像我們當(dāng)中的很多人一樣,溫迪·馬謝洛清楚地記得“9·11”事件發(fā)生時(shí)自己在哪里,正在做什么。她當(dāng)時(shí)正在埃格林空軍基地(Eglin Air Force Base)的美國(guó)空軍軍械中心(Air Force’s Air Armament Center)擔(dān)任合約主管,該基地位于佛羅里達(dá)州狹長(zhǎng)地帶,距離彭薩科拉東部約70英里(約112.65公里)。
在當(dāng)天基地隨之而來的混亂當(dāng)中,馬謝洛記得遇到了其工作特有的一個(gè)難題:聯(lián)邦預(yù)算年將在9月30日截止,意味著她的團(tuán)隊(duì)將只有19天的時(shí)間來根據(jù)當(dāng)時(shí)的預(yù)算權(quán)限處理緊急要求,而這將是一筆不小的數(shù)目。
馬謝洛回憶說:“我們的責(zé)任之一就是為醫(yī)療行業(yè)打造支持系統(tǒng),包括發(fā)電機(jī)以及人們?cè)谧匀换蛉藶闉?zāi)害中部署的其他設(shè)備,也就是那些當(dāng)你在不知道接下來會(huì)發(fā)生什么的情況下所需使用的設(shè)備。當(dāng)然在‘9·11’當(dāng)天,各種困惑蜂擁而至,而且基地本能地會(huì)讓員工回家,但我當(dāng)時(shí)說:‘不,你得讓大家回歸工作崗位,因?yàn)槲覀兯炇鸬暮霞s正是生產(chǎn)當(dāng)前所需的這些設(shè)備。’”
在2001年9月的最后幾天,馬謝洛和她的團(tuán)隊(duì)確實(shí)扭轉(zhuǎn)了很多合同,而且在隨后美國(guó)出兵阿富汗以及伊拉克的幾年中亦是如此。她自己曾經(jīng)于2005年被派往伊拉克。在“9·11”事件發(fā)生之后的幾年中,她所專長(zhǎng)領(lǐng)域受到了極大重視。盡管如此,美國(guó)在過去20年的海外戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中仍然耗費(fèi)了8萬多億美元的資金,推動(dòng)了政府承包“迷彩經(jīng)濟(jì)”(Camo Economy)的蓬勃發(fā)展?!懊圆式?jīng)濟(jì)”是由波士頓大學(xué)(Boston University)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)成本項(xiàng)目(Costs of War Project)的主任海迪·佩爾提爾提出的。
像洛克希德·馬?。↙ockheed Martin)、雷神公司(Raytheon)——2019年與聯(lián)合技術(shù)公司(United Technologies)合并,以及通用動(dòng)力(General Dynamics)這類傳統(tǒng)承包巨頭因此受益匪淺,而像Palantir Technologies公司這樣的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)亦成為了家喻戶曉的品牌。
佩爾提爾在研究該主題的一篇論文中寫道:“2019年,五角大樓在承包方面花費(fèi)了3700億美元,超過了6760億國(guó)防相關(guān)可自由支配預(yù)算總額的一半,較其2001年在承包商方面的開支增長(zhǎng)了驚人的164%?!?/p>
與此同時(shí),從美國(guó)國(guó)土安全部(Homeland Security)的災(zāi)害救援,到擴(kuò)大醫(yī)療范圍,再到政府業(yè)務(wù)數(shù)字化等諸多舉措,為大大小小的公司帶來了賺錢機(jī)遇。
在這一過程中,承包的屬性和構(gòu)架發(fā)生了變化,而且出現(xiàn)了新的復(fù)雜問題。即便我們阻止了“9·11”事件的發(fā)生,但這場(chǎng)變革的某些方面可能已經(jīng)初現(xiàn)彌端,因此我們也可以說恐怖襲擊帶來了一個(gè)轉(zhuǎn)折點(diǎn)?!?·11”事件之前,時(shí)任美國(guó)國(guó)防部部長(zhǎng)的唐納德·拉姆斯菲爾德(今年6月去世)對(duì)于有望削減官僚主義條條框框的理念就持支持態(tài)度。在“9·11”襲擊之后,五角大樓讓承包商來填補(bǔ)或加速阿富汗、伊拉克等地的計(jì)劃。
康奈爾大學(xué)(Cornell University)的政治科學(xué)家、康奈爾科技政策實(shí)驗(yàn)室(Cornell Tech Policy Lab)的主任薩拉·克雷普斯說:“很明顯,拉姆斯菲爾德對(duì)安全設(shè)備領(lǐng)域的私營(yíng)化持贊成態(tài)度。其中部分原因在于,他已經(jīng)在這個(gè)官僚體系中工作了很多年,因此他也知道這個(gè)體系存在的低效問題?!笨死灼账沟难芯糠较蚴强萍寂c國(guó)家安全的融合。
盡管拉姆斯菲爾德的舉措通常很有爭(zhēng)議,但他的很多理念都得到了實(shí)施。在他任職期間,五角大樓派遣黑水公司(Blackwater)的雇員和其他私人安保人員前往戰(zhàn)場(chǎng),來執(zhí)行一系列職務(wù),有時(shí)候會(huì)造成平民與承包商的死亡。就像新澤西州民主黨、前海軍飛行員米基·謝里爾議員最近指出的那樣,在過去20年美國(guó)駐扎阿富汗的這段時(shí)期,私人承包商的死亡人數(shù)(3846)比美軍(2372)還要高。
隨著美國(guó)軍隊(duì)開始應(yīng)對(duì)阿富汗深山和其他地區(qū)的恐怖組織所謂的非對(duì)稱威脅,軍隊(duì)對(duì)新科技依賴日漸增加。為了實(shí)現(xiàn)精準(zhǔn)的目標(biāo)鎖定,同時(shí)減少美軍的傷亡,五角大樓采用了無人機(jī)偵察以及無人機(jī)打擊,這意味著軍隊(duì)如今需要新類型的技能,而且有時(shí)候通過啟用新的供應(yīng)商來獲取這些技能。
克雷普斯表示,“無人機(jī)打開了”硅谷與五角大樓之間更深層次的合作關(guān)系。她還記得在21世紀(jì)10年代中期,一批她認(rèn)識(shí)的灣區(qū)工程學(xué)生提前結(jié)束了學(xué)業(yè)。一些人去了特斯拉(Tesla)工作,還有一些加入了總部位于加州硅谷的頂級(jí)無人機(jī)制造商AeroVironment公司。她回憶說:“這項(xiàng)工作看起來非常新奇,足以吸引全球頂尖科技大學(xué)的人才?!?/p>
同時(shí),五角大樓開始聘請(qǐng)像Palantir Technologies公司這樣的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)來分析他們開始捕捉的有價(jià)值信息。Palantir Technologies公司成立于2003年,當(dāng)時(shí)位于帕洛阿爾托,后于2020年將總部遷至丹佛,其今年的營(yíng)收超過了10億美元。按照五角大樓的承包標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來看,Palantir Technologies依然只是個(gè)嬰兒。作為對(duì)比,洛克希德·馬丁公司2020年的營(yíng)收達(dá)到了654億美元,而其2010年的營(yíng)收為456億美元。然而,雖然這些巨頭依然坐擁大量的五角大樓業(yè)務(wù),但美國(guó)政府似乎越來越愿意與規(guī)模較小的企業(yè)合作,來開發(fā)創(chuàng)新的新科技。
然而,并非所有人都愿意看到大型科技與政府之間越發(fā)緊密的合作關(guān)系,尤其是涉及情報(bào)搜集的領(lǐng)域。2018年,3000多名谷歌(Google)雇員簽署了一份呈交給首席執(zhí)行官桑達(dá)爾·皮查伊的公開請(qǐng)?jiān)笗?,認(rèn)為公司參與Project Maven項(xiàng)目與公司知名的箴言“不作惡”(Don’t be evil)背道而馳。Project Maven是五角大樓用于戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)的人工智能科技。在面臨內(nèi)部逆流的情況下,谷歌選擇了不再續(xù)簽Maven業(yè)務(wù)?!都~約時(shí)報(bào)》(New York Times)稱,該項(xiàng)目長(zhǎng)達(dá)18個(gè)月,價(jià)值高達(dá)1500萬美元。微軟(Microsoft)和亞馬遜(Amazon)也出現(xiàn)了抗議活動(dòng),抵制公司在情報(bào)和國(guó)防領(lǐng)域與政府簽訂的合約。
對(duì)五角大樓的策劃者來說,由于已經(jīng)習(xí)慣了與波音(Boeing)和洛克希德·馬丁這類巨頭合作,因此這些插曲顯得相當(dāng)刺耳??死灼账贡硎荆S著谷歌參與Project Maven,雇員那邊的反對(duì)聲此起彼伏。雇員說,我們來谷歌不是為了做國(guó)防部合同?!斑@對(duì)美國(guó)國(guó)防部來說還是新鮮事。在21世紀(jì)初,所有人都知道他們通過伊拉克和阿富汗的私人安保公司,參與了國(guó)防事務(wù)。所有在黑水公司工作的人都知道自己的公司是做什么的?!?/p>
像亞馬遜或谷歌這樣的科技巨頭,1500萬美元的政府合約對(duì)于營(yíng)收的貢獻(xiàn)是微不足道的,因此它們?nèi)∠藝?guó)防相關(guān)的工作來取悅不高興的員工,何況還有大量的小公司愿意取而代之。但問題來了,如何管理這些小公司。能夠理解的是,如果納稅人的錢是用來購(gòu)買未證實(shí)供應(yīng)商的未經(jīng)測(cè)試技術(shù),那么政府合約經(jīng)理在花錢時(shí)就會(huì)變得十分謹(jǐn)慎。
馬謝洛指出,小公司也有著一些相同的顧慮。2014年,她升任中將,負(fù)責(zé)位于弗吉尼亞州利堡的國(guó)防合約管理局(Defense Contract Management Agency)。該局負(fù)責(zé)國(guó)防部以及其他機(jī)構(gòu)的所有合約談判工作,她也因此處理了大量類似問題。(2017年,馬謝洛從軍隊(duì)退役,如今她是一名獨(dú)立咨詢師。)
她指出,一個(gè)明顯的癥結(jié)在于知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)。創(chuàng)新科技公司可能希望政府為自己新技術(shù)的開發(fā)初期提供資助,而且意料之中的是,他們?cè)诮灰渍勁袝r(shí)異常謹(jǐn)慎,因?yàn)檫@類交易會(huì)限制公司隨后實(shí)現(xiàn)該技術(shù)商業(yè)化的能力。馬謝洛說:“在某些情況下,這些公司在談判合約的研發(fā)部分時(shí)都做的不錯(cuò),但當(dāng)涉及到生產(chǎn)階段時(shí),它們會(huì)放棄這個(gè)機(jī)會(huì),因?yàn)樗鼈儾幌M麑⑵錂?quán)益拱手讓給政府。因此,合約領(lǐng)域的一個(gè)嚴(yán)重問題在于,我們?nèi)绾伪Wo(hù)和鼓勵(lì)創(chuàng)新者與我們合作,同時(shí)如何保護(hù)我們的投資?!?/p>
為了給與政府合作的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)造機(jī)會(huì),更多的合約經(jīng)理都在嘗試一個(gè)名為“聯(lián)合模式”的方案。在這種方案中,政府會(huì)利用第三方,通常是一家非盈利組織,來管理涉及多家初創(chuàng)企業(yè)和小公司的合約。
美國(guó)合約管理協(xié)會(huì)(National Contract Management Association)位于弗吉尼亞州阿什伯恩,其首席執(zhí)行官克雷格·康萊德說:“在聯(lián)合模式下,我們會(huì)按照專長(zhǎng)來劃分群組?!痹搮f(xié)會(huì)的成員包括政府承包業(yè)務(wù)官員,以及與其合作開展業(yè)務(wù)的公司。(馬謝洛是該協(xié)會(huì)董事會(huì)的總裁當(dāng)選者。)
康萊德稱:“聯(lián)合模式為非傳統(tǒng)初創(chuàng)企業(yè)提供了參與合約的載體,這些初創(chuàng)企業(yè)經(jīng)常稱與聯(lián)邦政府工作會(huì)拖慢公司的發(fā)展進(jìn)程。政府能夠采用這種方法來借用其開發(fā)技能或?yàn)榫幊绦枨筇峁椭??!?/p>
在與初創(chuàng)企業(yè)合作時(shí),網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全可能會(huì)成為一個(gè)棘手的問題。馬謝洛指出,不管是采用傳統(tǒng)的合約模式還是這些新型方案,“其中一些人并不具備軍方的網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全意識(shí)?!彪S著政府技術(shù)供應(yīng)商數(shù)量的不斷增長(zhǎng),黑客與勒索軟件攻擊風(fēng)險(xiǎn)以及規(guī)避這些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的責(zé)任,對(duì)于當(dāng)今的承包商和承包商管理者來說是一個(gè)重要關(guān)注點(diǎn)。
該顧慮充分反映了國(guó)家安全政策領(lǐng)域過去20年中發(fā)生的諸多變化。人們似乎越發(fā)意識(shí)到,那些可以對(duì)我們?cè)斐蓚Φ膭?shì)力已經(jīng)發(fā)生了轉(zhuǎn)變,它們?nèi)缃裾趪L試盜竊我們的數(shù)據(jù)或破壞我們必要的操作系統(tǒng),例如SolarWinds漏洞門事件和科洛尼爾管道(Colonial Pipeline)黑客勒索事件。
美國(guó)總統(tǒng)喬·拜登在8月召集了多名首席執(zhí)行官,包括亞馬遜的安迪·賈西、微軟的薩蒂亞·納德拉以及蘋果(Apple)的蒂姆·庫(kù)克,來探討這一話題。拜登說:“我們一再看到,我們所依賴的科技,從手機(jī)到輸油管再到電網(wǎng),可能會(huì)成為黑客和犯罪分子的攻擊目標(biāo)。與此同時(shí),我們的高素質(zhì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全員工成長(zhǎng)的還不夠快,難以應(yīng)對(duì)這一局面?,F(xiàn)實(shí)在于,美國(guó)的大多數(shù)關(guān)鍵設(shè)施由私人領(lǐng)域持有和經(jīng)營(yíng),而聯(lián)邦政府無法獨(dú)自應(yīng)對(duì)這一挑戰(zhàn)?!?/p>
隨著政府尋求私營(yíng)領(lǐng)域來幫助解決這一重要問題,馬謝洛在“9·11”清晨時(shí)的想法則十分值得借鑒:如果政府并不知道會(huì)遇到什么問題,那么就應(yīng)該通過承包的方式來獲取你所需的技術(shù)。然而,要想弄清楚這一點(diǎn)是異常困難的,因?yàn)樵谶@個(gè)世界中,威脅并非是實(shí)體性質(zhì)的,而是技術(shù)性的。政府與科技供應(yīng)商合作的緊密度最終將決定美國(guó)是否能夠做好充分準(zhǔn)備來應(yīng)對(duì)不斷增長(zhǎng)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全挑戰(zhàn)。20年前,很少有人可以想象得到當(dāng)前看似抽象卻令人擔(dān)憂的危險(xiǎn)。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:馮豐
審校:夏林
像我們當(dāng)中的很多人一樣,溫迪·馬謝洛清楚地記得“9·11”事件發(fā)生時(shí)自己在哪里,正在做什么。她當(dāng)時(shí)正在埃格林空軍基地(Eglin Air Force Base)的美國(guó)空軍軍械中心(Air Force’s Air Armament Center)擔(dān)任合約主管,該基地位于佛羅里達(dá)州狹長(zhǎng)地帶,距離彭薩科拉東部約70英里(約112.65公里)。
在當(dāng)天基地隨之而來的混亂當(dāng)中,馬謝洛記得遇到了其工作特有的一個(gè)難題:聯(lián)邦預(yù)算年將在9月30日截止,意味著她的團(tuán)隊(duì)將只有19天的時(shí)間來根據(jù)當(dāng)時(shí)的預(yù)算權(quán)限處理緊急要求,而這將是一筆不小的數(shù)目。
馬謝洛回憶說:“我們的責(zé)任之一就是為醫(yī)療行業(yè)打造支持系統(tǒng),包括發(fā)電機(jī)以及人們?cè)谧匀换蛉藶闉?zāi)害中部署的其他設(shè)備,也就是那些當(dāng)你在不知道接下來會(huì)發(fā)生什么的情況下所需使用的設(shè)備。當(dāng)然在‘9·11’當(dāng)天,各種困惑蜂擁而至,而且基地本能地會(huì)讓員工回家,但我當(dāng)時(shí)說:‘不,你得讓大家回歸工作崗位,因?yàn)槲覀兯炇鸬暮霞s正是生產(chǎn)當(dāng)前所需的這些設(shè)備。’”
在2001年9月的最后幾天,馬謝洛和她的團(tuán)隊(duì)確實(shí)扭轉(zhuǎn)了很多合同,而且在隨后美國(guó)出兵阿富汗以及伊拉克的幾年中亦是如此。她自己曾經(jīng)于2005年被派往伊拉克。在“9·11”事件發(fā)生之后的幾年中,她所專長(zhǎng)領(lǐng)域受到了極大重視。盡管如此,美國(guó)在過去20年的海外戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中仍然耗費(fèi)了8萬多億美元的資金,推動(dòng)了政府承包“迷彩經(jīng)濟(jì)”(Camo Economy)的蓬勃發(fā)展?!懊圆式?jīng)濟(jì)”是由波士頓大學(xué)(Boston University)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)成本項(xiàng)目(Costs of War Project)的主任海迪·佩爾提爾提出的。
像洛克希德·馬?。↙ockheed Martin)、雷神公司(Raytheon)——2019年與聯(lián)合技術(shù)公司(United Technologies)合并,以及通用動(dòng)力(General Dynamics)這類傳統(tǒng)承包巨頭因此受益匪淺,而像Palantir Technologies公司這樣的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)亦成為了家喻戶曉的品牌。
佩爾提爾在研究該主題的一篇論文中寫道:“2019年,五角大樓在承包方面花費(fèi)了3700億美元,超過了6760億國(guó)防相關(guān)可自由支配預(yù)算總額的一半,較其2001年在承包商方面的開支增長(zhǎng)了驚人的164%?!?/p>
與此同時(shí),從美國(guó)國(guó)土安全部(Homeland Security)的災(zāi)害救援,到擴(kuò)大醫(yī)療范圍,再到政府業(yè)務(wù)數(shù)字化等諸多舉措,為大大小小的公司帶來了賺錢機(jī)遇。
在這一過程中,承包的屬性和構(gòu)架發(fā)生了變化,而且出現(xiàn)了新的復(fù)雜問題。即便我們阻止了“9·11”事件的發(fā)生,但這場(chǎng)變革的某些方面可能已經(jīng)初現(xiàn)彌端,因此我們也可以說恐怖襲擊帶來了一個(gè)轉(zhuǎn)折點(diǎn)?!?·11”事件之前,時(shí)任美國(guó)國(guó)防部部長(zhǎng)的唐納德·拉姆斯菲爾德(今年6月去世)對(duì)于有望削減官僚主義條條框框的理念就持支持態(tài)度。在“9·11”襲擊之后,五角大樓讓承包商來填補(bǔ)或加速阿富汗、伊拉克等地的計(jì)劃。
康奈爾大學(xué)(Cornell University)的政治科學(xué)家、康奈爾科技政策實(shí)驗(yàn)室(Cornell Tech Policy Lab)的主任薩拉·克雷普斯說:“很明顯,拉姆斯菲爾德對(duì)安全設(shè)備領(lǐng)域的私營(yíng)化持贊成態(tài)度。其中部分原因在于,他已經(jīng)在這個(gè)官僚體系中工作了很多年,因此他也知道這個(gè)體系存在的低效問題?!笨死灼账沟难芯糠较蚴强萍寂c國(guó)家安全的融合。
盡管拉姆斯菲爾德的舉措通常很有爭(zhēng)議,但他的很多理念都得到了實(shí)施。在他任職期間,五角大樓派遣黑水公司(Blackwater)的雇員和其他私人安保人員前往戰(zhàn)場(chǎng),來執(zhí)行一系列職務(wù),有時(shí)候會(huì)造成平民與承包商的死亡。就像新澤西州民主黨、前海軍飛行員米基·謝里爾議員最近指出的那樣,在過去20年美國(guó)駐扎阿富汗的這段時(shí)期,私人承包商的死亡人數(shù)(3846)比美軍(2372)還要高。
隨著美國(guó)軍隊(duì)開始應(yīng)對(duì)阿富汗深山和其他地區(qū)的恐怖組織所謂的非對(duì)稱威脅,軍隊(duì)對(duì)新科技依賴日漸增加。為了實(shí)現(xiàn)精準(zhǔn)的目標(biāo)鎖定,同時(shí)減少美軍的傷亡,五角大樓采用了無人機(jī)偵察以及無人機(jī)打擊,這意味著軍隊(duì)如今需要新類型的技能,而且有時(shí)候通過啟用新的供應(yīng)商來獲取這些技能。
克雷普斯表示,“無人機(jī)打開了”硅谷與五角大樓之間更深層次的合作關(guān)系。她還記得在21世紀(jì)10年代中期,一批她認(rèn)識(shí)的灣區(qū)工程學(xué)生提前結(jié)束了學(xué)業(yè)。一些人去了特斯拉(Tesla)工作,還有一些加入了總部位于加州硅谷的頂級(jí)無人機(jī)制造商AeroVironment公司。她回憶說:“這項(xiàng)工作看起來非常新奇,足以吸引全球頂尖科技大學(xué)的人才?!?/p>
同時(shí),五角大樓開始聘請(qǐng)像Palantir Technologies公司這樣的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)來分析他們開始捕捉的有價(jià)值信息。Palantir Technologies公司成立于2003年,當(dāng)時(shí)位于帕洛阿爾托,后于2020年將總部遷至丹佛,其今年的營(yíng)收超過了10億美元。按照五角大樓的承包標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來看,Palantir Technologies依然只是個(gè)嬰兒。作為對(duì)比,洛克希德·馬丁公司2020年的營(yíng)收達(dá)到了654億美元,而其2010年的營(yíng)收為456億美元。然而,雖然這些巨頭依然坐擁大量的五角大樓業(yè)務(wù),但美國(guó)政府似乎越來越愿意與規(guī)模較小的企業(yè)合作,來開發(fā)創(chuàng)新的新科技。
然而,并非所有人都愿意看到大型科技與政府之間越發(fā)緊密的合作關(guān)系,尤其是涉及情報(bào)搜集的領(lǐng)域。2018年,3000多名谷歌(Google)雇員簽署了一份呈交給首席執(zhí)行官桑達(dá)爾·皮查伊的公開請(qǐng)?jiān)笗?,認(rèn)為公司參與Project Maven項(xiàng)目與公司知名的箴言“不作惡”(Don’t be evil)背道而馳。Project Maven是五角大樓用于戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)的人工智能科技。在面臨內(nèi)部逆流的情況下,谷歌選擇了不再續(xù)簽Maven業(yè)務(wù)?!都~約時(shí)報(bào)》(New York Times)稱,該項(xiàng)目長(zhǎng)達(dá)18個(gè)月,價(jià)值高達(dá)1500萬美元。微軟(Microsoft)和亞馬遜(Amazon)也出現(xiàn)了抗議活動(dòng),抵制公司在情報(bào)和國(guó)防領(lǐng)域與政府簽訂的合約。
對(duì)五角大樓的策劃者來說,由于已經(jīng)習(xí)慣了與波音(Boeing)和洛克希德·馬丁這類巨頭合作,因此這些插曲顯得相當(dāng)刺耳??死灼账贡硎?,隨著谷歌參與Project Maven,雇員那邊的反對(duì)聲此起彼伏。雇員說,我們來谷歌不是為了做國(guó)防部合同。“這對(duì)美國(guó)國(guó)防部來說還是新鮮事。在21世紀(jì)初,所有人都知道他們通過伊拉克和阿富汗的私人安保公司,參與了國(guó)防事務(wù)。所有在黑水公司工作的人都知道自己的公司是做什么的?!?/p>
像亞馬遜或谷歌這樣的科技巨頭,1500萬美元的政府合約對(duì)于營(yíng)收的貢獻(xiàn)是微不足道的,因此它們?nèi)∠藝?guó)防相關(guān)的工作來取悅不高興的員工,何況還有大量的小公司愿意取而代之。但問題來了,如何管理這些小公司。能夠理解的是,如果納稅人的錢是用來購(gòu)買未證實(shí)供應(yīng)商的未經(jīng)測(cè)試技術(shù),那么政府合約經(jīng)理在花錢時(shí)就會(huì)變得十分謹(jǐn)慎。
馬謝洛指出,小公司也有著一些相同的顧慮。2014年,她升任中將,負(fù)責(zé)位于弗吉尼亞州利堡的國(guó)防合約管理局(Defense Contract Management Agency)。該局負(fù)責(zé)國(guó)防部以及其他機(jī)構(gòu)的所有合約談判工作,她也因此處理了大量類似問題。(2017年,馬謝洛從軍隊(duì)退役,如今她是一名獨(dú)立咨詢師。)
她指出,一個(gè)明顯的癥結(jié)在于知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)。創(chuàng)新科技公司可能希望政府為自己新技術(shù)的開發(fā)初期提供資助,而且意料之中的是,他們?cè)诮灰渍勁袝r(shí)異常謹(jǐn)慎,因?yàn)檫@類交易會(huì)限制公司隨后實(shí)現(xiàn)該技術(shù)商業(yè)化的能力。馬謝洛說:“在某些情況下,這些公司在談判合約的研發(fā)部分時(shí)都做的不錯(cuò),但當(dāng)涉及到生產(chǎn)階段時(shí),它們會(huì)放棄這個(gè)機(jī)會(huì),因?yàn)樗鼈儾幌M麑⑵錂?quán)益拱手讓給政府。因此,合約領(lǐng)域的一個(gè)嚴(yán)重問題在于,我們?nèi)绾伪Wo(hù)和鼓勵(lì)創(chuàng)新者與我們合作,同時(shí)如何保護(hù)我們的投資?!?/p>
為了給與政府合作的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)造機(jī)會(huì),更多的合約經(jīng)理都在嘗試一個(gè)名為“聯(lián)合模式”的方案。在這種方案中,政府會(huì)利用第三方,通常是一家非盈利組織,來管理涉及多家初創(chuàng)企業(yè)和小公司的合約。
美國(guó)合約管理協(xié)會(huì)(National Contract Management Association)位于弗吉尼亞州阿什伯恩,其首席執(zhí)行官克雷格·康萊德說:“在聯(lián)合模式下,我們會(huì)按照專長(zhǎng)來劃分群組。”該協(xié)會(huì)的成員包括政府承包業(yè)務(wù)官員,以及與其合作開展業(yè)務(wù)的公司。(馬謝洛是該協(xié)會(huì)董事會(huì)的總裁當(dāng)選者。)
康萊德稱:“聯(lián)合模式為非傳統(tǒng)初創(chuàng)企業(yè)提供了參與合約的載體,這些初創(chuàng)企業(yè)經(jīng)常稱與聯(lián)邦政府工作會(huì)拖慢公司的發(fā)展進(jìn)程。政府能夠采用這種方法來借用其開發(fā)技能或?yàn)榫幊绦枨筇峁椭?。?/p>
在與初創(chuàng)企業(yè)合作時(shí),網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全可能會(huì)成為一個(gè)棘手的問題。馬謝洛指出,不管是采用傳統(tǒng)的合約模式還是這些新型方案,“其中一些人并不具備軍方的網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全意識(shí)。”隨著政府技術(shù)供應(yīng)商數(shù)量的不斷增長(zhǎng),黑客與勒索軟件攻擊風(fēng)險(xiǎn)以及規(guī)避這些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的責(zé)任,對(duì)于當(dāng)今的承包商和承包商管理者來說是一個(gè)重要關(guān)注點(diǎn)。
該顧慮充分反映了國(guó)家安全政策領(lǐng)域過去20年中發(fā)生的諸多變化。人們似乎越發(fā)意識(shí)到,那些可以對(duì)我們?cè)斐蓚Φ膭?shì)力已經(jīng)發(fā)生了轉(zhuǎn)變,它們?nèi)缃裾趪L試盜竊我們的數(shù)據(jù)或破壞我們必要的操作系統(tǒng),例如SolarWinds漏洞門事件和科洛尼爾管道(Colonial Pipeline)黑客勒索事件。
美國(guó)總統(tǒng)喬·拜登在8月召集了多名首席執(zhí)行官,包括亞馬遜的安迪·賈西、微軟的薩蒂亞·納德拉以及蘋果(Apple)的蒂姆·庫(kù)克,來探討這一話題。拜登說:“我們一再看到,我們所依賴的科技,從手機(jī)到輸油管再到電網(wǎng),可能會(huì)成為黑客和犯罪分子的攻擊目標(biāo)。與此同時(shí),我們的高素質(zhì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全員工成長(zhǎng)的還不夠快,難以應(yīng)對(duì)這一局面?,F(xiàn)實(shí)在于,美國(guó)的大多數(shù)關(guān)鍵設(shè)施由私人領(lǐng)域持有和經(jīng)營(yíng),而聯(lián)邦政府無法獨(dú)自應(yīng)對(duì)這一挑戰(zhàn)?!?/p>
隨著政府尋求私營(yíng)領(lǐng)域來幫助解決這一重要問題,馬謝洛在“9·11”清晨時(shí)的想法則十分值得借鑒:如果政府并不知道會(huì)遇到什么問題,那么就應(yīng)該通過承包的方式來獲取你所需的技術(shù)。然而,要想弄清楚這一點(diǎn)是異常困難的,因?yàn)樵谶@個(gè)世界中,威脅并非是實(shí)體性質(zhì)的,而是技術(shù)性的。政府與科技供應(yīng)商合作的緊密度最終將決定美國(guó)是否能夠做好充分準(zhǔn)備來應(yīng)對(duì)不斷增長(zhǎng)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全挑戰(zhàn)。20年前,很少有人可以想象得到當(dāng)前看似抽象卻令人擔(dān)憂的危險(xiǎn)。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:馮豐
審校:夏林
Like many of us, Wendy Masiello remembers exactly where she was and what she was doing on 9/11. In her case, she was serving as the director of contracting for the Air Force’s Air Armament Center at Eglin Air Force Base, about 70 miles east of Pensacola on the Florida panhandle.
In the scramble that ensued on base that day, Masiello remembers having one concern that was unique to her line of work: The federal fiscal year ends on Sept. 30, meaning her team would have only 19 days to process emergency requests against the current budget authority, of which she expected a large number.
“One of our responsibilities was to do support systems for the medical community, including generators, and other equipment you deploy during natural or man-made disasters—things that you need in moments when you don’t know exactly what will come next,” Masiello recalls. “On 9/11, of course, there was so much confusion, and there was an instinct to send our people home, but I said, ‘No, you need to get us back to work, because the contracts we put together are for exactly the kind of equipment we are going to need now.’”
Masiello and her team indeed turned around many contracts in those final days of September 2001, and in the years to follow as the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and later Iraq, where she deployed in 2005. In the years since 9/11, her area of expertise has been in high demand. All told, the U.S. spent upwards of $8 trillion to fight wars overseas over the past 20 years—driving what Heidi Peltier, director of Boston University’s Costs of War Project, has dubbed a burgeoning “Camo Economy” of government contracting.
Traditional contracting giants like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon (which United Technologies acquired and merged with in 2019), and General Dynamics have benefited, while upstarts like Palantir Technologies have become household names.
“In 2019, the Pentagon spent $370 billion on contracting—more than half the total defense-related discretionary spending, $676 billion, and a whopping 164% higher than its spending on contractors in 2001,” Peltier wrote in a paper on the subject.
At the same time, measures ranging from Homeland Security disaster relief to expanding access to health care to the digitization of government business have created opportunities for companies of all sizes to cash in.
Along the way, the nature and structure of contracting has changed, and new complexities have emerged. Though some aspects of this evolution may have happened even if 9/11 had somehow been prevented, it is fair to say that the terrorist attacks created an inflection point. Before 9/11, then–Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who died this past June, championed ideas that, in his view, had the potential to cut through bureaucratic red tape. After the attacks, the Pentagon looked to contractors to supplement or accelerate initiatives in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.
“Clearly, Rumsfeld was pro-privatization of aspects of the security apparatus,” says Sarah Kreps, a political scientist at Cornell University and director of the Cornell Tech Policy Lab, who studies the intersection of technology and national security. “Part of it is that he had worked in the bureaucracy for some many years, and so he knew there was an inefficiency to it.”
Though Rumsfeld’s efforts were often controversial, he was able to implement many of his ideas. During his tenure, the Pentagon dispatched Blackwater employees and other private security personnel to war zones to fulfill a variety of roles, sometimes with deadly results for civilians and contractors alike. As Rep. Mikie Sherrill, a New Jersey Democrat and former Navy pilot noted recently, more private contractors died during the 20-year American presence in Afghanistan (3,846) than U.S. troops (2,372).
As the U.S. military began pursuing the so-called asymmetric threat posed by terrorist cells in the remote mountains of Afghanistan and elsewhere, it came to rely more and more on new technology. In an effort to achieve precision targeting while also limiting U.S. casualties, the Pentagon adopted drone surveillance and drone warfare, meaning that the military now required new types of skills and sometimes turned to new suppliers to find them.
“Drones opened the door” to a deeper partnership between Silicon Valley and the Pentagon, says Kreps, who remembers a moment in the mid 2010s when a slew of engineering students she knew in the Bay Area left their academic programs early. A bunch went to work at Tesla, while another cohort joined AeroVironment, a top dronemaker then headquartered in Simi Valley, Calif. “The work was seen as novel enough to siphon off talent from the best tech universities in the world,” she recalls.
In parallel, the Pentagon began hiring upstarts like Palantir to analyze the troves of data they began to capture. Founded in Palo Alto in 2003, Palantir (which relocated its headquarters to Denver in 2020) crossed $1 billion in revenue this year. It’s still a baby by Pentagon contracting standards. By way of comparison, Lockheed Martin saw its revenue hit $65.4 billion in 2020, up from $45.6 billion in 2010. But if the giants still enjoy plenty of Pentagon business, the government seems increasingly comfortable working with smaller players to develop innovative new technologies.
Not everyone was happy with the growing partnership between Big Tech and the government, however, particularly in matters related to intelligence gathering. In 2018, more than 3,000 Google employees signed an open-letter petition to CEO Sundar Pichai arguing that the company’s participation in Project Maven, an effort by the Pentagon to adapt artificial intelligence technology for battlefield use, was contrary to the company’s famous motto of “Don’t be evil.” In the face of internal blowback, Google opted not to seek a renewal of the Maven business, which was worth up to $15 million over 18 months, according to the New York Times. Employees at Microsoft and Amazon protested some of their companies’ intelligence and defense-related government contracts as well.
For Pentagon planners, accustomed to working with the Boeings and Lockheed Martins of the world, these episodes were something of a rude awakening. “With Google getting into Project Maven, there was such a backlash on the part of employees, who said, ‘We didn’t go to Google to do DoD contracting,’” says Kreps. “That was new. In the early 2000s, with private security firms in Iraq and Afghanistan, everyone knew they were involved in the business of defense. Everyone who went to work at Blackwater knew what they had signed up for.”
If tech giants like Amazon or Google, for whom a $15 million government contract was barely a drop in the revenue bucket, passed on defense work in order to mollify unhappy employees, there were plenty of smaller tech firms willing to fill the vacuum. The question then was how to manage them. Government contract managers are understandably cautious of spending taxpayer dollars on untested technology from an unproven vendor.
And some of the wariness is mutual, notes Masiello. In 2014, she became a lieutenant general overseeing the Defense Contract Management Agency based at Fort Lee, Va., which has responsibility for negotiating all contracts for the Department of Defense as well as other agencies—placing her at the nexus of many of these issues. (She retired from the military in 2017 and is now an independent consultant.)
One sticking point in particular, she noted, was intellectual property. Innovative technology companies might want government funding in the early stages of developing a new technology, but they were unsurprisingly cautious when negotiating a deal that limited their ability to commercialize it later on. “In some cases, companies have done a good job in R&D, and then when they get to the production phase of a contract, they walk away from the opportunity because they don’t want to give up their rights to the government,” Masiello says. “So a big question in the contracting world is, How do we protect and encourage innovators to work with us while also allowing us to protect our investment?”
To create opportunities for startups to work with the government, more contract managers are experimenting with an arrangement called the consortia model, whereby the government taps a third party—often a nonprofit—to manage a contract that draws contributions from a number of different startups and small businesses.
“In consortia models, we group around expertise,” says Kraig Conrad, CEO of the National Contract Management Association, an organization in Ashburn, Va., whose members include government contracting officers and the companies with whom they do business. (Masiello is president-elect of NCMA’s board.)
“It provides nontraditional startups, who often say that working with the federal government slows us down, with a vehicle to participate in a contract,” Conrad says. “And it’s a method for the government to tap into development skills or power a programming need.”
Cybersecurity can be a thorny issue when working with startups—“some of whom do not share military cybersecurity concerns,” Masiello notes—whether under the traditional contracting model or within these new kinds of arrangements. As the government works with more technology suppliers, the exposure to hacks and ransomware attacks—and responsibility for mitigating them—is a huge area of focus for contractors and contractor managers today.
Tellingly, this concern reflects one of the shifts that has happened over the past two decades in terms of national security policy. Increasingly it seems as if the forces that would do us harm have pivoted, and are instead trying to steal our data or compromise our essential operating systems, whether it be the SolarWinds or Colonial Pipeline hack.
President Joe Biden convened a group of CEOs, including Amazon’s Andy Jassy, Microsoft’s Satya Nadella, and Apple’s Tim Cook, on the topic in August. “We’ve seen time and again how the technologies we rely on—from our cell phones to pipelines to the electric grid—can become targets of hackers and criminals. At the same time, our skilled cybersecurity workforce has not grown fast enough to keep pace,” Biden said. “The reality is most of our critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, and the federal government can’t meet this challenge alone.”
As the government looks to the private sector for help on this crucial issue, Masiello’s logic from the morning of 9/11 applies: The government should be contracting for the type of technology you need when you don’t exactly know what’s coming your way. But it’s doubly hard to know what that is in a world where the threats are not physical but technological. How well the government learns to work with technology suppliers will ultimately determine how well equipped the U.S. is to meet the growing cybersecurity challenge. Twenty years ago, few would have imagined the abstract-seeming but no less worrying dangers we would face today.