????

????這個(gè)救助方案的一個(gè)大問(wèn)題是，向FROB注資將加劇西班牙政府仍在不斷加碼的債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)。如果最終需要所有1,000億歐元，西班牙的負(fù)債/GDP比率（一個(gè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)衡量指標(biāo)）將從可以掌控的68.5%升至非常危險(xiǎn)的77%。但主權(quán)債務(wù)交易員們指出，西班牙的負(fù)債/GDP比率還不能準(zhǔn)確反映其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。因?yàn)樵摫嚷蕸](méi)有反映資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表外、由西班牙政府無(wú)條件擔(dān)保的幾十億歐元債務(wù)。據(jù)西班牙央行（Bank of Spain）稱，加上這些表外債務(wù)，西班牙的債務(wù)/GDP比率將從68.5%增至87%。在此基礎(chǔ)上再加1,000億歐元，該比例將躍升至約96%。

????當(dāng)然，前提是這1,000億歐元足以拯救西班牙的銀行業(yè)。但現(xiàn)在我們真的不知道西班牙銀行業(yè)需要多少錢，這得等到6月21日左右咨詢公司奧緯咨詢（Oliver Wyman）和羅蘭貝格（Roland Berger）公布西班牙銀行業(yè)資產(chǎn)市值的獨(dú)立評(píng)估報(bào)告后才能得到答案。

????大多數(shù)分析師和交易員們都假定，所有已開(kāi)發(fā)房地產(chǎn)需要大幅折價(jià)50%。但更讓人擔(dān)心的是銀行所持土地的價(jià)值。據(jù)了解狀況的一位人士稱，尋求購(gòu)買西班牙銀行資產(chǎn)的對(duì)沖基金和兀鷲基金愿意折價(jià)50%購(gòu)買已開(kāi)發(fā)房地產(chǎn)，但對(duì)于未開(kāi)發(fā)土地，“連付2%的錢”都不愿意。西班牙銀行業(yè)持有的很多土地都處于西班牙國(guó)內(nèi)邊遠(yuǎn)地區(qū)，如內(nèi)陸省份埃斯特雷馬杜拉，這一地區(qū)在不遠(yuǎn)的未來(lái)可能不會(huì)有任何開(kāi)發(fā)活動(dòng)。

????因此，瑞士信貸（Credit Suisse）稱，如果上述兩家獨(dú)立審計(jì)公司最終將所有的西班牙土地估值定為零，西班牙銀行業(yè)可能總計(jì)需要從FROB獲得400億歐元。還有2,600億歐元的已開(kāi)發(fā)土地也將面臨估值下調(diào)。如果要用現(xiàn)有撥備彌補(bǔ)缺口，并注入足夠現(xiàn)金，確保每家銀行都擁有10%的一級(jí)資本充足率，總計(jì)將需要近1,000億歐元。如果銀行被要求持有更多資本，所需資金總額就會(huì)輕松超過(guò)1,000億歐元。前提還是西班牙近期出現(xiàn)的資本和儲(chǔ)蓄外逃將在未來(lái)停止。如果這種資金流出持續(xù)進(jìn)行，西班牙銀行的股東權(quán)益價(jià)值將下降，需要從FROB獲得更多資金。

????這個(gè)救助方案實(shí)在是荒謬。不僅沒(méi)有移除西班牙的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，事實(shí)上歐盟反而是在讓這個(gè)國(guó)家承擔(dān)更多的債務(wù)。一旦市場(chǎng)有機(jī)會(huì)深入研究這一方案，持有西班牙債券的保費(fèi)將繼續(xù)處于畸高水平。因此，它基本上意味著西班牙將繼續(xù)完全依賴歐洲央行（European Central Bank）來(lái)購(gòu)買其債券。最終，這個(gè)體系將崩塌，迫使西班牙政府自己也要向歐盟和國(guó)際貨幣基金組織（IMF）求救。主權(quán)救助方案帶來(lái)的緊縮政策以及信譽(yù)破產(chǎn)對(duì)于拉霍伊和其支持者都是無(wú)法承受的打擊。

????一個(gè)更有效的救助措施本應(yīng)是歐盟共同努力，通過(guò)承擔(dān)部分或所有債務(wù)，降低西班牙的銀行業(yè)和主權(quán)債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)。這個(gè)方案將把風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分散到歐元區(qū)所有17個(gè)成員國(guó)，讓馬德里能夠抽出身來(lái)，再次以合理的價(jià)格發(fā)行自己的主權(quán)債券。但目前來(lái)看，眼下的西班牙銀行業(yè)救助方案只不過(guò)是這場(chǎng)似乎無(wú)休無(wú)止的危機(jī)中出臺(tái)的又一個(gè)權(quán)宜之計(jì)。

????譯者：早稻米

????The big problem with this deal is that the money being funneled to the FROB is going to be added to Spain's already burgeoning debt load. That means that if it ends up needing all 100 billion euros, Spain's official debt-to-GDP ratio, a measure of risk, would increase from a somewhat manageable 68.5% to a far more dangerous 77%. But traders who deal in sovereign debt note that Spain's official debt-to-GDP ratio doesn't give an accurate picture of its risk. That's because it doesn't take into account the billions of euros of off-balance sheet debts, which are obligations that are implicitly guaranteed by the Spanish government. Add in those off-balance sheet items and the nation's debt-to-GDP ratio jumps from 68.5% to 87%, according to the Bank of Spain. Top it off with another 100 billion euros and the ratio jumps to around 96%.

????Of course this assumes that 100 billion euros will be enough to save Spain's banks. We truly won't know how much the banks need until Oliver Wyman and Roland Berger, the consulting firms, release their independent assessment of the mark-to-market values of Spanish bank assets, which is expected around the 21st of this month.

????Most analysts and traders are assuming that all developed properties will need to be reduced by a whopping 50%. But what is frightening is the value of the land being held by the banks. Hedge funds and vulture funds seeking to buy up distressed Spanish banking assets are offering 50 cents on the dollar for developed properties, but "wouldn't even offer two cents," for undeveloped land, according to a person with knowledge of the situation. Apparently a lot of the land being held by the banks is in remote areas of the country, like the landlocked province of Extremadura, which will probably not see much development anytime in the near future.

????So if the independent auditors end up marking all Spanish land to zero, the banks would collectively need 40 billion euros from the FROB, according to Credit Suisse. That leaves 260 billion euros of developed land to mark down. When you offset that against current provisions and inject enough cash to ensure every bank has a tier one capital ratio of 10% then you are nearly at 100 billion euros. If banks are required to hold more capital, then it easily exceeds the 100 billion euro mark. This also assumes that the capital and deposit flight that Spain has seen recently comes to a halt. If it continues, the equity values of the banks would fall, requiring them to request even more money from the FROB.

????This bailout is truly an exercise in absurdity. Instead of taking risk off Spain's shoulders, the EU is actually saddling the sovereign with even more debt. Once the market has a chance to study this deal in depth, it will continue to demand a prohibitively high premium to hold Spanish bonds. As such, this almost guarantees that Spain will continue to be totally dependent on the European Central Bank to buy its debt. Eventually this system will break down, forcing the Spanish government to seek a bailout of its own from the EU and the IMF. The austerity and humiliation that would go along with a sovereign bailout may be too much for Rajoy and the rest of his cohorts to stand.

????A more effective bailout would have been one where the EU collectively worked to lower Spain's bank and sovereign debt burden by assuming all or part of it. This would spread risk among all 17-members of the euro zone and would free Madrid to once again issue its own debt at a reasonable price point. But for now, this bailout will serve as yet-another stop-gap measure in this seemingly never ending crisis.