1998年,關(guān)于微策略公司(MicroStrategy)創(chuàng)始人邁克爾·塞勒,有一件流傳甚廣的軼事。據(jù)說在1998年,就在微策略公司還有幾個小時就要敲鐘上市的時候,邁克爾·塞勒既沒有做什么表態(tài)去安撫大股東,也沒有給出什么預(yù)測數(shù)字,甚至沒有往冰桶里放一瓶香檳。
當時他住在曼哈頓皇宮酒店里的一間三層的套房里,據(jù)說它的房費是1萬美元一晚,不過他的注意力完全被另一件東西吸引了——那就是這間套房里的私人電梯。據(jù)媒體報道,這個年輕的創(chuàng)業(yè)者對這個電梯十分著迷,以至于大清早坐著這個電梯上上下下玩了幾個小時。
回顧邁克爾·塞勒33年的創(chuàng)業(yè)生涯,我們發(fā)現(xiàn),他或許就是喜歡這種忽上忽下的感覺,甚至喜歡主動追逐這種感覺。在微策略公司成功登陸納斯達克的當天,它的股價就在發(fā)行價基礎(chǔ)上爆漲100%,單日估值猛增近10億美元。到了當天收盤時,塞勒所持的股份已價值5.4億美元。
幾年后,微策略公司陷入了一起會計丑聞,股價在一天內(nèi)暴跌62%,塞勒一下?lián)p失了60億美元的個人財富。他甚至因此而成了益智游戲《猜謎大挑戰(zhàn)》里的一個問題的答案:“誰在一天里損失的錢最多?”
不管怎樣,這位創(chuàng)業(yè)者還是挺住了那次風浪。后來,他向Facebook提供了一款很有前途的新產(chǎn)品,將他打造的一款云軟件平臺賣了1億多美元,又寫了一本暢想移動技術(shù)的未來的暢銷書,還成了一個游艇收藏家,他的一艘游艇還在HBO喜劇《明星伙伴》里亮過相。
不過,塞勒最大膽的賭注還并不是這些,而是在過去兩年的時間里,將年收入約5億美元的微策略公司全部押寶在了比特幣上。8月2日,微策略宣布已掌舵公司30年的塞勒將卸任CEO一職,轉(zhuǎn)任公司的執(zhí)行董事長。塞勒在一份聲明中表示,這份新工作能讓他“專注于比特幣的收購策略和相關(guān)的比特幣倡議?!保ㄓ捎谌湛刂浦镀睓?quán),加上他將留任公司執(zhí)董,那么這次職務(wù)調(diào)整肯定是塞勒本人的決定。我們數(shù)次聯(lián)系微策略公司,請求采訪塞勒本人,但一直未獲回應(yīng)。)離奇的是,雖然微策略公司宣布減記9.18億美元的比特幣資產(chǎn),但在消息傳出次日,它的股價竟然還上漲了15%,達到321美元,市值增長超4億美元。
微策略股價的這次離奇猛漲,讓圍繞在塞勒身上的神秘色彩又濃了一些??紤]到微策略公司本質(zhì)上是一家軟件業(yè)務(wù)公司,華爾街的這次反應(yīng),到底是覺得公司沒有了執(zhí)迷于比特幣的塞勒會好得多,還是覺得讓他一門心思搞比特幣,微策略公司會更有前途呢?
備受爭議的創(chuàng)業(yè)之路:一個沒有商業(yè)才能的“小馬斯克”
2020年8月11日,塞勒的一則推文一石激起千層浪。他宣布,微策略公司“啟動了比特幣戰(zhàn)略”,已斥資2.5億美元購買了21454枚比特幣,當時比特幣的單價還不到12000美元。但是在2013年的時候,塞勒還曾批判比特幣“所剩的日子屈指可數(shù)”。不過在疫情爆發(fā)初期,塞勒突然頓悟了。當時微策略公司手上有大筆現(xiàn)金,而塞勒則擔心美聯(lián)儲的寬松貨幣政策會加劇通脹,導(dǎo)致他手里的現(xiàn)金嚴重貶值。
當時,他在一次接受采訪時表示:“我們突然意識到,我們是坐在一座5億美元的冰山上。”塞勒贊同比特幣之父中本聰?shù)挠^點,即央行會不可避免地促使法定貨幣貶值,而數(shù)字加密貨幣以其供應(yīng)量的有限性,可以成為一種可靠且無法被侵蝕的“儲值工具”,甚至“優(yōu)于現(xiàn)金”。塞勒在微策略公司舉辦了研討會,試圖讓管理團隊相信比特幣擁有改變世界的潛能,并且“愉快地給他們布置了家庭作業(yè)和練習題,讓他們學(xué)習比特幣相關(guān)知識”。
到了2021年2月,也就是他首次購買比特幣6個月后,塞勒宣布,微策略公司購買比特幣將不僅僅是為了給軟件銷售收入保值,而是要順勢轉(zhuǎn)型,既不放棄傳統(tǒng)軟件業(yè)務(wù),同時也要成立專門的比特幣部門,因為塞勒相信,比特幣的價值將隨著時間的推移而大幅上升。而利用軟件銷售收入和借款來購買比特幣,也能比投資核心業(yè)務(wù)、股票回購和收購等措施更快地提振股價。
到目前為止,微策略公司已經(jīng)借款24億美元用于購買比特幣,該公司持有的比特幣也達到129699枚,以當前市價約合31億美元。在決定下注的時候,微策略公司相當于借入了相當于全部股東權(quán)益3倍的資金。現(xiàn)在,這家公司可以說已經(jīng)成了一個專注于炒幣的公司了,而且它還專門成立了一個比特幣分析部門。雖然塞勒目前只持有微策略公司五分之一的股份,但這些股份卻控制了64%的投票權(quán),所以在決策上還是他說了算。
不過據(jù)《財富》了解,這種賭注的風險也是很高的。微策略公司甚至沒有辦法給公司的董事和高管買全部保險,理由是風險太高,商業(yè)保險公司在財務(wù)上無法接受。就這個問題,該公司的第二季度財報顯示,公司與塞勒個人達成了一項協(xié)議,對公司董事和高管因股東訴訟導(dǎo)致的損失,由塞勒個人予以補償。商業(yè)保險公司最高可以提供3000萬美元的董事及高管責任險(簡稱D&O保險),但塞勒可以在此基礎(chǔ)上再補償1000萬美元。另外在這項保險新政6月生效前,他還愿意以個人名義為董事和高管們提供4000萬美元的D&O保險。為此,微策略公司每年還得向塞勒個人支付120萬美元的“保費”。
簡而言之,由于保險公司認為微策略公司的風險太高,塞勒只得自己充當起保險公司的角色,一旦哪天公司的董事會、高管以及他本人遭到股東訴訟,他就得自己掏錢來賠。
不少批評人士認為,塞勒的賭注將以失敗收場。研究公司New Constructs的創(chuàng)始人、會計專家大衛(wèi)·特雷納就笑稱:“說起瘋狂程度,塞勒可以說是‘小馬斯克’,只不過沒有馬斯克的商業(yè)天賦?!碧乩准{還表示:“他嚴重錯配了投資者的資本,市場會在短期內(nèi)會獎勵這種行為,但是他和股東們最終將以一種痛苦的方式達成和解?!?/p>
塞勒的創(chuàng)業(yè)故事:高中全班第一,24歲創(chuàng)辦微策略
從很早的時候開始,塞勒身上就融合了聰明和瘋狂這兩種特質(zhì)。塞勒的父親是美國空軍的一名軍士長,母親是一個鄉(xiāng)村歌手的女兒。他的少年時代是在俄亥俄州代頓市的萊特帕特森基地附近度過的。他高中就學(xué)會了開滑翔機,并且以全班第一名的成績從高中畢業(yè)。后來他獲得了美國后備軍官訓(xùn)練計劃(ROTC)獎學(xué)金,進入麻省理工學(xué)院學(xué)習科技史和航空航天學(xué)。他的論文研究的是意大利文藝復(fù)興時期的城邦的數(shù)學(xué)模型。但是由于體檢發(fā)現(xiàn)了心臟雜音,他只得放棄了成為飛行員或宇航員的念頭。在杜邦公司當了一段時間的計算機模擬規(guī)劃師后,1989年,24歲的塞勒與兩名MIT的校友共同創(chuàng)辦了一家咨詢公司,也就是現(xiàn)在的微策略公司。
當時塞勒意識到,互聯(lián)網(wǎng)具有強大的數(shù)據(jù)分析能力,可以幫助企業(yè)分析關(guān)于產(chǎn)品和市場的海量數(shù)據(jù)。很快,客戶們開始每年向微策略公司支付幾十萬美元的費用,用于創(chuàng)建直觀的圖表,來顯示一些直觀的消費趨勢,比如哪些消費者喜歡特定的飲料或者保險產(chǎn)品。微策略公司還與麥當勞簽訂了1000萬美元的合同,用于開發(fā)應(yīng)用,以評估促銷措施的效果。這份合同對微策略公司的早期發(fā)展起了重要的推動作用。
到了1998年,塞勒為了IPO進行為期11天的路演時,他的表現(xiàn)已經(jīng)非常出色了。當時他還邀請了一名《華盛頓郵報》的記者記錄整個過程。塞勒的銷售風格靠的是激情、舞臺技巧和宏大敘事,而不是數(shù)字。他天花亂綴的介紹要比PPT吸引人得多。他曾說過:“什么是聚焦,我們聚焦到可以把天花板燒出一個洞!”
這種以個人魅力開路的方法起到了奇效。華爾街普遍認為,塞勒雖然傲慢,但確實很有煽動力。從當時的新聞報道看,塞勒對數(shù)據(jù)分析技術(shù)報有極大熱情,而且對這項技術(shù)的未來描繪了一幅令人信服的路線圖,投資人幾乎都是憑借對他的信心簽約的。華爾街有一位軟件投資人,每次開會的時候都愛把軟件行業(yè)的CEO們的鄙視一番,認為他們“都是垃圾”,但是塞勒卻憑借三寸不爛之舌,硬生生地讓他簽了字。在貝爾斯登公司,塞勒只花了20分鐘,就讓這家公司的老板認購了10%的股份。全球最大基金公司富達集團被稱為業(yè)界最難攻破的后場,但用塞勒的話說,他攻破這家公司“就像扣籃一樣”摧枯拉朽。
在1998年6月掛牌上市后,微策略公司迅速成了華爾街的寵兒。到2000年3月,它的股價已經(jīng)達到發(fā)行價的16倍,市值近180億美元。
微策略公司也是企業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)分析技術(shù)的先行者。這項技術(shù)可以通過數(shù)據(jù)分析軟件,讓零售公司、制藥巨頭、銀行、保險公司和政府機構(gòu)從大量數(shù)據(jù)中發(fā)現(xiàn)一些重要的趨勢。憑借這手絕活,微策略公司拿下了300多個長期客戶,其中包括肯德基、輝瑞、迪士尼、安聯(lián)、勞氏和美國廣播公司等巨頭。以某家咖啡連鎖店為例,在使用了微策略公司的技術(shù)后,它就可以深度研究會員卡數(shù)據(jù),看哪一類顧客喜歡哪些品,這樣他們就可以向特定顧客推送新產(chǎn)品,或者發(fā)送優(yōu)惠信息。零售商使用微策略公司的技術(shù)后,可以優(yōu)化客戶服務(wù),縮短客服電話時長。保險公司則可以發(fā)現(xiàn)和提醒那些沒有按時服藥的患者。
當然,微策略公司并不是科技界的“超級巨星”。20多年來,這家公司多多少少有些“工匠精神”,基本上做的都是幕后工作。它的兩大競爭對手Salesforce和微軟智能云雖然起步較晚,但增長速度都很快。目前,微策略公司的年銷售額穩(wěn)定在5億美元區(qū)間,但它的生命力還是很旺盛的。
2000年3月20日,微策略公司宣布了一條令市場震動的消息——它的審計公司普華永道要求它重報前兩年的收入和利潤。在重新審計之后,該公司1998年和1999年的業(yè)績從2800萬美元盈利,變成了3700萬美元虧損。作為公司的聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人和前財務(wù)總監(jiān),塞勒以及另一位創(chuàng)始人和公司的財務(wù)總監(jiān)選擇向證監(jiān)會繳納1100萬美元罰款以了結(jié)相關(guān)指控,作為CEO,塞勒本人掏了830萬。但塞勒和其他卷入這樁丑聞的人都不承認有任何不當行為。
到2002年的年中,微策略公司的市值已狂跌至4000萬美元左右,較最高時下降了98%。
不過這時,塞勒又有了一個點子,正是這個點子導(dǎo)致了微策略公司的再度崛起。他預(yù)見到移動設(shè)備會出現(xiàn)爆發(fā)式增長,因此,他認為可以開發(fā)一些程序來幫助客戶分析從用戶的iPhone和筆記本電腦中收集的海量數(shù)據(jù)。在2009年前后,塞勒將他的軟件免費提供給了臉書的新任運營總監(jiān)謝麗爾·桑德伯格。2012年的一篇《財富》文章指出,微策略公司的技術(shù)對于臉書十分重要,它能讓銷售人員知道每個產(chǎn)品能帶來多少收入。臉書最終成為了微策略公司的一個穩(wěn)定客戶,每年能給它帶來幾百萬美元的收入,而塞勒也借助移動化的東風實現(xiàn)了持續(xù)盈利。
雖然生意做得不算特別大,但塞勒的個人生活卻堪稱奢華。他在邁阿密海灘有一幢別墅,里面有13間臥室和12間浴室。他還有一架價值4700萬美元的龐巴迪飛機和兩艘游艇。其中一艘游艇名叫“哈爾號”,是為了紀念1736年將他的祖先從荷蘭鹿特丹帶到費城的那艘船。船上有電子版的莫奈、梵高和畢加索的畫作,頂層甲板還有一個巨大的浴缸。他的備用游艇“亞瑟號”也裝飾得極為豪華,且擁有波利尼西亞風格的房間,船上還有兩臺瑪格麗特酒機。據(jù)2012年的那篇《財富》文章報道,一直未婚的塞勒據(jù)傳曾與約旦的努爾王后約會過。他還有自己的私人管家。
他還是一個派對達人。2010年他在華盛頓的W酒店給自己過生日,特地組織了一個野生動物主題的派對,還把一條緬甸白蟒蛇掛在脖子上拍照。每年感恩節(jié)前,他還會在曼哈頓SoHo舉辦搖滾節(jié),讓賓客們打扮成搖滾明星的樣子。
尋找大創(chuàng)意
在接受《財富》采訪時,塞勒的前同事們表示,除了華麗的社交生活,塞勒還渴望在科技界擁有廣泛的影響力。他很想成為一名著名的思想領(lǐng)袖。用一名離職員工的話說,就是“成為一個被萬眾仰慕的思想巨人”。
不過事實證明,他是很擅長觀察大趨勢的。他在2012年出版了一本暢銷書《移動化浪潮:移動智能將如何改變一切》。書中預(yù)見了移動設(shè)備將如何引發(fā)從零售到銀行的方方面面的革命。
塞勒在微策略公司內(nèi)部至少打造了兩項引人注目的新業(yè)務(wù)。一位塞勒的前同事曾這樣評價他:“他有預(yù)見未來的能力?!痹?000年代末,他開發(fā)了一個監(jiān)控平臺,讓家庭和企業(yè)可以通過一個網(wǎng)站(alarm.com)監(jiān)測自家的安全系統(tǒng)。2008年,他將這項業(yè)務(wù)以2800萬美元賣給了私募投資者?,F(xiàn)在,Alarm.com已經(jīng)是一家欣欣向榮的上市公司了,市值達到了35億美元。在2010年代初期,塞勒為呼叫中心開發(fā)了第一批基于云服務(wù)的自動語音應(yīng)答系統(tǒng),名將其命名為“天使”(Angel)。2013年,Genesys公司以1.1億美元收購了“天使”。根據(jù)Prescient & Strategic Intelligence公司的研究,呼叫中心軟件市場目前的規(guī)模為240億美元,預(yù)計未來十年將以18%的速度增長。而“天使”技術(shù)則幫助Genesys成為了該市場的一個重要參與者。
他很善于培養(yǎng)人才,也很善于經(jīng)營企業(yè)。一位已經(jīng)離職的經(jīng)理表示:“他會給每個和他共事過的人留下深刻印象?!睋?jù)說,塞勒總能一種“瘋狂的天才”的形象激勵人,讓人們覺得如果他的這些瘋狂的實驗?zāi)軌虺晒Γ敲此麄儜?yīng)該也能做到。與他共事過的人有他的MIT校友喬·佩恩,2013年他將自己創(chuàng)辦的軟件Eloqua以近10億美元賣給了甲骨文。他的聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人桑珠·班薩爾與CEO雷吉·阿加瓦爾共同創(chuàng)辦了Cvent公司,它的軟件可以幫助用戶策劃線下線下會議和其他活動。該公司去年12月進行了IPO,目前市值為28億美元。
不過,據(jù)塞勒的前同事稱,塞勒是一個喜怒無常、管理上事無巨細的人。有人說他“管理太嚴了”。塞勒是一個極度自信的人,因此他覺得自己什么事情都能親歷親為,因此他也不愿意過多賦權(quán)給手下的人。
他的前同事表示:“他不允許人們按照自己的方式做事,然而沒有這種做事的自由度,人們就無法成長。當然,我認為這還是利大于弊的。想想看,如果你每一步都跟著他投資,先是互聯(lián)網(wǎng),再是移動技術(shù)和云計算!”
塞勒這種情緒化和陰晴不定的風格也給管理層帶來了很大壓力,一定程度上阻礙了公司的發(fā)展。從2018年起,他已經(jīng)換了3個營銷總監(jiān),一個財務(wù)總監(jiān)才干了一年就離職了。塞勒留不住優(yōu)秀人才,這也解釋了他為什么沒有把“天使”技術(shù)和Alarm.com這樣優(yōu)秀的創(chuàng)意做大做強,而是賣給了其他公司。
微策略公司的股東架構(gòu),一定程度上助長了塞勒的控制狂傾向,使他的權(quán)力遠遠超過了他的所有權(quán)比例。該公司一共發(fā)行了兩種股票,A股只有1票的投票權(quán),而B股有10票投票權(quán),塞勒持有大量B股,因此即便他只占有五分之一的股份,卻控制了64%的投票權(quán),因此他幾乎可以在公司為所欲為。這樣無疑是有風險的,塞勒將公司的大量資產(chǎn)拿去炒幣,同時耽擱了原本盈利的核心業(yè)務(wù),這樣一來顯然使股東承受了重大風險。對于一家80%的股份由散戶投資者持有的公司而言,塞勒的自由裁量權(quán)顯然是過大了。
比特幣的最大推手
在將微策略公司的命運綁在比特幣身上的同時,塞勒本人幾乎成了全球頭號的比特幣推手。據(jù)報道,去年正是塞勒說服伊隆·馬斯克買了15億美元的比特幣,馬斯克的背書極大提振了比特幣的價格和聲譽。(不過特斯拉已經(jīng)在第二季度出售了大部分所持的比特幣,只保留了原始購買量的四分之一左右。)
從去年年底到今年6月份,比特幣的幣值一下子從將近7萬美元暴跌至不到2萬美元。這段時間,塞勒幾乎每天都要上電視,鼓吹比特幣是金融的未來,最近的下跌正是入手的好時機。不過他很少提及比特幣的實際用途,比如買房買車買菜等等,也不提它有抗通脹的作用,而是以他標志性的危言聳聽的語氣,稱全世界已經(jīng)處在經(jīng)濟大災(zāi)難的邊緣,比特幣才是一個穩(wěn)定的避風港。他在接受CNN采訪時說:“比特幣是一艘救生艇,它在狂風暴雨的海面上顛簸,為所有需要從沉船上逃生的人提供了希望?!比者€在推特上放了一張“激光眼”的照片,以表明他有意使比特幣成為一種新的經(jīng)濟賦權(quán)工具。(一位批評人士揶揄道:“他把自己當成宙斯了?!保?/p>
塞勒認為,比特幣的幣值幾年內(nèi)就會達到50萬美元,人們應(yīng)該“把要留給孫子的錢換成比特幣。”
出人意料的是,雖然近期比特幣崩盤了,但微策略公司的市值卻不跌反漲。從2020年8月到現(xiàn)在,雖然微策略公司的股價幾經(jīng)大起大落,但截至8月3日,已經(jīng)達到323美元每股,幾乎翻了三番。顯然是有看好區(qū)塊鏈的交易員將這家公司看作了比特幣的化身。
問題是,微策略公司的股市表現(xiàn)與它軟弱的基本面是相悖的。它的股價的漲幅遠遠超過了所持比特幣的升值部分。比如6月16日,比特幣的售價是20300美元,而微策略公司的股價是161美元,其市值為18億美元。到8月3日,比特幣的價格回彈15%,達到23300美元,相當于微策略公司持有的比特幣增值了4億美元。雖然該公司的基本業(yè)務(wù)在衰退,但在那周的時間里,它的股價卻幾乎翻了一番,達到312美元。這相當于它的市值一下子增加了18億美元,是它持有的比特幣增值部分的4倍多。
這種現(xiàn)象說明微策略公司有一種“塞勒效應(yīng)”,這位CEO能憑借天花亂綴的話術(shù),讓大批投資者相信他的看法。業(yè)界有6位分析師對微策略公司的股價做了12個月的預(yù)測,其中兩位持悲觀態(tài)度,認為其股價會跌至180至250美元區(qū)間,兩位認為當前300多美元的股價已經(jīng)到頂了,但還有兩位認為它還有巨大的增值空間。比如BTIG研究公司認為,它的股價有望漲到950美元。很多人也認為微策略公司的股價與它的炒幣收益不成比例,因此紛紛買空微策略公司。目前該公司大約有一半的股票被做空,這也創(chuàng)下了長期做空的紀錄。
有批評人士認為,塞勒的激進轉(zhuǎn)向?qū)е铝斯净A(chǔ)的軟件業(yè)務(wù)受損,而他恰恰需要軟件業(yè)務(wù)的現(xiàn)金流來支持買比特幣所借的幾十億債務(wù)。正在做空微策略公司的Bireme Capital公司分析師瑞安·巴倫廷表示:“比特幣的不確定性很高,我想象不來持有大量比特幣對它的基礎(chǔ)業(yè)務(wù)有什么好處。如果你是客戶的話,你可能也會擔心這其中的風險,那么找它合作還不如找微軟?!?/p>
另一方面,塞勒給微策略公司加的杠桿太重了,如果比特幣價格下跌,公司很可能將沒有足夠現(xiàn)金,來償還最早在2025年就要到期的巨額債務(wù)。
塞勒是從2020年8月開始購買比特幣的,到目前為止,他已經(jīng)借了24億巨債用來炒幣,其中涉及3種債務(wù)和1種保證金貸款。他還動用了公司賬上的大量現(xiàn)金,包括所有自由現(xiàn)金流,全部用來炒比特幣。
2021年2月,他還發(fā)行了10億美元新股,并將收入全部投入到比特幣上。當時,微策略公司的股價一度從2020年8月的124美元飆升至770美元。Bireme Capital公司的分析師巴倫廷表示:“在融資方面,塞勒是很聰明的,他在股價最高時賣掉了他的股份。但如果他用這些高價股票來買比特幣,效果還會好得多。但他卻選擇了舉借巨額債務(wù)來購買幣值極不穩(wěn)定的比特幣,屆時他的比特幣價值很可能遠遠低于他的債務(wù)?!?/p>
不管怎樣,塞勒已經(jīng)斥資40億美元購買了129699個比特幣,平均購價為31320美元。但是目前,比特幣的價格已跌至23300美元,也就是比他的入手價低了26%,他手中的比特幣目前只值30億美元,也就是縮水了10億美元。在微策略公司豪賭比特幣之前,該公司幾乎沒有任何債務(wù),因此也沒有利息支出。但現(xiàn)在它卻欠了債權(quán)人和對沖基金24億美元。它每年還要為這些借款支付4600萬美元的利息。
因此,現(xiàn)在的微策略公司面臨著四大威脅。首先,它的利息支出幾乎耗光了軟件業(yè)務(wù)的自由現(xiàn)金流。如果它的基本業(yè)務(wù)繼續(xù)縮水,那微策略公司就沒有犯錯的空間了,但這種可能性是存在的。正如巴倫廷所指的那樣,如果微策略公司損失了大量業(yè)務(wù),除了被迫賣掉比特幣,它毫無其他辦法支付利息。雖然塞勒發(fā)誓稱這種情況永遠不會發(fā)生。
第二,微策略公司苛刻的融資條件也是一個風險隱患。它是以“超長期投資”的名義搞到的借款,還款周期是3到6年。它還發(fā)行了5億美元的優(yōu)先擔保票據(jù),到期時間是2028年。此外它還發(fā)行了6.5億美元的可轉(zhuǎn)換債券,到期時間是2025年。但2028年到期的那筆債券規(guī)定,如果到了2025年,微策略公司沒有足夠現(xiàn)金償還那筆6.5億的債務(wù),則這5億美元的還款期將被提前到2025年,而且要優(yōu)先償還。而要還清這兩筆債務(wù),該公司至少需要準備10.5億美元的流動資產(chǎn)。
要知道,目前微策略公司持有的比特幣價值僅比它的債務(wù)高出7億美元左右,而且公司幾乎沒有多余的現(xiàn)金了,因為大家都知道它把所有的錢都花在了炒幣上。而由于利息支出大幅增加,它的軟件業(yè)務(wù)也無法產(chǎn)生可觀的現(xiàn)金流。當然,到2025年,比特幣也不見得會跌到讓它還不上債的水平。但如果比特幣價值穩(wěn)定在2萬美元以下,屆時它的債務(wù)就會超過所持比特幣的價值,使公司面臨資不抵債的風險。這還是建立在軟件收入一直能夠支付利息支出的前提下,這樣塞勒就不必賣幣來支付利息了。
第三,如果微策略公司繼續(xù)維持當前的處境,又會發(fā)生什么?如果比特幣一直維持在2萬多美元的水平,它又能產(chǎn)生足夠現(xiàn)金來支付利息,那么最有可能的結(jié)果,就是它的股價回歸其基本價值。巴倫廷認為:“如果微策略公司繼續(xù)維持現(xiàn)狀,炒幣帶來的股市溢價就會消退,因為它的核心業(yè)務(wù)在支付完利息后已經(jīng)不剩什么錢了。”剩下的只是比特幣賬戶與債務(wù)之間的價差,而目前這一數(shù)字已經(jīng)達到7億美元左右。這就是巴倫廷眼中微策略公司所剩的價值。如果巴倫廷的預(yù)測是正確的,那么該公司目前36億美元的市值還存在80%的水份。如果真按照他的劇本走,一旦塞勒的“忽悠”不靈了,微策略公司的股價就將大幅跳水。
再來說說最后一個風險因素。作為一家原本優(yōu)秀的軟件公司,如果其股價跌破了傳統(tǒng)價值,那么它的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層很可能會遭到一系列違反受信業(yè)務(wù)的訴訟,如前所述,塞勒本人對此已經(jīng)提供了相當一部分保險。但股東們?nèi)绻鹪V的話,理由也是很充分的,因為塞勒把股東的錢拿去投資了一種最不穩(wěn)定、最有爭議性的資產(chǎn),但同時卻讓一家本可以繼續(xù)賺取相當利潤的企業(yè)陷入了危機。
畢竟,塞勒之所以聞名于世,就是因為他對未來科技的預(yù)測經(jīng)常是準確的。雖然他的創(chuàng)業(yè)史起起伏伏,但他有時也確實是正確的。但不管怎樣,他將自己和比特幣綁在了一起,就是將公司的未來押在了一個極不穩(wěn)定的投機工具上。
至于這部“電梯”會將他帶向頂樓還是地下室,我們現(xiàn)在還無法判斷。(財富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:樸成奎
1998年,關(guān)于微策略公司(MicroStrategy)創(chuàng)始人邁克爾·塞勒,有一件流傳甚廣的軼事。據(jù)說在1998年,就在微策略公司還有幾個小時就要敲鐘上市的時候,邁克爾·塞勒既沒有做什么表態(tài)去安撫大股東,也沒有給出什么預(yù)測數(shù)字,甚至沒有往冰桶里放一瓶香檳。
當時他住在曼哈頓皇宮酒店里的一間三層的套房里,據(jù)說它的房費是1萬美元一晚,不過他的注意力完全被另一件東西吸引了——那就是這間套房里的私人電梯。據(jù)媒體報道,這個年輕的創(chuàng)業(yè)者對這個電梯十分著迷,以至于大清早坐著這個電梯上上下下玩了幾個小時。
回顧邁克爾·塞勒33年的創(chuàng)業(yè)生涯,我們發(fā)現(xiàn),他或許就是喜歡這種忽上忽下的感覺,甚至喜歡主動追逐這種感覺。在微策略公司成功登陸納斯達克的當天,它的股價就在發(fā)行價基礎(chǔ)上爆漲100%,單日估值猛增近10億美元。到了當天收盤時,塞勒所持的股份已價值5.4億美元。
幾年后,微策略公司陷入了一起會計丑聞,股價在一天內(nèi)暴跌62%,塞勒一下?lián)p失了60億美元的個人財富。他甚至因此而成了益智游戲《猜謎大挑戰(zhàn)》里的一個問題的答案:“誰在一天里損失的錢最多?”
不管怎樣,這位創(chuàng)業(yè)者還是挺住了那次風浪。后來,他向Facebook提供了一款很有前途的新產(chǎn)品,將他打造的一款云軟件平臺賣了1億多美元,又寫了一本暢想移動技術(shù)的未來的暢銷書,還成了一個游艇收藏家,他的一艘游艇還在HBO喜劇《明星伙伴》里亮過相。
不過,塞勒最大膽的賭注還并不是這些,而是在過去兩年的時間里,將年收入約5億美元的微策略公司全部押寶在了比特幣上。8月2日,微策略宣布已掌舵公司30年的塞勒將卸任CEO一職,轉(zhuǎn)任公司的執(zhí)行董事長。塞勒在一份聲明中表示,這份新工作能讓他“專注于比特幣的收購策略和相關(guān)的比特幣倡議。”(由于塞勒控制著投票權(quán),加上他將留任公司執(zhí)董,那么這次職務(wù)調(diào)整肯定是塞勒本人的決定。我們數(shù)次聯(lián)系微策略公司,請求采訪塞勒本人,但一直未獲回應(yīng)。)離奇的是,雖然微策略公司宣布減記9.18億美元的比特幣資產(chǎn),但在消息傳出次日,它的股價竟然還上漲了15%,達到321美元,市值增長超4億美元。
微策略股價的這次離奇猛漲,讓圍繞在塞勒身上的神秘色彩又濃了一些??紤]到微策略公司本質(zhì)上是一家軟件業(yè)務(wù)公司,華爾街的這次反應(yīng),到底是覺得公司沒有了執(zhí)迷于比特幣的塞勒會好得多,還是覺得讓他一門心思搞比特幣,微策略公司會更有前途呢?
備受爭議的創(chuàng)業(yè)之路:一個沒有商業(yè)才能的“小馬斯克”
2020年8月11日,塞勒的一則推文一石激起千層浪。他宣布,微策略公司“啟動了比特幣戰(zhàn)略”,已斥資2.5億美元購買了21454枚比特幣,當時比特幣的單價還不到12000美元。但是在2013年的時候,塞勒還曾批判比特幣“所剩的日子屈指可數(shù)”。不過在疫情爆發(fā)初期,塞勒突然頓悟了。當時微策略公司手上有大筆現(xiàn)金,而塞勒則擔心美聯(lián)儲的寬松貨幣政策會加劇通脹,導(dǎo)致他手里的現(xiàn)金嚴重貶值。
當時,他在一次接受采訪時表示:“我們突然意識到,我們是坐在一座5億美元的冰山上。”塞勒贊同比特幣之父中本聰?shù)挠^點,即央行會不可避免地促使法定貨幣貶值,而數(shù)字加密貨幣以其供應(yīng)量的有限性,可以成為一種可靠且無法被侵蝕的“儲值工具”,甚至“優(yōu)于現(xiàn)金”。塞勒在微策略公司舉辦了研討會,試圖讓管理團隊相信比特幣擁有改變世界的潛能,并且“愉快地給他們布置了家庭作業(yè)和練習題,讓他們學(xué)習比特幣相關(guān)知識”。
到了2021年2月,也就是他首次購買比特幣6個月后,塞勒宣布,微策略公司購買比特幣將不僅僅是為了給軟件銷售收入保值,而是要順勢轉(zhuǎn)型,既不放棄傳統(tǒng)軟件業(yè)務(wù),同時也要成立專門的比特幣部門,因為塞勒相信,比特幣的價值將隨著時間的推移而大幅上升。而利用軟件銷售收入和借款來購買比特幣,也能比投資核心業(yè)務(wù)、股票回購和收購等措施更快地提振股價。
到目前為止,微策略公司已經(jīng)借款24億美元用于購買比特幣,該公司持有的比特幣也達到129699枚,以當前市價約合31億美元。在決定下注的時候,微策略公司相當于借入了相當于全部股東權(quán)益3倍的資金?,F(xiàn)在,這家公司可以說已經(jīng)成了一個專注于炒幣的公司了,而且它還專門成立了一個比特幣分析部門。雖然塞勒目前只持有微策略公司五分之一的股份,但這些股份卻控制了64%的投票權(quán),所以在決策上還是他說了算。
不過據(jù)《財富》了解,這種賭注的風險也是很高的。微策略公司甚至沒有辦法給公司的董事和高管買全部保險,理由是風險太高,商業(yè)保險公司在財務(wù)上無法接受。就這個問題,該公司的第二季度財報顯示,公司與塞勒個人達成了一項協(xié)議,對公司董事和高管因股東訴訟導(dǎo)致的損失,由塞勒個人予以補償。商業(yè)保險公司最高可以提供3000萬美元的董事及高管責任險(簡稱D&O保險),但塞勒可以在此基礎(chǔ)上再補償1000萬美元。另外在這項保險新政6月生效前,他還愿意以個人名義為董事和高管們提供4000萬美元的D&O保險。為此,微策略公司每年還得向塞勒個人支付120萬美元的“保費”。
簡而言之,由于保險公司認為微策略公司的風險太高,塞勒只得自己充當起保險公司的角色,一旦哪天公司的董事會、高管以及他本人遭到股東訴訟,他就得自己掏錢來賠。
不少批評人士認為,塞勒的賭注將以失敗收場。研究公司New Constructs的創(chuàng)始人、會計專家大衛(wèi)·特雷納就笑稱:“說起瘋狂程度,塞勒可以說是‘小馬斯克’,只不過沒有馬斯克的商業(yè)天賦。”特雷納還表示:“他嚴重錯配了投資者的資本,市場會在短期內(nèi)會獎勵這種行為,但是他和股東們最終將以一種痛苦的方式達成和解?!?/p>
塞勒的創(chuàng)業(yè)故事:高中全班第一,24歲創(chuàng)辦微策略
從很早的時候開始,塞勒身上就融合了聰明和瘋狂這兩種特質(zhì)。塞勒的父親是美國空軍的一名軍士長,母親是一個鄉(xiāng)村歌手的女兒。他的少年時代是在俄亥俄州代頓市的萊特帕特森基地附近度過的。他高中就學(xué)會了開滑翔機,并且以全班第一名的成績從高中畢業(yè)。后來他獲得了美國后備軍官訓(xùn)練計劃(ROTC)獎學(xué)金,進入麻省理工學(xué)院學(xué)習科技史和航空航天學(xué)。他的論文研究的是意大利文藝復(fù)興時期的城邦的數(shù)學(xué)模型。但是由于體檢發(fā)現(xiàn)了心臟雜音,他只得放棄了成為飛行員或宇航員的念頭。在杜邦公司當了一段時間的計算機模擬規(guī)劃師后,1989年,24歲的塞勒與兩名MIT的校友共同創(chuàng)辦了一家咨詢公司,也就是現(xiàn)在的微策略公司。
當時塞勒意識到,互聯(lián)網(wǎng)具有強大的數(shù)據(jù)分析能力,可以幫助企業(yè)分析關(guān)于產(chǎn)品和市場的海量數(shù)據(jù)。很快,客戶們開始每年向微策略公司支付幾十萬美元的費用,用于創(chuàng)建直觀的圖表,來顯示一些直觀的消費趨勢,比如哪些消費者喜歡特定的飲料或者保險產(chǎn)品。微策略公司還與麥當勞簽訂了1000萬美元的合同,用于開發(fā)應(yīng)用,以評估促銷措施的效果。這份合同對微策略公司的早期發(fā)展起了重要的推動作用。
到了1998年,塞勒為了IPO進行為期11天的路演時,他的表現(xiàn)已經(jīng)非常出色了。當時他還邀請了一名《華盛頓郵報》的記者記錄整個過程。塞勒的銷售風格靠的是激情、舞臺技巧和宏大敘事,而不是數(shù)字。他天花亂綴的介紹要比PPT吸引人得多。他曾說過:“什么是聚焦,我們聚焦到可以把天花板燒出一個洞!”
這種以個人魅力開路的方法起到了奇效。華爾街普遍認為,塞勒雖然傲慢,但確實很有煽動力。從當時的新聞報道看,塞勒對數(shù)據(jù)分析技術(shù)報有極大熱情,而且對這項技術(shù)的未來描繪了一幅令人信服的路線圖,投資人幾乎都是憑借對他的信心簽約的。華爾街有一位軟件投資人,每次開會的時候都愛把軟件行業(yè)的CEO們的鄙視一番,認為他們“都是垃圾”,但是塞勒卻憑借三寸不爛之舌,硬生生地讓他簽了字。在貝爾斯登公司,塞勒只花了20分鐘,就讓這家公司的老板認購了10%的股份。全球最大基金公司富達集團被稱為業(yè)界最難攻破的后場,但用塞勒的話說,他攻破這家公司“就像扣籃一樣”摧枯拉朽。
在1998年6月掛牌上市后,微策略公司迅速成了華爾街的寵兒。到2000年3月,它的股價已經(jīng)達到發(fā)行價的16倍,市值近180億美元。
微策略公司也是企業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)分析技術(shù)的先行者。這項技術(shù)可以通過數(shù)據(jù)分析軟件,讓零售公司、制藥巨頭、銀行、保險公司和政府機構(gòu)從大量數(shù)據(jù)中發(fā)現(xiàn)一些重要的趨勢。憑借這手絕活,微策略公司拿下了300多個長期客戶,其中包括肯德基、輝瑞、迪士尼、安聯(lián)、勞氏和美國廣播公司等巨頭。以某家咖啡連鎖店為例,在使用了微策略公司的技術(shù)后,它就可以深度研究會員卡數(shù)據(jù),看哪一類顧客喜歡哪些品,這樣他們就可以向特定顧客推送新產(chǎn)品,或者發(fā)送優(yōu)惠信息。零售商使用微策略公司的技術(shù)后,可以優(yōu)化客戶服務(wù),縮短客服電話時長。保險公司則可以發(fā)現(xiàn)和提醒那些沒有按時服藥的患者。
當然,微策略公司并不是科技界的“超級巨星”。20多年來,這家公司多多少少有些“工匠精神”,基本上做的都是幕后工作。它的兩大競爭對手Salesforce和微軟智能云雖然起步較晚,但增長速度都很快。目前,微策略公司的年銷售額穩(wěn)定在5億美元區(qū)間,但它的生命力還是很旺盛的。
2000年3月20日,微策略公司宣布了一條令市場震動的消息——它的審計公司普華永道要求它重報前兩年的收入和利潤。在重新審計之后,該公司1998年和1999年的業(yè)績從2800萬美元盈利,變成了3700萬美元虧損。作為公司的聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人和前財務(wù)總監(jiān),塞勒以及另一位創(chuàng)始人和公司的財務(wù)總監(jiān)選擇向證監(jiān)會繳納1100萬美元罰款以了結(jié)相關(guān)指控,作為CEO,塞勒本人掏了830萬。但塞勒和其他卷入這樁丑聞的人都不承認有任何不當行為。
到2002年的年中,微策略公司的市值已狂跌至4000萬美元左右,較最高時下降了98%。
不過這時,塞勒又有了一個點子,正是這個點子導(dǎo)致了微策略公司的再度崛起。他預(yù)見到移動設(shè)備會出現(xiàn)爆發(fā)式增長,因此,他認為可以開發(fā)一些程序來幫助客戶分析從用戶的iPhone和筆記本電腦中收集的海量數(shù)據(jù)。在2009年前后,塞勒將他的軟件免費提供給了臉書的新任運營總監(jiān)謝麗爾·桑德伯格。2012年的一篇《財富》文章指出,微策略公司的技術(shù)對于臉書十分重要,它能讓銷售人員知道每個產(chǎn)品能帶來多少收入。臉書最終成為了微策略公司的一個穩(wěn)定客戶,每年能給它帶來幾百萬美元的收入,而塞勒也借助移動化的東風實現(xiàn)了持續(xù)盈利。
雖然生意做得不算特別大,但塞勒的個人生活卻堪稱奢華。他在邁阿密海灘有一幢別墅,里面有13間臥室和12間浴室。他還有一架價值4700萬美元的龐巴迪飛機和兩艘游艇。其中一艘游艇名叫“哈爾號”,是為了紀念1736年將他的祖先從荷蘭鹿特丹帶到費城的那艘船。船上有電子版的莫奈、梵高和畢加索的畫作,頂層甲板還有一個巨大的浴缸。他的備用游艇“亞瑟號”也裝飾得極為豪華,且擁有波利尼西亞風格的房間,船上還有兩臺瑪格麗特酒機。據(jù)2012年的那篇《財富》文章報道,一直未婚的塞勒據(jù)傳曾與約旦的努爾王后約會過。他還有自己的私人管家。
他還是一個派對達人。2010年他在華盛頓的W酒店給自己過生日,特地組織了一個野生動物主題的派對,還把一條緬甸白蟒蛇掛在脖子上拍照。每年感恩節(jié)前,他還會在曼哈頓SoHo舉辦搖滾節(jié),讓賓客們打扮成搖滾明星的樣子。
尋找大創(chuàng)意
在接受《財富》采訪時,塞勒的前同事們表示,除了華麗的社交生活,塞勒還渴望在科技界擁有廣泛的影響力。他很想成為一名著名的思想領(lǐng)袖。用一名離職員工的話說,就是“成為一個被萬眾仰慕的思想巨人”。
不過事實證明,他是很擅長觀察大趨勢的。他在2012年出版了一本暢銷書《移動化浪潮:移動智能將如何改變一切》。書中預(yù)見了移動設(shè)備將如何引發(fā)從零售到銀行的方方面面的革命。
塞勒在微策略公司內(nèi)部至少打造了兩項引人注目的新業(yè)務(wù)。一位塞勒的前同事曾這樣評價他:“他有預(yù)見未來的能力?!痹?000年代末,他開發(fā)了一個監(jiān)控平臺,讓家庭和企業(yè)可以通過一個網(wǎng)站(alarm.com)監(jiān)測自家的安全系統(tǒng)。2008年,他將這項業(yè)務(wù)以2800萬美元賣給了私募投資者?,F(xiàn)在,Alarm.com已經(jīng)是一家欣欣向榮的上市公司了,市值達到了35億美元。在2010年代初期,塞勒為呼叫中心開發(fā)了第一批基于云服務(wù)的自動語音應(yīng)答系統(tǒng),名將其命名為“天使”(Angel)。2013年,Genesys公司以1.1億美元收購了“天使”。根據(jù)Prescient & Strategic Intelligence公司的研究,呼叫中心軟件市場目前的規(guī)模為240億美元,預(yù)計未來十年將以18%的速度增長。而“天使”技術(shù)則幫助Genesys成為了該市場的一個重要參與者。
他很善于培養(yǎng)人才,也很善于經(jīng)營企業(yè)。一位已經(jīng)離職的經(jīng)理表示:“他會給每個和他共事過的人留下深刻印象?!睋?jù)說,塞勒總能一種“瘋狂的天才”的形象激勵人,讓人們覺得如果他的這些瘋狂的實驗?zāi)軌虺晒?,那么他們?yīng)該也能做到。與他共事過的人有他的MIT校友喬·佩恩,2013年他將自己創(chuàng)辦的軟件Eloqua以近10億美元賣給了甲骨文。他的聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人桑珠·班薩爾與CEO雷吉·阿加瓦爾共同創(chuàng)辦了Cvent公司,它的軟件可以幫助用戶策劃線下線下會議和其他活動。該公司去年12月進行了IPO,目前市值為28億美元。
不過,據(jù)塞勒的前同事稱,塞勒是一個喜怒無常、管理上事無巨細的人。有人說他“管理太嚴了”。塞勒是一個極度自信的人,因此他覺得自己什么事情都能親歷親為,因此他也不愿意過多賦權(quán)給手下的人。
他的前同事表示:“他不允許人們按照自己的方式做事,然而沒有這種做事的自由度,人們就無法成長。當然,我認為這還是利大于弊的。想想看,如果你每一步都跟著他投資,先是互聯(lián)網(wǎng),再是移動技術(shù)和云計算!”
塞勒這種情緒化和陰晴不定的風格也給管理層帶來了很大壓力,一定程度上阻礙了公司的發(fā)展。從2018年起,他已經(jīng)換了3個營銷總監(jiān),一個財務(wù)總監(jiān)才干了一年就離職了。塞勒留不住優(yōu)秀人才,這也解釋了他為什么沒有把“天使”技術(shù)和Alarm.com這樣優(yōu)秀的創(chuàng)意做大做強,而是賣給了其他公司。
微策略公司的股東架構(gòu),一定程度上助長了塞勒的控制狂傾向,使他的權(quán)力遠遠超過了他的所有權(quán)比例。該公司一共發(fā)行了兩種股票,A股只有1票的投票權(quán),而B股有10票投票權(quán),塞勒持有大量B股,因此即便他只占有五分之一的股份,卻控制了64%的投票權(quán),因此他幾乎可以在公司為所欲為。這樣無疑是有風險的,塞勒將公司的大量資產(chǎn)拿去炒幣,同時耽擱了原本盈利的核心業(yè)務(wù),這樣一來顯然使股東承受了重大風險。對于一家80%的股份由散戶投資者持有的公司而言,塞勒的自由裁量權(quán)顯然是過大了。
比特幣的最大推手
在將微策略公司的命運綁在比特幣身上的同時,塞勒本人幾乎成了全球頭號的比特幣推手。據(jù)報道,去年正是塞勒說服伊隆·馬斯克買了15億美元的比特幣,馬斯克的背書極大提振了比特幣的價格和聲譽。(不過特斯拉已經(jīng)在第二季度出售了大部分所持的比特幣,只保留了原始購買量的四分之一左右。)
從去年年底到今年6月份,比特幣的幣值一下子從將近7萬美元暴跌至不到2萬美元。這段時間,塞勒幾乎每天都要上電視,鼓吹比特幣是金融的未來,最近的下跌正是入手的好時機。不過他很少提及比特幣的實際用途,比如買房買車買菜等等,也不提它有抗通脹的作用,而是以他標志性的危言聳聽的語氣,稱全世界已經(jīng)處在經(jīng)濟大災(zāi)難的邊緣,比特幣才是一個穩(wěn)定的避風港。他在接受CNN采訪時說:“比特幣是一艘救生艇,它在狂風暴雨的海面上顛簸,為所有需要從沉船上逃生的人提供了希望?!比者€在推特上放了一張“激光眼”的照片,以表明他有意使比特幣成為一種新的經(jīng)濟賦權(quán)工具。(一位批評人士揶揄道:“他把自己當成宙斯了?!保?/p>
塞勒認為,比特幣的幣值幾年內(nèi)就會達到50萬美元,人們應(yīng)該“把要留給孫子的錢換成比特幣。”
出人意料的是,雖然近期比特幣崩盤了,但微策略公司的市值卻不跌反漲。從2020年8月到現(xiàn)在,雖然微策略公司的股價幾經(jīng)大起大落,但截至8月3日,已經(jīng)達到323美元每股,幾乎翻了三番。顯然是有看好區(qū)塊鏈的交易員將這家公司看作了比特幣的化身。
問題是,微策略公司的股市表現(xiàn)與它軟弱的基本面是相悖的。它的股價的漲幅遠遠超過了所持比特幣的升值部分。比如6月16日,比特幣的售價是20300美元,而微策略公司的股價是161美元,其市值為18億美元。到8月3日,比特幣的價格回彈15%,達到23300美元,相當于微策略公司持有的比特幣增值了4億美元。雖然該公司的基本業(yè)務(wù)在衰退,但在那周的時間里,它的股價卻幾乎翻了一番,達到312美元。這相當于它的市值一下子增加了18億美元,是它持有的比特幣增值部分的4倍多。
這種現(xiàn)象說明微策略公司有一種“塞勒效應(yīng)”,這位CEO能憑借天花亂綴的話術(shù),讓大批投資者相信他的看法。業(yè)界有6位分析師對微策略公司的股價做了12個月的預(yù)測,其中兩位持悲觀態(tài)度,認為其股價會跌至180至250美元區(qū)間,兩位認為當前300多美元的股價已經(jīng)到頂了,但還有兩位認為它還有巨大的增值空間。比如BTIG研究公司認為,它的股價有望漲到950美元。很多人也認為微策略公司的股價與它的炒幣收益不成比例,因此紛紛買空微策略公司。目前該公司大約有一半的股票被做空,這也創(chuàng)下了長期做空的紀錄。
有批評人士認為,塞勒的激進轉(zhuǎn)向?qū)е铝斯净A(chǔ)的軟件業(yè)務(wù)受損,而他恰恰需要軟件業(yè)務(wù)的現(xiàn)金流來支持買比特幣所借的幾十億債務(wù)。正在做空微策略公司的Bireme Capital公司分析師瑞安·巴倫廷表示:“比特幣的不確定性很高,我想象不來持有大量比特幣對它的基礎(chǔ)業(yè)務(wù)有什么好處。如果你是客戶的話,你可能也會擔心這其中的風險,那么找它合作還不如找微軟。”
另一方面,塞勒給微策略公司加的杠桿太重了,如果比特幣價格下跌,公司很可能將沒有足夠現(xiàn)金,來償還最早在2025年就要到期的巨額債務(wù)。
塞勒是從2020年8月開始購買比特幣的,到目前為止,他已經(jīng)借了24億巨債用來炒幣,其中涉及3種債務(wù)和1種保證金貸款。他還動用了公司賬上的大量現(xiàn)金,包括所有自由現(xiàn)金流,全部用來炒比特幣。
2021年2月,他還發(fā)行了10億美元新股,并將收入全部投入到比特幣上。當時,微策略公司的股價一度從2020年8月的124美元飆升至770美元。Bireme Capital公司的分析師巴倫廷表示:“在融資方面,塞勒是很聰明的,他在股價最高時賣掉了他的股份。但如果他用這些高價股票來買比特幣,效果還會好得多。但他卻選擇了舉借巨額債務(wù)來購買幣值極不穩(wěn)定的比特幣,屆時他的比特幣價值很可能遠遠低于他的債務(wù)?!?/p>
不管怎樣,塞勒已經(jīng)斥資40億美元購買了129699個比特幣,平均購價為31320美元。但是目前,比特幣的價格已跌至23300美元,也就是比他的入手價低了26%,他手中的比特幣目前只值30億美元,也就是縮水了10億美元。在微策略公司豪賭比特幣之前,該公司幾乎沒有任何債務(wù),因此也沒有利息支出。但現(xiàn)在它卻欠了債權(quán)人和對沖基金24億美元。它每年還要為這些借款支付4600萬美元的利息。
因此,現(xiàn)在的微策略公司面臨著四大威脅。首先,它的利息支出幾乎耗光了軟件業(yè)務(wù)的自由現(xiàn)金流。如果它的基本業(yè)務(wù)繼續(xù)縮水,那微策略公司就沒有犯錯的空間了,但這種可能性是存在的。正如巴倫廷所指的那樣,如果微策略公司損失了大量業(yè)務(wù),除了被迫賣掉比特幣,它毫無其他辦法支付利息。雖然塞勒發(fā)誓稱這種情況永遠不會發(fā)生。
第二,微策略公司苛刻的融資條件也是一個風險隱患。它是以“超長期投資”的名義搞到的借款,還款周期是3到6年。它還發(fā)行了5億美元的優(yōu)先擔保票據(jù),到期時間是2028年。此外它還發(fā)行了6.5億美元的可轉(zhuǎn)換債券,到期時間是2025年。但2028年到期的那筆債券規(guī)定,如果到了2025年,微策略公司沒有足夠現(xiàn)金償還那筆6.5億的債務(wù),則這5億美元的還款期將被提前到2025年,而且要優(yōu)先償還。而要還清這兩筆債務(wù),該公司至少需要準備10.5億美元的流動資產(chǎn)。
要知道,目前微策略公司持有的比特幣價值僅比它的債務(wù)高出7億美元左右,而且公司幾乎沒有多余的現(xiàn)金了,因為大家都知道它把所有的錢都花在了炒幣上。而由于利息支出大幅增加,它的軟件業(yè)務(wù)也無法產(chǎn)生可觀的現(xiàn)金流。當然,到2025年,比特幣也不見得會跌到讓它還不上債的水平。但如果比特幣價值穩(wěn)定在2萬美元以下,屆時它的債務(wù)就會超過所持比特幣的價值,使公司面臨資不抵債的風險。這還是建立在軟件收入一直能夠支付利息支出的前提下,這樣塞勒就不必賣幣來支付利息了。
第三,如果微策略公司繼續(xù)維持當前的處境,又會發(fā)生什么?如果比特幣一直維持在2萬多美元的水平,它又能產(chǎn)生足夠現(xiàn)金來支付利息,那么最有可能的結(jié)果,就是它的股價回歸其基本價值。巴倫廷認為:“如果微策略公司繼續(xù)維持現(xiàn)狀,炒幣帶來的股市溢價就會消退,因為它的核心業(yè)務(wù)在支付完利息后已經(jīng)不剩什么錢了。”剩下的只是比特幣賬戶與債務(wù)之間的價差,而目前這一數(shù)字已經(jīng)達到7億美元左右。這就是巴倫廷眼中微策略公司所剩的價值。如果巴倫廷的預(yù)測是正確的,那么該公司目前36億美元的市值還存在80%的水份。如果真按照他的劇本走,一旦塞勒的“忽悠”不靈了,微策略公司的股價就將大幅跳水。
再來說說最后一個風險因素。作為一家原本優(yōu)秀的軟件公司,如果其股價跌破了傳統(tǒng)價值,那么它的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層很可能會遭到一系列違反受信業(yè)務(wù)的訴訟,如前所述,塞勒本人對此已經(jīng)提供了相當一部分保險。但股東們?nèi)绻鹪V的話,理由也是很充分的,因為塞勒把股東的錢拿去投資了一種最不穩(wěn)定、最有爭議性的資產(chǎn),但同時卻讓一家本可以繼續(xù)賺取相當利潤的企業(yè)陷入了危機。
畢竟,塞勒之所以聞名于世,就是因為他對未來科技的預(yù)測經(jīng)常是準確的。雖然他的創(chuàng)業(yè)史起起伏伏,但他有時也確實是正確的。但不管怎樣,他將自己和比特幣綁在了一起,就是將公司的未來押在了一個極不穩(wěn)定的投機工具上。
至于這部“電梯”會將他帶向頂樓還是地下室,我們現(xiàn)在還無法判斷。(財富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:樸成奎
It was the early hours before MicroStrategy’s IPO in 1998, but founder Michael Saylor wasn’t assuaging big investors or running through projections, or even putting champagne on ice.
Ensconced in a $10,000-a-night three-story rooftop suite at Manhattan’s Palace Hotel, he found his attention captured by something else entirely: the suite’s private elevator. He was so enthralled by the opulent toy that, according to a press account at the time, the young founder spent the early morning hours obsessively riding it up and down.
Indeed, when looking at Michael Saylor’s 33-year career, one gets the sense that the wild ups and downs don’t faze him at all. In fact, he may even be chasing them. At the NASDAQ later that morning, MicroStrategy’s stock popped 100% from the offering price to garner an almost $1 billion valuation. By the close, Saylor’s stake reached $540 million.
Years later, MicroStrategy would become ensnared in an accounting scandal that sent the stock plunging 62% in one day; Saylor lost $6 billion in personal wealth. His swift financial decline even turned him into an answer to the Trivial Pursuit question: “Who has lost the most money in a single day?”
Still, the entrepreneur persisted. He went on to offer a promising new product to Facebook, sell a cloud-based software platform he’d built in-house for over $100 million, pen a prophet bestseller on the mobile future, and collect multiple yachts, one of which starred in the wild party scene of an Entourage movie.
But Saylor’s most outrageous swing of all is one that’s playing out right now at MicroStrategy. Over the past two years he has essentially bet his entire $500 million revenue company on the future of Bitcoin. On August 2, the company announced Saylor would step down as CEO after three decades at the helm to take the role of executive chairman. In a statement, Saylor attested that the new job will enable him to focus “on our Bitcoin acquisition strategy and related Bitcoin advocacy initiatives.” (Given that Saylor controls the voting stock, and will stay on executive chairman, it’s certain the decision was his, though the company did not respond to several requests for interviews with Saylor.) In a surreal twist, though the company announced a gigantic writedown of $918 million on its Bitcoin holdings, MicroStrategy’s stock soared the day after the news hit, rising 15% to $321 and gaining over $400 million in market cap.
The jump deepens the mysterious mythology of Michael Saylor. Did Wall Street cheer because the bedrock software business will fare far better when Saylor, distracted by Bitcoin, isn’t running things day-to-day? Or does having him as a full-time crypto evangelist actually lift Bitcoin’s prospects and hence brighten MicroStrategy’s future?
Saylor’s journey from entrepreneur to evangelist has been controversial: “An Elon Junior without the business talent”
It all started with an innocuous tweet. On Aug. 11, 2020, Saylor reinvented himself and MicroStrategy overnight by grabbing the kind of earth-changing mega-idea he’d long been chasing: He announced on Twitter that MicroStrategy had “embarked on its Bitcoin strategy” by spending $250 million to buy 21,454 Bitcoin at less than $12,000 each. Back in 2013, Saylor had trashed Bitcoin, tweeting that “its days are numbered.” But during the early days of the pandemic, Saylor experienced an epiphany. MicroStrategy was accumulating tons of cash—and Saylor fretted that the Fed’s easy-money policies would severely erode his war chest’s value by eventually stoking inflation.
“We just had the awful realization we were sitting on top of an $500 million ice cube,” he recalled in an interview at the time. Saylor shared Bitcoin creator Satoshi Nakamoto’s view that central banks will inevitably debase fiat currencies. For Saylor, crypto’s limited supply made it a reliable, incorruptible “store of value” that was “superior to cash.” Saylor held seminars at MicroStrategy to convince his lieutenants of Bitcoin’s world-changing advances, and “cheerfully assigned them homework and learning exercises.”
By February of 2021, six months from his original purchase, Saylor announced that MicroStrategy wasn’t just deploying Bitcoin to preserve cash earned from selling software. It would henceforth reinvent itself as a hybrid that combined its traditional franchise and an arm that specializes in accumulating Bitcoin as a business, based on the conviction that its value will rise substantially over time, and that using the software cash flows and borrowing to buy Bitcoin could boost MicroStrategy’s stock much faster than reinvesting in the core business, buying back stock, or making acquisitions.
At this point MicroStrategy has borrowed a staggering $2.4 billion to buy Bitcoin, of which it now owns 129,699 at a current market value of $3.1 billion. To build its cache, MicroStrategy has borrowed the equivalent of three times its entire base of shareholders’ equity when the adventure began. It’s now primarily a vehicle for speculating in the lead crypto—as it runs an enterprise analytics arm on the side. And though he owns just one-fifth of MicroStrategy’s shares, those shares control 64% of the votes, hence he calls the shots.
But this wild experiment has proved so risky that, Fortune has learned, MicroStrategy was unable to obtain full insurance for its directors and officers (D&O) policies from commercial insurers on terms it deemed financially acceptable. As a result, as detailed in its Q2 10Q, it reached an agreement with Saylor in which the founder and CEO indemnified the board members and C-suite for damages incurred in suits by shareholders. Private carriers are now providing D&O protection for up to $30 million in damages. But Saylor is personally indemnifying the directors and officers for another $10 million over and above claims paid by the carriers. He’s also providing D&O coverage for up to $40 million in claims for policies instituted before the new commercial policies were secured in June. The company is paying Saylor “premiums” of $1.2 million on an annualized basis to provide the coverage.
Put simply, Saylor is insuring himself, his board, and his executives against shareholder suits because the carriers who usually provide comprehensive coverage consider it too risky.
There are no shortage of critics predicting Saylor’s experiment will end in grief. David Trainer, an accounting expert and founder of research firm New Constructs quips that “in terms of madmen, Saylor is ‘Elon Junior,’ without the business talent.” Adds Trainer, “He’s massively misallocating his investors’ capital because the market rewarded that behavior in the short-term. It will reconcile in a painful way for himself and his shareholders.”
Saylor’s origin story: From the top of his high school class to founding MicroStrategy at age 24
From his early days, Saylor has been an unusual blend of a deep intellectual and a carnival barker. His father was a U.S. Air Force master sergeant, his mother the daughter of a country singer. As a teenager growing up near the Wright-Patterson base in Dayton, Ohio, Saylor learned to fly gliders and finished first in his high school class. He went to MIT on an ROTC scholarship, studying the history of technology, aeronautics, and astronautics. His thesis presented a mathematical model for an Italian Renaissance city-state. A benign heart murmur grounded his ambitions to become a pilot or astronaut, and after a brief spell as a computer simulation planner at DuPont, Saylor at age 24 cofounded MicroStrategy in 1989 as a consulting firm with two friends from MIT.
The group recognized the internet’s power for the parsing troves of data that companies collected on their products and markets. Soon clients were paying MicroStrategy hundreds of thousands a year to create easy-to-read charts and grids showing key trends in the types of consumers who preferred different soft drinks or insurance products. Winning a $10 million contract from McDonald’s to develop applications for analyzing the effectiveness of its promotions furnished an early boost.
By the time the 11-day 1998 IPO road show rolled around, Saylor had hit his stride, inviting a Washington Post reporter along to chronicle the process. Saylor’s selling style relied on passion, stagecraft, and a lofty vision, not numbers. His rah-rah intro to the official presentation got more buzz than the slideshow: “We’re so focused, we’ll burn a hole in the ceiling!” he’d proclaim.
The I-fill-a-room approach worked big-time. The Wall Street crowd viewed Saylor as arrogant but persuasive. According to the rollicking account, Saylor showed so much passion, and presented such a compelling road map for the future of data analytics, that bankers signed on virtually as a leap of faith. An ultra-arrogant software investor started the meeting by raging about how much he despised most of the industry’s CEOs. But somehow Saylor’s grand vision, his argument that his products would “purge ignorance from the planet,” got the investor to sign on. At Bear Stearns, it took Saylor just 20 minutes before his host scribbled “10%” on the prospectus, signaling his firm would take that chunk of the offering, and walked out. So impressed were the notoriously tough gatekeepers from Fidelity, the world’s largest fund purveyor, that winning their commitment, in Saylor’s words, amounted to “a slam dunk.”
Following the IPO in June 1998, MicroStrategy dazzled Wall Street to shine as a darling of the dotcom frenzy. By March of 2000, its shares had soared 16-fold from the offering price, ballooning its market cap to almost $18 billion.
The company was a pioneer in an important new field: enterprise analytics, software programs that enable retailers, pharma giants, banks, insurers, and government agencies to spot key trends by parsing vast streams of data. It would eventually boast a roster of over 300 mainly longstanding clients, including KFC, Pfizer, Disney, Allianz, Lowe’s, and ABC. Using MicroStrategy’s technology, a coffee chain can dive deep into loyalty card data to identify which flavors different types of customers prefer, so they can target the best candidates for a new offering by sending special offers to their mobile devices. Retailers deploy MicroStrategy’s analytics to find the responses reps use at contact centers that best help customers and shorten calls. Insurers summon its programs to spot and nudge patients suffering from chronic conditions who aren’t taking their medication on schedule.
To be sure, MicroStrategy never achieved tech superstardom. For two decades, Saylor ran his brainchild in a workmanlike fashion, more or less from the shadows. MicroStrategy bumped along as a reliable plodder. Its two main rivals in the field, Salesforce.com and Microsoft’s Intelligent Cloud business, home of its Azure product, started later but grew fast, while MicroStrategy flatlined at annual sales in the $500 million range. Still, it remained a durable survivor.
But on Mar. 20, 2000, MicroStrategy rocked the markets by announcing that its auditors, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, required their client to radically restate revenues and profits for the previous two years. The restatements for 1998 and 1999 took MicroStrategy from a previously reported $28 million gain from operations to a $37 million loss. Saylor, a cofounder, and the former CFO paid the SEC $11 million to settle the charges, the CEO surrendering $8.3 million. Neither Saylor nor the others implicated in the scandal admitted wrongdoing.
By mid-2002, MicroStrategy’s valuation had dropped to around $40 million, down some 98% from its peak.
But Saylor had an idea—one that would lead to an astounding comeback. Anticipating the explosion in mobile devices, he foresaw a niche in providing the programs that enable clients to analyze the vast troves of customer data collected over iPhones or laptops. Around 2009, Saylor offered his software to Facebook’s new COO, Sheryl Sandberg—for free. MicroStrategy became central to the social network’s infrastructure, providing such functions as informing salespeople how much revenue each produces, according to a 2012 Fortune story by David Caplan. Facebook eventually proved a multimillion-dollar-a-year customer, and Saylor rode the mobile wave to achieve a trajectory of moderate but consistent profitability.
But if the business was less than flashy, Saylor’s personal life was anything but. Among his holdings: Villa Vecchia in Miami Beach, an opulent mansion built for the president of F.W. Woolworth that has 13 bedrooms and 12 baths. He also has a $47 million Bombardier jet and two yachts. The 147-foot Harle, reportedly named after the ship that brought his ancestors from Rotterdam in the Netherlands to Philadelphia in 1736, features artwork databases that display digital versions of Monets, Van Goghs, and Picassos, not to mention a giant hot tub on the top deck. His backup party vessel, the similarly sized Usher, welcomes guests to art deco and Polynesian-themed staterooms, and offers two on-board margarita machines. According to the 2012 Fortune piece, the never-married Saylor was rumored to have dated Queen Noor of Jordan, and had his own private butler.
His host-with-the-most parties are legendary. At his birthday celebration at Washington’s W Hotel in 2010, Saylor organized a safari-themed affair festooned with exotic animals—draping an albino Burmese python around his own neck for photos. Each year just before Thanksgiving, Saylor holds his renowned Rocktoberfest gala in Manhattan’s SoHo and assorted venues, where the guests dress as rock stars.
Looking for his big idea
Flamboyant social life aside, what Saylor really craves is widespread influence in the tech world, former associates interviewed by Fortune say. According to those sources, Saylor yearns to be a renowned thought leader—“to be widely admired as an intellectual powerhouse,” in the words of one departed employee.
Indeed, he’s been prescient at spotting trends: His 2012 book—briefly a bestseller—The Mobile Wave: How Mobile Intelligence Will Change Everything foresaw the revolution that mobile devices would unleash on everything from retailing to banking.
Saylor created at least two remarkable new businesses inside MicroStrategy. “He’s got the ability to see the future,” says a former associate. In the late aughts, he developed a pioneering platform that enabled homes and businesses to monitor security systems over the web called alarm.com. He sold it to private equity investors in 2008 for $28 million. Today, Alarm.com is a thriving publicly traded enterprise valued at $3.5 billion. In the early 2010s, Saylor developed one of the first automated voice response systems for contact centers, a cloud-based service called Angel. Genesys bought Angel in 2013 for $110 million. According to a study by Prescient & Strategic Intelligence, the contact center software market is now a $24 billion business forecast to grow at 18% over the next decade—and the Angel deal helped make Genesys a major player in the field.
He’s good at incubating talent as well as businesses. “He leaves a mark on anyone who works with him,” says a departed manager. By all accounts, Saylor inspires people with a kind of mad-genius daring that makes them believe that if he can make these crazy experiments work, they can too. Among his successful alums are Joe Payne, who in 2013 sold software startup Eloqua to Oracle for almost $1 billion; and his cofounder, Sanju Bansal, who together with CEO Reggie Aggarwal launched Cvent, which provides software for planners of in-person and mobile conferences and other events. It IPO’d last December, and now carries a market cap of $2.8 billion.
Still, former associates say that Saylor is a highly temperamental micromanager who, as one source puts it, “controls too tightly.” Saylor’s supreme self-confidence made him believe that he could run everything himself, and made him reluctant to delegate strong operating roles to lieutenants, according to ex-employees.
“He doesn’t allow people to do things their own way, and over time,” the source continues. “And that freedom [is what] creates more growth over time. Still, there’s more good here than bad. Imagine if you’d invested in his theses over time, in the web, mobile technology, the cloud!”
Saylor’s emotional, mercurial style ignites heavy churn in the C-suite, hindering MicroStrategy’s growth. Since 2018, he’s had three chief marketing officers, and a CFO left in 2020 after just one year. His problem keeping good people may also explain why he didn’t fully build such promising ideas as Angel and Alarm.com but instead sold the technology.
Enabling Saylor’s controlling tendencies is MicroStrategy’s shareholder structure, which awards him power far in excess of his ownership position. The company has two classes of stock, and Saylor’s ownership of B shares that carry 10 votes versus one for the class A give him 64% of the votes, though he owns just one-fifth of the total shares. In effect, Saylor can do whatever he wants at MicroStrategy. The danger is that by putting its assets in harm’s way, and undermining its formerly profitable core business, he destroys immense value for his shareholders. Saylor has already taken extraordinary, possibly quixotic liberties with a business that’s 80% owned by public shareholders.
Bitcoin’s biggest booster
At the same time he wildly shifted MicroStrategy’s fortunes into Bitcoin, Saylor emerged as arguably the world’s leading promoter for the cryptocurrency. According to press reports, it was Saylor who helped convince Elon Musk to buy $1.5 billion in Bitcoin early last year, an endorsement that greatly boosted its price and reputation. (Tesla sold most of its Bitcoin holdings in Q2, and retains just one-quarter of its original purchases.)
Bitcoin’s steep drop from almost $70,000 in late 2021 to under $20,000 in June 2022 rallied Saylor to appear almost daily on TV arguing that Bitcoin is the future of finance, and that the selloff makes it an even more fantastic buy. On CNBC, CNN, Fox’s Tucker Carlson Tonight or CoinDesk’s webcast, Saylor typically appears clad in an open-collared black shirt, sporting a shaggy mop of gray hair, seated before a fireplace at his penthouse apartment on the Georgetown waterfront in Washington, D.C. He seldom specifies practical uses for Bitcoin, such as its potential as a currency for buying and selling cars and groceries, or as a hedge against inflation. Instead, in his trademark high-pitched delivery, Saylor argues that the world is on the verge of an economic cataclysm, and that Bitcoin represents a haven of stability. “Bitcoin is a lifeboat, tossed on a stormy sea, offering hope to anyone that needs to get off the sinking ship,” he intoned on CNN. Saylor’s Twitter feed features his image emitting smoke through flashing “l(fā)aser eyes” that “signal intent to make Bitcoin an instrument of economic empowerment.” (“He thinks he’s Zeus,” snaps one critic.)
Saylor argues that Bitcoin will reach $500,000 within a few years, and that folks should “take the money they were going to give their grandchildren and convert it to Bitcoin.”
The crazy thing is, despite the Bitcoin crash, amazingly, MicroStrategy is worth far more now than when Saylor started his adventure: Since August 2020, despite huge spikes and deep drops along the way, MicroStrategy’s stock has almost tripled to $323 as of August 3. Crypto-loving traders clearly see MicroStrategy as a proxy for Bitcoin.
The problem? MicroStrategy’s performance is defying its weak fundamentals. Its stock consistently posts increases that far outstrip the dollar gains for the Bitcoin holdings: On June 16, with Bitcoin selling at around $20,300, MicroStrategy’s shares traded at $161, and its market cap stood at $1.8 billion. By August 3, Bitcoin had rebounded by 15% to $23,300, raising the value of MicroStrategy’s strongbox by around $400 million. But even though its basic business was fading, its shares over those six weeks almost doubled to $312. That moonshot added $1.8 billion to its market cap, more than four times the amount the Bitcoin on its books swelled in value.
This phenomenon suggests a “Saylor premium”: that the CEO’s charismatic salesmanship is converting hordes of believer-shareholders to his vision. Of the six analysts providing 12-month price forecasts for MicroStrategy, two are pessimistic, predicting a drop to between $180 and $250; two reckon the stock have maxed out that the current $300-plus; and two see room for big increases, with BTIG Research expecting a jump to $950. The view that the leap in the stock price is far out of proportion to its gains on Bitcoin has prompted short-sellers to pour into MicroStrategy. Around half of its shares are currently sold short, a record for this longstanding target for shorts.
According to critics, Saylor’s big switch is hurting its bedrock software franchise, and he needs big cash flows from that business to support the new billions in debt. “I can’t imagine that the uncertainty of holding all that Bitcoin can be good for the underlying business,” says Ryan Ballentine of Bireme Capital, who’s shorting MicroStrategy shares. “If you’re a client and worry it could cause big problems, why not go to a competitor like Microsoft?”
Saylor has also leveraged MicroStrategy so heavily that if the price of Bitcoin drops, it will lack the cash to repay big chunks of debt that could come due as early as 2025.
Since Saylor started buying Bitcoin in August 2020, he’s borrowed a staggering $2.4 billion to purchase coins, using three separate bond offerings and a margin loan. He’s also tapped most of the company’s pre-Bitcoin cash, and all of its free cash flow, to buy more.
In addition, he floated a $1 billion equity offering in February of 2021, and plowed all the proceeds into Bitcoin. At the time, MicroStrategy shares had jumped from $124 in August of 2020 to $770. “On the financing side, Saylor was smart to sell his shares at such an overpriced number,” says short-seller Ballentine of Bireme Capital. “He would have been a lot better off buying all of his Bitcoin with overpriced stock. Instead, he’s stuck with loads of debt that bought super-volatile Bitcoin that could become worth a lot less than the debt.”
The rub is that Saylor has spent $4 billion to accumulate 129,699 Bitcoin at an average price of around $31,320. But today, with Bitcoin selling at roughly $23,300 or 26% less, his holdings are worth $3 billion, or $1 billion less than he paid. Before the Bitcoin adventure, MicroStrategy held virtually no debt and hence carried no interest expense. But today, it owes $2.4 billion to bondholders and hedge funds. It’s also paying $46 million a year in interest on those borrowings.
Hence, MicroStrategy faces four big threats. First, its interest costs wipe out the free cash flow from the software business, after subtracting the cost of options grants. MicroStrategy has no margin for error if profits from the basic business shrink. And that’s a strong possibility. As short-seller Ballentine points out, clients know that if MicroStrategy loses any substantial amount of business, it won’t be able to cover its interest payments without selling Bitcoin, something Saylor swears will never happen.
Second, the tight conditions of MicroStategy’s financings also raise red flags. It’s borrowing on terms of under three to six years for financing what it bills as an ultra-long-term investment. It issued $500 million on senior secured notes officially due in 2028, and also floated a $650 million convertible bond offering payable in 2025. But the covenants on the 2028 senior notes stipulate that if the company doesn’t have the full $650 million in cash available to pay off the 2025 offering when it comes due, the maturity on the $500 bond jumps to 2025, and is payable ahead of the $650 million bond. So as early as 2025, if MicroStrategy doesn’t have the $650 million in cash, it will need to pay the $500 million and, after satisfying that debt, retire the original 2025 issue for $650 million in cash. To make both payments, MicroStrategy would need $1.05 billion in liquidity.
Keep in mind that right now, its Bitcoin strongbox is worth just $700 million or so more than its debt. And MicroStrategy holds little extra cash. It’s famously spending everything on Bitcoin. Nor is the software business generating any significant cash, due to the big jump in interest expense. It’s unlikely that the price of Bitcoin will drop so low that MicroStrategy won’t be able to repay the debt as the bonds and margin loan come due through 2025. But if the price settles at below $20,000, by that point it could owe more than the value of the coins on its books. The company risks being effectively insolvent. And that’s assuming the software business generates the cash to cover its current interest so that Saylor doesn’t have to start dumping coins to keep the payments current.
Third, what happens if MicroStrategy just bumps along much as it’s doing now? Bitcoin’s price stays in the low to mid-$20,000s, and it produces enough cash to pay its interest. The most likely outcome is that the shares revert to their fundamental value. “If MicroStrategy muddles along, the crypto-insanity premium goes away,” says Ballentine. “The core business is making no money after interest payments.” What’s left is the difference between the Bitcoin holdings, and the debt incurred to build the stockpile. Right now, that number is around $700 million. And that’s the underlying worth Ballentine is placing on all of MicroStrategy. If he’s right, the company right now, at a market cap of $3.6 billion, is overpriced by around 80%. In the muddling scenario, the math takes precedence, Saylor’s Pied Piper appeal evaporates, and MicroStrategy’s stock takes a deep dive.
Which brings us back to the final risk factor. If the stock dives below its traditional value as a sound software franchise, MicroStrategy is likely to see a rash of suits against its leaders for breach of fiduciary duty, and as previously stated, it’s Saylor himself who is providing a big part of the coverage at this point. The suing shareholders could have a strong case. Saylor has loaded his creation with gigantic debt to amass the most volatile and controversial of assets, while endangering a stalwart that could have kept minting modest profits for years to come.
In the end, Michael Saylor is famous for his outrageously self-confident predictions about the technological future. Despite the violent ups and downs, he’s been right some of the time. But by hitching himself to Bitcoin, he’s staked his company’s future on a wildly volatile speculative vehicle.
It’s impossible to tell whether this elevator is heading for the penthouse or the sub-basement.