????你們已經(jīng)敲定新任首席執(zhí)行官的績效指標(biāo)，采取無合同政策并找到談判最合算薪酬獎金方案的辦法了嗎？

????如果董事會已經(jīng)準(zhǔn)備好了管用的職位描述，董事就能讓首席執(zhí)行官候選人知道自己的績效將會如何衡量。比如，董事會希望首席執(zhí)行官操縱股價或營收嗎？那么股東總回報（TSR，total shareholder return）和每股收益（EPS，earnings per share）就是合理的指標(biāo)。如果他們想要更高的目標(biāo)，就應(yīng)該就與這些期望相關(guān)的衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進行溝通。

????董事會應(yīng)該制訂“首席執(zhí)行官無合同”政策，這是高盛公司（Goldman Sachs）董事會成員比爾?喬治首創(chuàng)的。在經(jīng)濟形勢急轉(zhuǎn)直下的時期，“首席執(zhí)行官無合同”能使重新談判薪酬的難度大為降低，解雇首席執(zhí)行官時也無需支付未經(jīng)承諾的額外賠償。想想當(dāng)年惠普前任首席執(zhí)行官馬克?赫德和老東家不歡而散時拿到手的巨額分手費吧。不過當(dāng)董事會心急火燎地要找到新管家時，不管打著口哨的牛仔（也就是首席執(zhí)行官候選人）提出多高的薪資要求，它常常身不由己地照付不誤，對各種瘋狂的薪酬方案都會一口答應(yīng)。

????福特公司（Ford）的首席執(zhí)行官艾倫?穆拉利一直都被認(rèn)為是鮑爾默的潛在接班人之一。穆拉利在福特享有極為豐厚的待遇，微軟最好不要原樣照搬這套方案。據(jù)CNN金融頻道（CNNMoney）今年三月的一個報道稱，盡管沒有“實現(xiàn)為高管支薪設(shè)定的眾多內(nèi)部績效目標(biāo)”，他2012年還是賺了2100萬美元并“在其領(lǐng)導(dǎo)福特的六年時間里積累了價值超過3億美元的福特股票”。

????股東們還應(yīng)該問問，對于一心想從公司錢袋子里大撈特?fù)频氖紫瘓?zhí)行官候選人，是否應(yīng)該取消其參選資格。同時為了鼓勵公司內(nèi)部有一批能持續(xù)參選的候選人，董事會是否考慮過制定相關(guān)規(guī)定，比如向其支付的薪酬不超過鮑爾默直接下屬的20%？

????董事會發(fā)現(xiàn)，如果選的是內(nèi)部候選人，薪酬談判就要容易得多。不過有些董事會也已成功地在戰(zhàn)略上運用商業(yè)情報讓外來者的薪酬要求降了一個臺階。股東們應(yīng)該感到好奇的是，董事們對自己的弱點有多清楚，以及他們是否會出于自己的利益考慮要求某人進入或離開董事會。可以想想美國證券交易委員會（SEC）前主席理查德?布雷登當(dāng)年作為世通公司的獨立監(jiān)察員時扮演的角色，那時他掌握著世通公司新高管薪酬方案的最終審批權(quán)。

????你們向首席執(zhí)行官候選人解釋過他們是不能進入董事會的嗎？

????當(dāng)然，微軟董事對新任首席執(zhí)行官的意見會非常重視。但是他會參加董事會——他不需要投票權(quán)。美國公司董事聯(lián)合會（National Association of Corporate Directors）創(chuàng)始人兼名譽退休主席約翰?M.納什表示：“首席執(zhí)行官不應(yīng)該進入董事會?！保í毤遗叮杭{什曾在本人的公司效力。）

????這可能是所有建議中最觸及根本的了。不過如果股東白白地讓提出這個建議的機會溜掉有什么好處呢？如果股東們希望微軟董事會做出明智的選擇并走上正確的方向，那11月19日他們就需要明確表態(tài)：董事們必須首先齊心協(xié)力、行動一致——然后再向新任首席執(zhí)行官明確表示，獨立董事將會執(zhí)掌大局。

????就算董事會在本次會議前就宣布了新任首席執(zhí)行官的人選，股東們也應(yīng)該不依不饒地拋出這些問題。畢竟，一個在錯誤條件下聘用的新任首席執(zhí)行官可能很快就會證明是個不當(dāng)人選。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

????埃莉諾?布洛克斯?jié)h姆是價值聯(lián)盟及公司治理聯(lián)盟公司（The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance，http://thevaluealliance.com）的首席執(zhí)行官，這個企業(yè)主要提供董事會培訓(xùn)及咨詢服務(wù)。

????譯者：清遠(yuǎn)

????Have you identified the new CEO's performance metrics, adopted a no contracts policy, and figured out ways to negotiate the most cost-effective salary and bonus package?

????If the board has developed an effective job description, the directors will be able to let CEO candidates know how their performance will be measured. For example, does the board want the CEO to manipulate stock price or earnings? Then TSR (total shareholder return) and EPS (earnings per share) are reasonable metrics. If they are seeking loftier goals, they should communicate measures tied to those expectations.

????Boards should establish a "no CEO contracts" policy, something Goldman Sachs (GS) board member Bill George has championed. No CEO contracts make it much easier to renegotiate pay when the bloom has gone off the rose and fire a CEO without unwarranted obligations. Consider the huge payout given to former HP CEO Mark Hurd upon his unsavory exit. But when a board has a gun to its head to find a new hire, it often caves into paying whatever the whistling cowboy (a.k.a. the CEO candidate) dictates and agreeing to all kinds of crazy compensation arrangements.

????Ford's CEO Alan Mulally has been suggested as a potential candidate to replace Ballmer. Mulally has had a sweet deal at Ford (F) that Microsoft should not seek to replicate. Despite falling "well short of numerous internal performance targets used to set pay for top executives," according to a CNNMoney report from March, he earned $21 million in 2012 and has "accumulated Ford stock worth more than $300 million in the six-plus years he has led Ford."

????Shareholders ought to ask whether a focus on extracting as much moolah from the corporate coffers as possible will disqualify a CEO candidate. And to encourage a strong pool of internal candidates who can step in on an ongoing basis, has the board considered guidelines, such as not paying more than 20% above what Ballmer's current direct reports earn?

????Boards find pay negotiation a lot easier if they choose an internal candidate. But some boards have been successful in using information strategically to ratchet down an outsider's package. Shareholders should be curious about how cognizant the directors are about their own weaknesses and whether they plan to ask someone on or off the board to act on behalf of their interests. Think about the role former SEC chair Richard Breeden played as independent monitor of WorldCom when he had final signoff on new executive hire pay packages.

????Have you explained to CEO candidates that they won't be sitting on the board?

????Of course, the Microsoft board will be keenly interested in the new CEO's opinions. But she'll be in the board meetings -- she doesn't need a vote. "The CEO should not sit on the board," says John M. Nash, founder and president emeritus of the National Association of Corporate Directors. (Full disclosure: Nash has worked for my company.)

????This may be the most radical suggestion of all. But what good will it do shareholders to let this opportunity pass? If shareholders want the Microsoft board to make a good choice and get off on the right foot, on November 19 they need to send a clear message that directors need to first get their act together -- and then make clear to the new CEO that independent board members will be calling the shots.

????Even if the board announces the new CEO before the meeting, shareholders should aggressively pursue these questions. After all, a new CEO hired under the wrong conditions may prove unsuitable very quickly.