隨著美國(guó)總統(tǒng)喬·拜登政府收緊芯片封鎖,半導(dǎo)體銷(xiāo)售持續(xù)低迷,中國(guó)科技行業(yè)承受的壓力與日俱增。今年頭兩個(gè)月,中國(guó)的芯片進(jìn)出口均大幅下降。
《南華早報(bào)》(South China Morning Post)援引中國(guó)海關(guān)的數(shù)據(jù)稱(chēng),中國(guó)芯片進(jìn)口量在2023年頭兩個(gè)月同比下降26.5%。1月和2月的芯片出口量也同比下降20.9%。
這比去年全年的降幅還要大。據(jù)《南華早報(bào)》報(bào)道,去年中國(guó)的芯片進(jìn)口下降15.3%,出口下降12%。2022年是中國(guó)自2004年以來(lái)首次出現(xiàn)芯片進(jìn)口下降的情況。
據(jù)報(bào)道,中國(guó)最大的幾家芯片公司已經(jīng)感受到了美方封鎖加碼帶來(lái)的重重壓力。早在2020年就被列入美國(guó)貿(mào)易黑名單的中芯國(guó)際集成電路制造有限公司在今年2月坦言,由于設(shè)備采購(gòu)方面的困難,公司不得不推遲新工廠的投產(chǎn)日期。
在中國(guó)開(kāi)展業(yè)務(wù)的非中國(guó)芯片制造商也深感憂慮。總部位于荷蘭的阿斯麥控股(ASML Holdings)是最先進(jìn)芯片所需光刻工具的唯一制造商。該公司的首席執(zhí)行官溫彼得(Peter Wennink)在3月7日對(duì)英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》(Financial Times)表示,阿斯麥每年都不得不以“顯著的兩位數(shù)”比例持續(xù)增加安全和知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)方面的支出。
“我們必須要對(duì)技術(shù)泄露和知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)泄露保持高度警惕嗎?是的,現(xiàn)在比以往任何時(shí)候都要更加警惕?!彼娣Q(chēng),美國(guó)的新封鎖措施將促使中國(guó)打造自己的芯片生態(tài)系統(tǒng)。
芯片封鎖
2022年10月,拜登政府開(kāi)始全面限制向中國(guó)企業(yè)銷(xiāo)售芯片和芯片制造設(shè)備。自那時(shí)起,美國(guó)對(duì)中國(guó)半導(dǎo)體企業(yè)的施壓力度不斷升級(jí)。
3月2日,拜登政府將中國(guó)云計(jì)算服務(wù)商浪潮集團(tuán)(以及其他幾家中國(guó)企業(yè))列入其實(shí)體名單。未經(jīng)特別許可,美國(guó)公司不能向貿(mào)易黑名單上的公司銷(xiāo)售產(chǎn)品。
作為全球第三大數(shù)據(jù)中心服務(wù)器供應(yīng)商的浪潮集團(tuán),也是美國(guó)芯片公司的客戶(hù)。據(jù)路透社(Reuters)報(bào)道,在3月6日的投資者會(huì)議上,英偉達(dá)(Nvidia)和超威半導(dǎo)體(AMD)都被問(wèn)及向浪潮出售產(chǎn)品的問(wèn)題。
有報(bào)道稱(chēng),同樣在芯片供應(yīng)鏈中占據(jù)重要地位的日本和荷蘭,已經(jīng)同意對(duì)中國(guó)實(shí)施類(lèi)似的出口限制,但兩國(guó)尚未公布具體細(xì)節(jié)。今年2月接受英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》采訪時(shí),日本芯片制造設(shè)備大廠京瓷集團(tuán)(Kyocera)的社長(zhǎng)指出,現(xiàn)在就連一些“非尖端工具”也開(kāi)始受到監(jiān)管審查。
此外,旨在通過(guò)巨額補(bǔ)貼鼓勵(lì)半導(dǎo)體制造業(yè)向美國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)移的《芯片與科學(xué)法案》(CHIPS and Science Act)已經(jīng)付諸實(shí)施。華盛頓于上周開(kāi)始接受補(bǔ)貼申請(qǐng)。
然而,美國(guó)補(bǔ)助資金的附加條件,比如需要向員工提供兒童保育服務(wù),讓一些非美國(guó)芯片公司感到擔(dān)憂。韓國(guó)貿(mào)易部在3月7日稱(chēng),這些條件“不僅會(huì)加深業(yè)務(wù)運(yùn)營(yíng)的不確定性,還會(huì)侵犯企業(yè)的管理和技術(shù)自主權(quán),從而將削弱美國(guó)作為投資目的地選項(xiàng)的吸引力?!?/p>
這些封鎖舉措正在推動(dòng)中國(guó)的主要科技公司尋找外國(guó)半導(dǎo)體的替代品。阿里巴巴集團(tuán)芯片部門(mén)的負(fù)責(zé)人于3月3日表示,阿里巴巴將重點(diǎn)采用一種名為RISC-V的開(kāi)源芯片設(shè)計(jì)架構(gòu),不再依托美國(guó)英特爾公司(Intel Corporation)和英國(guó)Arm公司主導(dǎo)的設(shè)計(jì)架構(gòu)。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:任文科
隨著美國(guó)總統(tǒng)喬·拜登政府收緊芯片封鎖,半導(dǎo)體銷(xiāo)售持續(xù)低迷,中國(guó)科技行業(yè)承受的壓力與日俱增。今年頭兩個(gè)月,中國(guó)的芯片進(jìn)出口均大幅下降。
《南華早報(bào)》(South China Morning Post)援引中國(guó)海關(guān)的數(shù)據(jù)稱(chēng),中國(guó)芯片進(jìn)口量在2023年頭兩個(gè)月同比下降26.5%。1月和2月的芯片出口量也同比下降20.9%。
這比去年全年的降幅還要大。據(jù)《南華早報(bào)》報(bào)道,去年中國(guó)的芯片進(jìn)口下降15.3%,出口下降12%。2022年是中國(guó)自2004年以來(lái)首次出現(xiàn)芯片進(jìn)口下降的情況。
據(jù)報(bào)道,中國(guó)最大的幾家芯片公司已經(jīng)感受到了美方封鎖加碼帶來(lái)的重重壓力。早在2020年就被列入美國(guó)貿(mào)易黑名單的中芯國(guó)際集成電路制造有限公司在今年2月坦言,由于設(shè)備采購(gòu)方面的困難,公司不得不推遲新工廠的投產(chǎn)日期。
在中國(guó)開(kāi)展業(yè)務(wù)的非中國(guó)芯片制造商也深感憂慮。總部位于荷蘭的阿斯麥控股(ASML Holdings)是最先進(jìn)芯片所需光刻工具的唯一制造商。該公司的首席執(zhí)行官溫彼得(Peter Wennink)在3月7日對(duì)英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》(Financial Times)表示,阿斯麥每年都不得不以“顯著的兩位數(shù)”比例持續(xù)增加安全和知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)方面的支出。
“我們必須要對(duì)技術(shù)泄露和知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)泄露保持高度警惕嗎?是的,現(xiàn)在比以往任何時(shí)候都要更加警惕?!彼娣Q(chēng),美國(guó)的新封鎖措施將促使中國(guó)打造自己的芯片生態(tài)系統(tǒng)。
芯片封鎖
2022年10月,拜登政府開(kāi)始全面限制向中國(guó)企業(yè)銷(xiāo)售芯片和芯片制造設(shè)備。自那時(shí)起,美國(guó)對(duì)中國(guó)半導(dǎo)體企業(yè)的施壓力度不斷升級(jí)。
3月2日,拜登政府將中國(guó)云計(jì)算服務(wù)商浪潮集團(tuán)(以及其他幾家中國(guó)企業(yè))列入其實(shí)體名單。未經(jīng)特別許可,美國(guó)公司不能向貿(mào)易黑名單上的公司銷(xiāo)售產(chǎn)品。
作為全球第三大數(shù)據(jù)中心服務(wù)器供應(yīng)商的浪潮集團(tuán),也是美國(guó)芯片公司的客戶(hù)。據(jù)路透社(Reuters)報(bào)道,在3月6日的投資者會(huì)議上,英偉達(dá)(Nvidia)和超威半導(dǎo)體(AMD)都被問(wèn)及向浪潮出售產(chǎn)品的問(wèn)題。
有報(bào)道稱(chēng),同樣在芯片供應(yīng)鏈中占據(jù)重要地位的日本和荷蘭,已經(jīng)同意對(duì)中國(guó)實(shí)施類(lèi)似的出口限制,但兩國(guó)尚未公布具體細(xì)節(jié)。今年2月接受英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》采訪時(shí),日本芯片制造設(shè)備大廠京瓷集團(tuán)(Kyocera)的社長(zhǎng)指出,現(xiàn)在就連一些“非尖端工具”也開(kāi)始受到監(jiān)管審查。
此外,旨在通過(guò)巨額補(bǔ)貼鼓勵(lì)半導(dǎo)體制造業(yè)向美國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)移的《芯片與科學(xué)法案》(CHIPS and Science Act)已經(jīng)付諸實(shí)施。華盛頓于上周開(kāi)始接受補(bǔ)貼申請(qǐng)。
然而,美國(guó)補(bǔ)助資金的附加條件,比如需要向員工提供兒童保育服務(wù),讓一些非美國(guó)芯片公司感到擔(dān)憂。韓國(guó)貿(mào)易部在3月7日稱(chēng),這些條件“不僅會(huì)加深業(yè)務(wù)運(yùn)營(yíng)的不確定性,還會(huì)侵犯企業(yè)的管理和技術(shù)自主權(quán),從而將削弱美國(guó)作為投資目的地選項(xiàng)的吸引力?!?/p>
這些封鎖舉措正在推動(dòng)中國(guó)的主要科技公司尋找外國(guó)半導(dǎo)體的替代品。阿里巴巴集團(tuán)芯片部門(mén)的負(fù)責(zé)人于3月3日表示,阿里巴巴將重點(diǎn)采用一種名為RISC-V的開(kāi)源芯片設(shè)計(jì)架構(gòu),不再依托美國(guó)英特爾公司(Intel Corporation)和英國(guó)Arm公司主導(dǎo)的設(shè)計(jì)架構(gòu)。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:任文科
Tightening chip controls from the Joe Biden administration and a persistent slump in semiconductor sales are continuing to squeeze China’s tech sector, with both the country’s exports and imports of chips falling steeply in the first two months of the year.
China’s chip imports by volume fell 26.5% in the first months of 2023, compared to the same period a year earlier, according to the South China Morning Post, citing Chinese customs data. Chip exports for January and February also dropped 20.9% year-on-year.
That’s a sharper contraction than what was recorded for all of last year. China’s chip imports fell by 15.3% last year, while its exports dropped 12%, according to the SCMP. Last year was the first time the country reported a fall in chip imports since 2004.
China’s largest chip companies are reportedly already feeling the strain from the continued pressure. Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, which has been on a U.S. trade blacklist since 2020, admitted in February that it was delaying the launch of its new factory due to the difficulty of sourcing equipment.
Non-Chinese chipmakers with China operations are also concerned. ASML Holdings, the Netherlands-based company that is the only manufacturer of the lithography tools needed for the most advanced chips, has had to increase spending on security and intellectual property protection by a “significant double digit” percentage each year, CEO Peter Wennink told the Financial Times on March 7.
“Do we have to be highly sensitized on knowhow leakage, on IP leakage? More than ever before,” he said, warning that new controls will push China to create its own chip ecosystem.
Chip controls
The Biden administration has escalated its pressure on China’s semiconductor business since last October, when it imposed sweeping restrictions on sales of chips and chipmaking equipment to Chinese companies.
On March 2, the Biden administration added Chinese cloud computing firm Inspur (among several other Chinese firms) to its Entity List. U.S. firms cannot sell to companies on the trade blacklist without special permission.
Inspur, which is the world’s third-largest supplier of the servers used in data centers, is also a customer of chips from U.S. companies. Both Nvidia and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) were asked about sales to Inspur at an investor conference on March 6, reports Reuters.
Japan and the Netherlands, which are also key countries in the chip supply chain, have reportedly agreed to impose similar restrictions on exports to China, though neither country has released details. In a February interview with the Financial Times, the president of Kyocera, a major Japanese contributor to chipmaking equipment, noted that even “non-cutting-edge tools” were starting to come under regulatory scrutiny.
Washington is also encouraging semiconductor manufacturing to move to the U.S. by offering generous subsidies through the CHIPS and Science Act, which started to accept subsidy applications last week.
Yet some non-U.S. chip companies are concerned about the conditions attached to U.S. funds, such as the need to provide childcare. These conditions “deepen business uncertainties, violate companies’ management and technology rights as well as make the United States less attractive as an investment option,” South Korea’s trade ministry said on March 7.
Controls are pushing China’s major tech companies to look for alternatives to foreign semiconductors. On March 3, the head of Alibaba Group’s chip division said that they would focus more on an open-source chip design architecture called RISC-V, as opposed to designs from U.S.-based Intel Corporation or U.K.-based Arm.