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高盛集團(tuán)首席執(zhí)行官:拒絕遠(yuǎn)程辦公

遠(yuǎn)程辦公在全球范圍內(nèi)已經(jīng)是大勢所趨,但蘇德巍卻不怕別人說他是“老古董”。

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高盛集團(tuán)首席執(zhí)行官蘇德巍。圖片來源:PHOTOGRAPH BY CELESTE SLOMAN FOR FORTUNE

今年2月1日的上午,高盛集團(tuán)(Goldman Sachs)重新開放了其位于曼哈頓下城、高44層的總部辦公室。但是,首席執(zhí)行官蘇德?。―avid Solomon)卻對當(dāng)日的員工出勤率十分不滿。在奧密克戎變異毒株席卷紐約后,高盛的辦公樓被封禁一個月。幸運的是,現(xiàn)在高盛大樓已經(jīng)重新開放,員工又可以在辦公室一起工作了,這正是蘇德巍熱切期盼的場景,而且全公司上下都知道這位首席執(zhí)行官的想法。然而即便在兩周前就已經(jīng)發(fā)出了通知,但直到中午時分,總部的1萬名員工中卻只有差不多5000人出現(xiàn)在辦公室,這讓蘇德巍感到了挑戰(zhàn)。

不溫不火的首日出勤率是反?,F(xiàn)象,還是某種預(yù)兆?

遠(yuǎn)程辦公在全球范圍內(nèi)已經(jīng)是大勢所趨,但蘇德巍也不怕別人說他是“老古董”??萍季揞^們,包括賽富時(Salesforce)、推特(Twitter)、Meta(Facebook 母公司)、Spotify都已經(jīng)允許世界各地成千上萬的員工全職遠(yuǎn)程工作。高盛在華爾街的一些競爭對手,例如花旗集團(tuán)(Citigroup)和瑞銀(UBS),也會允許員工定期居家工作,并表示該政策將增強公司在招聘和留住優(yōu)秀人才方面的競爭優(yōu)勢。蘇德巍表達(dá)過與之相反的觀點。他在2021年2月的一次金融行業(yè)會議上表示,遠(yuǎn)程辦公“對我們來說并不理想,它不是新常態(tài)。而是一種失常,我們將盡快糾正。”

上述觀點發(fā)表一年后的今天,蘇德巍仍然初心不改。2月1日,重回辦公室的第一天,蘇德巍告訴《財富》雜志:“高盛集團(tuán)吸引著數(shù)以千計出類拔萃的年輕人前來學(xué)習(xí)如何工作,創(chuàng)建優(yōu)質(zhì)人脈網(wǎng)絡(luò),并努力為客戶做好服務(wù),這是我們的制勝秘訣。而其中最關(guān)鍵的是大家在一起,與經(jīng)驗更豐富的同事合作共事。如果我們打破這種聯(lián)結(jié),將遠(yuǎn)程辦公作為常態(tài),雖然大家仍然能夠完成大量工作?!碑?dāng)然,高盛自身的表現(xiàn)證明了這一點:過去兩年是高盛有史以來業(yè)績最好的兩年,公司報告顯示,2021年利潤達(dá)到創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的216億美元。(僅去年一年,蘇德巍就拿到了3500萬美元薪酬。)“但是如此一來,我們獨特的基礎(chǔ)也將被磨滅?!?/p>

因此,蘇德巍得出結(jié)論:“高盛要保持這一獨特的文化基礎(chǔ),必須將大家重新聚在一起。”

蘇德巍是在徒勞地抗拒潮流?還是說,正如他主張的那樣,整個商界對新冠疫情帶來的一系列臨時需求反應(yīng)過度,忽視了人類彼此間根深蒂固的力量?所有公司都必須直面上述問題,畢竟利益攸關(guān)。提倡混合辦公制度的企業(yè)在幾年后可能會發(fā)現(xiàn),員工面對面交流的減少導(dǎo)致公司的文化和創(chuàng)造力雙雙萎縮,而要恢復(fù)則可能需更長時間。但如果上述風(fēng)險壓根沒有發(fā)生,那么堅持要求員工坐班的雇主就將面臨地租超支損失。更嚴(yán)重的是,他們可能無法吸引并留住優(yōu)秀人才。

作為極端案例,高盛的做法極具啟發(fā)意義??赡軟]有哪個大公司比高盛更重視面對面工作,正因如此,當(dāng)初新冠疫情來襲,擺在高盛面前的是一場獨具威脅的危機。

高盛的辦公室遍布世界六大洲,公司很早就預(yù)見了新冠疫情的威脅。2020年開年不久,高盛的全球各大職能主管和其他高管開始舉行電話會議,討論集團(tuán)的新冠疫情應(yīng)對計劃,每周至少兩次,一直延續(xù)至今。與會高管很快得出了清晰的結(jié)論:新冠病毒將從亞洲傳播到歐洲再到北美;供應(yīng)鏈將被打亂,變得脆弱不堪;關(guān)閉辦公場所將不可避免。

新冠疫情迫使高盛的管理層做出了一系列艱難決定。1979年,德高望重的高級合伙人約翰·懷特黑德在負(fù)責(zé)編撰高盛的12大業(yè)務(wù)原則時寫道:“我們做任何事情都強調(diào)團(tuán)隊合作?!钡绻粓F(tuán)隊的成員各自居家辦公,這個團(tuán)隊還可以正常運轉(zhuǎn)嗎?”

人力主管本特利·德拜爾是澳大利亞人,曾經(jīng)在強生公司(Johnson & Johnson)任職,2020年1月加入高盛,當(dāng)時正值新冠疫情來襲。在高盛內(nèi)部的播客中,他回憶到自己剛上任就要“做出可能連公司領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層都極不待見的各類調(diào)整,直到新冠疫情的嚴(yán)重性更加明顯后,這種窘境才有所改善”。個中滋味,苦不堪言。我不得不及時采取行動,改變“那些被奉為圭臬、無人敢碰的公司政策和做法?!?/p>

2020年3月中旬,與大多數(shù)其他大型銀行同步,高盛關(guān)閉了在美洲、歐洲、中東和非洲的所有辦公場所,亞洲辦公室在此之前就已經(jīng)關(guān)閉。紐約總部僅允許一小部分人進(jìn)出,包括少數(shù)需要使用總部的設(shè)備來做市的交易員和零星的幾位高管。整個新冠疫情期間,蘇德巍都堅持正常到公司上班。

轉(zhuǎn)眼間,高盛有98%的員工都開始居家辦公,這實在太魔幻了。德拜爾回憶道:“哪怕是在新冠疫情高峰期的1月時問我,這種情況會不會出現(xiàn)在高盛,我都會認(rèn)為你是瘋了。”

與大多數(shù)的其他大型銀行相比,高盛并沒有更早要求員工返回辦公室,相反,有些情況下高盛給出的期限甚至更寬容。但從一開始,高盛的管理層就表示,無論員工何時重返辦公室,都要確保辦公室能夠隨時正常運轉(zhuǎn)。正因如此,供應(yīng)鏈的中斷尤為引人擔(dān)憂。

2021年6月,德爾塔疫情過后,員工陸續(xù)進(jìn)入高盛紐約總部大樓,準(zhǔn)備重返工作崗位。圖片來源:Michael Nagle—Bloomberg/Getty Images

高盛的部分辦公室內(nèi)部有很多項目依靠供應(yīng)商管理,比如:內(nèi)部診所、差旅安排、技術(shù)服務(wù)等等。據(jù)知情人士透露,高盛在復(fù)工后需要一眾供應(yīng)商同步到現(xiàn)場辦公,而高盛深知在新冠疫情停工期間,這些供應(yīng)商“可能拿不到報酬。”但是為確保各服務(wù)供應(yīng)商隨叫隨到,高盛在新冠疫情期間仍然堅持向停工的供應(yīng)商支付服務(wù)費。

新冠疫情初期,蘇德巍擔(dān)心的另一個大問題是即將在夏季入職的新員工。在大多數(shù)公司,新人入職可能僅僅是一件需要操辦的事情,但對高盛而言,這可是頭等大事。若想明白其中緣由,并進(jìn)而理解新冠疫情為何讓高盛如此受傷,就必須先了解高盛不同尋常的運營模式。

高盛是一家擁有153年悠久歷史的華爾街巨頭,但它又是一家非常年輕化的公司。在高盛的全球43900名員工中,約有73%是千禧一代或Z世代,50%的員工年齡在20歲到30歲之間。但隨著職場晉升,“后浪團(tuán)”的人數(shù)會逐漸減少,因為高盛內(nèi)部的職級架構(gòu)極其扁平,職場新人和高管之間只有4層基礎(chǔ)職級,分別是:分析員、助理、副總裁(美國以外地區(qū)稱為執(zhí)行董事)和董事總經(jīng)理。雖然高盛自1999年上市以來一直沒有成為合伙企業(yè),但一小部分常務(wù)董事可以兼獲合伙人頭銜?,F(xiàn)有的合伙人其實是指參與單獨獎金計劃的董事總經(jīng)理。

每年夏天都會有大約3000名新員工入職高盛,其中大多數(shù)人剛剛獲得學(xué)士學(xué)位。據(jù)培訓(xùn)公司W(wǎng)all Street Oasis報道,高盛的分析師在入職首年的薪酬豐厚,全球范圍內(nèi)的平均薪金達(dá)到136400美元,雖然略低于各大主要銀行的平均薪酬(143000美元),但其培訓(xùn)、人脈和威望對應(yīng)聘者非常有吸引力。新人通常會報名參加為期兩年的培訓(xùn)項目,在項目接近尾聲時,高盛會設(shè)法留住其中的佼佼者,哪怕他們原本想去商學(xué)院繼續(xù)深造。而其余的大部分人將離開高盛從事其他工作。正常情況下,在兩年項目結(jié)束后,十個人中只會留下兩個人。

對高盛和年輕分析師們而言,這種模式都大有裨益,即使他們中的大多數(shù)人最終會選擇離開高盛。通過密切觀察,高盛從成群出類拔萃的新員工中遴選出最優(yōu)秀的人才,其余的人則能夠帶著鍍金的履歷闖蕩世界。許多人會到金融行業(yè)的其他領(lǐng)域就業(yè)。一位已經(jīng)退休的高盛高級合伙人表示:“像KKR集團(tuán)、黑石(Blackstones)這樣的企業(yè)都在坐等高盛招聘到優(yōu)秀人才,替他們培訓(xùn)好,然后伺機挖墻腳?!痹谌蚍秶鷥?nèi),這些離開高盛的新人有的會一路晉升,擔(dān)任要職,其所在公司常常也會變成高盛的客戶。

蘇德巍解釋了高盛體系的運轉(zhuǎn)方式。“我們每年為公司的各大職能部門招聘數(shù)以千計的優(yōu)秀本科畢業(yè)生。這其中的一部分人會留下來。很多人會離開,去追求別的事業(yè)。但他們都會因為曾經(jīng)在高盛工作而感到自豪。他們會時?;叵肫疬@段經(jīng)歷和其中的收獲。此外,他們來自世界各地,都是極其聰穎、非常有趣的人。試想你今年也是22歲,剛剛加入一個由這些同齡人組成的3000人的群體,彼此交流互動會是一個多么美妙的體驗。更不必說這個群體中還有23至26歲的其他年輕人,其中不乏專業(yè)層面的交流,還可以幫助你打造一個持續(xù)一生的‘朋友圈’。這就是高盛的生態(tài)系統(tǒng),富有活力而且異常強大?!?/p>

這一點也被競爭對手和行業(yè)專家所廣泛認(rèn)同。在《財富》雜志最新發(fā)布的“全球最受贊賞的公司”榜單中,決定排名先后的投票者,包括業(yè)內(nèi)頂級高管和董事,以及關(guān)注該行業(yè)的股票分析師們,共同將高盛推上業(yè)內(nèi)人才管理第一名的寶座,領(lǐng)先于摩根大通(JPMorgan Chase)、摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)、美國銀行(Bank of America)、花旗集團(tuán)(Citigroup)、匯豐銀行(HSBC)等眾多企業(yè)。

有了這一背景信息,就不難理解在過去兩年內(nèi),高盛為何那樣傷神。蘇德巍說:“新冠疫情中,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)一個現(xiàn)象,如果你每天在家除了努力工作,就是看電視,那么在高盛工作所帶來的那種美好而獨特的體驗就會慢慢消失?!比绻悛氉栽诩夜ぷ鳎敲闯掷m(xù)一生的人際網(wǎng)絡(luò)、向全球頂尖人才學(xué)習(xí)的機會、由數(shù)以千計榮譽等身的同齡人所創(chuàng)造的那種令人陶醉的氛圍就都會消失殆盡。而隨著時間的推移,高盛可能會失去其獨特的魅力和光環(huán)。對高盛而言,遠(yuǎn)程辦公遠(yuǎn)不僅僅是一個挑戰(zhàn),還會破壞“公司的生態(tài)系統(tǒng)”。

問題可能會愈發(fā)嚴(yán)重。內(nèi)森·里澤在2019年1月入職高盛的倫敦辦事處,擔(dān)任分析師,2021年4月便選擇離開,因為他感覺自己已經(jīng)精疲力盡,需要為自己的健康著想。他告訴《財富》雜志:“我見證過新冠疫情和封鎖的至暗時刻?!彼麑⒆约旱慕?jīng)歷寫成文章,發(fā)表在《紐約雜志》(New York)上,文中寫道:“當(dāng)我開始居家工作時,最先意識到的是高盛的辦公室福利有多好?!崩绻緝?nèi)部的醫(yī)護(hù)中心和健身房。“無論是在辦公室一起加班到深夜,還是在健身房里并肩揮灑汗水,努力與他人共同追求卓越,都充滿著團(tuán)結(jié)人心的魔力。而這一切在線上環(huán)境中是不可能實現(xiàn)的。”里澤告訴《財富》雜志,他離開高盛是因為不喜歡工作本身,如果不是這樣,“我想立即回到那里。”

里澤的經(jīng)歷絕非少數(shù)。此次新冠疫情對高盛的分析師們來說十分殘酷,原因有兩個。首先,在辦公室上班,有很多因素讓人覺得再辛苦也值得;其次就是強制居家辦公期間,分析員們承擔(dān)著與往常相同的高強度工作,卻失去了親自到公司上班所帶來的好處。除此之外,本就辛苦的工作突然變得更加艱難,這已經(jīng)是危險信號。

高盛為期兩年的分析師項目從來都是一場鏖戰(zhàn):每周工作80小時到100小時,壓力巨大,充滿著不可能完成的節(jié)點。新冠疫情驟然改變了很多行業(yè),其中一些行業(yè)(比如電子商務(wù)、視頻直播、互聯(lián)網(wǎng)服務(wù))順勢崛起,另一些行業(yè)(例如酒店業(yè)、旅游業(yè)、能源產(chǎn)業(yè))則深受打擊,然而所有這些行業(yè)都迫切地需要金融服務(wù)。受此影響,高盛在2020年的營收增長了22%,2021年更是猛增至33%,創(chuàng)全球并購交易史上最高年收入紀(jì)錄,也讓高盛在全球企業(yè)購并業(yè)務(wù)的排名中穩(wěn)坐頭把交椅。2021年也是史上IPO數(shù)量最多的一年,高盛在該業(yè)務(wù)領(lǐng)域同樣排名第一位。但對高盛的分析師們來說,這意味著更為漫長的工作周,和更大的壓力。

據(jù)《紐約郵報》(New York Post)后來報道,早在2020年4月,就有居家辦公的高盛分析師抱怨:工作時無法使用公司的高性能電腦,只能使用自己的,而且以前在辦公室加班到晚上8點會有25美元的餐補現(xiàn)在也沒有了。不滿情緒“偷走”了員工的時間和注意力,然而工作量還在不斷增加。10個月后,高盛的舊金山辦公室的13名分析師聯(lián)合向領(lǐng)導(dǎo)們發(fā)送了一份PPT,其中詳細(xì)羅列了他們的各種不滿:上周平均工作105小時,上個月每周工作98小時,平均凌晨3點才能夠睡覺,身體和心理健康狀況急轉(zhuǎn)直下。

新冠疫情同樣削弱了其他一些重要的活動體驗。比哈佛大學(xué)(Harvard University)都難進(jìn)的高盛暑期實習(xí)項目,在2020年首次全方位通過線上方式開展,正常10周的項目時長也被壓縮到了5周,整個項目簡直是黯淡無光。而另一件同樣史無前例的事情,更讓高盛的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層感到慚愧:3000名通過線上方式“報到”開啟高盛職業(yè)生涯的新員工,從未獲得他們求職時所期待的那種面對面的工作經(jīng)歷。

2020年6月,高盛重新開放了紐約地區(qū)的辦公室,但鼓勵員工盡可能繼續(xù)居家工作。新冠肺炎的病例數(shù)從2020年夏末開始激增,在2020年和2021年之交的冬季里達(dá)到前所未有的峰值,直到被近期出現(xiàn)的奧密克戎疫情超越。即使在這種情況下,高盛還是盡可能的展現(xiàn)了面對面工作的魔力。蘇德巍表示,“花時間花精力親自與客戶會面是與客戶建立關(guān)系的基礎(chǔ)”,在歷史性全球疫情的大背景下尤為如此。就在那個冬天,美國航空公司(American Airlines)通過抵押內(nèi)部“常旅客計劃”融資75億美元,高盛處理了這筆交易。美國航空公司的首席財務(wù)官德里克·克爾后來在內(nèi)部銀行家在線會議上表示,高盛之所以拿到這個訂單,是因為它們是唯一一家來到美國航空的得州總部、現(xiàn)場爭取訂單的公司。克爾告訴《財富》雜志:“第二天早上,馬上有四家銀行打來電話,想約我面談?!?/p>

還是那個冬天,2021年2月,蘇德巍正在思忖如何避免重蹈上年夏天的覆轍。他在一次華爾街在線會議上說:“我希望今年夏天新來的年輕人不用再遠(yuǎn)程報到,我希望這3000名新人獲得更多面對面交流的機會、一手的學(xué)徒體驗和導(dǎo)師指導(dǎo)。因為這些對高盛來說極為重要?!?/p>

這次蘇德巍終于如愿以償了。如今,他表示:“我認(rèn)為這對我們來說是巨大的成就。據(jù)我所知,去年夏天,我們是紐約唯一一家把所有暑期分析師和合伙人全部聚集到一起的公司,他們在紐約獲得了完整的項目體驗。為了創(chuàng)造這個機會,我們付出了巨大的努力?!?/p>

在此之前,高盛已經(jīng)宣布了2021年6月亞洲以外全球各地重返辦公室的日期,可以看出,公司對返崗辦公的期待和鼓勵。自2021年9月7日起,任何進(jìn)入高盛美國辦公室的人都必須完成新冠疫苗的完全接種,2022年2月1日起,還必須接種加強針。

這或許是近兩年來第一次,人們能夠大膽相信,高盛的遠(yuǎn)程辦公常態(tài)化時代已經(jīng)終結(jié)。

然而,大考才剛剛開始。新冠病毒是否永遠(yuǎn)地改變了以辦公室為核心的工作秩序?還是說這種所謂的轉(zhuǎn)變會出乎權(quán)威人士和民意調(diào)查者的意料,最終會慢慢消亡?最近的一項民調(diào)顯示,只有3%的白領(lǐng)愿意每周五天都到辦公室坐班,還有許多人表示如果要求每周連續(xù)五天坐班,他們就會主動辭職。然而,在高盛每周可能是連續(xù)上班六或七天,在當(dāng)今的勞動力市場上,這般不近人情的用人模式能否存續(xù)?

有人認(rèn)為,高盛吸引人才的能力已經(jīng)是今非昔比,不能繼續(xù)對新員工提出如此高的要求。記者、作家兼前華爾街投資銀行家威廉·D·科漢,著有《金錢與權(quán)力:高盛如何統(tǒng)治世界》(Money and Power: How Goldman Sachs Came to Rule the World)等書。他指出:“成為并購銀行家不再是頂尖人才追求的目標(biāo),他們已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)戰(zhàn)私募股權(quán)或科技領(lǐng)域。”哈佛商學(xué)院(Harvard Business School)的2021屆畢業(yè)生中,有23%進(jìn)入咨詢行業(yè),19%進(jìn)入技術(shù)領(lǐng)域,14%進(jìn)入私募股權(quán),8%進(jìn)入對沖基金,7%進(jìn)入風(fēng)險投資,只有4%進(jìn)入高盛所在的投資銀行業(yè)。

有人可能會認(rèn)為這些數(shù)字具有誤導(dǎo)性,因為從商學(xué)院畢業(yè)后去投行工作已經(jīng)是昔日的職業(yè)模式??茲h說:“我在1987年從哥倫比亞商學(xué)院(Columbia Business School)畢業(yè)時,只有兩種選擇:要么進(jìn)投行,要么做咨詢。如今,如果你即將取得MBA學(xué)位并打算去華爾街做助理,別人就會認(rèn)為你有點失敗?!碑?dāng)下更明智的做法是“大學(xué)畢業(yè)后,在華爾街找到一份分析師工作,然后等待被私募股權(quán)公司招走,而且是越快越好。”

高盛正在面臨著對優(yōu)秀本科畢業(yè)生吸引力不足的壓力,上述局面無疑是雪上加霜。怎奈競爭激烈。雇主品牌咨詢公司優(yōu)興咨詢(Universum)對全球超過100萬名學(xué)生(包括本科生)進(jìn)行的最新調(diào)查顯示,對最有志向的學(xué)生來說,摩根士丹利、瑞銀和高盛在受青睞投行中的受歡迎度幾乎并列第一。

然而,即使可以持續(xù)吸引其一貫推崇的“干將型選手”,高盛或會在其他方面付出代價。波士頓咨詢公司(Boston Consulting Group)的高級合伙人德博拉·洛維奇表示:“如果你支持文化多樣性,我們的數(shù)據(jù)顯示,少數(shù)派人才,比如黑人、拉丁裔、亞洲人和女性都更喜歡居家辦公。因此,如果有其他雇主愿意滿足這種偏好,就會導(dǎo)致你很難招到人才。”洛維奇稱,這種情況很不妙,因為“人才多樣性是優(yōu)化產(chǎn)品、進(jìn)行創(chuàng)新的關(guān)鍵。有大量數(shù)據(jù)能夠證實這一點。失去人才多樣性,公司會吃虧的?!甭寰S奇的核心觀點是:“企業(yè)面臨的真正挑戰(zhàn),不是要不要組織員工回到辦公室,而是讓混合辦公制度真正有效運轉(zhuǎn)起來?!?/p>

蘇德巍認(rèn)為此類擔(dān)憂是把問題過于簡單化了,也可以說是理由不充分。他將員工多元化作為頭等大事,例如,堅持要求新任分析師中至少50%為女性。高盛在2020年首次達(dá)成這一目標(biāo),新一任分析師中的女性職員占比達(dá)到55%。如今的高盛與其他大型銀行一樣,會向社會公布少數(shù)族裔代表的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)。其少數(shù)族裔員工數(shù)量處于行業(yè)中間位置。2020年,黑人員工占高盛美國員工總數(shù)的6.8%(最新可得數(shù)據(jù)),達(dá)到了美國黑人人口比例的一半。而且這些數(shù)字還在上升,這也是評定公司管理人員獎金的指標(biāo)之一。

賽富時的首席執(zhí)行官馬克·貝尼奧夫和其他一些科技公司領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人均已經(jīng)欣然接受靈活辦公模式。圖片來源:Jason Alden—Bloomberg/Getty Images

關(guān)于頂尖人才的吸引,高盛的首席執(zhí)行官蘇德巍認(rèn)為,將其比作華爾街與科技巨頭之爭未免“過于草率”。每個行業(yè)都會吸引到各種各樣的人才,從事不盡相同的工作。他表示,“在Facebook,做軟件工程師的人和做廣告銷售的人擁有完全不同的目標(biāo)和抱負(fù)。同樣,來高盛做投資銀行家或交易員的人與擔(dān)任軟件工程師的人,其目標(biāo)也不相同?!备呤⒁龅氖亲屓藣徠ヅ?,而不是在每個職位空缺上都勝其他用人單位一籌。蘇德巍相信,這一點他仍然能夠做到。

坦白講,即使只有3%的白領(lǐng)愿意全職在辦公室工作,高盛只需要吸引這3%中的一小部分人。女性和少數(shù)族裔或許更加偏愛遠(yuǎn)程辦公,但同樣,在這些群體中,蘇德巍還是有機會找到他想要的、極少數(shù)與眾不同的人才。

在高盛,另一個經(jīng)常被忽視卻耐人尋味的細(xì)節(jié)是:平日里隨便選一天,都有很多員工在遠(yuǎn)程辦公。高盛的公司文化里,一向很照顧因為意外原因而需要留在家中的員工。高盛有著慷慨的員工探親假政策。公司高層的管理者們經(jīng)常出差拜訪客戶,在路上工作在所難免。內(nèi)森·里澤說,當(dāng)初他被工作累得精疲力盡向領(lǐng)導(dǎo)們請假時,他們立刻同意了,并表示休息多長時間都可以。他告訴《財富》雜志:“你的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)們要求很高,但當(dāng)你提出要求時他們也會立馬答應(yīng)?!闭f到關(guān)鍵處,他打了個響指。高盛的文化“允許員工處理個人瑣事”,蘇德巍說,“但這與早上醒來隨口就說:‘哦,外面下雨了,我今天不想去上班了?!莾纱a事?!?/p>

現(xiàn)在和未來的頂尖年輕人才是否會接受高盛的這種文化,答案尚未可知。15 年前曾經(jīng)在高盛工作,現(xiàn)已投身其他行業(yè)的一位高管回憶道:“在當(dāng)時那種技術(shù)工具條件下,我就問過自己這個問題,我所做的工作真的需要我在公司坐班嗎?”

本已懸殊的代際差別可能正在進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大。近期,高盛總部的日出勤率徘徊在60%至70%之間,雖然好于2月1日重返辦公室當(dāng)天的表現(xiàn),但即使將正常的差旅和其他因素考慮在內(nèi),也沒有恢復(fù)正常水平。一位已經(jīng)退休的高級合伙人評論說:“不僅高盛,所有公司,返回辦公室辦公最大阻力都是來自最年輕的員工。這確實讓人詫異。年長的員工可不會這樣?!?/p>

蘇德巍的理念與整個美國商界顯得格格不入。在美國,居家工作已經(jīng)是新常態(tài),很多寫字樓正在被改建為公寓,綠樹成蔭的郊區(qū)房屋價格一飛沖天,但蘇德巍并不受大趨勢所約束,他還是獨樹一幟,全神貫注地發(fā)展高盛。他說:“我認(rèn)為,我們行業(yè)的工作方式與五年前并無差異,五年后也不會變?!?/p>

像所有優(yōu)秀的華爾街銀行家一樣,蘇德巍喜歡“反其道而行之”。是贏是輸,利益攸關(guān)。(財富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:潘文秀

審校:夏林

今年2月1日的上午,高盛集團(tuán)(Goldman Sachs)重新開放了其位于曼哈頓下城、高44層的總部辦公室。但是,首席執(zhí)行官蘇德?。―avid Solomon)卻對當(dāng)日的員工出勤率十分不滿。在奧密克戎變異毒株席卷紐約后,高盛的辦公樓被封禁一個月。幸運的是,現(xiàn)在高盛大樓已經(jīng)重新開放,員工又可以在辦公室一起工作了,這正是蘇德巍熱切期盼的場景,而且全公司上下都知道這位首席執(zhí)行官的想法。然而即便在兩周前就已經(jīng)發(fā)出了通知,但直到中午時分,總部的1萬名員工中卻只有差不多5000人出現(xiàn)在辦公室,這讓蘇德巍感到了挑戰(zhàn)。

不溫不火的首日出勤率是反?,F(xiàn)象,還是某種預(yù)兆?

遠(yuǎn)程辦公在全球范圍內(nèi)已經(jīng)是大勢所趨,但蘇德巍也不怕別人說他是“老古董”??萍季揞^們,包括賽富時(Salesforce)、推特(Twitter)、Meta(Facebook 母公司)、Spotify都已經(jīng)允許世界各地成千上萬的員工全職遠(yuǎn)程工作。高盛在華爾街的一些競爭對手,例如花旗集團(tuán)(Citigroup)和瑞銀(UBS),也會允許員工定期居家工作,并表示該政策將增強公司在招聘和留住優(yōu)秀人才方面的競爭優(yōu)勢。蘇德巍表達(dá)過與之相反的觀點。他在2021年2月的一次金融行業(yè)會議上表示,遠(yuǎn)程辦公“對我們來說并不理想,它不是新常態(tài)。而是一種失常,我們將盡快糾正。”

上述觀點發(fā)表一年后的今天,蘇德巍仍然初心不改。2月1日,重回辦公室的第一天,蘇德巍告訴《財富》雜志:“高盛集團(tuán)吸引著數(shù)以千計出類拔萃的年輕人前來學(xué)習(xí)如何工作,創(chuàng)建優(yōu)質(zhì)人脈網(wǎng)絡(luò),并努力為客戶做好服務(wù),這是我們的制勝秘訣。而其中最關(guān)鍵的是大家在一起,與經(jīng)驗更豐富的同事合作共事。如果我們打破這種聯(lián)結(jié),將遠(yuǎn)程辦公作為常態(tài),雖然大家仍然能夠完成大量工作?!碑?dāng)然,高盛自身的表現(xiàn)證明了這一點:過去兩年是高盛有史以來業(yè)績最好的兩年,公司報告顯示,2021年利潤達(dá)到創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的216億美元。(僅去年一年,蘇德巍就拿到了3500萬美元薪酬。)“但是如此一來,我們獨特的基礎(chǔ)也將被磨滅?!?/p>

因此,蘇德巍得出結(jié)論:“高盛要保持這一獨特的文化基礎(chǔ),必須將大家重新聚在一起。”

蘇德巍是在徒勞地抗拒潮流?還是說,正如他主張的那樣,整個商界對新冠疫情帶來的一系列臨時需求反應(yīng)過度,忽視了人類彼此間根深蒂固的力量?所有公司都必須直面上述問題,畢竟利益攸關(guān)。提倡混合辦公制度的企業(yè)在幾年后可能會發(fā)現(xiàn),員工面對面交流的減少導(dǎo)致公司的文化和創(chuàng)造力雙雙萎縮,而要恢復(fù)則可能需更長時間。但如果上述風(fēng)險壓根沒有發(fā)生,那么堅持要求員工坐班的雇主就將面臨地租超支損失。更嚴(yán)重的是,他們可能無法吸引并留住優(yōu)秀人才。

作為極端案例,高盛的做法極具啟發(fā)意義??赡軟]有哪個大公司比高盛更重視面對面工作,正因如此,當(dāng)初新冠疫情來襲,擺在高盛面前的是一場獨具威脅的危機。

高盛的辦公室遍布世界六大洲,公司很早就預(yù)見了新冠疫情的威脅。2020年開年不久,高盛的全球各大職能主管和其他高管開始舉行電話會議,討論集團(tuán)的新冠疫情應(yīng)對計劃,每周至少兩次,一直延續(xù)至今。與會高管很快得出了清晰的結(jié)論:新冠病毒將從亞洲傳播到歐洲再到北美;供應(yīng)鏈將被打亂,變得脆弱不堪;關(guān)閉辦公場所將不可避免。

新冠疫情迫使高盛的管理層做出了一系列艱難決定。1979年,德高望重的高級合伙人約翰·懷特黑德在負(fù)責(zé)編撰高盛的12大業(yè)務(wù)原則時寫道:“我們做任何事情都強調(diào)團(tuán)隊合作?!钡绻粓F(tuán)隊的成員各自居家辦公,這個團(tuán)隊還可以正常運轉(zhuǎn)嗎?”

人力主管本特利·德拜爾是澳大利亞人,曾經(jīng)在強生公司(Johnson & Johnson)任職,2020年1月加入高盛,當(dāng)時正值新冠疫情來襲。在高盛內(nèi)部的播客中,他回憶到自己剛上任就要“做出可能連公司領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層都極不待見的各類調(diào)整,直到新冠疫情的嚴(yán)重性更加明顯后,這種窘境才有所改善”。個中滋味,苦不堪言。我不得不及時采取行動,改變“那些被奉為圭臬、無人敢碰的公司政策和做法?!?/p>

2020年3月中旬,與大多數(shù)其他大型銀行同步,高盛關(guān)閉了在美洲、歐洲、中東和非洲的所有辦公場所,亞洲辦公室在此之前就已經(jīng)關(guān)閉。紐約總部僅允許一小部分人進(jìn)出,包括少數(shù)需要使用總部的設(shè)備來做市的交易員和零星的幾位高管。整個新冠疫情期間,蘇德巍都堅持正常到公司上班。

轉(zhuǎn)眼間,高盛有98%的員工都開始居家辦公,這實在太魔幻了。德拜爾回憶道:“哪怕是在新冠疫情高峰期的1月時問我,這種情況會不會出現(xiàn)在高盛,我都會認(rèn)為你是瘋了?!?/p>

與大多數(shù)的其他大型銀行相比,高盛并沒有更早要求員工返回辦公室,相反,有些情況下高盛給出的期限甚至更寬容。但從一開始,高盛的管理層就表示,無論員工何時重返辦公室,都要確保辦公室能夠隨時正常運轉(zhuǎn)。正因如此,供應(yīng)鏈的中斷尤為引人擔(dān)憂。

高盛的部分辦公室內(nèi)部有很多項目依靠供應(yīng)商管理,比如:內(nèi)部診所、差旅安排、技術(shù)服務(wù)等等。據(jù)知情人士透露,高盛在復(fù)工后需要一眾供應(yīng)商同步到現(xiàn)場辦公,而高盛深知在新冠疫情停工期間,這些供應(yīng)商“可能拿不到報酬?!钡菫榇_保各服務(wù)供應(yīng)商隨叫隨到,高盛在新冠疫情期間仍然堅持向停工的供應(yīng)商支付服務(wù)費。

新冠疫情初期,蘇德巍擔(dān)心的另一個大問題是即將在夏季入職的新員工。在大多數(shù)公司,新人入職可能僅僅是一件需要操辦的事情,但對高盛而言,這可是頭等大事。若想明白其中緣由,并進(jìn)而理解新冠疫情為何讓高盛如此受傷,就必須先了解高盛不同尋常的運營模式。

高盛是一家擁有153年悠久歷史的華爾街巨頭,但它又是一家非常年輕化的公司。在高盛的全球43900名員工中,約有73%是千禧一代或Z世代,50%的員工年齡在20歲到30歲之間。但隨著職場晉升,“后浪團(tuán)”的人數(shù)會逐漸減少,因為高盛內(nèi)部的職級架構(gòu)極其扁平,職場新人和高管之間只有4層基礎(chǔ)職級,分別是:分析員、助理、副總裁(美國以外地區(qū)稱為執(zhí)行董事)和董事總經(jīng)理。雖然高盛自1999年上市以來一直沒有成為合伙企業(yè),但一小部分常務(wù)董事可以兼獲合伙人頭銜?,F(xiàn)有的合伙人其實是指參與單獨獎金計劃的董事總經(jīng)理。

每年夏天都會有大約3000名新員工入職高盛,其中大多數(shù)人剛剛獲得學(xué)士學(xué)位。據(jù)培訓(xùn)公司W(wǎng)all Street Oasis報道,高盛的分析師在入職首年的薪酬豐厚,全球范圍內(nèi)的平均薪金達(dá)到136400美元,雖然略低于各大主要銀行的平均薪酬(143000美元),但其培訓(xùn)、人脈和威望對應(yīng)聘者非常有吸引力。新人通常會報名參加為期兩年的培訓(xùn)項目,在項目接近尾聲時,高盛會設(shè)法留住其中的佼佼者,哪怕他們原本想去商學(xué)院繼續(xù)深造。而其余的大部分人將離開高盛從事其他工作。正常情況下,在兩年項目結(jié)束后,十個人中只會留下兩個人。

對高盛和年輕分析師們而言,這種模式都大有裨益,即使他們中的大多數(shù)人最終會選擇離開高盛。通過密切觀察,高盛從成群出類拔萃的新員工中遴選出最優(yōu)秀的人才,其余的人則能夠帶著鍍金的履歷闖蕩世界。許多人會到金融行業(yè)的其他領(lǐng)域就業(yè)。一位已經(jīng)退休的高盛高級合伙人表示:“像KKR集團(tuán)、黑石(Blackstones)這樣的企業(yè)都在坐等高盛招聘到優(yōu)秀人才,替他們培訓(xùn)好,然后伺機挖墻腳?!痹谌蚍秶鷥?nèi),這些離開高盛的新人有的會一路晉升,擔(dān)任要職,其所在公司常常也會變成高盛的客戶。

蘇德巍解釋了高盛體系的運轉(zhuǎn)方式?!拔覀兠磕隇楣镜母鞔舐毮懿块T招聘數(shù)以千計的優(yōu)秀本科畢業(yè)生。這其中的一部分人會留下來。很多人會離開,去追求別的事業(yè)。但他們都會因為曾經(jīng)在高盛工作而感到自豪。他們會時?;叵肫疬@段經(jīng)歷和其中的收獲。此外,他們來自世界各地,都是極其聰穎、非常有趣的人。試想你今年也是22歲,剛剛加入一個由這些同齡人組成的3000人的群體,彼此交流互動會是一個多么美妙的體驗。更不必說這個群體中還有23至26歲的其他年輕人,其中不乏專業(yè)層面的交流,還可以幫助你打造一個持續(xù)一生的‘朋友圈’。這就是高盛的生態(tài)系統(tǒng),富有活力而且異常強大?!?/p>

這一點也被競爭對手和行業(yè)專家所廣泛認(rèn)同。在《財富》雜志最新發(fā)布的“全球最受贊賞的公司”榜單中,決定排名先后的投票者,包括業(yè)內(nèi)頂級高管和董事,以及關(guān)注該行業(yè)的股票分析師們,共同將高盛推上業(yè)內(nèi)人才管理第一名的寶座,領(lǐng)先于摩根大通(JPMorgan Chase)、摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)、美國銀行(Bank of America)、花旗集團(tuán)(Citigroup)、匯豐銀行(HSBC)等眾多企業(yè)。

有了這一背景信息,就不難理解在過去兩年內(nèi),高盛為何那樣傷神。蘇德巍說:“新冠疫情中,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)一個現(xiàn)象,如果你每天在家除了努力工作,就是看電視,那么在高盛工作所帶來的那種美好而獨特的體驗就會慢慢消失?!比绻悛氉栽诩夜ぷ?,那么持續(xù)一生的人際網(wǎng)絡(luò)、向全球頂尖人才學(xué)習(xí)的機會、由數(shù)以千計榮譽等身的同齡人所創(chuàng)造的那種令人陶醉的氛圍就都會消失殆盡。而隨著時間的推移,高盛可能會失去其獨特的魅力和光環(huán)。對高盛而言,遠(yuǎn)程辦公遠(yuǎn)不僅僅是一個挑戰(zhàn),還會破壞“公司的生態(tài)系統(tǒng)”。

問題可能會愈發(fā)嚴(yán)重。內(nèi)森·里澤在2019年1月入職高盛的倫敦辦事處,擔(dān)任分析師,2021年4月便選擇離開,因為他感覺自己已經(jīng)精疲力盡,需要為自己的健康著想。他告訴《財富》雜志:“我見證過新冠疫情和封鎖的至暗時刻。”他將自己的經(jīng)歷寫成文章,發(fā)表在《紐約雜志》(New York)上,文中寫道:“當(dāng)我開始居家工作時,最先意識到的是高盛的辦公室福利有多好?!崩绻緝?nèi)部的醫(yī)護(hù)中心和健身房?!盁o論是在辦公室一起加班到深夜,還是在健身房里并肩揮灑汗水,努力與他人共同追求卓越,都充滿著團(tuán)結(jié)人心的魔力。而這一切在線上環(huán)境中是不可能實現(xiàn)的。”里澤告訴《財富》雜志,他離開高盛是因為不喜歡工作本身,如果不是這樣,“我想立即回到那里。”

里澤的經(jīng)歷絕非少數(shù)。此次新冠疫情對高盛的分析師們來說十分殘酷,原因有兩個。首先,在辦公室上班,有很多因素讓人覺得再辛苦也值得;其次就是強制居家辦公期間,分析員們承擔(dān)著與往常相同的高強度工作,卻失去了親自到公司上班所帶來的好處。除此之外,本就辛苦的工作突然變得更加艱難,這已經(jīng)是危險信號。

高盛為期兩年的分析師項目從來都是一場鏖戰(zhàn):每周工作80小時到100小時,壓力巨大,充滿著不可能完成的節(jié)點。新冠疫情驟然改變了很多行業(yè),其中一些行業(yè)(比如電子商務(wù)、視頻直播、互聯(lián)網(wǎng)服務(wù))順勢崛起,另一些行業(yè)(例如酒店業(yè)、旅游業(yè)、能源產(chǎn)業(yè))則深受打擊,然而所有這些行業(yè)都迫切地需要金融服務(wù)。受此影響,高盛在2020年的營收增長了22%,2021年更是猛增至33%,創(chuàng)全球并購交易史上最高年收入紀(jì)錄,也讓高盛在全球企業(yè)購并業(yè)務(wù)的排名中穩(wěn)坐頭把交椅。2021年也是史上IPO數(shù)量最多的一年,高盛在該業(yè)務(wù)領(lǐng)域同樣排名第一位。但對高盛的分析師們來說,這意味著更為漫長的工作周,和更大的壓力。

據(jù)《紐約郵報》(New York Post)后來報道,早在2020年4月,就有居家辦公的高盛分析師抱怨:工作時無法使用公司的高性能電腦,只能使用自己的,而且以前在辦公室加班到晚上8點會有25美元的餐補現(xiàn)在也沒有了。不滿情緒“偷走”了員工的時間和注意力,然而工作量還在不斷增加。10個月后,高盛的舊金山辦公室的13名分析師聯(lián)合向領(lǐng)導(dǎo)們發(fā)送了一份PPT,其中詳細(xì)羅列了他們的各種不滿:上周平均工作105小時,上個月每周工作98小時,平均凌晨3點才能夠睡覺,身體和心理健康狀況急轉(zhuǎn)直下。

新冠疫情同樣削弱了其他一些重要的活動體驗。比哈佛大學(xué)(Harvard University)都難進(jìn)的高盛暑期實習(xí)項目,在2020年首次全方位通過線上方式開展,正常10周的項目時長也被壓縮到了5周,整個項目簡直是黯淡無光。而另一件同樣史無前例的事情,更讓高盛的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層感到慚愧:3000名通過線上方式“報到”開啟高盛職業(yè)生涯的新員工,從未獲得他們求職時所期待的那種面對面的工作經(jīng)歷。

2020年6月,高盛重新開放了紐約地區(qū)的辦公室,但鼓勵員工盡可能繼續(xù)居家工作。新冠肺炎的病例數(shù)從2020年夏末開始激增,在2020年和2021年之交的冬季里達(dá)到前所未有的峰值,直到被近期出現(xiàn)的奧密克戎疫情超越。即使在這種情況下,高盛還是盡可能的展現(xiàn)了面對面工作的魔力。蘇德巍表示,“花時間花精力親自與客戶會面是與客戶建立關(guān)系的基礎(chǔ)”,在歷史性全球疫情的大背景下尤為如此。就在那個冬天,美國航空公司(American Airlines)通過抵押內(nèi)部“常旅客計劃”融資75億美元,高盛處理了這筆交易。美國航空公司的首席財務(wù)官德里克·克爾后來在內(nèi)部銀行家在線會議上表示,高盛之所以拿到這個訂單,是因為它們是唯一一家來到美國航空的得州總部、現(xiàn)場爭取訂單的公司??藸柛嬖V《財富》雜志:“第二天早上,馬上有四家銀行打來電話,想約我面談?!?/p>

還是那個冬天,2021年2月,蘇德巍正在思忖如何避免重蹈上年夏天的覆轍。他在一次華爾街在線會議上說:“我希望今年夏天新來的年輕人不用再遠(yuǎn)程報到,我希望這3000名新人獲得更多面對面交流的機會、一手的學(xué)徒體驗和導(dǎo)師指導(dǎo)。因為這些對高盛來說極為重要?!?/p>

這次蘇德巍終于如愿以償了。如今,他表示:“我認(rèn)為這對我們來說是巨大的成就。據(jù)我所知,去年夏天,我們是紐約唯一一家把所有暑期分析師和合伙人全部聚集到一起的公司,他們在紐約獲得了完整的項目體驗。為了創(chuàng)造這個機會,我們付出了巨大的努力?!?/p>

在此之前,高盛已經(jīng)宣布了2021年6月亞洲以外全球各地重返辦公室的日期,可以看出,公司對返崗辦公的期待和鼓勵。自2021年9月7日起,任何進(jìn)入高盛美國辦公室的人都必須完成新冠疫苗的完全接種,2022年2月1日起,還必須接種加強針。

這或許是近兩年來第一次,人們能夠大膽相信,高盛的遠(yuǎn)程辦公常態(tài)化時代已經(jīng)終結(jié)。

然而,大考才剛剛開始。新冠病毒是否永遠(yuǎn)地改變了以辦公室為核心的工作秩序?還是說這種所謂的轉(zhuǎn)變會出乎權(quán)威人士和民意調(diào)查者的意料,最終會慢慢消亡?最近的一項民調(diào)顯示,只有3%的白領(lǐng)愿意每周五天都到辦公室坐班,還有許多人表示如果要求每周連續(xù)五天坐班,他們就會主動辭職。然而,在高盛每周可能是連續(xù)上班六或七天,在當(dāng)今的勞動力市場上,這般不近人情的用人模式能否存續(xù)?

有人認(rèn)為,高盛吸引人才的能力已經(jīng)是今非昔比,不能繼續(xù)對新員工提出如此高的要求。記者、作家兼前華爾街投資銀行家威廉·D·科漢,著有《金錢與權(quán)力:高盛如何統(tǒng)治世界》(Money and Power: How Goldman Sachs Came to Rule the World)等書。他指出:“成為并購銀行家不再是頂尖人才追求的目標(biāo),他們已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)戰(zhàn)私募股權(quán)或科技領(lǐng)域?!惫鹕虒W(xué)院(Harvard Business School)的2021屆畢業(yè)生中,有23%進(jìn)入咨詢行業(yè),19%進(jìn)入技術(shù)領(lǐng)域,14%進(jìn)入私募股權(quán),8%進(jìn)入對沖基金,7%進(jìn)入風(fēng)險投資,只有4%進(jìn)入高盛所在的投資銀行業(yè)。

有人可能會認(rèn)為這些數(shù)字具有誤導(dǎo)性,因為從商學(xué)院畢業(yè)后去投行工作已經(jīng)是昔日的職業(yè)模式。科漢說:“我在1987年從哥倫比亞商學(xué)院(Columbia Business School)畢業(yè)時,只有兩種選擇:要么進(jìn)投行,要么做咨詢。如今,如果你即將取得MBA學(xué)位并打算去華爾街做助理,別人就會認(rèn)為你有點失敗。”當(dāng)下更明智的做法是“大學(xué)畢業(yè)后,在華爾街找到一份分析師工作,然后等待被私募股權(quán)公司招走,而且是越快越好。”

高盛正在面臨著對優(yōu)秀本科畢業(yè)生吸引力不足的壓力,上述局面無疑是雪上加霜。怎奈競爭激烈。雇主品牌咨詢公司優(yōu)興咨詢(Universum)對全球超過100萬名學(xué)生(包括本科生)進(jìn)行的最新調(diào)查顯示,對最有志向的學(xué)生來說,摩根士丹利、瑞銀和高盛在受青睞投行中的受歡迎度幾乎并列第一。

然而,即使可以持續(xù)吸引其一貫推崇的“干將型選手”,高盛或會在其他方面付出代價。波士頓咨詢公司(Boston Consulting Group)的高級合伙人德博拉·洛維奇表示:“如果你支持文化多樣性,我們的數(shù)據(jù)顯示,少數(shù)派人才,比如黑人、拉丁裔、亞洲人和女性都更喜歡居家辦公。因此,如果有其他雇主愿意滿足這種偏好,就會導(dǎo)致你很難招到人才。”洛維奇稱,這種情況很不妙,因為“人才多樣性是優(yōu)化產(chǎn)品、進(jìn)行創(chuàng)新的關(guān)鍵。有大量數(shù)據(jù)能夠證實這一點。失去人才多樣性,公司會吃虧的。”洛維奇的核心觀點是:“企業(yè)面臨的真正挑戰(zhàn),不是要不要組織員工回到辦公室,而是讓混合辦公制度真正有效運轉(zhuǎn)起來?!?/p>

蘇德巍認(rèn)為此類擔(dān)憂是把問題過于簡單化了,也可以說是理由不充分。他將員工多元化作為頭等大事,例如,堅持要求新任分析師中至少50%為女性。高盛在2020年首次達(dá)成這一目標(biāo),新一任分析師中的女性職員占比達(dá)到55%。如今的高盛與其他大型銀行一樣,會向社會公布少數(shù)族裔代表的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)。其少數(shù)族裔員工數(shù)量處于行業(yè)中間位置。2020年,黑人員工占高盛美國員工總數(shù)的6.8%(最新可得數(shù)據(jù)),達(dá)到了美國黑人人口比例的一半。而且這些數(shù)字還在上升,這也是評定公司管理人員獎金的指標(biāo)之一。

關(guān)于頂尖人才的吸引,高盛的首席執(zhí)行官蘇德巍認(rèn)為,將其比作華爾街與科技巨頭之爭未免“過于草率”。每個行業(yè)都會吸引到各種各樣的人才,從事不盡相同的工作。他表示,“在Facebook,做軟件工程師的人和做廣告銷售的人擁有完全不同的目標(biāo)和抱負(fù)。同樣,來高盛做投資銀行家或交易員的人與擔(dān)任軟件工程師的人,其目標(biāo)也不相同?!备呤⒁龅氖亲屓藣徠ヅ?,而不是在每個職位空缺上都勝其他用人單位一籌。蘇德巍相信,這一點他仍然能夠做到。

坦白講,即使只有3%的白領(lǐng)愿意全職在辦公室工作,高盛只需要吸引這3%中的一小部分人。女性和少數(shù)族裔或許更加偏愛遠(yuǎn)程辦公,但同樣,在這些群體中,蘇德巍還是有機會找到他想要的、極少數(shù)與眾不同的人才。

在高盛,另一個經(jīng)常被忽視卻耐人尋味的細(xì)節(jié)是:平日里隨便選一天,都有很多員工在遠(yuǎn)程辦公。高盛的公司文化里,一向很照顧因為意外原因而需要留在家中的員工。高盛有著慷慨的員工探親假政策。公司高層的管理者們經(jīng)常出差拜訪客戶,在路上工作在所難免。內(nèi)森·里澤說,當(dāng)初他被工作累得精疲力盡向領(lǐng)導(dǎo)們請假時,他們立刻同意了,并表示休息多長時間都可以。他告訴《財富》雜志:“你的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)們要求很高,但當(dāng)你提出要求時他們也會立馬答應(yīng)?!闭f到關(guān)鍵處,他打了個響指。高盛的文化“允許員工處理個人瑣事”,蘇德巍說,“但這與早上醒來隨口就說:‘哦,外面下雨了,我今天不想去上班了?!莾纱a事?!?/p>

現(xiàn)在和未來的頂尖年輕人才是否會接受高盛的這種文化,答案尚未可知。15 年前曾經(jīng)在高盛工作,現(xiàn)已投身其他行業(yè)的一位高管回憶道:“在當(dāng)時那種技術(shù)工具條件下,我就問過自己這個問題,我所做的工作真的需要我在公司坐班嗎?”

本已懸殊的代際差別可能正在進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大。近期,高盛總部的日出勤率徘徊在60%至70%之間,雖然好于2月1日重返辦公室當(dāng)天的表現(xiàn),但即使將正常的差旅和其他因素考慮在內(nèi),也沒有恢復(fù)正常水平。一位已經(jīng)退休的高級合伙人評論說:“不僅高盛,所有公司,返回辦公室辦公最大阻力都是來自最年輕的員工。這確實讓人詫異。年長的員工可不會這樣?!?/p>

蘇德巍的理念與整個美國商界顯得格格不入。在美國,居家工作已經(jīng)是新常態(tài),很多寫字樓正在被改建為公寓,綠樹成蔭的郊區(qū)房屋價格一飛沖天,但蘇德巍并不受大趨勢所約束,他還是獨樹一幟,全神貫注地發(fā)展高盛。他說:“我認(rèn)為,我們行業(yè)的工作方式與五年前并無差異,五年后也不會變。”

像所有優(yōu)秀的華爾街銀行家一樣,蘇德巍喜歡“反其道而行之”。是贏是輸,利益攸關(guān)。(財富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:潘文秀

審校:夏林

CEO David Solomon could not have been pleased at the turnout when Goldman Sachs reopened its 44-story headquarters in lower Manhattan on the morning of Feb. 1. The building had been closed for a month as COVID-19’s Omicron variant swept through town. Now, finally, with luck, Goldman employees could resume working together in person, as Solomon emphatically wants them to do, without further shutdowns. Yet as of late morning on that Tuesday, only about 5,000 of Goldman’s 10,000 HQ workers had shown up—despite having had over two weeks’ notice, and in seeming defiance of Solomon’s pointed desire to get everyone back in the office as soon as safely possible.

Is that tepid turnout an anomaly? Or is it a harbinger?

Solomon has risked looking like a Neanderthal as remote work has gone mainstream worldwide. Top-tier tech firms—Salesforce, Twitter, Meta (Facebook’s parent), Spotify—have told thousands of employees they’re liberated to work remotely full-time, anywhere in the world. Some of Goldman’s Wall Street rivals, including Citigroup and UBS, are letting staffers work from home regularly and claim the policy will give the firms a competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining excellent employees. Solomon has said the opposite. Remote work “is not ideal for us, and it’s not a new normal,” he famously told a finance industry conference in February 2021. “It’s an aberration that we’re going to correct as quickly as possible.”

Now, a year after making that declaration, Solomon isn’t backing down. “The secret sauce to our organization is, we attract thousands of really extraordinary young people who come to Goldman Sachs to learn to work, to create a network of other extraordinary people, and work very hard to serve our clients,” he told Fortune on that back-to-the-office day, Feb. 1. “Part of the secret sauce is that they come together and collaborate and work with people that are much more experienced than they are. If you break that all down and scatter it around”—that is, if you make remote work the new normal—“you can still get a bunch of work done.” Goldman’s own performance bears that last statement out: The past two years were Goldman’s best ever, with the company reporting a record profit of $21.6 billion in 2021. (And Solomon collected $35 million in compensation last year alone.) “But you start to fray the foundational things that make the place so unique.”

Solomon’s inevitable conclusion: “For Goldman Sachs to retain that cultural foundation, we have to bring people together.”

Is Solomon futilely resisting the tide? Or, as he believes, is the rest of the business world overreacting to the pandemic’s temporary demands and ignoring the deep-rooted power of human beings with one another? Every organization must face such questions, and the stakes are high. Businesses that embrace hybrid work may discover only years later that with less face-to-face employee interaction, their culture and creativity have withered—and recovering could take more years. But if that risk proves baseless, employers that insist on presence in the workplace will overspend on real estate and, far worse, may not attract and keep the best workers.

Goldman’s experience is instructive as an extreme case. Perhaps no major company values in-person work more highly—which means that when the pandemic arrived, the firm faced a uniquely threatening crisis.

*****

With offices on six continents, Goldman foresaw the threat of COVID-19 early. Soon after 2020 dawned, functional chiefs and other executives globally began group pandemic planning calls twice weekly, sometimes more often, which continue today. A few facts quickly became clear: The virus would spread from Asia to Europe to North America; supply chains would be disrupted and unreliable; closing offices would be unavoidable.

For Goldman’s top leaders, the pandemic forced painful decisions. “We stress teamwork in everything we do,” wrote John Whitehead, a revered senior partner, when he listed the firm’s 12 principles in 1979. But would teams really work if their members were alone in their homes?

HR chief Bentley de Beyer, an Australian who was previously at Johnson & Johnson, arrived at Goldman in January 2020, just as the pandemic hit. He recalled in a podcast for internal distribution that he immediately faced issues of “making adjustments that might be wildly unpopular, even with some of our business leaders at the time, until the seriousness of the outbreak became more obvious.” It was wrenching. Changing policies and practices that “may have been sacred cows in the firm—something that no one in the firm would have dared touch or assess or make any adjustments to—we’ve had to do that in real time.”

Goldman closed all its offices in the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa in mid-March, in step with most other big banks; Asian offices had closed earlier. The only people allowed in New York headquarters were a small number of traders who needed to make markets using technology in the building, plus a few top executives. Throughout the pandemic, Solomon never stopped going to the office.

Suddenly 98% of the firm’s workforce was working from home—a surreal experience. De Beyer recalled that “if you’d asked me, even in January, would that be possible at a firm like Goldman Sachs, I would have thought you were a little crazy.”

Goldman did not require employees to return to the office sooner than most other big banks, and in some cases it waited longer. But from the beginning, senior leaders focused intensely on making sure offices would be fully functional from the moment employees returned, whenever that might be. That’s why disrupted supply chains were especially worrying.

Goldman relies on vendors to manage its in-house medical clinics in some offices, its travel programs, its technology services, and more; the firm “needed those vendors to be there” when it was time to return to the office, says someone familiar with the firm’s thinking, and it knew that during the pandemic those vendors “potentially weren’t going to get paid.” To ensure they’d be there when needed, Goldman continued to pay some vendors through the pandemic, even when no money was owed.

Another of Solomon’s top concerns in the pandemic’s early days was the firm’s incoming class of new hires, arriving in the summer. That issue would be concerning at most companies, but at Goldman it’s supremely important. To understand why, and to understand more broadly why the pandemic was so traumatic for Goldman, it’s necessary to understand the firm’s unusual operating model.

Contrary to the popular conception of a big, 153-year-old Wall Street firm, Goldman Sachs is an extremely young company. Some 73% of its 43,900 employees are millennials or Gen Z; 50% of employees are in their twenties. That herd gets thinned out quickly as it rises through the hierarchy, which is remarkably flat. Just four basic job categories separate the rookies from the top executives: analyst, associate, vice president (called executive director outside the U.S.), and managing director. A small percentage of managing directors gain an additional title, partner, though Goldman hasn’t been a partnership since it went public in 1999; today’s partners are managing directors who participate in a separate bonus plan.

Each summer some 3,000 new employees arrive, most of them having just received bachelor’s degrees. Those first-year analysts are well paid, receiving an average globally of $136,400 in salary and bonus, reports the Wall Street Oasis training firm—slightly below the major-bank average ($143,000) because applicants value so highly the Goldman training, network, and street cred. The rookies typically sign up for a two-year program, near the end of which Goldman will try to entice the very best not to go elsewhere, not even to go to business school, but to stay at the firm. Most of the rest will leave for other jobs. It isn’t unusual for 80% of an incoming class to be gone after two years.

That model offers multiple benefits for Goldman and for the young analysts, even the large majority who don’t stay with the firm. Goldman attracts an ultra-elite group of new hires and then observes them closely to identify the very best. The rest go out into the world with the gleaming Goldman credential. Many land elsewhere in the financial world. “The KKRs, the Blackstones, and others count on Goldman Sachs to hire really good people and train them for them, and try to pick ’em off,” says a retired senior partner. Those recruits sometimes rise to high positions at firms globally, which often become Goldman customers.

Solomon explains how it all works as a system. “We hire thousands of people out of undergraduate school every year—really extraordinary people across all areas of the firm. Some of them stay. A lot go on to do other things. But they will be very proud of the fact that they worked for Goldman Sachs. They will think back generously on their experience and what it taught them.” In addition, “they’re super-smart, really interesting people from all over the world. If you’re a 22-year-old who has just been thrown into a pot of 3,000 other 22-year-olds—let alone the 23-, 24-, 25-, and 26-year-olds—you get to interact with them. Some of that interaction is professional. Some of it becomes a friends’ network that you carry with you in life. That is the ecosystem of the firm. That’s a very powerful ecosystem.”

Competitors and industry experts agree. In Fortune’s latest list of the World’s Most Admired Companies, the voters who determine the ranking—top industry executives and directors, plus stock analysts who follow the industry—rated Goldman No. 1 in people management in its industry, ahead of JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America, Citigroup, HSBC, and more.

Against that background, it becomes clear why the past two years were so agonizing for the firm. Solomon says, “One of the things we saw in the pandemic is, if all you’re doing is a lot of work and looking at a television screen, a lot of the things that make that experience so fantastic disappear.” The lifelong network, the learning from some of the world’s best, the heady atmosphere created by thousands of staggeringly accomplished peers—working alone from home, they were gone. Over time, the firm could lose its unique allure, its aura. For Goldman, remote work was much worse than just a challenge. It undermined the very “ecosystem of the firm.”

The problems could be much worse. Nathan Risser joined Goldman at its London office as an analyst in January 2019 and left in April 2021, burned out and needing to protect his health. “I saw the darkest days of the pandemic and lockdown,” he tells Fortune. He wrote an article about his experience, published in New York, observing that “the first thing I noticed when I started working from home was how important the in-office perks at Goldman had become”—things like the medical center and on-site gym. “There’s something about striving to achieve the exceptional alongside others, whether by working late nights in the office or putting in a hard hour in the gym, that pulls people together. And that can’t happen in a virtual environment.” Risser tells Fortune he left because he didn’t like the work, but if it were otherwise, “I’d want to be back in there immediately.”

His experience was far from rare. The pandemic was brutal for Goldman analysts for two reasons. It wasn’t just that being stuck at home left them with all the usual hard work but without the in-office factors that made the Goldman experience bearable and valuable. In addition, the hard work suddenly turned much harder, which is saying something.

The Goldman two-year analyst program has always been trial by fire: 80- to 100-hour weeks, intense pressure, impossible deadlines. The pandemic violently disrupted an array of industries, some for better (e-commerce, video streaming, internet services), some for worse (hospitality, travel, energy), all of them urgently needing financial services. Result: Goldman’s revenue jumped 22% in 2020 and then leaped a further 33% in 2021—the all-time biggest year in mergers and acquisitions globally, with Goldman ranking No. 1 worldwide in handling M&A deals. 2021 was also the biggest-ever year for IPOs, and Goldman ranked No. 1 in handling those. For analysts, the long weeks grew even longer, the pressure heavier.

As early as April 2020, the New York Post later reported, analysts were complaining about having to use their own computers instead of the better ones at work and not getting the $25 meal stipend available after 8 p.m. at the office—irritations that stole time and attention from the growing workload. Ten months later, a group of 13 analysts in the San Francisco office sent bosses a PowerPoint deck detailing their grievances: working an average of 105 hours in the previous week, 98 hours a week in the previous month, getting to bed at 3 a.m. on average, mental and physical health declining sharply.

The pandemic gravely weakened other critical experiences. For the first time, Goldman’s summer interns—a group that’s harder to get into than Harvard—faced an entirely digital program in 2020, lasting just five weeks instead of the usual 10, a sad substitute for the real thing. Even more mortifying for the firm’s leaders was another unprecedented event: The incoming class of 3,000 new employees would “arrive” digitally and start working for Goldman having never known the in-person experience they signed up for.

Goldman reopened its New York area offices in June 2020 but encouraged employees to continue working from home if they could. COVID case counts began rising steeply at summer’s end, peaking in the winter of 2020–21 at levels not matched until the recent Omicron variant arrived. Yet even then, Goldman deployed the power of physical presence when it could. “Building relationships with clients comes from showing up and making the effort to be there,” Solomon says—especially amid a historic global pandemic. When American Airlines borrowed $7.5 billion collateralized by its frequent-flier program that winter, Goldman handled the transaction. American’s CFO, Derek Kerr, later told an online meeting of the airline’s bankers that Goldman got the deal because it was the only firm that showed up at American’s Texas headquarters to make its pitch. “The next morning I had calls from four banks wanting to come see me,” he tells Fortune.

That same winter, in February 2021, Solomon was already thinking hard about avoiding a repeat of summer 2020. “I don’t want another class of young people arriving at Goldman Sachs this summer remotely,” he told an online Wall Street conference—“3,000 young people coming in that aren’t getting more direct contact, direct apprenticeship, direct mentorship. That’s very, very important to us.”

He got his wish. He says now, “I think it made a huge difference for us. Last summer I believe we were the only firm that had all of our summer analysts and associates in New York, 100% there, for their whole summer experience. We worked very hard to create that opportunity.”

By then the firm had announced dates for a return to the office—expected, not just encouraged—in June 2021 at locations worldwide except in Asia. As of last Sept. 7, anyone entering Goldman’s U.S. offices had to be fully vaccinated; as of Feb. 1, 2022, everyone must now be fully vaccinated and boostered.

For the first time in nearly two years, it became realistic to believe that just maybe, regular remote work at Goldman Sachs was over.

*****

Now begins the great test. Has COVID-19 transformed the office-based working world forever? Or will the much-ballyhooed transformation sputter, defying the pundits and pollsters? A recent poll finds that only 3% of white-collar workers want to report to the office five days a week, and many say if they’re required to do so, they’ll quit. In today’s labor market, can the unrepentant Goldman model—requiring many workers in the office not five days a week, but often six or seven—survive?

Some argue that Goldman isn’t quite the talent magnet it once was and can’t continue demanding so much from its recruits. “Being an M&A banker is no longer an alpha male thing,” says William D. Cohan, a journalist, author, and former Wall Street investment banker whose books include Money and Power: How Goldman Sachs Came to Rule the World. “The alphas have gone on to private equity or tech.” Among the Harvard Business School’s class of 2021, 23% went into consulting, 19% into technology, 14% into private equity, 8% into hedge funds, 7% into venture capital, and just 4% into Goldman’s industry, investment banking.

One could argue that those numbers are misleading because going from business school to investment banking is yesterday’s career model. “Back when I graduated from Columbia Business School in 1987, literally it was either investment banking or consulting,” says Cohan. “Now if you’re getting an MBA and going to be an associate on Wall Street, that’s considered a bit of a failure.” Much better is that “you graduate from college, get an analyst job on Wall Street, and then get whisked away as quickly as possible by the private equity firms.”

That only adds to the pressure Goldman is facing to continue attracting the best candidates coming out of undergrad. But the competition is fierce. The employer branding firm Universum’s latest survey of over a million students worldwide, including undergraduates, finds that the most ambitious students favor investment banking; Morgan Stanley, UBS, and Goldman are virtually tied for the top score.

But even if Goldman continues to draw the supersmart go-getters it prizes, it could pay a price in other ways. “If you really believe in diversity, our data tells us that the diverse talent—Black, Latinx, Asian, women—all have a higher preference to be at home,” says Deborah Lovich, a senior partner at Boston Consulting Group. “So if there’s another employer that will meet that preference, you’re going to be left out.” That’s bad news, she says, because “diversity is key to better product and innovation. There’s tons of data on it. You’ll be at a loss.” Her bottom-line view: “The challenge is not, Do we bring everyone back?” Rather, it’s “getting hybrid work to work really effectively.”

David Solomon thinks such worries are simplistic or ill-informed. He has made diversifying the workforce a priority, for example insisting that incoming classes of analysts be at least 50% female; Goldman hit the target for the first time in 2020, with 55%. The firm now publishes data on minority representation, as do the other big banks. Goldman’s numbers are in the middle of the pack; Black employees were 6.8% of the firm’s U.S. workforce in 2020 (most recent available data), half the Black percentage of the U.S. population. But the numbers are rising, and increasing them is a factor in managers’ bonuses.

As for attracting the best and brightest, Solomon believes the popular framing of a Wall Street vs. Big Tech competition is “a vast oversimplification.” Each industry attracts a wide range of applicants for a wide range of jobs. “Somebody that goes to work for Facebook as a software engineer is a completely different person with completely different goals and ambitions than someone that goes to Facebook to sell advertising,” he says. “Someone that comes to Goldman Sachs to be an investment banker or trader is different from somebody that comes to Goldman Sachs to be a software engineer.” Goldman doesn’t have to beat every employer for every job opening; it just needs to get the right people in the right jobs, and Solomon believes he can still do that.

More broadly, it may well be that only 3% of the white-collar workforce want to work full-time in an office, but Goldman needs to attract only a tiny fraction of that pool. Women and minorities are more likely to prefer remote work, but again, within the averages Solomon may be able to find the special few he wants.

One more subtlety often overlooked: On any given day, many Goldman employees are working remotely. The culture has always accommodated employees who need to stay home for unexpected reasons. The company offers a generous family leave policy. In the hierarchy’s upper reaches, managers travel heavily to visit clients, and they work from the road. When Nathan Risser burned out and told his bosses he needed time off, he says, they agreed immediately and told him to stay out as long as he needed. “Your bosses are very demanding,” he tells Fortune, “but when you put in a request for something”—he snaps his fingers—“it’s granted.” Life at Goldman is lived in “a culture that allows people to deal with what they have to deal with,” says Solomon. “But that’s very different from having the latitude to wake up and say, ‘You know, it’s raining. I don’t feel like going to work.’”

The unanswered question is whether enough of today’s and tomorrow’s best young people will accept that culture. An executive in another industry recalls that as a young Goldman employee 15 years ago, “I at least had the question in my mind, Do I need to be here doing this work? And that was with the technology tools we had at the time.”

A sharp generational fault line may be widening. Daily occupancy at Goldman HQ was recently at 60% to 70%—better than the 50% on back-to-the-office day but not back to normal even accounting for normal travel and other factors. A retired senior partner observes, “Not just at Goldman but at all the firms, the biggest resistance to coming into the office is coming from the most junior people. It’s really quite remarkable. And the senior ones don’t like it.”

Solomon is jarringly out of step with corporate America. Working from home is the new normal, office towers are being converted to condos, and homes in leafy suburbs are priced like palaces. But Solomon isn’t bound by broad trends; he’s focused on Goldman, ever unique. “I just don’t think the way we work in our business is that different than it was five years ago,” he says, “and I don’t think it will be different five years from now.”

Like any good Wall Street banker, he’s willing to bet against the crowd. Much is riding on whether he’s right.

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