????摩根大通（J.P. Morgan）應(yīng)該一分為二，就像花旗集團(tuán)（Citigroup）前董事長桑迪?威爾對所有大銀行做出的建議那樣。事實上，摩根大通應(yīng)該先行一步。但在此之前，該行董事會需要解決好治理問題，分拆才能順利進(jìn)行。

????過去幾周，摩根大通一波不平，一波又起。種種事件讓人繼續(xù)質(zhì)疑公司聲明的可靠性以及其動機(jī)和行為的正當(dāng)性。上周，美國聯(lián)邦能源監(jiān)管委員會（FERC）根據(jù)能源操縱調(diào)查提交的文件列出了“基于電子郵件的詳細(xì)總結(jié)”，證明“摩根大通多次明知故犯，將非特許保密郵件列為特許保密郵件。”

????將這項調(diào)查推上風(fēng)口浪尖的是英國《金融時報》（Financial Times）。該報最近報道，摩根大通這樣的華爾街銀行正在越來越深地插手石油交易和向煉油廠供應(yīng)原油等事務(wù)。

????摩根大通首席執(zhí)行官杰米?戴蒙在公司第二季度業(yè)績電話會議上不愿回答有關(guān)倫敦銀行同業(yè)拆借利率（Libor）操縱的問題，但據(jù)《華爾街日報》（Wall Street Journal）報道，摩根大通一些交易員因涉嫌串通操縱利率，正在接受調(diào)查。

????上上周，美國參議員卡爾?列文和商業(yè)銅用戶直言，反對摩根大通和Blackrock提議的銅ETF，擔(dān)心會推高銅價。

????這只是近期突出的一些問題，但并非全部。新的訴訟和調(diào)查正在展開。

????7月13日，兩位銀行分析師提出摩根大通太大了，難以管理。那么，摩根大通應(yīng)該聽從威爾的建議，還是把腦袋埋進(jìn)沙子里，希望一切最終都會過去？

????為了避免走不必要的彎路，監(jiān)管部門需要發(fā)話，摩根大通董事會應(yīng)該著手解決自己的治理問題，而且正如桑迪?威爾所建議的那樣，這家銀行應(yīng)該一分為二。

第一步：清理摩根大通董事會

????一個正常運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)的審計委員會絕不會允許杰米?戴蒙在4月13日的第一季度業(yè)績電話會議上對交易損失規(guī)模做出“大錯特錯”的描述。如今從7月13日的分析師會議上我們已經(jīng)了解到，雖然4月份時戴蒙說損失不大，但蒙在鼓里的投資者所不知到的是，第一季度的數(shù)據(jù)已包含了7.18億美元的首席投資辦公室損失。前些年董事會就曾收到關(guān)于首席投資辦公室的警告，4月初的很多新聞報道也發(fā)出了警報。

????一個功能正常的審計委員會本應(yīng)詢問第一季度數(shù)據(jù)中的交易損失狀況。他們本應(yīng)有例行的預(yù)先審批業(yè)績報告的程序，不該讓管理層在不進(jìn)行交易損失披露的情況下，在4月13日業(yè)績演示的第12頁中進(jìn)行解釋?；蛘撸绻?月13日委員會已經(jīng)知道了這筆交易損失，仍然保持沉默，這也是錯誤。不管是哪一種，首席執(zhí)行官和首席財務(wù)官都沒有獲得有價值的協(xié)助。

????此外，還有其他的內(nèi)部控制問題。如果審計委員會監(jiān)督充分，原本可以阻止這家公司對風(fēng)險水平的不實陳述，阻止其第一季度交易損失重述（翻番至14億美元）。摩根大通說過，其首席投資官辦公室的程序要比投行部門薄弱；標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的內(nèi)部審計調(diào)查本應(yīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)這一點。

????是不是說，摩根大通太大了，難以監(jiān)管？審計委員會的成員們有沒有投入必要的時間和精力來做好這份工作？他們真的具有獨(dú)立思考嗎？

????交易巨虧后有些經(jīng)理的高額獎金將被追回，但薪酬委員會選擇對其他人高抬貴手。對最高管理層和中下層實施兩套雙重標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，這種行為傳遞了錯誤的信號。

????一個正常運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)的薪酬委員會本應(yīng)實施最高層獎金遞延計劃，就像監(jiān)管部門建議的那樣。他們不應(yīng)依賴獎金追回——和獎金遞延不同，獎金追回發(fā)生在事后。另外，他們不應(yīng)當(dāng)將業(yè)績或股價指標(biāo)作為明里暗里的薪酬基礎(chǔ)。把業(yè)績（金融服務(wù)公司的業(yè)績非常易受影響）和股價（反映股東對不透明的財務(wù)報表的看法）作為指標(biāo)根本不合適。

????J.P. Morgan should split in two, as former Citigroup chair Sandy Weill has recommended for all big banks. In fact, it should go first. But before it does, the bank's board needs to address its own governance issues so the split goes well.

????It has been another tumultuous couple of weeks for J.P. Morgan (JPM). Events continued to raise questions about the veracity of company statements and the propriety of its motives and actions. Last week, a FERC filing in an energy manipulation investigation provided a "detailed, email-by-email summary" to back up its assertions that "J.P. Morgan repeatedly and deliberately insisted that unprivileged emails were privileged."

????Bringing the investigation into sharper focus, the Financial Times recently reported that Wall Street banks like J.P. Morgan are becoming more heavily involved in the oil trading businessand supplying oil to refiners.

????CEO Jamie Dimon would not answer questions about Libor manipulation during the bank's second quarter earnings call, but the Wall Street Journal has reported that its traders are now under investigation for conspiring to rig the rates.

????Last week, Senator Carl Levin along with commercial copper consumers spoke out in oppositionto a J.P. Morgan and Blackrock (BLK) proposed copper exchange traded fund on worries it would raise copper prices.

????While this just offers a flavor of recent concerns, it hardly represents the full story. New lawsuits and investigations are underway.

????On July 13, two bank analysts suggested the bank was too big to manage. So will J.P. Morgan heed Weill's recommendation or just put its head in the sand and hope it all goes away?

????To save needless suffering, regulators need to speak out, the J.P. Morgan board should address its governance problems, and, as Weill recommends, the company should be split in two.

First step: Cleaning up J.P. Morgan's board

????A well run audit committee would never have allowed Jamie Dimon to be "dead wrong" about the importance of the trading losses on April 13. As we now know from the July 13 analyst meeting, while Dimon was saying the losses were insignificant in April, unbeknownst to the investing public, embedded in the April 13 numbers were $718 million in losses from the chief investment office (CIO). The board had received warnings about the CIO in prior years and had the benefit of news reports in early April.

????A functional audit committee would have asked about the level of trading losses in the first quarter numbers. They would have had practices in place to review and approve earnings releases in advance and never would have allowed management to show the explanation onpage 12 of the April 13 earnings presentation without a trading loss disclosure. Alternatively, if the committee knew of the loss on April 13 and remained silent, this would be wrong as well. Either way, valuable assistance was kept from the CEO and CFO.

????Then there are the other internal controls issues. Sufficient audit committee oversight could haveprevented the company from misstating its risk levels and prevented restatement of its first quarter trading losses, which doubled to $1.4 billion. J.P. Morgan has said its procedures in the CIO office were weaker than those in its investment bank; a standard internal audit review should have unearthed this.

????Is the company just too big to oversee? Did the audit committee members put in the time and attention required to do their jobs well? Are they truly independent-minded?

????While some managers will have substantial clawbacks in the wake of the trading debacle, the compensation committee is punting on others. Having two sets of standards – one for top management and another for those down the line -- sends the wrong message.

????A well-run compensation committee would have implemented meaningful top management bonus deferral programs, as regulators have recommended. They would not rely on clawbacks -- which, unlike bonus deferrals, occur after the fact. They would also not be using earnings or stock price metrics as implicit or explicit bases for rewards. Earnings, which are highly malleable at a financial services firm, and stock price, which represents feedback from shareholders on opaque financial statements, are hardly relevant measures.