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美國總統(tǒng)唐納德·特朗普訪英期間，似乎在英國脫歐問題上選好了隊(duì)，他告訴《太陽報(bào)》，英國首相特雷莎·梅的“脫歐方案和人們想要的相差甚遠(yuǎn)”。這話強(qiáng)烈詬病了梅的工作，但同時(shí)也提出了一個(gè)十分關(guān)鍵的問題：脫歐應(yīng)該是什么樣的？

7月9日，最高調(diào)的脫歐擁護(hù)者鮑里斯·約翰遜繼脫歐事務(wù)大臣戴維·戴維斯之后也遞交辭呈，作為英國脫歐運(yùn)動(dòng)的主要推動(dòng)者，他認(rèn)為政府新提出的方案有悖于脫歐運(yùn)動(dòng)對(duì)英國上下做出的承諾。

約翰遜在辭職信中哀嘆脫歐夢(mèng)正在慢慢死去。據(jù)他診斷，病因是“毫無必要的自我懷疑”。他認(rèn)為英國正在朝半脫歐的方向發(fā)展，這意味著哪怕離開歐盟后，英國也會(huì)被困在歐盟體系中。但與其說是因?yàn)槿狈ψ孕牛匾脑蚴怯趦?nèi)部矛盾與為了脫歐必須要進(jìn)行的利弊權(quán)衡和妥協(xié)讓步中苦苦掙扎。

數(shù)月以來，英國政府似乎一直想完成不可能的任務(wù)，試圖畫圓為方，既想正式離開歐盟的單一市場(chǎng)和關(guān)稅同盟，又不想在愛爾蘭和北愛爾蘭之間形成硬邊界，同時(shí)還想確保形成的協(xié)議對(duì)整個(gè)聯(lián)合王國都有效（也就是說保證不會(huì)有北愛爾蘭單獨(dú)協(xié)議）。梅仍然堅(jiān)定不移地致力于在退出單一市場(chǎng)的同時(shí)不形成硬邊界。然而離開單一市場(chǎng)就意味著需要在南北愛爾蘭邊界設(shè)置檢查崗或者對(duì)北愛爾蘭做出特別安排，而她（和其少數(shù)政府支持者北愛爾蘭民主統(tǒng)一黨）已經(jīng)排除了這兩個(gè)選項(xiàng)。上述不同立場(chǎng)間顯然無法兼容。

愛爾蘭邊界在很多方面都成為脫歐進(jìn)程的阿喀琉斯之踵。目前，北愛爾蘭和愛爾蘭之間沒有實(shí)體邊界存在，這得益于英國和愛爾蘭的歐盟成員國身份和雙方20年來的和平共處，因此沒有必要在兩國間建立任何實(shí)體邊界。雙方都擔(dān)心強(qiáng)化南北愛爾蘭邊界會(huì)破壞20年來的政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展，所以在努力避免出現(xiàn)這種結(jié)果。但也因此嚴(yán)重限制了英國脫歐的范圍。

英國政府試圖解決上述難題，內(nèi)閣也于7月6日對(duì)英國與歐盟的未來關(guān)系達(dá)成了一致立場(chǎng)，但三天后約翰遜辭職了。政府的建議是繼續(xù)留在歐盟市場(chǎng)中，但僅僅保留商品交易，放棄服務(wù)交易。只是退出單一服務(wù)市場(chǎng)不會(huì)產(chǎn)生邊界問題，而英國政府相信可以和歐盟之外的其他經(jīng)濟(jì)體之間達(dá)成服務(wù)貿(mào)易自由化，可以說是非常宏偉的目標(biāo)了。此外，英方還提出了一個(gè)復(fù)雜的關(guān)稅方案，要求英國可以代表歐盟對(duì)從英國中轉(zhuǎn)運(yùn)往歐盟的商品征稅，對(duì)于目的地是英國的貨品，征收（可能較低的）英國關(guān)稅。同樣的，設(shè)計(jì)這個(gè)復(fù)雜程序部分原因是為了避免在南北愛爾蘭間形成邊界，同時(shí)保持一定的貿(mào)易政策自由度。批評(píng)者——雙方都有——認(rèn)為這一政策既讓英國接受了歐盟的規(guī)則，又失去對(duì)歐盟的規(guī)則制定的影響力，而且質(zhì)疑在實(shí)際過程中這個(gè)程序是否可行。

關(guān)于這個(gè)提案，有兩點(diǎn)需要了解。第一，它是保守黨內(nèi)部談判的產(chǎn)物，而不是和歐盟談判的結(jié)果。梅希望畫出的脫歐藍(lán)圖既能體現(xiàn)脫歐者想要維持主權(quán)和貿(mào)易獨(dú)立的想法，又可以最大程度地減少留歐者（和商界）對(duì)于脫歐可能引發(fā)的經(jīng)濟(jì)混亂的擔(dān)憂，同時(shí)保持南北愛爾蘭的現(xiàn)狀。但約翰遜和戴維斯的想法卻沒有辦法得到滿足。許多更強(qiáng)硬的脫歐派充滿憤怒，但目前梅似乎得到了多數(shù)國會(huì)議員的支持。

第二，按照現(xiàn)有的形式，這一方案很可能無法獲得布魯塞爾的認(rèn)同。歐盟在談判中有自己的底線。核心原則是不破壞歐盟單一市場(chǎng)的完整性以及支撐這一完整性的商品、資本、服務(wù)和勞工自由。歐盟會(huì)覺得英國只想保留單一商品市場(chǎng)的想法是挑肥揀瘦，既想享受歐盟成員國待遇的好處，又不想履行全面義務(wù)。從單一市場(chǎng)的完整性和法律角度來看，歐盟領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人會(huì)認(rèn)為單一市場(chǎng)的不可分割性是維持歐盟政治平衡的必要條件。如果進(jìn)行拆分，給英國特殊安排，整個(gè)聯(lián)盟可能就散了。

歐洲委員會(huì)從更實(shí)用的角度上質(zhì)疑如何能夠按照英國希望的方式分割商品和服務(wù)。雖然可能商品的單一市場(chǎng)對(duì)歐盟更有利（因?yàn)闅W盟對(duì)英國的商品貿(mào)易是順差，服務(wù)貿(mào)易是逆差，而供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)窃谡麄€(gè)大陸形成一體），但是想要維持市場(chǎng)完整性的政治考慮顯然占據(jù)了上風(fēng)。更廣義地講，歐盟領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人認(rèn)為聯(lián)盟面對(duì)著多種政治挑戰(zhàn)和不同派系。這種情況下，維持團(tuán)結(jié)和歐盟體系的完整性是重中之重。

今后脫歐將何去何從？當(dāng)前政府的妥協(xié)很可能會(huì)在和布魯塞爾的談判中進(jìn)一步被稀釋。如果英國想要脫離歐盟的司法管轄，要如何管理這套共同的規(guī)則體系？這一問題也沒有完整的答案。英國和歐盟移民這個(gè)政治敏感話題很可能會(huì)制造出新的分歧。歐盟可能會(huì)試圖引導(dǎo)英國達(dá)成一個(gè)和挪威類似的協(xié)議，讓英國仍然完全留在單一市場(chǎng)中，但加強(qiáng)海關(guān)管理規(guī)定，屆時(shí)懷疑論者會(huì)認(rèn)為脫歐名存實(shí)亡。雖然英國方面態(tài)度出現(xiàn)了軟化，但可能，甚至很可能，到2019年3月29日這一既定脫歐日期，英國和歐盟只是對(duì)雙方未來關(guān)系的大致輪廓達(dá)成了一致，具體細(xì)節(jié)仍然需要在之后的過渡期繼續(xù)進(jìn)行談判磋商。

同時(shí)，脫歐支持者需要想一想，是用他們想要的方式脫歐更重要，還是徹底離開更重要。他們能否接受一個(gè)沒那么“純粹的”脫歐夢(mèng)，還是支持政府做出讓步，確保英國真正離開歐盟？另一個(gè)知名的脫歐支持者邁克爾·戈夫現(xiàn)在仍然在內(nèi)閣任職，據(jù)報(bào)道，他的思路更長遠(yuǎn)：3月前退出，但雙邊關(guān)系可以等到未來去慢慢界定慢慢發(fā)展。其他人立場(chǎng)卻更加強(qiáng)硬，他們控訴政府背叛了國家。但他們只是少數(shù)派，而且不確定這些人是否愿意或者能夠推翻梅的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)，而這勢(shì)必會(huì)進(jìn)一步引發(fā)政治混亂。

今年秋天，這種不穩(wěn)定似乎避無可避。10月將召開歐盟峰會(huì)。英國和歐盟卻還沒有對(duì)所謂“保障”協(xié)議的形式達(dá)成一致，這指的是如果其他的海關(guān)制度不起作用時(shí)，為避免在南北愛爾蘭間形成硬邊界而制定的保障政策。英國同意了制訂保障協(xié)議，但認(rèn)為歐盟的提案可能會(huì)影響英聯(lián)邦的憲法完整性。何況任何協(xié)議都需要經(jīng)過英國和歐洲議會(huì)的同意。梅現(xiàn)在只有一個(gè)少數(shù)派政府，黨內(nèi)還有很大一部分人持不同意見，因此她可能需要從反對(duì)黨中尋求支持，才能避免出現(xiàn)零協(xié)議的慘淡局面。簡(jiǎn)而言之，英國政治的不穩(wěn)定還遠(yuǎn)未結(jié)束。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

托馬斯·雷恩斯是英國皇家國際事務(wù)研究所的研究員及歐洲項(xiàng)目經(jīng)理。

譯者：Agatha

During his visit to the U.K., President Donald Trump seemed to take sides on Brexit, telling The Sun Thursday that U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May “is striking is a much ?different deal than the one the people voted on.” While harshly critical of May, it raises the key question: What should Brexit look like?

On July 9, Boris Johnson, Brexit’s most high-profile champion, followed the Brexit secretary David Davis in quitting the government, believing its proposed new approach does not deliver on the promises made to the country by the Leave campaign, which he helped lead.

In his resignation letter, Johnson mourns that the Brexit dream is dying. His diagnosis of the cause is “needless self-doubt.” He believes the U.K. is headed for a semi-Brexit, with the U.K. locked into the EU system even after its departure. But rather than a lack of confidence, Brexit is floundering on the rocks of its own contradictions, and the very real trade-offs and compromises it necessitates.

For months, the government has been trying to square a seemingly impossible circle, in which Britain formally leaves the EU’s single market and customs union, avoids a border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, and ensures there is a deal for the whole of the U.K. (i.e. making sure that there is no separate deal for Northern Ireland). May remains steadfastly committed to leaving the single market, and to avoiding a hard border. Yet leaving the single market would necessitate the need for checks on the Irish border, or specific arrangements for Northern Ireland, which she (and the Northern Irish Democratic Unionist Party, which props up her minority government) have already excluded. These positions appear mutually incompatible.

The Irish border has in many ways become the Achilles heel of the Brexit process. At present, there is no border infrastructure between Northern Ireland and the Republic. EU membership and 20 years of peace have obviated the need for any physical infrastructure on the border. Both sides worry that a hardening of that frontier could undo two decades of political and economic progress, and so are committed to avoiding this outcome. But this severely limits the scope for the U.K. to diverge from the EU.

Johnson’s resignation came three days after the cabinet agreed on a new U.K. position on the future U.K.-EU relationship on July 6, which tries to find a way to solve this riddle. The government’s proposal is to remain in the EU’s market for goods but not for services. Leaving the services market does not create the same border problems, and the government believes, rather ambitiously, that there is scope to liberalize service trade with other economies outside of the EU. Alongside this, it proposes a convoluted customs arrangement under which the U.K. will collect tariffs on the EU’s behalf for all goods that enter the U.K. but are bound for the EU, but apply a (potentially lower) U.K. tariff for goods intended just for the U.K. Again, this complicated process is in part designed to avoid a border in Ireland, while maintaining some freedom of maneuver in trade policy. Critics—coming from both sides—view this as accepting the rules while losing influence over them, while also questioning whether the customs plan is workable in practice.

There are two important things to know about this proposal. The first is that it is the product of a negotiation within the Conservative Party, rather than a negotiation with the EU. May has sought to sketch a form of Brexit which reflects the Leavers’ desire for restored sovereignty and trading independence, with the concerns of Remainers (and business) that the economic dislocation of withdrawal is minimized, all the while preserving the status quo on the island of Ireland. Johnson and Davis’s views could not be accommodated. Many of the more hard-line Brexiteers are angry, but for now May appears to have the support of the majority of her MPs.

The second is that it is very unlikely that this approach, in its current form, will pass muster in Brussels. The EU has its own red lines in this negotiation. Its key principle is that the integrity of the EU’s single market—and the four freedoms (goods, capital, services, and labor) that underpin it—is not undermined. It will interpret the ambition for a single market in goods only to be a form of cherry picking, a selective attempt to retain the benefits of membership without full obligations. EU leaders see the market in more holistic and legal terms, believing its indivisiility is a necessary part of the political balance of the union. Unpick one part, give Britain a special deal, and the whole thing could unravel.

On a more practical level, the European Commission questions whether goods and services can really be separated in the way the U.K. hopes. And while there might be some advantages to the EU of a single market in goods (the EU has a goods surplus with Britain, but a services deficit, and supply chains are integrated across the continent), this does not overcome the political priority of preserving the market. More broadly, EU leaders see a union facing multiple political challenges and divides. In such conditions, preserving unity, and the EU system’s integrity, is paramount.

Where does Brexit go from here? The current government compromise is likely to be diluted further in negotiations in Brussels. The question of how a common rulebook will be governed when the U.K. wants to leave the EU’s legal jurisdiction is not fully answered. The politically sensitive issue of U.K.-EU immigration is likely to create further divisions. The EU may try to nudge the U.K. toward an arrangement comparable to Norway’s, in which it remains fully in the single market, but with an enhanced customs arrangement, which sceptics would view as Brexit in name only. Even with some softening on the U.K. side, it is possible, even likely, that by March 29, 2019, the scheduled departure date, the U.K. and the EU will still only have agreed on the outlines of this future relationship, with the detail to be determined in the transition period afterwards.

Meanwhile, the Brexiteers will need to decide if it is more important for the U.K. to leave in the way they would like, or to leave full stop. Do they accept a less “pure” version of their dream or back a compromise to ensure Britain actually leaves? Michael Gove, another prominent Brexiteer who has remained in the Cabinet, is reported to take the longer view: Get out by March and the relationship can be shaped and evolve in the future. Others take a more hard-line stance, accusing the government of betrayal. They are a minority though, and it is not clear if they are willing or capable of toppling May and unleashing further political chaos.

Such instability seems inevitable at some point in the autumn. There is a crunch EU summit in October. The U.K. and the EU have yet to agree on the form of the so-called “backstop” arrangement, an insurance policy against a hard border in Ireland if other customs systems don’t work. The U.K. has agreed to a backstop, but views the EU’s proposals on this as a risk to the constitutional integrity of the union. And any deal will also need to pass through the U.K. and European parliaments. With a minority government and a sizeable portion of her party opposed, May might seek support from some in the opposition to avoid a calamitous no-deal scenario. In short, Britain’s era of political instability will not end soon.

Thomas Raines is a research fellow and Europe programme manager at Chatham House.