。
4 – 2012年,無(wú)視夸大股票死亡的說(shuō)法
2012年,很多投資者仍在從全球金融危機(jī)中艱難復(fù)蘇。當(dāng)時(shí)馬克斯指出,金融危機(jī)對(duì)很多人心理造成了“沉重負(fù)擔(dān)”。過(guò)度空頭情緒讓他想起了1979年《商業(yè)周刊》(Businessweek)的一篇文章,題為《股票之死》(The Death of Equities)。他說(shuō),該篇文章在多年持續(xù)通脹和股市回報(bào)糟糕之后發(fā)表,并根據(jù)當(dāng)時(shí)環(huán)境做出前景悲觀(guān)的預(yù)測(cè)。然而1979年絕對(duì)不是股票末日。舉個(gè)例子,自1979年年底以來(lái),標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)已經(jīng)飆升近4,000%。
2012年,馬克斯發(fā)現(xiàn)投資者心理與20世紀(jì)70年代末非常相似,都對(duì)市場(chǎng)預(yù)測(cè)過(guò)于悲觀(guān),因此他寫(xiě)了一篇題為《往日重現(xiàn)》(Déjà Vu All Over Again)的文章,詳細(xì)闡述了股市出現(xiàn)“積極景象”比再次低迷可能性更大的觀(guān)點(diǎn)。
“從2012年也就是往日重現(xiàn)之年到2021年,標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)的年回報(bào)率達(dá)到16.5%,”他指出?!斑^(guò)度負(fù)面情緒再一次帶來(lái)高額收益。就這么簡(jiǎn)單?!?/p>
5 – 2020年,新冠疫情時(shí)買(mǎi)入
2020年年初,新冠病毒開(kāi)始在全球傳播時(shí),馬克斯和其他人一樣并不確定未來(lái)會(huì)怎樣。但當(dāng)股市暴跌,恐慌在華爾街蔓延時(shí),這位億萬(wàn)富翁感覺(jué)反向操作的時(shí)機(jī)又到了。他的樂(lè)觀(guān)觀(guān)點(diǎn)獲得了證實(shí),此前他團(tuán)隊(duì)的交易員賈斯汀·夸利亞表示,經(jīng)濟(jì)封鎖中不少需要現(xiàn)金維持經(jīng)營(yíng)的公司被迫出售債券?!跋鹌そ罱K于能夠拉起來(lái)了?!辟Z斯汀表示。在馬克斯看來(lái),這是明確的反向買(mǎi)入信號(hào),也就是說(shuō)最糟糕的情況可能已經(jīng)過(guò)去。
“造成混亂的事件從來(lái)不會(huì)讓我們高興,尤其是當(dāng)前發(fā)生的事情。”今年3月底,他在一份備忘錄中寫(xiě)道?!暗琴Z斯汀上面提到的情緒推動(dòng)了情緒化拋售,我們才能享受最劃算的投資?!瘪R克斯又一次選擇正確,因?yàn)樽?020年3月新冠疫情低點(diǎn)以來(lái),標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)已經(jīng)上漲超過(guò)90%。
三個(gè)主要經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)
根據(jù)數(shù)十年的市場(chǎng)經(jīng)驗(yàn),馬克斯在備忘錄的最后總結(jié)了一些對(duì)投資者最重要的經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)。
這位億萬(wàn)富翁表示,首先也是最重要的一點(diǎn)便是投資者要認(rèn)真學(xué)習(xí)歷史,這樣才能“識(shí)別模式”,通過(guò)“把脈市場(chǎng)溫度”充分利用經(jīng)常可預(yù)測(cè)的商業(yè)周期。
“諷刺的是,從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看,投資者心理以及市場(chǎng)周期看似反復(fù)無(wú)常不可預(yù)測(cè),然而總是以相當(dāng)可靠的方式波動(dòng)?!彼麑?xiě)道。
馬克斯表示,學(xué)習(xí)經(jīng)濟(jì)和市場(chǎng)史后,投資者就能夠理解另一個(gè)重要的教訓(xùn),即所有商業(yè)周期都源于“過(guò)度和修正”。他認(rèn)為,市場(chǎng)主要由投資者情緒驅(qū)動(dòng),而不是機(jī)械的過(guò)程,這意味著有時(shí)人們會(huì)過(guò)于樂(lè)觀(guān),甚至想“證明‘沒(méi)有所謂價(jià)格太高’這一危險(xiǎn)說(shuō)法正確”。但在過(guò)度樂(lè)觀(guān)之后,投資者心理轉(zhuǎn)向恐懼,通常會(huì)出現(xiàn)調(diào)整。
“向某個(gè)方向大幅運(yùn)動(dòng)之后,遲早會(huì)出現(xiàn)反方向修正,并不會(huì)‘一直保持’。”他解釋道。
其次,在市場(chǎng)過(guò)熱或看跌修正時(shí)期,馬克斯認(rèn)為投資者要控制自己的情緒,避免受到同輩壓力影響。他指出,此類(lèi)時(shí)期往往會(huì)出現(xiàn)不合邏輯的敘事,比如“沒(méi)有所謂價(jià)格太高”或“股票跌到?jīng)]有人想買(mǎi)”。
“記住,在極端時(shí)期……賺錢(qián)的秘訣在于逆向主義,而不是從眾?!彼麑?xiě)道?!叭绻龅?jīng)]有道理卻又被廣泛接受的觀(guān)點(diǎn),或者發(fā)現(xiàn)太理想到不真實(shí)(或太悲觀(guān)到不真實(shí))的觀(guān)點(diǎn)時(shí),可以適當(dāng)采取行動(dòng)?!?/p>
最后也許有點(diǎn)諷刺的是,馬克斯在長(zhǎng)篇備忘錄中一再?gòu)?qiáng)調(diào),哪怕對(duì)最優(yōu)秀的投資經(jīng)理來(lái)說(shuō),預(yù)測(cè)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的未來(lái)也是幾乎不可能完成的任務(wù),應(yīng)該極少?lài)L試。
“底線(xiàn)是,我們?cè)谙饦?shù)資本對(duì)待相關(guān)預(yù)測(cè)非常謙遜,只有在別無(wú)選擇的情況下才會(huì)偏離中立假設(shè)和正常行為?!?0年內(nèi)五次’能夠讓讀者了解本公司對(duì)把握市場(chǎng)的興趣。事實(shí)上,我們的行動(dòng)也很猶豫?!彼麑?xiě)道。
對(duì)體育迷來(lái)說(shuō),沃倫·巴菲特有個(gè)比喻能夠完美描述馬克斯的觀(guān)點(diǎn)。2017年HBO紀(jì)錄片《成為沃倫·巴菲特》(Becoming Warren Buffett)中,巴菲特曾經(jīng)表示投資就像在棒球比賽中當(dāng)擊球手,而且從不浪費(fèi)好球?!巴顿Y的訣竅就是坐在那,看著一球又一球投過(guò),等待最佳擊打位置的球。如果旁邊人們一直大喊:‘快擊球啊,懶鬼!’根本不必理會(huì)。”(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:夏林
If you ask Howard Marks how he made his $2.2 billion fortune, he might describe decades of work as an analyst at Citicorp (a subsidiary of Citigroup), leading the high-yield debt and convertible securities office at TCW Group in the ‘80s and early ‘90s, or even his lucrative investments in luxury properties. But of course, the key calls Marks made after founding Oaktree Capital Management in 1995 have made the bulk of his earnings. In fact, he now says just five prophetic predictions built his reputation as a legend on the Street.
The septuagenarian detailed these five specific market calls between 2000 and 2020 in a new memo titled Taking the Temperature Monday. The mostly contrarian takes ended up netting Marks billions, but the lessons learned may be even more valuable.
For Marks, a great investor is able to use their knowledge of economic history, the inner workings of financial markets, and psychology to get an idea of the current mood or temperature among investors. When that mood becomes too bullish, it’s time to seek safety. But when it’s overly bearish, it’s time to look for bargains. It’s a contrarian riff on the famous Warren Buffett quote, “be fearful when others are greedy, and greedy when others are fearful.”
In the five instances detailed below, including his prescient warnings prior to the Global Financial Crisis and dotcom bust, Marks noted that “the markets were either crazily elevated or massively depressed,” which enabled him to “recommend becoming more defensive or more aggressive with a good chance of being right” and make a killing in the process. He wrote that he learned several lessons by looking back at his five big calls, and Fortune has highlighted three of the most important ones.
1 – 2000, the dotcom bubble
In 1999, as the dotcom bubble grew day by day, legendary financial journalist Edward Chancellor released a book that helped make his reputation: Devil Take the Hindmost, which details the history of speculation from ancient Rome through the railway mania of the 19th century. When Marks read Chancellor’s book that year, he wrote that was “struck by the similarities” between the speculative bubbles of old and the meteoric rise of tech stocks at the time.
Seeing this market distortion, Marks wrote a memo to clients titled bubble.com in January 2000, just two months before the bubble began to burst, warning that internet-linked equities were overvalued and that speculative mania had taken hold of investors.
“The lure of easy profits, the willingness to leave one’s day job to cash in, the ability to invest blithely in money-losing companies whose business models one can’t explain – all these felt like themes that had rhymed over the course of financial history, leading to bubbles and their painful bursting. And all of them were visible in investor behavior as 1999 came to an end,” he wrote.
After Mark’s warning, the S&P 500 went on to fall 46% between March of 2000 and October 2002, while the tech-heavy NASDAQ Composite dropped roughly 80%.
2 – 2007, The Global Financial Crisis
Between October 2004 and July of 2007, Marks repeatedly warned that there was a “slow developing trainwreck” on the way. He noted that the Federal Reserve has turned to accommodative monetary policy after the dotcom bubble burst, which led savings accounts and typical safe haven assets to offer poor returns, pushing investors towards more risky investments. And eventually the belief that “home prices only go up” began to take hold among consumers in a repeat of speculative bubbles of the past.
By July 2007, Marks published a memo sarcastically titled It’s All Good, where he warned that investors were feeling far too optimistic and ignoring risks, meaning a recession was likely on the way. Five months later, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) began, leading Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers to collapse and the S&P 500 to fall 53% from its high in 2007 to its bottom in June 2009.
Marks explained that he didn’t have inside knowledge of the issues in the subprime mortgage market that ultimately sparked the GFC, and his “cautious conclusions” were simply based on “taking the temperature of the market”—essentially recognizing when investors have became, to paraphrase former Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan, irrationally exuberant.
3 – 2008, Buying the GFC dip
Ever the contrarian, Marks decided it was time to buy after the subprime mortgage crisis crippled the U.S. housing market and kicked off the GFC. He described how, between January 2007 and March 2008, Oaktree collected an $11 billion “reserve fund” to buy distressed debt, and began shopping in September 2008.
“I think the outlook has to be viewed as binary: will the world end or won’t it?” Marks wrote in a memo at the peak of market pessimism in 2008. “We will invest on the assumption that it will go on, that companies will make money, that they’ll have value, and that buying claims on them at low prices will work in the long run. What alternative is there?”
Of course, he went on to make billions buying all those distressed assets. And the S&P 500 has soared roughly 500% since its GFC lows.
4 – 2012, Ignoring equities’ exaggerated death
In 2012, many investors were still recovering from the GFC. Marks noted at the time that it “weighed heavy” on their psychology. This excessive bearishness led him to recall a 1979 Businessweek article titled The Death of Equities. He said that the piece followed years of persistent inflation and poor stock market returns and had extrapolated a pessimistic outlook from the current environment. But 1979 was definitely far from the death of equities. The S&P 500, for example, has surged nearly 4000% since the end of that year.
In 2012, Marks saw all the same patterns in investor psychology that had led to overly bearish market predictions in the late ’70s, so he penned a piece titled Déjà Vu All Over Again detailing his belief that “positive scenarios” for stocks were more likely than another downturn.
“From 2012 – the year of Déjà Vu All Over Again – through 2021, the S&P 500 returned 16.5% a year,” he noted. “Once again, excessively negative sentiment had resulted in major gains. It’s as simple as that.”
5 – 2020, Buying the COVID dip
When COVID-19 began to spread around the globe in early 2020, Marks, like everyone else, was unsure about what the future held. But when the stock market tanked and panic began to spread on Wall Street, the billionaire had a feeling that, once again, it was time for a contrarian stance. His bullish view was confirmed after a trader on his team, Justin Quaglia, said that he was seeing forced selling of bonds from companies that needed the cash to stay afloat with the economy locked down. “We finally had the rubber band snap,” the trader said. For Marks, it was a contrarian buy signal that meant the worst was likely over.
“We’re never happy to have the events that bring on chaos, and especially not the ones that are underway today,” he wrote in a late March memo. “But it’s sentiment like Justin describes above that fuels the emotional selling that allows us to access the greatest bargains.” Again, Marks was proven correct, as the S&P 500 has risen over 90% since its COVID lows in March 2020.
3 key lessons learned
Drawing from his decades of experience in the markets, Marks broke down a few of the most important lessons for investors at the end of his memo.
First and foremost, the billionaire said that investors need to be students of history—only then can they “engage in pattern recognition” and begin to take advantage of the often predictable nature of business cycles by “taking the temperature of the market.”
“Ironically, when viewed over the long term, investor psychology and thus market cycles – which seem flighty and unpredictable – fluctuate in ways that approach dependability,” he wrote.
After becoming a student of economic and market history, Marks said that investors will begin to understand another important lesson: all business cycles stem from “excesses and corrections.” He argued that markets are mainly driven by investors’ emotions, rather than mechanical processes, which means that there are times of excess when people become so optimistic that they seek to “justify the dangerous view that ‘there’s no price too high.’” But these overly bullish periods are typically followed by a correction as investor psychology turns to fear.
“[A] strong movement in one direction is more likely to be followed – sooner or later – by a correction in the opposite direction than by a trend that ‘grows to the sky,’” he explained.
Secondly, during times of market excess or bearish corrections, Marks wrote that he believes investors need to be able to control their emotions and avoid falling victim to peer pressure. He noted that illogical narratives will often form during these periods, such as “there’s no price too high” or “stocks have fallen so far that no one will be interested in them.”
“Remember that in extreme times…the secret to making money lies in contrarianism, not conformity,” he wrote. “When you come across a widely accepted proposition that doesn’t make sense or one you find too good to be true (or too bad to be true), take appropriate action.”
Finally, and perhaps a bit ironically, Marks stressed time and again throughout his lengthy memo that attempting to predict the future of the global economy, even for the best of investment managers, is a nearly impossible task and should be done infrequently.
“[T]he bottom line is that, at Oaktree, we approach these things with great humility, diverging from our neutral assumptions and normal behavior only when circumstances leave us no other choice. ‘Five times in 50 years’ gives you an idea about our level of interest in being market timers. The fact is, we do so hesitantly,” he wrote.
For the sports fans, Warren Buffett has an analogy that perfectly describes Marks’ view. In the 2017 HBO documentary Becoming Warren Buffett, the billionaire says investing is just like being a batter in a baseball game where there are no called strikes. “The trick in investing is just to sit there and watch pitch after pitch go by and wait for the one right in your sweet spot. And if people are yelling, ‘Swing, you bum!’ Ignore them.”