位于鹽湖城的美國大酒店迎來了一場盛大表演，在“葡萄牙人”樂隊的一首《Feel it Still》中，200多名達(dá)美航空的員工輪流等待著與公司的CEO艾德·巴斯蒂安自拍的機會。巴斯蒂安一頭銀發(fā)，穿著剪裁合體的西裝、黑色網(wǎng)球鞋，戴一副黑框玳瑁眼鏡。他用胳膊摟著一名壯實的行李搬運工的肩膀，這個哥們兒下去后，又上來兩名穿著公司新派發(fā)的“護照紫”制服的空乘。粉絲們會挨個兒將手機遞給巴斯蒂安的一名助理，助理則在電腦上挨個核對名單，以確保人人都能得到與老板的自拍。

據(jù)說在每次類似的活動上，巴斯蒂安都會堅持一直站在那里充當(dāng)“人肉背景板”，直到所有排隊的人都拿到了和老板的自拍。今天的自拍活動就持續(xù)了一個多小時。31歲的空乘丹妮爾·斯特里克蘭表示：“作為空姐，我們經(jīng)常會遇到名人，但我一直都不是一個追星族。這是我第一次跟艾德·巴斯蒂安合影，但是我已經(jīng)被他迷住了?！?

IT’S SHOWTIME at Salt Lake City’s Grand America Hotel. As the bouncy groove of “Feel It Still” by the band Portugal. The Man pulsates through the cavernous ballroom, some 200 Delta Air Lines employees wait their turn for a selfie with CEO Ed Bastian. Sporting a slim-tailored suit, black designer tennis shoes, and tortoise-shell glasses, the 6-foot-2, silver-haired Bastian poses with an arm thrown over the shoulder of a burly baggage handler, then trades grins with a duo of flight attendants clad in newly issued uniforms whose deep purple hue their designer, Zac Posen, dubs “Passport Plum.” The fans relay their cell phones in a constant stream to a Bastian aide who clicks away so that everybody gets a souvenir.

Bastian reputedly never leaves a selfie session until the procession is finished, and today, the parade lasts over an hour. “We meet celebrities all the time, and I’m never starstruck,” says flight attendant Danielle Strickland, 31. “But this was the first time I got a picture with Ed Bastian, and I was starstruck.”

這正是達(dá)美航空“天鵝絨”見面會上的一個片斷?！疤禊Z絨”是巴斯蒂安在達(dá)美航空陷入破產(chǎn)困境時，為鼓舞士氣而舉辦的一個內(nèi)部活動?，F(xiàn)在，“天鵝絨”活動每月會在達(dá)美航空的一個樞紐城市舉辦一次。巴斯蒂安首先會發(fā)表一通鼓舞人心的演講，然后是文藝表演和大家喜聞樂見的自拍環(huán)節(jié)。每次“天鵝絨”活動氣氛之狂熱，不亞于一場政客的拜票會。鹽湖城的這次活動選在了9月的一個周二，氣氛也是一如既往的熱烈。巴斯蒂安先是對呼叫中心的訂票專員講話，接著對鹽湖城國際機場的地勤人員講話，然后視察了公司耗資35億美元新建的航站樓。接著，他走進飛行員休息室，跟疲憊的機長們聊了一會兒天。全程都有一位攝像師寸步不離地跟著他。在此行的每個環(huán)節(jié)，巴斯蒂安都會抽出時間回答員工的問題。達(dá)美航空的內(nèi)部網(wǎng)站專門開辟了一個叫“問艾德任何問題”的視頻專欄，用來向員工喊話，此行的一些精彩時刻無疑也會被剪輯發(fā)布在這里。

在航空業(yè)的資深觀察人士看來，巴斯蒂安抓隊伍士氣的本事，頗有業(yè)內(nèi)兩位前輩的遺風(fēng)：一是大陸航空的CEO戈登·貝休恩，二是西南航空的聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人赫布·凱萊赫。不過那兩位大佬舉止粗放豪爽，巴斯蒂安則更彬彬有禮。這一路雖然行程匆忙，但他顯得沉穩(wěn)放松，全程脫稿演講，侃侃而談。

最重要的是，他的講話總能引起很大反響。在鹽湖城的這次活動上，他的話撥起了老員工的心弦：“看看我們經(jīng)歷了什么！我們經(jīng)歷了破產(chǎn)，經(jīng)歷了西北航空的并購，經(jīng)歷了油價的起起落落。我們擁有的不多，但我們擁有彼此！”幾分鐘后，他又談起了收入問題：“明年情人節(jié)，我們要連續(xù)第五年拿出10億美元分紅！”接下來是他的宏偉藍(lán)圖：“我們就是美國的王，是全國當(dāng)之無愧的冠軍，但是我們的未來是全世界，世界就是我們的奧運賽場。”

這番鼓舞人心的言語以巴斯蒂安的男中音說出，令人聽來特別舒服。他似乎也對自己“打雞血”的本事十分自信。不過也許用不了多久，他就會發(fā)現(xiàn)，隊伍士氣不像原來那樣好鼓舞了。隨著經(jīng)濟放緩和利潤縮水，達(dá)美航空面臨的形勢極為嚴(yán)峻。如果公司不能將戰(zhàn)略執(zhí)行到近乎完美的程度，公司所有的利益相關(guān)者——從推輪椅的行李搬運工，到身家?guī)装賰|的機構(gòu)投資者，恐怕都會對他這碗雞血產(chǎn)生免疫了。

在美國三大全球性航空公司中（另兩家是美國航空和聯(lián)合大陸航空），達(dá)美航空的運營最好、利潤最高，巴斯蒂安力推的“員工和諧”顯然是一大功臣。今年，達(dá)美航空的準(zhǔn)點率達(dá)到了85%，超過了聯(lián)合大陸航空、美國航空（這兩家都是80%），以及美國最大的廉價航空公司——西南航空（79%）。它的座公里收入（指航空公司運送1名旅客飛行1公里帶來的收入）也比競爭對手平均高出19%。

The occasion is a “Velvet” (for “velvet rope”), a conclave Bastian created in the dark days when Delta was mired in bankruptcy. He now holds Velvets once a month in one of the airline’s hub cities. Bastian headlines each extravaganza with an early morning pep talk, followed by the photo op. Then he embarks on meet-and-greets with local employees that proceed at the frenzied pace of a political campaign. This Tuesday in September is no exception, with the CEO delivering speeches to reservation agents at a regional call center and then to ground workers at Salt Lake City International Airport; touring the construction site of Delta’s new $3.5 billion terminal there; and strolling into the pilots’ break room to chat up blasé-looking captains. Bastian—trailed by a video cameraman—finds time at each stop to answer questions, fodder for spots on the “Ask Ed Anything” internal video site that channels his message to employees.

To veteran airline-watchers, Bastian’s knack for courting employees calls to mind two past industry leaders famous for rallying the troops: former Continental CEO Gordon ?Bethune and Southwest cofounder Herb Kelleher. But while those chieftains were folksy, flamboyant, and even profane, Bastian’s style is different. If Bethune and Kelleher were brass bands, Bastian’s a smooth jazz ensemble. Through the headlong rush, he comes off as coolly relaxed. His talks, delivered sans notes, flow in paragraphs uninterrupted by the usual “you knows” and “I means.”

Most of all, Bastian hits notes that get big reactions. At the Salt Lake City Velvet, he tugged at veteran workers’ heartstrings: “Look where we’ve come from! Through bankruptcy, the Northwest merger, fuel going up and down. We didn’t have much, but we had each other!” Minutes later, it was all about pay. “We’ll deliver over $1 billion to you in profit sharing on Valentine’s Day for the fifth year in a row.” Next up, the Big Vision: “We’re king of the U.S., the undisputed national champion,” he declared. “But our future is global. The world is the Olympics.”

Rah-rah hyperbole sounds comfortable in Bastian’s baritone. He seems to know the cheerleader role fits him like his designer sneakers. But he may soon find himself working harder than ever to rally the troops. Rough air looms for Delta, in the form of shrinking profits and a slowing economy. And if the company doesn’t execute its strategy to near-perfection, all of its stakeholders—from wheelchair-pushing porters to billionaire institutional investors—are going to need a lot more cheering up.

The worker harmony that Bastian does so much to promote is a major reason Delta is the best-run, most profitable carrier among the Big Three U.S. global airlines, a group that includes American and United Continental. This year, Delta’s on-time arrival record of 85% is tops among the giants, waxing United and American (both 80%) while also besting Southwest, the biggest domestic budget carrier (79%). For every mile it flies one seat in the U.S., Delta collects 19% more in revenues, on average, than its rivals.

達(dá)美航空的成功有兩方面原因，一是它擁有行業(yè)最強的機場網(wǎng)絡(luò)。與其他航空公司相比，達(dá)美航空擁有更多航空樞紐，如亞特蘭大機場、底特律機場、鹽湖城機場等，也就是說，它在很多航線上面臨的競爭并不激烈，包括來自廉價航空公司的競爭。同時，達(dá)美航空也在積極增加飛往紐約、波士頓、洛杉磯、舊金山、西雅圖等大型沿海城市的航班。這些航線對商務(wù)旅客的爭奪雖然十分激烈，但這也正體現(xiàn)了達(dá)美航空的第二大優(yōu)勢：它的可靠性和機上服務(wù)非常值得稱道。這也吸引了很多企業(yè)客戶的青睞，從而為達(dá)美航空帶來了更多利潤。差旅管理公司Advito的全球航空業(yè)務(wù)副總裁奧利維爾·貝諾伊特指出：“達(dá)美航空在服務(wù)和運營表現(xiàn)方面做出大量投資，這意味著在同等價格下，企業(yè)客戶將更傾向于選擇達(dá)美航空。”

就算有這些優(yōu)勢，達(dá)美航空也未必會像巴斯蒂安在鹽湖城承諾的那樣繼續(xù)保持穩(wěn)步增長。即便作為“三大航”中表現(xiàn)最優(yōu)秀的航空公司，達(dá)美航空也需要卓越的戰(zhàn)略執(zhí)行才能保持繁榮，這也側(cè)面說明了行業(yè)發(fā)展面臨的困境。近年來，達(dá)美航空的利潤較2015年至2016年的高峰期有了顯著下滑。達(dá)美航空在員工薪酬和設(shè)備升級上做出了大量投資，這些戰(zhàn)略舉措雖然提高了公司在員工和消費者心中的形象，但也成為了影響公司盈利能力的重要原因。雖然最近的油價上漲也是影響利潤的一個重要因素，但過去四年間，該公司與燃料成本無關(guān)的支出（如工資等）增長很快，遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過了收入的增長速度。今年也不例外，波士頓的研究機構(gòu)Trefis在最近的一份報告中稱：“沉重的成本損害了達(dá)美航空的利潤?！痹摴绢A(yù)測，到2022年，達(dá)美航空的現(xiàn)金流將下降11%。

由于投資者對這些數(shù)據(jù)感到擔(dān)憂，達(dá)美航空的股票也跑輸了大盤。自2017年年初以來，它的股價大約上漲了15%，同期標(biāo)普500指數(shù)的漲幅則達(dá)到了25%。投資者衡量一只股票前景的重要指標(biāo)是市盈率，達(dá)美航空目前的市盈率只有10.1倍，遠(yuǎn)低于標(biāo)普500指數(shù)的21.1倍，只勉強與美國航空和聯(lián)合大陸航空持平。這說明無論是機構(gòu)還是散戶投資者，都認(rèn)為美國的全球性航空公司是日薄西山的夕陽產(chǎn)業(yè)，未來的收益只會逐年下降。

成本并不是影響達(dá)美航空利潤的唯一因素，宏觀經(jīng)濟衰退（哪怕是比較溫和的經(jīng)濟放緩）也會扼殺近期公司收益的回升趨勢。歐洲是達(dá)美航空增長最快的市場，但英國脫歐引發(fā)的動蕩很可能給其歐洲業(yè)務(wù)造成重大影響。信用卡業(yè)務(wù)是航空業(yè)一個很少有人關(guān)注但利潤豐厚的業(yè)務(wù)，但隨著信用卡市場的競爭嚴(yán)重加劇，達(dá)美航空與美國運通共同推出的SkyMiles信用卡業(yè)務(wù)也必然會受到?jīng)_擊。

在這樣陰云密布的氣候中，要想將達(dá)美航空帶向新的高度，就需要一位杰出的機長。巴斯蒂安現(xiàn)年61歲，曾任公司的財務(wù)總監(jiān)，于2016年年中出任CEO一職。巴斯蒂安制定了一個“兩手抓”計劃：一手抓成本，也就是要將成本保持在一個更可控的水平上；一手抓增收，增收一靠擴展國際市場，二靠繼續(xù)挖掘信用卡業(yè)務(wù)的潛力。

巴斯蒂安的辦公室位于達(dá)美航空亞特蘭大總部園區(qū)的一棟古色古香的二層小樓，這里也是達(dá)美航空創(chuàng)始人科萊特·伍爾曼曾經(jīng)工作的地方。在這里，巴斯蒂安向我們解釋了他的藍(lán)圖：“過去幾年，我們的成本上漲了不少……有部分原因是，公司在破產(chǎn)之后進行了大量裁員，我們需要補充這部分勞動力。不過現(xiàn)在我們已經(jīng)補充完了?！?/p>

接著他又表示，美國的航空市場已經(jīng)非常成熟了，所以“從長期看，我們想把國際收入占總收入的比例從現(xiàn)在的35%提高到50%?！边@一戰(zhàn)略能否能夠使達(dá)美航空的營運利潤率回升到2015年到2016年的16%的水平？對此，巴斯蒂安解釋道：“當(dāng)時的局勢對我們很有利，因為油價剛剛下跌了，而商務(wù)機票的票價還保持在比較高的水平。”他雖然顯得很有信心，但當(dāng)被問到具體的增長目標(biāo)時，他還是表現(xiàn)得十分謹(jǐn)慎，并承認(rèn)“干這一行必須要謙虛”。

The reasons for that rich premium are twofold. The first is the industry’s strongest airport network. Delta commands more fortress hubs—Atlanta, Minneapolis, Detroit, and Salt Lake City among them—than any other airline, which means it has more routes on which it faces less competition, including from low-cost carriers. Overall, Delta has also been the most aggressive in adding flights to big coastal cities like New York, Boston, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle, where the battle for business customers is fierce. That battle is a showcase for Delta’s second advantage: Its superior reliability and onboard service, which tilt corporate business toward the carrier, bringing the airline a more lucrative and profitable mix of traffic. “Delta’s investment in service and operating performance means that at the same price, companies will lean toward choosing Delta,” says Olivier Benoit, VP of the global air practice at Advito, a firm that manages travel programs for large companies.

But despite all those advantages, the smooth ascent that Bastian promises in Salt Lake City will prove difficult to achieve. It’s a gauge of how tough the business has become that the best of the Big Three will need brilliant navigation to keep thriving. Put simply, Delta’s profits have been heading in the wrong direction, falling sharply from the peaks of 2015 and 2016. And the same strategic moves that have burnished the airline’s image with employees and consumers—big investments in worker compensation and equipment upgrades—are now among the factors weakening its profitability. While rising fuel prices are a factor, Delta’s non-fuel expenses, led by labor, have been rising rapidly for the past four years, far outpacing revenues. This year has been no exception: Boston research firm Trefis stated in a recent report that “Heavy costs are hurting margins” at Delta; Trefis projects that Delta’s cash flows will decline by 11% by 2022.

As investors fret over these numbers, Delta’s stock has lagged the market. Since the beginning of 2017, it has risen 15% vs. 25% for the S&P 500. The best measure for how investors assess its prospects is its trailing price-to-earnings multiple: Delta’s P/E stands at just 10.1, well below the S&P’s 21.1 and almost identical to those of American and United. Those puny P/Es signal that individuals and institutions voting with their dollars view America’s global airlines as lumbering legacies whose earnings will decline steadily in the years ahead.

Costs are hardly the only factor narrowing Delta’s margin for error. A recession, or even a more modest slowdown, could reverse a recent resurgence in fares and revenues. Europe has become Delta’s fastest-growing market, but turbulence from Brexit could halt the upswing. And heavy competition in the credit card market could drain the little-noticed but deep pool of profits that Delta shares with American Express through its SkyMiles credit card.

Given the cloudy outlook, taking Delta to new heights will require brilliant piloting. And Bastian, 61, a former CFO and crack numbers man who took the corporate captain’s seat in mid-2016, knows it. His plan rests on two legs: holding costs to a more manageable rate and expanding revenues faster—chiefly by expanding where the big growth is, in international markets, and continuing to exploit that under?appreciated credit card partnership.

In a wood-paneled office once occupied by Delta’s principal founder, C.E. Woolman, in a quaint, two-story brick building resembling an oversize cottage on Delta’s Atlanta campus, Bastian explains his blueprint. “In the past couple of years, we had a lot of cost inflation?…?in part because we still needed to catch up on labor from the big cuts following our bankruptcy,” he says. “But now we’re caught up.”

The U.S., he continues, is a mature airline market today, so “in the long-term, we want to lift our international revenues from around 35% of the total to 50%.” Will that strategy lift Delta’s operating margins back to their 16% peak of 2015 and 2016? “That was a sweet spot because oil prices had dropped, but business fares were still high,” he explains. He projects confidence, but when pressed for specific targets, he gets a little more reticent, admitting, “This business is humbling.”

雖然巴斯蒂安執(zhí)掌達(dá)美航空只有兩年半，但他已經(jīng)幫助公司結(jié)束了長達(dá)20年的動蕩。

巴斯蒂安自幼在紐約州的波基普西市長大，家中有兄弟姐妹九個，巴斯蒂安是家中長子。他的父親是一名牙醫(yī)，母親是牙醫(yī)助理。在他小時候，他家人心目中的“豪華旅行”就是全家擠在一輛旅行車?yán)?，然后開車去佛羅里達(dá)度寒假。巴斯蒂安直到25歲才第一次坐飛機。

不過那時，巴斯蒂安已經(jīng)在會計界小有名氣了。大學(xué)畢業(yè)后，他以審計員的身份就職普華永道，不久后他便揭露了智威湯遜公司（J. Walter Thompson）的大規(guī)模欺詐案。當(dāng)時智威湯遜主要經(jīng)營電視廣告業(yè)務(wù)，在1981年的年度審計中，巴斯蒂安發(fā)現(xiàn)該公司故意記入了5000萬美元的虛假收入。此事促使美國證監(jiān)會針對該公司展開了調(diào)查，并影響了好幾位普華永道合伙人的職業(yè)生命，但巴斯蒂安自己的事業(yè)卻就此一飛沖天，他年僅31歲便成了普華永道的合伙人。巴斯蒂安有一個令人羨慕的“特權(quán)”，就是監(jiān)督MTV音樂錄影大獎的投票，每年的頒獎典禮上，他都會穿著燕尾服，將計票結(jié)果遞給現(xiàn)場的頒獎嘉賓。巴斯蒂安回憶道，有一年，朋克巨星比利·艾多爾拿過了計票結(jié)果，將它塞到了他的緊身褲里，等現(xiàn)場攝像機開始錄像時，再把它從褲子拉鏈里拿出來。

此后，巴斯蒂安曾在百事可樂旗下的菲多利公司擔(dān)任8年的財務(wù)經(jīng)理，然后于1998年進入達(dá)美航空任財務(wù)主管。21世紀(jì)初的那幾年，由于油價飆升，加之來自廉價航空公司的競爭加劇，達(dá)美航空的業(yè)務(wù)遭遇了重大威脅，公司不得不降薪以度時艱。與此同時，公司的高管們卻想方設(shè)法地要保住自己的退休金和所謂的“留職”獎金，哪怕在公司破產(chǎn)重組期間也是如此。時任公司主管的杰瑞·格林斯坦恩回憶道：“員工們都降了薪，卻發(fā)現(xiàn)他們的老板們留在公司居然還有獎金拿?！痹谶@種背景下，巴斯蒂安于2004年年初從公司辭職，去了亞特蘭大的一家照明控制工廠當(dāng)CFO。6個月后，格林斯坦恩在董事會斗爭中被扶上了 CEO寶座。他約巴斯蒂安在一家星巴克見面，并邀請他回來當(dāng)達(dá)美航空的CFO，任務(wù)是拯救達(dá)美航空，薪水則只有他在那家照明工廠的一半。

2005年，達(dá)美航空正式申請破產(chǎn)。在巴斯蒂安看來，這一招好比破解珍瓏棋局，只有向死求生，才是唯一的取勝之道。在破產(chǎn)保護期間，巴斯蒂安成了達(dá)美航空復(fù)興計劃的主要制定者，他制定的戰(zhàn)略基本確定了直至今日達(dá)美航空的發(fā)展路徑。為了讓員工擁護他的復(fù)興藍(lán)圖，2006年，他在亞特蘭大的一家梅西百貨里舉辦了第一場“天鵝絨”活動。他向員工宣告：達(dá)美航空將憑借卓越的可靠性和客戶服務(wù)，重新崛起為一家高端航空公司，收取比其他航空公司更高的價格，在美國航空業(yè)中脫穎而出。他承諾將把員工基本工資提高到有競爭力的水平。他還提出了一項時至今日仍在實施的利潤分享計劃：如果達(dá)美航空再次振興了，員工也將切實分享公司崛起的紅利。雖然當(dāng)時達(dá)美航空每年的虧損達(dá)幾十億美元，但工人們自發(fā)支持巴斯蒂安的愿景。2006年，當(dāng)達(dá)美航空面臨美國航空的惡意收購時，員工們自發(fā)揮舞標(biāo)語抵制，標(biāo)語上寫著：“留住達(dá)美，我的達(dá)美！”

在巴斯蒂安的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，達(dá)美航空與債權(quán)人進行了18個月的激烈談判，終于使得達(dá)美航空在2007年4月脫離破產(chǎn)。據(jù)他的同事稱，巴斯蒂安的精力極為充沛，要求也很高。曾與他共事過的大衛(wèi)波克律師事務(wù)所的合伙人馬歇爾·休伯納回憶道：“我這輩子從來沒有被逼得這么狠過，簡直是被他抽著鞭子驅(qū)趕著。不過等到工作結(jié)束后，他給我寫了一封兩頁紙的信，是用鋼筆寫的。信上說如果不是我，他根本無法完成這項工作?！?/p>

他的下一個任務(wù)，是領(lǐng)導(dǎo)兩家航空公司的合并——要知道，并購有時也經(jīng)常會帶來災(zāi)難。2008年，剛剛走出破產(chǎn)保護不久的達(dá)美航空收購了西北航空。接下來的兩年里，巴斯蒂安順利地將兩家公司的機隊和員工進行了整合，導(dǎo)演了堪稱航空業(yè)最完美的一場聯(lián)姻。2007年，曾任西北航空首席執(zhí)行官的理查德·安德森成為達(dá)美航空CEO，他立即委任巴斯蒂安為公司總裁，兩人在一起共事了八年半。安德森主要抓運營、機隊管理、機場升級和內(nèi)部維保，巴斯蒂安則主抓對外合作，在他的促成下，達(dá)美航空建立了美國航空業(yè)最大的海外合作網(wǎng)絡(luò)，其合作伙伴包括維珍大西洋航空、墨西哥航空、巴西戈爾航空、中國東方航空等；達(dá)美航空還與大韓航空建立了合資公司?？傊?，合作是巴斯蒂安的一個重要戰(zhàn)略。

當(dāng)時，公司上下早已認(rèn)可巴斯蒂安是安德森的接班人了。2016年5月，巴斯蒂安毫無懸念地接過了CEO大印。然而真正讓他在全美國知名的，卻是一場始料未及的事件——與全美步槍協(xié)會的沖突。今年3月，佛羅里達(dá)州帕克蘭市的一所高中發(fā)生大規(guī)模槍擊案，事發(fā)后，巴斯蒂安收到了來自帕克蘭的學(xué)生的郵件，這些郵件讓他注意到，達(dá)美航空向全美步槍協(xié)會的會員們提供了參加該協(xié)會年會的折扣機票。當(dāng)時，全美步槍協(xié)會的一位發(fā)言人在回應(yīng)外界對該協(xié)會的批評時曾表示：“傳統(tǒng)媒體的很多人最喜歡大規(guī)模槍擊案”，還稱“哭泣的白人媽媽是收視率冠軍”。這番話讓巴斯蒂安深感震驚。作為對此言論的回應(yīng)，達(dá)美航空取消了對那些機票的折扣。

盡管當(dāng)時只有13名會員使用了這個折扣，但全美步槍協(xié)會仍對達(dá)美航空此舉極為不滿。喬治亞州的參議院威脅道，如果達(dá)美航空不恢復(fù)對全美步槍協(xié)會會員的折扣，該州就將阻止一項燃油免稅法案的通過——該法案本可為達(dá)美航空每年節(jié)省4000萬美元。巴斯蒂安拒絕了佐治亞州參議院的提議，這項稅收減免政策也因此被取消了。但他的立場卻極大提升了達(dá)美航空的形象。巴斯蒂安向員工發(fā)布的一份備忘錄稱：“我們的價值是不能買賣的?！边@份備忘錄也被媒體廣泛轉(zhuǎn)載。此后巴斯蒂安也在一系列公共場合中堅定維護公司的立場。巴斯蒂安在接受《財富》雜志采訪時表示，達(dá)美航空的立場并不是為了樹立品牌形象，但它恰恰實現(xiàn)了這個目標(biāo)：“我們贏得了很多粉絲?！?/p>

英國維珍大西洋航空創(chuàng)始人、總裁理查理查德·布蘭森爵士也對巴斯蒂安的立場表示贊賞。他說：“我十分贊成他，商業(yè)領(lǐng)袖不能把所有問題留給政客?！背嗽谥卮髥栴}上立志一致，兩位航空大佬在其他場合也會經(jīng)常共同出席——特別是自從2013年達(dá)美航空收購維珍大西洋航空49%的股權(quán)以來。在最近亞特蘭大的一場募捐活動上，布蘭森還拿出一把剪刀，剪斷了巴斯蒂安的領(lǐng)帶。（布蘭森說：“他應(yīng)該跟我一樣，穿一件敞開的襯衫?！保┎贿^布蘭森雖然討厭巴斯蒂安的領(lǐng)帶，卻非常喜歡他的鞋子。最近有一次他們一起在達(dá)美航空總部出席活動，布蘭森突然跪下來，脫掉了巴斯蒂安穿著的一雙1500美元的伯魯提運動鞋（這是巴斯蒂安的女友送給他的禮物），然后穿到了自己腳上。布蘭森在最近的一次采訪中說：“我把它偷來了，他這下可要不回去了，我現(xiàn)在就穿著它呢。”

Though bastian has been CEO for only 2? years, he’s already helped steer Delta through two decades of turbulence.

The oldest of nine children, Bastian grew up in Poughkeepsie, N.Y. His father was a dentist who worked from a home office; Bastian’s mother served as the dental assistant. His family’s idea of luxury travel involved cramming everyone into a station wagon and driving to Florida for a winter vacation; Bastian didn’t board a plane for the first time until he was 25.

By then, he had already made a name for himself in accounting. Shortly after joining Price Waterhouse just out of college as an auditor, Bastian discovered massive fraud at the ad giant J. Walter Thompson. During a 1981 annual review, Bastian found that the JWT business that syndicated TV shows and sold spots on those shows to advertisers had booked $50 million in phony revenues. The scandal prompted an SEC investigation and damaged the careers of several Price Waterhouse partners, but it boosted Bastian’s stock: He made partner at age 31. One of his perks was supervising voting for the MTV Video Music Awards, where Bastian would appear onstage in a tux to hand ballots to rock-star presenters. One year, Bastian recalls, punk rocker Billy Idol took his ballot and stuck it in his skintight pants, then pulled it out through his fly as the cameras rolled.

After an eight-year stint as a financial manager at PepsiCo’s Frito-Lay subsidiary, Bastian joined Delta in 1998 as controller. When soaring oil prices and competition from low-cost carriers hammered Delta in the early 2000s, the airline began slashing wages, at the same time that top executives granted themselves pension plans protected even in bankruptcy, along with “retention” bonuses. “The employees getting pay cuts saw their bosses getting bonuses for staying,” recalls Jerry Grinstein, who was a director at the time. Bastian quit in disgust in early 2004, joining a lighting and controls manufacturer in Atlanta as CFO. Six months later, Grinstein—who had been named CEO in a boardroom revolt—met with Bastian at a Starbucks and lured him back as Delta’s CFO, offering him the challenge of saving Delta for half the salary he was making at the lighting company.

Delta filed for bankruptcy in 2005, a gambit Bastian advocated as its only route to survival. It was during its Chapter 11 period that Bastian became the prime developer and champion of the comeback plan that defines the airline’s strategy to this day. To sell the blueprint to employees, Bastian in 2006 headlined the first Velvets at a shuttered Macy’s in downtown Atlanta. His pitch: Delta would rebound as an upscale carrier that distinguished itself via superior reliability and customer service, commanding premium prices. He pledged to restore base pay to competitive levels and unveiled a profit-sharing formula that’s still in place today: If Delta thrived, employees would share richly in the upside. Although Delta was losing billions of dollars a year at the time, workers rallied behind Bastian’s vision. The workforce also found common cause in successfully fighting a 2006 hostile takeover bid from U.S. Airways, brandishing the slogan “Keep Delta My Delta!”

Bastian led the often-acrimonious, 18-month negotiations with creditors that enabled Delta’s emergence from bankruptcy in April 2007. According to associates, his stamina was extraordinary, and so were his demands. “I’ve never been driven harder in my life,” recalls Marshall Huebner, a Davis Polk law firm partner who worked closely with Bastian. “I had lash marks on my back. Then, when it’s over, he wrote me a two-page letter, in fountain pen, about how he couldn’t have done it without me.”

His next job was managing a process that often spells disaster: merging two airlines. In 2008, Delta acquired Northwest just after it emerged from bankruptcy, and for the next two years, Bastian smoothly combined fleets and workforces, orchestrating what’s generally regarded as the best major marriage in airline history. When Richard Anderson, who’d served as Northwest’s chief in more prosperous days, became Delta’s CEO in 2007, he promoted Bastian to president, and the two served together for the next 8? years. Anderson was a hawk on operations, managing the fleet, upgrading airports, and improving in-house maintenance. Bastian was the dealmaker, building the industry’s largest portfolio of partnerships with foreign carriers. That web now includes investments in Virgin Atlantic, AeroMexico, GOL of Brazil, and China Eastern, and a joint venture with Korean Air—partnerships crucial to his strategy today.

Bastian was widely recognized at Delta as Anderson’s heir apparent, and the handoff of the CEO role, in May 2016, was seamless. But he became a nationally known figure thanks to an unanticipated conflict: a high-profile duel with the National Rifle Association. This March, following the mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Fla., Bastian got emails from Parkland students drawing his attention to the discounts Delta offered to NRA members on flights to its annual convention. Bastian had already been appalled when an NRA spokesperson declared, in response to criticism of the organization’s advocacy, that “Many in the legacy media love mass shootings” and that “Crying white mothers are ratings gold.” In reaction to that kind of rhetoric, Delta canceled the discount.

Even though only 13 members had ever used the discount, the NRA vociferously complained. If the airline didn’t reinstate the deal, the Georgia state senate threatened to block passage of a fuel tax exemption that would have saved Delta $40 million a year. Bastian refused, and the tax break was killed. But his stance generated a publicity coup for Delta. The CEO issued a widely reported memo to employees stating,“Our values are not for sale” and deftly defended the airline in a range of public appearances. Delta’s stance, Bastian tells Fortune, wasn’t designed to burnish the airline’s brand, but it brought precisely that benefit: “We won a lot of fans.”

One partner who lauded Bastian’s stance was Sir Richard Branson, founder and president of Virgin Atlantic. “I couldn’t agree with him more,” Branson says. “Business leaders can’t leave it up to the politicians.” When such weighty issues aren’t in play, the two leaders share a lighter rapport, especially at joint appearances—frequent events since 2013, when Delta bought a 49% stake in Virgin Atlantic. At a recent fundraiser in Atlanta, Branson produced a pair of scissors and cut off Bastian’s tie. (“He should wear an open shirt, like me,” says Branson.) Branson covets Bastian’s footwear as much as he detests his neckwear. When they appeared onstage recently at Delta headquarters, Branson kneeled down and removed Bastian’s $1,500 Berluti sneakers (a gift from Bastian’s girlfriend), then slipped them on. “I stole them, and he’s not getting them back,” said Branson in a recent interview. “I’m wearing them as we speak.”

目前，美國航空業(yè)的形勢整體要比巴斯蒂安第一次拯救達(dá)美航空時好得多，但是沒有一家航空公司的變化比達(dá)美航空更大。隨著自由現(xiàn)金流的增加，原本只能靠老飛機和老航站樓打天下的達(dá)美航空終于開始重金購買新飛機。同時，達(dá)美航空每年都要投資數(shù)十億美元，在樞紐機場建設(shè)和翻新航站樓等設(shè)施。2018年，達(dá)美航空的資本支出將達(dá)到50億美元，比四年前多了一倍以上。接下來幾年，光是它在西雅圖、洛杉磯、紐約、鹽湖城等地的機場項目就將耗資80億美元以上。據(jù)ISS企業(yè)解決方案公司（ISS Corporate Solutions）估計，自2015年第三季度以來，達(dá)美航空部署的存量資本已增長12%，達(dá)到512億美元。

投資是為了回報，但達(dá)美航空要想讓這些投資產(chǎn)生強勁的回報，卻并不是一件容易的事。投資回報可以用一個叫做“經(jīng)濟增加值”（EVA）的指標(biāo)衡量，EVA是一種衡量“經(jīng)濟利潤”的指標(biāo)，即企業(yè)在資本成本之上賺取的利潤。根據(jù)ISS公司的統(tǒng)計，從2015年9月30日至2016年9月30日，達(dá)美航空的EVA比6.5%的資本成本高出了5.8個百分點。不過在過去12個月內(nèi)，達(dá)美航空的利潤下跌到了0.3%。不過這依然是值得尊敬的，大概相當(dāng)于高爾夫球的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)桿水平。ISS公司的常務(wù)董事馬克·布羅克韋表示：“相比于同等風(fēng)險的其他上市公司，達(dá)美航空的資本回報率是要稍好一些的?！钡@種水平還不足以讓投資者相信達(dá)美航空擁有“運營杠桿”——也就是將利潤率提高到一定程度以使利潤大幅增加的能力。

達(dá)美航空的困境是行業(yè)多年趨勢的產(chǎn)物。從今年年初到現(xiàn)在，達(dá)美航空的營收增長達(dá)到了8%，分析師認(rèn)為，歸功于經(jīng)濟的穩(wěn)健增長和商務(wù)票價的回升，達(dá)美航空今年的營收或?qū)⑦_(dá)到創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的440億美元。然而在過去四年間，公司的銷售額幾乎沒有任何實際增長。也就是說，自2014年以來，它的營收僅僅增長了10%。而在同一時間段，達(dá)美航空的勞動力成本出現(xiàn)激增，從81億美元上升到110億美元左右，漲幅達(dá)36%。因此，達(dá)美航空今年的稅前利潤約為50億美元，顯著低于2015年的59億美元。

達(dá)美航空的營收增長何以停滯不前呢？最主要的原因是一連串的價格戰(zhàn)嚴(yán)重?fù)p害了達(dá)美航空利潤最高的市場——商務(wù)機票。雷蒙德詹姆斯公司的分析師薩凡提·賽斯指出：“2011年到2014年，由于燃油價格高企，導(dǎo)致航班座位的供給增速低于需求的增速，而低利潤又使航空公司缺乏增加座位和航班的動力?！?015年，油價開始爆跌，捷藍(lán)航空、西南航空、精靈航空、邊疆航空等廉價航空公司開始攜大量新航班搶占原本屬于三大航的地盤。2015年至2016年，美國國內(nèi)航空公司的客運能力開始以每年4.5%至5.0%的速度增長。

隨著客運能力的增長，為了提高航班的上座率，各個廉價航空公司開始向部分在登機前幾天內(nèi)購票的旅客提供超低票價。這些買“尾票”的旅客也包括很多因為不是特定航空公司企業(yè)會員而選擇自行訂票的商務(wù)旅客。這些“不受控”的旅客約占達(dá)美航空旅客總量的15%和機票總量的35%。美國航空和聯(lián)合大陸航空也不想失去這些旅客。所以從2015年年中開始，他們也推出了打折機票，與廉價航空公司打價格戰(zhàn)。

這一時期，價格戰(zhàn)在全美各地打響。比如捷藍(lán)航空推出了針對長途航班的Mint頭等艙體驗計劃，重點拓展紐約的約翰肯尼迪機場和波士頓機場——這兩個機場也是達(dá)美航空的兩個大本營。巴斯蒂安回憶道：“尾票票價可以說已經(jīng)崩潰了?！睋?jù)他估計，從2014年到2018年年初，整個航業(yè)的商務(wù)機票價格下跌了25%左右。

然而現(xiàn)在，航空業(yè)的趨勢正在朝著另一個方向發(fā)展。航空燃油的價格從2016年年初的40美元每桶飆升到了今天的90美元每桶，使得廉價航空公司的單座客運成本的漲幅遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過了傳統(tǒng)三大航，各廉價航空公司只得紛紛提高票價。巴斯蒂安表示，現(xiàn)在商務(wù)機票的價格跟成本脫節(jié)的時代已經(jīng)過去了，行業(yè)通行的作法是將票價與六個月前的燃油價格掛鉤。目前，達(dá)美航空的商務(wù)票價已止跌回升了50%。巴斯蒂安還表示，由于燃油價格保持在90美元的高位，“各個廉價航空都在削減重復(fù)航線。”

價格戰(zhàn)并不是巴斯蒂安面臨的唯一挑戰(zhàn)，公司薪酬支出的不斷上漲也是一個棘手的問題。如前文所述，達(dá)美航空有一個非常慷慨的利潤分享計劃。每年情人節(jié)，達(dá)美航空會將稅前利潤的前25億美元的10%分給員工，對于高于25億美元的部分，則分20%給員工。目前達(dá)美航空的員工平均比聯(lián)合航空和美國航空的員工多賺5%，差距主要就在這些獎金。

公司管理層本來也不打算發(fā)這么多獎金的。2015年，達(dá)美航空曾計劃下一年度將5萬余名空乘、機師等一線員工的基本工資提高18.5%，以換取員工同意降低利潤分成。這些員工都不是工會成員，他們也同意公司的這一政策。但就在當(dāng)年年底，由達(dá)美航空的飛行員組成的工會拒絕了這個計劃。2017年，燃油價格的下降使達(dá)美航空的利潤大幅上升，公司同意為所有員工加薪6%。今年，達(dá)美航空最終決定，與其維持兩套不同的薪酬體系，不如對所有員工維持原有的10%和20%的利潤分成政策?？傊诙潭桃荒甓嗟臅r間里，公司的基本工資上漲了25%左右，而所有員工依然享受著公司管理層本打算削減的利潤分成方案。

巴斯蒂安承諾，達(dá)美航空的員工將享受業(yè)內(nèi)最高的薪酬水平。不過他也表示，將來公司的加薪幅度應(yīng)與美國經(jīng)濟的增長水平包括通脹水平（目前約為4.5%）相當(dāng)，此外員工還將享受利潤分成。

與此同時，巴斯蒂安還希望通過更新機隊來增加收入，也就是要用體型更大、燃油經(jīng)濟性更好的飛機取代現(xiàn)有老舊的小飛機，不僅要更換長途航線的飛機，對短途的小型支線飛機也要更換。到2020年，達(dá)美航空預(yù)計將退役主要航線上30%的“主線”客機。目前，達(dá)美航空約有300架耗油量巨大的MD-88和MD-90客機，這兩種客機分別可載客149名和158名，這批飛機平均已服役20年左右。為了取代這些飛機，達(dá)美航空已經(jīng)訂購了一批空客A321和A321neo客機及波音737-900客機，它們的載客量都在180名至197名之間。一旦新機全部到位，達(dá)美航空就能在相同數(shù)量的航班上多運送25%的旅客。更重要的是，這些新機的體型雖然更大，燃油消耗卻比MD系統(tǒng)客機少了20%左右，而且它們也不需要更多的機組人員。這樣一來，達(dá)美航空便能在固定成本下降或不變的情況下，運送比以前多得多的旅客。

The U.S. airline industry is in far better shape than it was when Bastian first started rallying his rank and file. But no airline has changed more than Delta. As its free cash flow swelled, an airline that once mainly flew old planes to aging terminals has invested heavily in new aircraft. It’s spending billions of dollars a year at its hub airports, building and refurbishing terminals and concourses. In 2018, Delta will lay out $5 billion in capital expenditures, more than double the number four years ago; its airport projects in Seattle, Los Angeles, New York, and Salt Lake City alone will cost $8 billion over the next several years. Since the third quarter of 2015, according to ISS Corporate Solutions, the total stock of capital Delta deploys has increased by 12% to $51.2 billion.

Delta needs to generate strong returns on those extra billions in fresh investments. But doing so is far from a sure thing. One yardstick for such performance is economic value added, or EVA, a metric that measures “economic profit,” the amount companies earn over and above their cost of capital. According to ISS, for the 12 months ending Sept. 30, 2016, Delta exceeded its 6.5% cost of capital by 5.8 percentage points. But over the past 12 months, its margin has fallen to 0.3%. That’s still respectable, a bit like shooting par for a pro golfer. “Delta is delivering slightly better returns on capital than what investors would expect from holdings that are equally risky,” says Mark Brockway, managing director of ISS. But it’s not the kind of number that convinces investors that Delta has “operating leverage”—the capacity to lift margins enough to send its profits skyward.

Delta’s dilemma is the product of trends that were years in the making. So far in 2018, revenues are growing at a brisk 8%, and analysts expect the airline to bring in a record $44 billion, thanks to a strong economy and a rebound in business fares. But over the previous four years, sales barely budged, so all told, they’ve grown a total of only 10% since 2014. By contrast, labor costs exploded over that period, from $8.1 billion to around $11 billion, a rise of 36%. As a result, Delta is expected to post pretax profits this year of around $5 billion—?notably lower than the $5.9 billion it reported in 2015.

Why did revenues go flat? The primary driver was a spate of fare wars that hammered Delta’s most lucrative market, premium business fares. “From 2011 to 2014, the supply of seats grew more slowly than demand because of high fuel prices, and low margins discouraged airlines from adding seats and flights,” explains Savanthi Syth, an analyst with Raymond James. But when oil prices collapsed in 2015, low-cost carriers, led by JetBlue, Southwest, Spirit, and Frontier, began invading the Big Three’s turf with a flood of new flights. Capacity, the total number of “seat miles” flown on domestic carriers, jumped between 4.5% and 5.0% annually in 2015 and 2016.

To fill the growing sea of seats, the budget airlines offered super-low fares to customers who booked their tickets within a few days of departure. These “walk-up” travelers include business folks who aren’t bound to specific airlines by corporate contracts and are free to choose among competing carriers. This “unmanaged” segment accounts for 15% of all Delta travelers and 35% of total fares. American and United, in particular, didn’t want to risk losing these customers. So starting in mid-2015, they matched the low-carriers’ walk-up fares with their own cut-rate deals.

The wave rippled across every business market. JetBlue, for example, expanded in New York’s JFK and in Boston, two big markets for Delta, offering its Mint premium class on long-haul routes. “Walk-up fares were crushed,” recalls Bastian. He estimates that the price of business tickets, across the entire industry, dropped as much as 25% between 2014 and the start of 2018.

Those trends are now moving in the other direction. A jump in jet-fuel prices—from as low as $40 a barrel in early 2016 to $90 today—has increased costs-per-seat at the budget carriers far more than for the Big Three, forcing their fares higher. Bastian says that business fares are no longer unhinged from costs and are tracking oil prices with around a six-month lag. So far, he says, Delta has recouped around 50% of the drop in business fares, and at $90, he adds, “the budget airlines are cutting back on the same routes.”

Still, competition on fares is far from Bastian’s only challenge: The airline’s ballooning compensation levels have posed an unruly problem of their own. Delta has an extremely generous profit-sharing plan. Each year, on Valentine’s Day, Delta hands its workers 10% of its first $2.5 billion in pretax profits, and 20% on any profits above that level. Those bonuses are the main reason its employees earn, on average, 5% more each year than their counterparts at United or American.

Management had intended to make the deal a bit less sweet. In 2015, Delta agreed to raise base pay the following year by 18.5% for its 50,000 flight attendants, mechanics, and other frontline workers, all of whom are nonunion, in exchange for the workforce accepting a smaller share of profits. Those workers liked the tradeoff. But later that year, Delta’s unionized pilots rejected the deal. Then in 2017, flush with profits from a drop in fuel prices, Delta granted all of its workers another 6% increase. And finally, this year, Delta decided that rather than keep two separate plans, it would restore the 10-and-20 formula for all workers. The bottom line: All told, base pay waxed around 25% in little over a year—and all workers still have the old profit-sharing plan that management had tried to cap.

Bastian pledges to keep Delta’s employees the best paid in the industry. But he says that looking forward, pay raises should pretty much match U.S. economic growth including inflation, today around 4.5%, plus profit sharing. (If this move proves unpopular, he’ll presumably hear about it in the selfie lines.)

Meanwhile, the CEO plans to reap more savings through a strategy called “up gauging.” That process involves replacing older, smaller planes with bigger, more fuel-efficient aircraft on longer routes as well as in its fleet of smaller, regional jets. Delta will have retired 30% of the “mainline” planes flown on its major routes by 2020. Today, it flies around 300 two-decades-old, fuel-?guzzling MD-88s and MD-90s that carry 149 and 158 seats, respectively. To replace them, Delta has ordered fleets of the A321 and ?A321neo from Airbus, and 737-900s from Boeing, which hold between 180 and 197 seats. Once that’s done, for a large portion of its fleet, Delta will be able to fly 25% more customers on the same number of flights. What’s more, despite being larger, the new aircraft consume around 20% less fuel than the MDs and don’t require larger crews. Delta will be able to put a lot more passengers on those planes at the same or lower fixed costs.

除此之外，達(dá)美航空的袖中還有一張盈利王牌，確切地說，這張王牌藏在幾百萬消費者的錢包里——它就是達(dá)美航空建立的一張龐大的市場合作網(wǎng)絡(luò)。無論是機票價格戰(zhàn)，還是燃油成本的起落，這些一般會影響航空公司財務(wù)業(yè)績的外部因素都不會給這個合作網(wǎng)絡(luò)造成影響。而這個合作網(wǎng)絡(luò)正是巴斯蒂安擔(dān)任達(dá)美航空的CFO和總裁期間談下來的。

每年，消費者都會通過達(dá)美航空與美國運通聯(lián)合發(fā)行的達(dá)美SkyMiles信用卡消費800億美元。持卡人使用該卡或其他有里程獎勵計劃的美國運通信用卡消費后，就會獲得達(dá)美航空的里程積分。以前，在航空公司與美國運通這種信用卡公司的合作中，一般信用卡公司會有更高的話語權(quán)，能用很便宜的價格從航空公司買到大量里程。但現(xiàn)在，達(dá)美航空的財力和品牌形象有了很大改善，所以反而是達(dá)美航空擁有了更高話語權(quán)。達(dá)美航空的財務(wù)總監(jiān)保羅·雅各布森表示：“這是一次革命性的變化。正是因為客戶對達(dá)美航空的忠誠，才為SkyMiles信用卡帶來了忠實客戶?！?/p>

今年，美國運通將為達(dá)美航空帶來34億美元的收入。這些收入主要來自兩個渠道：一是里程的采購，二是“商戶費”的分成。所謂“商戶費”，是指每次消費者使用信用卡消費，美國運通會從零售商戶那里抽成2.5%。美國運通主要通過循環(huán)信用利息和信用卡年費收入賺錢，而“商戶費”則主要被達(dá)美航空拿走了。據(jù)斯迪富（Stifel）公司的分析師喬伊·德納爾迪估計，達(dá)美航空在與美國運通的合作中獲得了66%的利潤。巴斯蒂安則表示，德納爾迪估計的利潤比例“太高了”，不過他也承認(rèn)，實際的利潤比例是“極為健康”的。不過不管達(dá)美航空實際分走的利潤是多少，它的利潤率都高于公司的核心航空業(yè)務(wù)，而且還在34億美元的基礎(chǔ)上以每年超過11%的速度增長。

然而，這部分利潤也并非總是穩(wěn)定的。旅行相關(guān)博客“View from the Wing”的博主加里·萊夫表示：“我認(rèn)為這部分利潤會下滑，有兩個原因：一是無論是競爭因素還是監(jiān)管因素都有可能壓低這部分利潤，二是航空信用卡面臨著來自銀行信用卡的激烈競爭?！庇械你y行信用卡的獎勵相比航空信用卡還要更高。包括萊夫在內(nèi)的一些分析師認(rèn)為，最好的情況就是SkyMiles信用卡在一段時間內(nèi)能繼續(xù)為達(dá)美航空帶來利潤，同時巴斯蒂安和他的團隊可以找到辦法讓核心的航空業(yè)務(wù)獲得更高收入。

為了促進核心業(yè)務(wù)的增長，達(dá)美航空也將目光投向了海外市場。在很多國家，不斷增長的中產(chǎn)階級人口和蓬勃發(fā)展的商業(yè)環(huán)境，使得那里的需求增長得極為迅猛。而達(dá)美航空在這里是有可能占據(jù)絕對優(yōu)勢的。普信集團持有7億美元的達(dá)美航空股份，該公司的投資經(jīng)理安德魯·戴維斯持指出：“達(dá)美航空對外國航空公司的投資，以及其與外國企業(yè)建立的合資公司的數(shù)量，要遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過美國的其他航空公司。隨著它繼續(xù)在全球范圍內(nèi)擴張，達(dá)美航空肯定能實現(xiàn)它需要的收入增長?！?/p>

美國和歐洲之間的航線是達(dá)美航空增長最快的市場。今年以來，這一塊業(yè)務(wù)的收入增長了12%，年化收益預(yù)計將達(dá)到62億美元。其中增長最快的是美國至英國的商務(wù)旅客。直到2010年前后，達(dá)美航空在開辟美歐航線上還是比較滯后的。但通過2013年與維珍大西洋航空的合作，達(dá)美航空一舉成為美歐航線上舉足輕重的存在，特別是在倫敦的希思羅機場。JoeSentMe.com的運營者喬伊·布蘭卡泰利表示：“紐約至倫敦航班的開通，使紐約和倫敦的大銀行都開始注意到達(dá)美航空?！?/p>

如今，達(dá)美-維珍聯(lián)盟是紐約至倫敦航線上僅次于美國航空和英國航空的合資公司的第二大勢力，平均每天要飛7到8個航班。最近幾年，海外的美資銀行利潤頗豐，咨詢顧問和交易操盤手經(jīng)常要往返于紐約和倫敦，指導(dǎo)各路企業(yè)妥善應(yīng)對英國脫歐。另外，強勢美元也使歐洲成了美國人休閑旅游的好去處。對于英國人來說，達(dá)美—維珍聯(lián)盟也給他們提供了幾個可以直飛的度假地，比如奧蘭多和拉斯維加斯等。

In the quest for more revenue, Delta has a very profitable ace up its sleeve—or, more accurately, in millions of people’s wallets. It’s a major marketing partnership that’s immune to the cycles in fares and fuel costs that roil financial results for airlines in general, and it’s one that Bastian can take credit for, having negotiated it back when he was CFO and president.

Each year, consumers spend $80 billion on purchases through cobranded American Express–Delta SkyMiles credit cards. AmEx buys miles from Delta that Delta exchanges as rewards for spending on that card, as well as through rewards programs on other AmEx cards. In the past, AmEx and other credit card companies had all the leverage in these relationships, buying big chunks of miles on the cheap when carriers were desperate for cash. But today, Delta’s fortunes, and its brand, have greatly improved, and it’s the airline that has the leverage. “It’s a revolutionary change, a stabilizing force,” says Delta CFO Paul Jacobson. “It’s loyalty to Delta that brings loyalty to the SkyMiles card.”

The result: This year, AmEx will send Delta $3.4 billion in revenues from two sources. The first is the purchase of miles. The second is a large chunk of the “merchant fee,” the approximately 2.5% that AmEx collects from retailers of the value of each purchase customers charge to the card. AmEx makes its money on revolving credit interest and annual fees—but Delta now gets most of the merchant fee. Joe DeNardi, an analyst for Stifel, estimates that Delta is reaping 66% margins from the AmEx deal. Bastian says that estimate is “much too high” but acknowledges that margins are “extremely healthy.” Whatever the actual margins, they’re higher than on core airline operations and growing at over 11% a year on that $3.4 billion base.

Nonetheless, that big flow of profits is vulnerable. “I argue that the margins will fall for two reasons,” says Gary Leff, who writes the traveler-oriented blog View from the Wing. “The interchange will be driven down, either by competition or regulation. And airline cards are getting tremendous competition from bank cards” with comparably high rewards. In a best-case scenario, Leff and others predict, the SkyMiles deal will help support Delta’s bottom line for a while as Bastian and his team figure out how to sustain higher revenues in the core airline franchise.

To make that growth happen, Delta is looking overseas—where growing middle-class populations and booming business climates are generating the kind of growth in demand that’s a thing of the past in the States. And here, Delta may have a decisive edge. “Delta’s developed far more big investments in foreign carriers and formed more overseas joint ventures than any other U.S. airline,” says Andrew Davis, a portfolio manager for T. Rowe Price whose funds hold $700 million in Delta shares. “As its global footprint expands, Delta can definitely generate the revenue growth it needs.”

Traffic between the U.S. and Europe is Delta’s fastest-growing franchise, posting a 12% jump in revenues so far this year to an annualized $6.2 billion—led by a 15% increase in the U.S.-to-U.K. segment. Earlier this decade, Delta was a laggard on what’s by far the premier route for business travelers between the U.S. and Europe: New York City to London’s Heathrow Airport. But the 2013 launch of Delta’s partnership with Virgin Atlantic, in a single stroke, made it a major force in that market and especially to Heathrow. “What’s known as NYLON put Delta on the map with the big banks in New York and London,” says Joe Brancatelli, who runs the website JoeSentMe.com for business airline travelers.

Today, the Delta-Virgin alliance is second only to the American–British Airways joint venture on the NYLON route, offering seven or eight flights a day. Profits are lively for global U.S. banks, and consultants and dealmakers are shuttling back and forth to London to advise on how best to handle Brexit. The strong dollar is making Europe in general a bargain for U.S. leisure travelers, and on the U.K. side, Delta-Virgin offers frequent flights to several of the Brits’ favorite vacation haunts, among them Orlando and Las Vegas.

達(dá)美航空還與法荷航空（Air France–KLM）展開合作，以服務(wù)更多歐洲城市。這項合作使達(dá)美航空開辟了至巴黎和阿姆斯特丹等城市的航線，同時它又可以通過這些樞紐機場連接歐洲的其他城市。這些合作并不屬于反壟斷法的監(jiān)管范疇，也就是說，達(dá)美航空和它的合作伙伴可以通過合作，議定票價和航班行程。

盡管達(dá)美航空的收入增長迅速，但它仍然有提高的空間。對于一名美國旅客來說，達(dá)美航空、法航和維珍航空類似于一個聯(lián)盟。假如你是紐約的一家銀行，那么你在達(dá)美航空就可以買到維珍航空或法荷航空的所有越洋航班，同時也可以享受它們在歐洲的龐大網(wǎng)絡(luò)。然而在歐洲方面，達(dá)美與法航以及達(dá)美與維珍的合作，則被視為兩個相互獨立的合作。因此對于一家歐洲企業(yè)來說，它是無法享受到這種三大航空公司無縫對接的商旅服務(wù)的，除非這家企業(yè)與兩家合資公司都簽訂了協(xié)議。當(dāng)然由于嫌麻煩，很多公司是不愿意這樣做的。

達(dá)美航空的解決方案是：與這兩家公司進行合并。目前，這兩家合資公司已經(jīng)分別向美國和歐盟申請了合并，巴斯蒂安相信，合并申請很快就會獲批。等到獲得主管部門批準(zhǔn)后，他們就能提供更大范圍的訂票服務(wù)，利潤也就會源源不斷地涌入了。旅游領(lǐng)袖集團（Travel Leaders Group）的航空關(guān)系高級副總裁彼得·弗里塔斯表示：“合并后的聯(lián)盟將為歐洲企業(yè)提供全面的全球商旅套餐?！?/p>

Delta also has a partnership with Air France–KLM to serve European cities. That’s lucrative, too, giving Delta a share of income on routes to cities such as Paris and Amsterdam, and connections to other cities within Europe from those hubs. All of these relationships are “antitrust-immune,” which means that Delta and its partners can cooperate to set fares and schedules.

Even though revenue has been growing rapidly, Delta has room for improvement. For a traveler from the U.S., Delta, Air France, and Virgin Atlantic can act as a single partnership. It can offer a New York bank, for example, a package deal that includes all those Virgin flights to Heathrow, as well as Air France–KLM’s transatlantic service and its vast network throughout Europe. But on the European side, the Delta–Air France and Delta-Virgin partnerships are considered independent of each other. That means European corporations can’t get comparably seamless business-travel arrangements for their employees unless they sign separate deals with the two joint ventures, something many aren’t willing to do.

Delta’s solution: Merge them. The two joint ventures have applied for permission to merge from the U.S. and EU, and Bastian is confident approval will arrive shortly. When they get a yes, they’ll be able to offer a wider array of bookings, and profits will follow. “Combining the two JVs would be a big deal,” says Peter Vlitas, SVP of airline relations at Travel Leaders Group, a firm that helps corporations negotiate travel contracts. “The combined alliances would offer full global corporate travel packages to companies based in Europe.”

同時，巴斯蒂安還希望扭轉(zhuǎn)達(dá)美航空在亞太地區(qū)節(jié)節(jié)敗退的局面。為此，他也做出了自己擔(dān)任CEO以來最大膽的賭注。

2012年至2017年，達(dá)美航空在亞洲的收入下降了35%，從36億美元跌至23億美元。直到最近，達(dá)美航空在亞洲都只有東京成田機場這一個樞紐，并且用自己的飛機從這里往返亞洲各地。2013年，日本政府將離東京市區(qū)更近的羽田機場從一個國內(nèi)機場改造成了國際機場。結(jié)果達(dá)美航空的許多以東京為目的地（而非中轉(zhuǎn)機場）的旅客選擇了改乘其他航空公司的航班，這樣一來，達(dá)美航空在成田機場的業(yè)務(wù)在經(jīng)濟上愈發(fā)難以為繼。而美國航空和聯(lián)合航空的損失則相對較小，因為他們與日本的幾家航空公司有合作關(guān)系，可以幫助他們在成田機場和羽田機場都保持運營。而達(dá)美航空卻沒有日本的合作伙伴。（巴斯蒂安雖然向日航拋出了橄欖枝，但雙方并沒談出什么成果。）

不過去年，達(dá)美航空與大韓航空簽訂了一項不受反壟斷審查的合資協(xié)議，從此，達(dá)美航空將可以在首爾附近的仁川國際機場提供服務(wù)。達(dá)美航空總裁格倫·豪恩斯坦將仁川機場稱為“全球機場界的泰姬陵”。仁川國際機場于2001年開放，是全球最新最大的機場之一。達(dá)美航空可由成田機場飛往25個城市。在仁川機場，達(dá)美航空占據(jù)了于今年1月平昌冬奧會期間亮相的2號航站樓的45個登機口。從這里，它與大韓航空的飛機可以飛往全球80個目的地（其中有40個在中國）。旅行博客“View from the Wing”的博主萊夫指出：“很多航空公司都可以直飛上?；蚴谞柕却蟪鞘小５F(xiàn)在達(dá)美航空改變了游戲規(guī)則，它可以直達(dá)亞洲的幾十個二線城市，不管是河內(nèi)還是哈爾濱?！?/p>

從紐約的約翰肯尼迪機場直飛仁川，單程需要飛7000英里左右。不過相比坐7000英里的飛機，肯定還是跑26.2英里的馬拉松更累。但在今年11月，作為跑步愛好者的巴斯蒂安就挑戰(zhàn)了一次紐約馬拉松賽。他參賽是為了支持亞特蘭大的瑞力基金會（Rally Foundation），該基金會是從事兒童癌癥研究的一個慈善組織。不過這次他跑得并不輕松，由于半月板撕裂，他在10月底一直是一瘸一拐地走路。比賽當(dāng)天，巴斯蒂安雖然跑完了全程，但總共卻花了6個多小時。他說：“跑到第15英里的時候，我的小腿都打結(jié)了，這讓最后10英里成了一場真正的戰(zhàn)斗?！边@次經(jīng)歷可能也有些預(yù)言的意味：在達(dá)美航空取得下一個成功前，他總是要經(jīng)歷一些痛苦的。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

本文的另一版本載于2018年12月1日刊的《財富》雜志。

譯者：樸成奎

In?the meantime, Bastian aims to reverse a long retreat for Delta in the Pacific—and he’s doing so with one of his most audacious gambits as CEO.

Between 2012 and 2017, Delta’s revenues from Asia fell 35%, from $3.6 billion to $2.3 billion. Until recently, Delta served Asia mainly through a hub at Narita International Airport in Tokyo, connecting traffic from there throughout Asia on its own planes. But in 2013, the Japanese government transformed Haneda, an airport much closer to Tokyo, from a domestic to an international hub. The result was that many of Delta’s “destination” travelers to Tokyo—passengers who planned to end their trips there rather than pass through—chose other airlines, making its Narita service less financially viable. American and United suffered less, since they have partnerships with Japanese airlines to help them operate in both Narita and Haneda. But Delta didn’t have a Japanese partner. (Bastian courted JAL, without results.)

Last year, however, Delta signed a new, antitrust-immune joint venture with Korean Air for service to giant Incheon International, near Seoul. That hub, which Delta president Glen Hauenstein calls “the Taj Mahal of world airports,” opened in 2001 and is one of the world’s newest and biggest facilities. From Narita, Delta flew to 25 cities. From Incheon, it will operate 45 gates at ultramodern Terminal 2, which made its debut in January 2018 in time for the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. From there it will connect on Korean Air planes to 80 destinations, including 40 in China. “Lots of airlines fly nonstop to major cities like Shanghai or Seoul,” says Leff, of View from the Wing. “The game changer is that Delta can now reach dozens upon dozens of secondary cities throughout Asia, whether it’s Hanoi or Harbin.”

A nonstop flight from JFK to Incheon stretches some 7,000 miles. This fall, Bastian was contemplating a shorter if no less daunting distance: 26.2 miles. Bastian, a regular jogger, had pledged to run in the New York Marathon in early November to support Atlanta’s Rally Foundation, a charity for childhood cancer research. His biggest obstacle: a torn meniscus that had him hobbling in late October. Come race day, Bastian went the distance, albeit in a time of more than six hours. “On mile 15, my calves knotted,” he says. It “turned the last 10 miles into a true battle.” The experience may prove to be prophetic: There’s likely to be some pain for Bastian before Delta’s next big gain.

A version of this article appears in the December 1, 2018 issue of Fortune.