目前最重要的經(jīng)濟學問題,或者在金融領(lǐng)域造成嚴重分裂的問題,當屬通貨膨脹是否會卷土重來。
一方認為,不惜代價應(yīng)對新冠疫情,導致發(fā)達國家的物價可能會上漲到近幾十年來前所未見的水平。另一方則主張,過去幾十年各國面臨的嚴重威脅是通貨緊縮而不是經(jīng)濟過熱,新冠疫情正在讓這種情況進一步惡化。
這場爭論從貿(mào)易競爭到失業(yè)救濟,影響到了各個政策領(lǐng)域,爭論的結(jié)果關(guān)乎所有人的利益。
據(jù)美國銀行(Bank of America)統(tǒng)計,各國政府和央行的疫情救濟支出已經(jīng)高達20萬億美元,如果這些救濟措施導致物價暴漲,他們可能面臨削減救濟的壓力。勞動者和消費者的工資收入和家庭支出會受到影響。如果通脹重來,超過40萬億美元退休儲蓄將面臨被侵蝕的風險。
經(jīng)濟學專家認為經(jīng)濟還面臨著其他風險。倫敦政治經(jīng)濟學院(London School of Economics)的學者、83歲高齡的查爾斯·古德哈特見證過多次經(jīng)濟興衰。他在最近的一篇論文中表示,疫情之后的通脹趨勢“將影響宏觀經(jīng)濟理論與教學,這種影響可能是永久性的?!?/p>
到目前為止,這種觀點尚無定論。有些國家公布的物價在疫情之初有所下降,但最近開始上漲。在債券市場和消費者當中,預期通貨膨脹率指標全線上漲。但我們需要多年之后才能掌握能夠最終解決問題的數(shù)據(jù)。
與此同時,投資者和公眾需要仔細權(quán)衡不同觀點。以下是一些主流觀點。
支持通脹重來的理由:貨幣供應(yīng)量
自由市場經(jīng)濟學家米爾頓·弗里德曼提出過一個著名的觀點,即通貨膨脹無論何時何地都是一種貨幣現(xiàn)象。
現(xiàn)在依舊有很多人支持這種觀點。支持者們提到了一些政府為應(yīng)對疫情大量印鈔的行為,并預測這種做法遲早會沖擊整體經(jīng)濟,并推高物價。
許多國家的貨幣供應(yīng)量增長速度均創(chuàng)下了歷史之最。此外,十年前的大量印鈔并沒有超出銀行的資產(chǎn)負債表,但這一次與之不同。有跡象表明,此次政府發(fā)放的現(xiàn)金正在流入消費者和公司的口袋。
古德哈特與Talking Heads Macro公司的馬諾伊·普拉丹在今年出版的新書《人口大逆轉(zhuǎn)》(The Great Demographic Reversal)的后記中寫道:“今天的政策措施正在注入大量資金,將直接提高廣義貨幣指標?!彪S著各地解除封鎖和隨之而來的經(jīng)濟復蘇,“通脹飆升”是必然結(jié)果。
反對通脹重來的理由:貨幣流通速度
影響物價的不止是貨幣擴張,還有貨幣的使用。這是2008年以來,即使在央行加大馬力印鈔的情況下通脹增速依舊低迷的原因之一。同樣的力量可能依舊在起作用。
貨幣“流通速度”是指人們使用貨幣購買商品和服務(wù)的貨幣換手頻率。2008年金融危機期間,貨幣流通速度下降,之后一直沒有恢復,現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)下降到前所未有的低谷。
華盛頓分析機構(gòu)LH Meyer/Monetary Policy Analytics的經(jīng)濟學家德里克·唐表示:“貨幣供應(yīng)量與通貨膨脹之間的聯(lián)系依舊非常脆弱。我們可能供應(yīng)了大量貨幣。但這并不代表會造成嚴重的通貨膨脹。”
支持通脹重來的理由:家庭財富
與2008年金融危機之后相比,消費支出的反彈速度更快,并將推高物價,因為政府采取了更激進的政策響應(yīng)措施,減輕了家庭財政遭遇的沖擊。
在中央銀行的支撐下,股市復蘇只用了幾個月時間,而不是長達數(shù)年的漫長過程。房地產(chǎn)價格沒有受到太大沖擊。對于低收入階層,政府為被臨時解雇或被裁員的勞動者提供了大量支持。不同于貨幣刺激政策,財政刺激資金會直接存入人們的銀行賬戶,可能會被用來消費。
對沖基金與咨詢公司Eurizon SLJ Capital的負責人史蒂芬·詹表示,這帶來了出現(xiàn)“需求拉動通貨膨脹”的可能。他說:“隨著人們對病毒的情緒有所好轉(zhuǎn),為什么不能出現(xiàn)強勁的最終需求?具有市場支配力、有能力提高價格的公司很可能會這樣做。”
反對通脹重來的理由:家庭恐慌
在經(jīng)濟衰退期間,政府的干預支撐了家庭收入,但這些錢并不會全部用來消費。儲蓄率已經(jīng)飆升。
出現(xiàn)這種情況的部分原因,確實是因為封鎖措施導致餐廳和酒吧停業(yè),并且人們普遍會避免乘飛機出行。但即便經(jīng)濟重啟,消費者有了更多選擇,對于健康和就業(yè)的擔憂意味著消費者依舊會保持謹慎。
Brean Capital公司的首席經(jīng)濟顧問約翰·瑞丁表示:“顯然我們在短期內(nèi)難以恢復常態(tài),除非人們把美聯(lián)儲印制的鈔票和政府發(fā)放的補貼用來消費?!?/p>
支持通脹重來的理由:寬松的中央銀行
許多分析師之所以預測通脹率上升,一個原因是央行作為低通脹時期物價穩(wěn)定的守護者,現(xiàn)在允許物價上漲的意愿異常強烈。
美聯(lián)儲即將發(fā)布一項新策略,要求其提高對通脹超調(diào)的容忍度,克制預防性加息,預計允許物價上漲將成為其官方立場。美國銀行的布魯諾·布萊金哈表示,美聯(lián)儲的重心是“當前的經(jīng)濟沖擊產(chǎn)生的通貨緊縮的影響。”即使在官方調(diào)整政策立場之前,美聯(lián)儲已經(jīng)“力爭在可預見的未來保持低利率?!?/p>
歐洲央行也開始進行類似的評估。歐洲央行在刺激通貨膨脹之前,曾嘗試執(zhí)行寬松的貨幣政策,但效果不及預期。摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)的經(jīng)濟學家們表示,與以往不同的是,“現(xiàn)在各國央行正在努力彌補衰退時期未能達到的部分通貨膨脹目標?!?/p>
反對通脹重來的理由:疲軟的就業(yè)市場
政策制定者相信以往的經(jīng)驗,認為通貨膨脹與失業(yè)之間存在一定的交替關(guān)系,也就是所謂的“菲利普斯曲線”。
政策制定者認為,當經(jīng)濟利用包括勞動力在內(nèi)的全部資源時,物價只會面臨持續(xù)上漲的壓力。
關(guān)于失業(yè)與通貨膨脹之間這種關(guān)系的強度一直存在疑問。如果兩者之間存在某種聯(lián)系,應(yīng)該可以緩解人們對于通貨膨脹的擔憂。各地失業(yè)率飆升,就業(yè)市場快速反彈到疫情之前的水平的可能性微乎其微。
支持通脹重來的理由:供應(yīng)受創(chuàng)
已經(jīng)有證據(jù)證明供應(yīng)鏈中斷正在推高物價。例如,過去2個月,中國的食品通貨膨脹加速,原因之一是疫情影響了食品進口。
疫情的長期風險也可能導致緊張的國際關(guān)系升級。政府可能更不愿意在戰(zhàn)略性物資方面依賴其他國家,比如口罩、藥品或電腦芯片等。政府可能會向企業(yè)施壓,要求企業(yè)將生產(chǎn)業(yè)務(wù)搬回國內(nèi),即使國內(nèi)的生產(chǎn)成本更高。
摩根士丹利的經(jīng)濟學家寫道,“貿(mào)易、科技和企業(yè)巨頭”,即廉價進口商品、科技進步和具有市場支配力有能力壓低工資的企業(yè)巨頭,是“過去30年導致通貨緊縮趨勢的驅(qū)動力?!钡@三個因素也被認為是導致社會不平等加劇的罪魁禍首,面臨著日益嚴格的政治審查,這“可能帶來通貨膨脹動態(tài)的巨大轉(zhuǎn)變?!?/p>
反對通脹重來的理由:閑置產(chǎn)能
抗擊新冠疫情常被拿來與真實的戰(zhàn)爭相提并論,而歷史上,戰(zhàn)爭往往會引發(fā)通貨膨脹。
但兩者之間有一個重要的區(qū)別。軍事沖突會毀滅經(jīng)濟的供給側(cè),比如工廠和鐵路等,由此導致的交通阻塞和供應(yīng)短缺會推高物價。但在新冠疫情期間,這些設(shè)施雖然沒有被使用,但它們依舊完好無損。
法國外貿(mào)銀行(Natixis SA)亞太區(qū)首席經(jīng)濟學家艾西亞·加西亞·埃雷羅表示,在疫情期間,受到?jīng)_擊的主要是需求。她說:“資本沒有被摧毀或耗盡,所以最終更容易出現(xiàn)產(chǎn)能過剩?!边@種區(qū)別是她選擇“通脹緊縮陣營”的原因之一。(財富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:Biz
目前最重要的經(jīng)濟學問題,或者在金融領(lǐng)域造成嚴重分裂的問題,當屬通貨膨脹是否會卷土重來。
一方認為,不惜代價應(yīng)對新冠疫情,導致發(fā)達國家的物價可能會上漲到近幾十年來前所未見的水平。另一方則主張,過去幾十年各國面臨的嚴重威脅是通貨緊縮而不是經(jīng)濟過熱,新冠疫情正在讓這種情況進一步惡化。
這場爭論從貿(mào)易競爭到失業(yè)救濟,影響到了各個政策領(lǐng)域,爭論的結(jié)果關(guān)乎所有人的利益。
據(jù)美國銀行(Bank of America)統(tǒng)計,各國政府和央行的疫情救濟支出已經(jīng)高達20萬億美元,如果這些救濟措施導致物價暴漲,他們可能面臨削減救濟的壓力。勞動者和消費者的工資收入和家庭支出會受到影響。如果通脹重來,超過40萬億美元退休儲蓄將面臨被侵蝕的風險。
經(jīng)濟學專家認為經(jīng)濟還面臨著其他風險。倫敦政治經(jīng)濟學院(London School of Economics)的學者、83歲高齡的查爾斯·古德哈特見證過多次經(jīng)濟興衰。他在最近的一篇論文中表示,疫情之后的通脹趨勢“將影響宏觀經(jīng)濟理論與教學,這種影響可能是永久性的?!?/p>
到目前為止,這種觀點尚無定論。有些國家公布的物價在疫情之初有所下降,但最近開始上漲。在債券市場和消費者當中,預期通貨膨脹率指標全線上漲。但我們需要多年之后才能掌握能夠最終解決問題的數(shù)據(jù)。
與此同時,投資者和公眾需要仔細權(quán)衡不同觀點。以下是一些主流觀點。
支持通脹重來的理由:貨幣供應(yīng)量
自由市場經(jīng)濟學家米爾頓·弗里德曼提出過一個著名的觀點,即通貨膨脹無論何時何地都是一種貨幣現(xiàn)象。
現(xiàn)在依舊有很多人支持這種觀點。支持者們提到了一些政府為應(yīng)對疫情大量印鈔的行為,并預測這種做法遲早會沖擊整體經(jīng)濟,并推高物價。
許多國家的貨幣供應(yīng)量增長速度均創(chuàng)下了歷史之最。此外,十年前的大量印鈔并沒有超出銀行的資產(chǎn)負債表,但這一次與之不同。有跡象表明,此次政府發(fā)放的現(xiàn)金正在流入消費者和公司的口袋。
古德哈特與Talking Heads Macro公司的馬諾伊·普拉丹在今年出版的新書《人口大逆轉(zhuǎn)》(The Great Demographic Reversal)的后記中寫道:“今天的政策措施正在注入大量資金,將直接提高廣義貨幣指標?!彪S著各地解除封鎖和隨之而來的經(jīng)濟復蘇,“通脹飆升”是必然結(jié)果。
反對通脹重來的理由:貨幣流通速度
影響物價的不止是貨幣擴張,還有貨幣的使用。這是2008年以來,即使在央行加大馬力印鈔的情況下通脹增速依舊低迷的原因之一。同樣的力量可能依舊在起作用。
貨幣“流通速度”是指人們使用貨幣購買商品和服務(wù)的貨幣換手頻率。2008年金融危機期間,貨幣流通速度下降,之后一直沒有恢復,現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)下降到前所未有的低谷。
華盛頓分析機構(gòu)LH Meyer/Monetary Policy Analytics的經(jīng)濟學家德里克·唐表示:“貨幣供應(yīng)量與通貨膨脹之間的聯(lián)系依舊非常脆弱。我們可能供應(yīng)了大量貨幣。但這并不代表會造成嚴重的通貨膨脹。”
支持通脹重來的理由:家庭財富
與2008年金融危機之后相比,消費支出的反彈速度更快,并將推高物價,因為政府采取了更激進的政策響應(yīng)措施,減輕了家庭財政遭遇的沖擊。
在中央銀行的支撐下,股市復蘇只用了幾個月時間,而不是長達數(shù)年的漫長過程。房地產(chǎn)價格沒有受到太大沖擊。對于低收入階層,政府為被臨時解雇或被裁員的勞動者提供了大量支持。不同于貨幣刺激政策,財政刺激資金會直接存入人們的銀行賬戶,可能會被用來消費。
對沖基金與咨詢公司Eurizon SLJ Capital的負責人史蒂芬·詹表示,這帶來了出現(xiàn)“需求拉動通貨膨脹”的可能。他說:“隨著人們對病毒的情緒有所好轉(zhuǎn),為什么不能出現(xiàn)強勁的最終需求?具有市場支配力、有能力提高價格的公司很可能會這樣做?!?/p>
反對通脹重來的理由:家庭恐慌
在經(jīng)濟衰退期間,政府的干預支撐了家庭收入,但這些錢并不會全部用來消費。儲蓄率已經(jīng)飆升。
出現(xiàn)這種情況的部分原因,確實是因為封鎖措施導致餐廳和酒吧停業(yè),并且人們普遍會避免乘飛機出行。但即便經(jīng)濟重啟,消費者有了更多選擇,對于健康和就業(yè)的擔憂意味著消費者依舊會保持謹慎。
Brean Capital公司的首席經(jīng)濟顧問約翰·瑞丁表示:“顯然我們在短期內(nèi)難以恢復常態(tài),除非人們把美聯(lián)儲印制的鈔票和政府發(fā)放的補貼用來消費?!?/p>
支持通脹重來的理由:寬松的中央銀行
許多分析師之所以預測通脹率上升,一個原因是央行作為低通脹時期物價穩(wěn)定的守護者,現(xiàn)在允許物價上漲的意愿異常強烈。
美聯(lián)儲即將發(fā)布一項新策略,要求其提高對通脹超調(diào)的容忍度,克制預防性加息,預計允許物價上漲將成為其官方立場。美國銀行的布魯諾·布萊金哈表示,美聯(lián)儲的重心是“當前的經(jīng)濟沖擊產(chǎn)生的通貨緊縮的影響。”即使在官方調(diào)整政策立場之前,美聯(lián)儲已經(jīng)“力爭在可預見的未來保持低利率?!?/p>
歐洲央行也開始進行類似的評估。歐洲央行在刺激通貨膨脹之前,曾嘗試執(zhí)行寬松的貨幣政策,但效果不及預期。摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)的經(jīng)濟學家們表示,與以往不同的是,“現(xiàn)在各國央行正在努力彌補衰退時期未能達到的部分通貨膨脹目標?!?/p>
反對通脹重來的理由:疲軟的就業(yè)市場
政策制定者相信以往的經(jīng)驗,認為通貨膨脹與失業(yè)之間存在一定的交替關(guān)系,也就是所謂的“菲利普斯曲線”。
政策制定者認為,當經(jīng)濟利用包括勞動力在內(nèi)的全部資源時,物價只會面臨持續(xù)上漲的壓力。
關(guān)于失業(yè)與通貨膨脹之間這種關(guān)系的強度一直存在疑問。如果兩者之間存在某種聯(lián)系,應(yīng)該可以緩解人們對于通貨膨脹的擔憂。各地失業(yè)率飆升,就業(yè)市場快速反彈到疫情之前的水平的可能性微乎其微。
支持通脹重來的理由:供應(yīng)受創(chuàng)
已經(jīng)有證據(jù)證明供應(yīng)鏈中斷正在推高物價。例如,過去2個月,中國的食品通貨膨脹加速,原因之一是疫情影響了食品進口。
疫情的長期風險也可能導致緊張的國際關(guān)系升級。政府可能更不愿意在戰(zhàn)略性物資方面依賴其他國家,比如口罩、藥品或電腦芯片等。政府可能會向企業(yè)施壓,要求企業(yè)將生產(chǎn)業(yè)務(wù)搬回國內(nèi),即使國內(nèi)的生產(chǎn)成本更高。
摩根士丹利的經(jīng)濟學家寫道,“貿(mào)易、科技和企業(yè)巨頭”,即廉價進口商品、科技進步和具有市場支配力有能力壓低工資的企業(yè)巨頭,是“過去30年導致通貨緊縮趨勢的驅(qū)動力?!钡@三個因素也被認為是導致社會不平等加劇的罪魁禍首,面臨著日益嚴格的政治審查,這“可能帶來通貨膨脹動態(tài)的巨大轉(zhuǎn)變?!?/p>
反對通脹重來的理由:閑置產(chǎn)能
抗擊新冠疫情常被拿來與真實的戰(zhàn)爭相提并論,而歷史上,戰(zhàn)爭往往會引發(fā)通貨膨脹。
但兩者之間有一個重要的區(qū)別。軍事沖突會毀滅經(jīng)濟的供給側(cè),比如工廠和鐵路等,由此導致的交通阻塞和供應(yīng)短缺會推高物價。但在新冠疫情期間,這些設(shè)施雖然沒有被使用,但它們依舊完好無損。
法國外貿(mào)銀行(Natixis SA)亞太區(qū)首席經(jīng)濟學家艾西亞·加西亞·埃雷羅表示,在疫情期間,受到?jīng)_擊的主要是需求。她說:“資本沒有被摧毀或耗盡,所以最終更容易出現(xiàn)產(chǎn)能過剩?!边@種區(qū)別是她選擇“通脹緊縮陣營”的原因之一。(財富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:Biz
There’s hardly any question that carries greater weight in economics right now, or divides the financial world more sharply, than whether inflation is on the way back.
One camp is convinced that the no-expense-spared fight against Covid-19 has put developed economies on course for rising prices on a scale they haven’t seen in decades. The other one says the virus is exacerbating the conditions of the past dozen years or so—when deflation, rather than overheating, has been the big threat.
The debate touches every area of policy, from trade rivalries to unemployment benefits, and everyone has an interest in the outcome.
Governments and central banks may face pressure to curtail their pandemic relief efforts, already worth some $20 trillion according to Bank of America, if they trigger a spike in prices. Workers and consumers will see the impact in wage packets and household bills. More than $40 trillion of retirement savings is at risk of erosion if inflation returns.
Inside the economics profession, there’s something else at stake too. Charles Goodhart—a scholar at the London School of Economics who, at the age of 83, has seen a few orthodoxies rise and fall—argued in a recent paper that what happens to inflation after the pandemic “will affect macroeconomic theory and teaching, perhaps forever.”
For now the jury is out. Some countries reported a drop in prices early in the crisis, and a jump more recently. In the bond markets and among consumers, measures of expected inflation have edged higher. But the data that will ultimately settle the question could take years to trickle in.
In the meantime, investors and the public are left to weigh the arguments. Here are some of the main ones.
Case for Inflation: Money Supply
Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, the free-market economist Milton Friedman famously argued.
That’s still a widely held view. And those who hold it are pointing to the wave of money created by governments to fight the pandemic–-and predicting that sooner or later it will wash through the whole economy and push prices up.
In many countries, money supply is growing at some of the fastest rates on record. What’s more, unlike a decade ago, when a similar infusion of money never moved much beyond banks’ balance sheets, there are signs this time around that the cash is making its way into the pockets of consumers and companies.
“Today’s policy measures are injecting cash ?ows that will directly raise the broader measures of money,” Goodhart and Manoj Pradhan of Talking Heads Macro wrote in a postscript to their book “The Great Demographic Reversal,” published this year. The inevitable outcome, as lockdowns ease and recovery ensues, will be “a surge in inflation.”
Case Against: Money Velocity
It’s the use of money, not just its creation, that affects prices. That’s one explanation for subdued inflation since 2008, even as central banks cranked up the printing presses. And the same forces may still be at work.
In the U.S. the “velocity” of money -– the frequency with which it changes hands, as people use it to buy goods and services -– fell off in the 2008 financial crisis, never really recovered, and has collapsed to unprecedented lows now.
“The link between money supply and inflation is still very tenuous,” says Derek Tang, an economist at LH Meyer/Monetary Policy Analytics in Washington. “We may have a ton of money supply. But that’s not necessarily going to lead to a ton of inflation.”
Case for Inflation: Household Wealth
Spending may bounce back faster than it did after 2008, and drive prices higher, because a more aggressive policy response has cushioned the blow to household finances.
Propped up by central banks, stock markets have taken months instead of years to recover. Home prices didn’t take much of a hit. And lower down the income ladder, governments have provided substantial support to workers who got furloughed or fired. Fiscal stimulus, unlike the monetary kind, goes directly into people’s bank accounts -– where it’s likely to get spent.
All of this opens the door for what’s known as “demand-pull inflation,” according to Stephen Jen, who runs hedge fund and advisory firm Eurizon SLJ Capital. “Why shouldn’t final demand be robust when sentiment regarding the virus improves?” he says. “Companies with any market power to raise prices will likely do so.”
Case Against: Household Fear
Incomes may have held up through the recession, thanks to government intervention, but not all the money is getting spent. Savings rates have soared.
To be sure, that’s partly a function of lockdowns that left restaurants and bars shuttered, and air travel widely shunned. But even as economies reopen and consumers have more options, worries about health and work could mean they stay cautious.
We’re clearly not back to normal in the short term until people spend the money that the Fed has created and the government has sent them,” says John Ryding, chief economic advisor at Brean Capital.
Case for Inflation: Loose Central Banks
One reason why many analysts expect higher inflation is simply because central banks, the guardians of price stability in the low-inflation era, are more willing than ever to let it rise.
The Federal Reserve is expected to make that official by announcing a new strategy that requires it to be more tolerant when prices overshoot, and refrain from preemptive interest-rate increases. The Fed’s focus is on “the disinflationary aspects of the current shock,” says Bank of America’s Bruno Braizinha. Even before any official change in the policy stance, it’s already “committing to keeping rates low for the foreseeable future.”
The European Central Bank has embarked on a similar review. Accommodative monetary policies have been tried before in the campaign to gin up some inflation, and fallen short. What’s new, according to Morgan Stanley economists, is that “central banks are now committing to make up for some of the lost inflation during downturns.”
Case Against: Loose Labor Markets
Policy makers have worked with a rule of thumb that assumes some kind of trade-off between inflation and unemployment, known as the Phillips Curve.
The idea is that prices will only face sustained upward pressure when the economy is using all its resources –- including labor.
Doubt has been cast on the strength of that link. Still, if there’s any connection at all, then it should ease concerns about inflation. Employment everywhere has slumped, with little prospect of a quick rebound to pre-pandemic levels.
Case for Inflation: Supply Shocks
There’s already evidence that disruptions to supply chains are pushing prices up. In China, for example, food inflation has been accelerating in the last couple of months, and a squeeze on imports because of the pandemic is one reason why.
The long-run risk is that the virus will escalate tensions. Governments may become more reluctant to rely on other countries for strategic goods, such as masks and medicine or computer chips. They could pressure business to bring manufacturing home, even when it’s more expensive.
“Trade, tech and titans” -- cheap imports, technological advances and corporate giants with the market power to suppress wages -- have been “the driving forces behind the disinflationary trends over the last 30 years,” Morgan Stanley economists wrote. But the same trio also gets blamed for widening inequality, and faces growing political scrutiny that “could create a regime shift in inflation dynamics.”
Case Against: Spare Capacity
The fight against Covid-19 has often been compared with an actual war, the kind of disaster that historically has triggered inflation.
But there’s an important difference. Military conflicts wreck the supply side of the economy, like factories and railway lines, leading to bottlenecks and shortages that push prices up. The coronavirus has left those facilities intact -- even if they’re not being used right now.
n a pandemic, it’s demand that takes the main hit, says Alicia Garcia Herrero, chief Asia Pacific economist with Natixis SA. “Capital is not destroyed or depleted, so it is much easier to end up with excess capacity,” she says. That distinction is one reason she’s “in the deflation camp.”