作為風(fēng)云一時的股票大亨,喬丹·貝爾福特曾經(jīng)一度掌握了一種魔力,能夠精準(zhǔn)地讓普羅大眾對他推銷的股票趨之若鶩。自稱為“華爾街之狼”(根據(jù)他2011年的自傳和2013年馬丁·斯科塞斯執(zhí)導(dǎo)的同名電影中的說法)的他是一名靠不正當(dāng)手段發(fā)家的投機(jī)者,從小散戶的身上騙走了2億美元——這一騙局也讓他在1999年入獄近兩年。但此后的貝爾福特東山再起,搖身一變,成了汽車經(jīng)銷和度假租賃等公司的勵志演講家和顧問,并以自己可以一眼辨認(rèn)出人群中哪些人能夠達(dá)成交易、哪些人只是渾水摸魚為榮。如今,誰可以比他更清楚在股市中浩浩蕩蕩的X世代(20世紀(jì)六七十年代生人)大筆抄底和網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)紀(jì)人扎堆推銷背后,是賺是虧呢?
最近,我收到了貝爾福特公關(guān)團(tuán)隊的電子郵件轟炸,就“Reddit大戰(zhàn)Robinhood”等問題發(fā)表了他的“專家意見”,于是趁機(jī)采訪了這名改過自新的罪犯。這位近乎瘋狂的證券奇才是將以Reddit為陣地的“散戶逼空”現(xiàn)象視為股票市場早該實現(xiàn)的民主化,還是認(rèn)為這只是與投資基本原理相悖的狂熱?此外,我還想知道在他看來,激起散戶熱情的“零傭金”產(chǎn)品是會賺還是賠——畢竟他是“知道如何在交易中真正能夠賺到錢的人”,他的觀點還是有參考價值的。
事實上,我只完成了“訂單返傭”(PFOF)的一部分——這是另外一位備受爭議的投資大鱷伯尼·麥道夫留給世人的東西。但令人驚訝的是,正是開創(chuàng)了這項具有爭議的系統(tǒng)的麥道夫,在“散戶起義”中被推上了風(fēng)口浪尖,并受到監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和美國國會的密切關(guān)注。龐氏騙局的“發(fā)明者”是第一個向中介經(jīng)紀(jì)人付費,讓他們把訂單再轉(zhuǎn)交給自己公司處理的莊家。
在此前的報道中,我曾經(jīng)提到道格·阿特金——他是第一個電子股票交易平臺極訊公司(Instinet)的前首席執(zhí)行官——在美國證券交易委員會(SEC)位于華盛頓特區(qū)的辦公室里與麥道夫產(chǎn)生的激烈沖突,爭論這種做法應(yīng)該被允許還是禁止。麥道夫吼道:“我只是想爭取更多的生意!”他爭辯道,為什么美國證券交易委員會要阻止他向經(jīng)紀(jì)人提供他們想要的錢?阿特金則說:“如果對投資者如此有利,為什么你的經(jīng)紀(jì)人要將其保密?”阿特金堅持認(rèn)為這種做法會欺騙小投資者,應(yīng)該被取締。那“華爾街之狼”對伯尼想要以此締造的商業(yè)帝國有何看法?
貝爾福特用最濃重的布朗克斯口音表達(dá)了他的看法——如果萊昂納多·迪卡普里奧在2013年的熱門電影中也模仿他的口音來演繹這位“華爾街之狼”,觀眾可能就需要字幕了。貝爾福特現(xiàn)在的言談風(fēng)格已然不像一名夸夸其談的推銷員,而是一位已經(jīng)看穿一切的股市前輩,并且對如何解決華爾街的問題有著自己的看法,態(tài)度鮮明。
小散戶們的危險
貝爾福特在長島創(chuàng)立了臭名昭著的Stratton Oakmont公司,并和他的經(jīng)紀(jì)人們謀劃了一系列股票投機(jī)計劃,將個體投資者們的家產(chǎn)吃干抹凈。經(jīng)紀(jì)人們會拋售低價股票,炒高其價值,等價格飛漲后收入自己囊中,然后在價格飆到頂峰后,將這些股票強賣給其他投資者。這種突然的大“拋售”通??梢园压善睅缀踬u空。但讓貝爾福特感到驚訝的是,散戶們聯(lián)手在Reddit上推高了GameStop和AMC之類的股票,使他的老把戲翻出了新花樣。他說:“他們正在集體推高這些股票的價格。但是他們沒有‘拋售’。我認(rèn)為不可能有那么多人能夠同時購進(jìn)股票,然后還可以在價格上漲時繼續(xù)持有。在買空賣空的投機(jī)交易中,一旦投資者把價值推高了,他們就會拋售。但這在散戶起義那里并沒有發(fā)生。”
恰恰相反,Reddit的散戶避開了傳統(tǒng)的投資規(guī)則——甚至是常規(guī)的投機(jī)倒把。他說:“他們的動機(jī)并不壞,不像老式的操盤手。他們真的相信這時候賣出是一種背叛行為。這就是原因,這些股票對他們來說是一種‘情懷股票’。他們對GameStop有一種情感上的依戀,因為他們都記得小時候看過GameStop的視頻游戲?!?/p>
他說,這次起義對華爾街而言,既是一股新勢力,又是一股反對勢力。貝爾福特指出:“這些小投資者對主流金融機(jī)構(gòu)憤怒已久,并且希望重新奪回屬于他們的金融領(lǐng)地。他們想表明自己也有發(fā)言權(quán)。比真金白銀更重要的是要有是非觀——因為當(dāng)股票上漲時他們不會兌現(xiàn)。通常,當(dāng)股票上漲時,人們會獲利,從而產(chǎn)生拋售壓力。我擔(dān)心小投資者們不能永遠(yuǎn)持有這些股票?!彼f,他們購買的許多股票都被高估了——投資新手對那些明明虧空嚴(yán)重的美國公司的忠誠度讓他瞠目結(jié)舌,并且根據(jù)華爾街分析師的看法,股市寒冬又將卷土重來。
比特幣的崛起
在貝爾福特看來,將讓Reddit散戶手中的寶貝股票暴跌的陰霾正在逼近。他說:“如果股價上漲太久,公司就會繼續(xù)發(fā)行股票。”公司能夠通過發(fā)行新股,或用溢價更高的股票來收購現(xiàn)有股票的方式達(dá)成這種交易。他注意到:“如果股票以400美元的價格出售,它的基本價值為200美元,則該公司有信托責(zé)任出售股票并套現(xiàn)。你不能指望股票永遠(yuǎn)上漲,而讓股票下跌的往往正是發(fā)行新股?!?/p>
貝爾福特認(rèn)為,最近美國人對比特幣的癡迷,部分原因在于年輕投資者相信大規(guī)模的投資熱潮可以讓比特幣這一“墮落天使”長時間保持高位?!叭藗儽槐忍貛艑檳牧?。”他說,“比特幣的供應(yīng)固定且有限,而至于股票,發(fā)行量可以是無限的?!必悹柛L乇硎?,比特幣更多是“純粹的供需關(guān)系”,不會因為公司發(fā)行新股而扭曲。這種加密貨幣不會面臨“股票之困”——即高價格往往會帶來更多的供應(yīng),將飆升打成低迷。
貝爾福特承認(rèn),他曾經(jīng)是比特幣的看跌者,但他錯了。他說:“2017年末,當(dāng)比特幣的價格達(dá)到1.9萬美元時,我在一個電視節(jié)目上告訴觀眾,它會崩潰。當(dāng)時我說的其實沒有錯,但我當(dāng)時也認(rèn)同比特幣會永遠(yuǎn)消失這一看法。賣不出去,卻很容易買進(jìn),所有這些都可以操縱?!必悹柛L禺?dāng)時的觀點是,監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)將禁止買賣比特幣?!氨忍貛趴雌饋硐袷峭昝赖南村X工具?!彼f,“我當(dāng)時以為,瑞士和開曼群島(均為避稅天堂——編注)的比特幣賬戶會暴露。我當(dāng)時還認(rèn)為,比特幣一開始會站穩(wěn)腳跟,緊接著被監(jiān)管趕出市場?!?/p>
但其實,貝爾福特從一開始就喜歡比特幣的“簡明的設(shè)計”,使其成為一種不會因發(fā)行量增加而貶值的貨幣。他現(xiàn)在相信,由于致命的監(jiān)管沖擊還未到來,這種情況就將持續(xù)下去?!艾F(xiàn)在比特幣的買家比以往任何時候都多。”貝爾福特說。他還認(rèn)為,比特幣的價格仍有很大的上漲空間,主要是因為它的固定供應(yīng)相對股票而言具有優(yōu)勢:新投資者將繼續(xù)推高價格,但能夠讓正處在上升期的股票縮水的“新股熱潮”不會在比特幣身上發(fā)生。他認(rèn)為,比特幣的價格將從目前的水平上漲80%,達(dá)到10萬美元。
不要落入“自由”交易的陷阱
貝爾福特完全同意伯克希爾-哈撒韋公司(Berkshire Hathaway)的查理·芒格的觀點,即散戶投資者從出售訂單流的、免傭金的在線經(jīng)紀(jì)商處得到的待遇并不公平。經(jīng)紀(jì)商們從線上散戶處獲取訂單,然后交易交給Citadel Securities、Jane Street和Virtu等大型高頻交易公司來執(zhí)行處理。貝爾福特認(rèn)為,與支付傭金相比,這種做法給客戶帶來的成本要高得多。經(jīng)紀(jì)商們會自己根據(jù)此前的交易記錄向做市商達(dá)成交易,以產(chǎn)生盡可能低的交易成本。他還懷疑,經(jīng)紀(jì)商把訂單賣給出價最高的買家。做市商支付給他們的錢越多,普通投資者的隱性成本就越高,而他們壓根不知道這一點。
“這可以堪稱最昂貴的‘自由貿(mào)易’?!必悹柛L卣f,“在這種所謂的‘自由交易’框架下,經(jīng)紀(jì)商們宣傳自己如何幫助‘小人物’,卻轉(zhuǎn)頭與‘大人物’攜手合作。這是對信任的一種背叛?!彼f,做市商之所以愿意為訂單流支付高價,是因為這給他們提供了一個了解市場走勢的獨家窗口。比如,當(dāng)公司看到大量的特斯拉(Tesla)訂單時,他們能夠用自己的賬戶購買特斯拉的股票,在下一波訂單到來之時,推高其給客戶提供的價格。“訂單流就是一切,告訴你市場的下一步走向。這相當(dāng)于給了高頻做市商一個‘預(yù)言’,讓小投資者處于巨大的信息劣勢。把所有的訂單流了如指掌,能夠向做市商提供公眾所不知道的信息。”
貝爾福特堅持認(rèn)為,小投資者不了解這種零傭金制度的真實成本?!八麄冎皇菃渭冎?,不用付傭金了。但他們不明白,經(jīng)紀(jì)商和做市商在交易中大肆得利?!彼f。貝爾福特從個人經(jīng)歷說起:“在Stratton Oakmont,傭金從來都不是重點。我們曾經(jīng)開玩笑說,傭金可以一直為零,因為我們幾乎所有的錢都是通過交易‘價差’賺來的。我對股票的市場走向從來都是了然于胸,如今處理GameStop指令的高頻交易員也是如此?!?/p>
貝爾福特指出,判斷價格走勢是交易員“撈錢”的兩種方式之一,另外一種則是盡可能接近“買入價”買進(jìn)股票,盡可能接近“賣出價”賣出股票,這樣做市商就能夠賺到很大的“價差”。假設(shè)XYZ股票的出價為50.00美元,要價為50.10美元。那就以50.00美元或接近這一價格買進(jìn),然后以盡可能接近50.10美元的價格賣出。中間地帶的差價就是賺到的錢?!必悹柛L卣f。
在他給出的例子中,如果做市商以50.01美元的價格買入XYZ,以50.09美元的價格賣出,就會產(chǎn)生8美分的巨額差價。但是,如果這家公司通過尋找愿意多花一點錢的買家來“處理訂單”,可以代表客戶以50.05美元的價格買進(jìn),以50.06美元的價格賣出,那么賣家就能夠多賺4美分,買家少花3美分,交易成本由8美分降為1美分?!敖灰讍T給出的定價取決于交易加價和較大價差的保持?!彼f,“除非你是特蕾莎修女,否則你肯定會落入這一誘惑當(dāng)中?!?/p>
貝爾福特說,總而言之,與支付傭金相比,普通投資者承擔(dān)了更多的總成本,而經(jīng)紀(jì)商們?yōu)樗麄冏约籂幦〉搅俗詈玫慕灰讬C(jī)會?!白鍪猩滩粦?yīng)該一邊為訂單流買單,一邊執(zhí)行散戶交易。”他表示,“這對小投資者來說很危險。”
最后,貝爾福特指出,在新冠疫情爆發(fā)前,他一直在全球各地發(fā)表勵志演講,現(xiàn)在他希望可以盡快“返崗”。在過去的一年里,他主要從事在線咨詢工作?!霸萍夹g(shù)讓創(chuàng)業(yè)成本降低,變得更加容易?!彼f,“我喜歡已經(jīng)做得很好的公司,但也希望有更多擴(kuò)張前景的公司?!?/p>
貝爾福特的網(wǎng)站上展示了對這位演講者的諸多敬意。迪卡普里奧寫道:“他賦予年輕企業(yè)家力量的能力,是雄心壯志、努力工作等種種變革性力量的光輝典范。”令人驚訝的是,貝爾福特很少為證券公司做咨詢。但是,他對這個他曾經(jīng)為之奮斗、一時成功、最終落入失敗的行業(yè)的洞察,是透視這個小人物和他所看到的種種新風(fēng)險的一個窗口。(財富中文網(wǎng))
編譯:陳聰聰、楊二一
作為風(fēng)云一時的股票大亨,喬丹·貝爾福特曾經(jīng)一度掌握了一種魔力,能夠精準(zhǔn)地讓普羅大眾對他推銷的股票趨之若鶩。自稱為“華爾街之狼”(根據(jù)他2011年的自傳和2013年馬丁·斯科塞斯執(zhí)導(dǎo)的同名電影中的說法)的他是一名靠不正當(dāng)手段發(fā)家的投機(jī)者,從小散戶的身上騙走了2億美元——這一騙局也讓他在1999年入獄近兩年。但此后的貝爾福特東山再起,搖身一變,成了汽車經(jīng)銷和度假租賃等公司的勵志演講家和顧問,并以自己可以一眼辨認(rèn)出人群中哪些人能夠達(dá)成交易、哪些人只是渾水摸魚為榮。如今,誰可以比他更清楚在股市中浩浩蕩蕩的X世代(20世紀(jì)六七十年代生人)大筆抄底和網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)紀(jì)人扎堆推銷背后,是賺是虧呢?
最近,我收到了貝爾福特公關(guān)團(tuán)隊的電子郵件轟炸,就“Reddit大戰(zhàn)Robinhood”等問題發(fā)表了他的“專家意見”,于是趁機(jī)采訪了這名改過自新的罪犯。這位近乎瘋狂的證券奇才是將以Reddit為陣地的“散戶逼空”現(xiàn)象視為股票市場早該實現(xiàn)的民主化,還是認(rèn)為這只是與投資基本原理相悖的狂熱?此外,我還想知道在他看來,激起散戶熱情的“零傭金”產(chǎn)品是會賺還是賠——畢竟他是“知道如何在交易中真正能夠賺到錢的人”,他的觀點還是有參考價值的。
事實上,我只完成了“訂單返傭”(PFOF)的一部分——這是另外一位備受爭議的投資大鱷伯尼·麥道夫留給世人的東西。但令人驚訝的是,正是開創(chuàng)了這項具有爭議的系統(tǒng)的麥道夫,在“散戶起義”中被推上了風(fēng)口浪尖,并受到監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和美國國會的密切關(guān)注。龐氏騙局的“發(fā)明者”是第一個向中介經(jīng)紀(jì)人付費,讓他們把訂單再轉(zhuǎn)交給自己公司處理的莊家。
在此前的報道中,我曾經(jīng)提到道格·阿特金——他是第一個電子股票交易平臺極訊公司(Instinet)的前首席執(zhí)行官——在美國證券交易委員會(SEC)位于華盛頓特區(qū)的辦公室里與麥道夫產(chǎn)生的激烈沖突,爭論這種做法應(yīng)該被允許還是禁止。麥道夫吼道:“我只是想爭取更多的生意!”他爭辯道,為什么美國證券交易委員會要阻止他向經(jīng)紀(jì)人提供他們想要的錢?阿特金則說:“如果對投資者如此有利,為什么你的經(jīng)紀(jì)人要將其保密?”阿特金堅持認(rèn)為這種做法會欺騙小投資者,應(yīng)該被取締。那“華爾街之狼”對伯尼想要以此締造的商業(yè)帝國有何看法?
貝爾福特用最濃重的布朗克斯口音表達(dá)了他的看法——如果萊昂納多·迪卡普里奧在2013年的熱門電影中也模仿他的口音來演繹這位“華爾街之狼”,觀眾可能就需要字幕了。貝爾福特現(xiàn)在的言談風(fēng)格已然不像一名夸夸其談的推銷員,而是一位已經(jīng)看穿一切的股市前輩,并且對如何解決華爾街的問題有著自己的看法,態(tài)度鮮明。
小散戶們的危險
貝爾福特在長島創(chuàng)立了臭名昭著的Stratton Oakmont公司,并和他的經(jīng)紀(jì)人們謀劃了一系列股票投機(jī)計劃,將個體投資者們的家產(chǎn)吃干抹凈。經(jīng)紀(jì)人們會拋售低價股票,炒高其價值,等價格飛漲后收入自己囊中,然后在價格飆到頂峰后,將這些股票強賣給其他投資者。這種突然的大“拋售”通??梢园压善睅缀踬u空。但讓貝爾福特感到驚訝的是,散戶們聯(lián)手在Reddit上推高了GameStop和AMC之類的股票,使他的老把戲翻出了新花樣。他說:“他們正在集體推高這些股票的價格。但是他們沒有‘拋售’。我認(rèn)為不可能有那么多人能夠同時購進(jìn)股票,然后還可以在價格上漲時繼續(xù)持有。在買空賣空的投機(jī)交易中,一旦投資者把價值推高了,他們就會拋售。但這在散戶起義那里并沒有發(fā)生?!?/p>
恰恰相反,Reddit的散戶避開了傳統(tǒng)的投資規(guī)則——甚至是常規(guī)的投機(jī)倒把。他說:“他們的動機(jī)并不壞,不像老式的操盤手。他們真的相信這時候賣出是一種背叛行為。這就是原因,這些股票對他們來說是一種‘情懷股票’。他們對GameStop有一種情感上的依戀,因為他們都記得小時候看過GameStop的視頻游戲。”
他說,這次起義對華爾街而言,既是一股新勢力,又是一股反對勢力。貝爾福特指出:“這些小投資者對主流金融機(jī)構(gòu)憤怒已久,并且希望重新奪回屬于他們的金融領(lǐng)地。他們想表明自己也有發(fā)言權(quán)。比真金白銀更重要的是要有是非觀——因為當(dāng)股票上漲時他們不會兌現(xiàn)。通常,當(dāng)股票上漲時,人們會獲利,從而產(chǎn)生拋售壓力。我擔(dān)心小投資者們不能永遠(yuǎn)持有這些股票?!彼f,他們購買的許多股票都被高估了——投資新手對那些明明虧空嚴(yán)重的美國公司的忠誠度讓他瞠目結(jié)舌,并且根據(jù)華爾街分析師的看法,股市寒冬又將卷土重來。
比特幣的崛起
在貝爾福特看來,將讓Reddit散戶手中的寶貝股票暴跌的陰霾正在逼近。他說:“如果股價上漲太久,公司就會繼續(xù)發(fā)行股票?!惫灸軌蛲ㄟ^發(fā)行新股,或用溢價更高的股票來收購現(xiàn)有股票的方式達(dá)成這種交易。他注意到:“如果股票以400美元的價格出售,它的基本價值為200美元,則該公司有信托責(zé)任出售股票并套現(xiàn)。你不能指望股票永遠(yuǎn)上漲,而讓股票下跌的往往正是發(fā)行新股。”
貝爾福特認(rèn)為,最近美國人對比特幣的癡迷,部分原因在于年輕投資者相信大規(guī)模的投資熱潮可以讓比特幣這一“墮落天使”長時間保持高位?!叭藗儽槐忍貛艑檳牧?。”他說,“比特幣的供應(yīng)固定且有限,而至于股票,發(fā)行量可以是無限的?!必悹柛L乇硎?,比特幣更多是“純粹的供需關(guān)系”,不會因為公司發(fā)行新股而扭曲。這種加密貨幣不會面臨“股票之困”——即高價格往往會帶來更多的供應(yīng),將飆升打成低迷。
貝爾福特承認(rèn),他曾經(jīng)是比特幣的看跌者,但他錯了。他說:“2017年末,當(dāng)比特幣的價格達(dá)到1.9萬美元時,我在一個電視節(jié)目上告訴觀眾,它會崩潰。當(dāng)時我說的其實沒有錯,但我當(dāng)時也認(rèn)同比特幣會永遠(yuǎn)消失這一看法。賣不出去,卻很容易買進(jìn),所有這些都可以操縱?!必悹柛L禺?dāng)時的觀點是,監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)將禁止買賣比特幣?!氨忍貛趴雌饋硐袷峭昝赖南村X工具?!彼f,“我當(dāng)時以為,瑞士和開曼群島(均為避稅天堂——編注)的比特幣賬戶會暴露。我當(dāng)時還認(rèn)為,比特幣一開始會站穩(wěn)腳跟,緊接著被監(jiān)管趕出市場?!?/p>
但其實,貝爾福特從一開始就喜歡比特幣的“簡明的設(shè)計”,使其成為一種不會因發(fā)行量增加而貶值的貨幣。他現(xiàn)在相信,由于致命的監(jiān)管沖擊還未到來,這種情況就將持續(xù)下去?!艾F(xiàn)在比特幣的買家比以往任何時候都多?!必悹柛L卣f。他還認(rèn)為,比特幣的價格仍有很大的上漲空間,主要是因為它的固定供應(yīng)相對股票而言具有優(yōu)勢:新投資者將繼續(xù)推高價格,但能夠讓正處在上升期的股票縮水的“新股熱潮”不會在比特幣身上發(fā)生。他認(rèn)為,比特幣的價格將從目前的水平上漲80%,達(dá)到10萬美元。
不要落入“自由”交易的陷阱
貝爾福特完全同意伯克希爾-哈撒韋公司(Berkshire Hathaway)的查理·芒格的觀點,即散戶投資者從出售訂單流的、免傭金的在線經(jīng)紀(jì)商處得到的待遇并不公平。經(jīng)紀(jì)商們從線上散戶處獲取訂單,然后交易交給Citadel Securities、Jane Street和Virtu等大型高頻交易公司來執(zhí)行處理。貝爾福特認(rèn)為,與支付傭金相比,這種做法給客戶帶來的成本要高得多。經(jīng)紀(jì)商們會自己根據(jù)此前的交易記錄向做市商達(dá)成交易,以產(chǎn)生盡可能低的交易成本。他還懷疑,經(jīng)紀(jì)商把訂單賣給出價最高的買家。做市商支付給他們的錢越多,普通投資者的隱性成本就越高,而他們壓根不知道這一點。
“這可以堪稱最昂貴的‘自由貿(mào)易’?!必悹柛L卣f,“在這種所謂的‘自由交易’框架下,經(jīng)紀(jì)商們宣傳自己如何幫助‘小人物’,卻轉(zhuǎn)頭與‘大人物’攜手合作。這是對信任的一種背叛。”他說,做市商之所以愿意為訂單流支付高價,是因為這給他們提供了一個了解市場走勢的獨家窗口。比如,當(dāng)公司看到大量的特斯拉(Tesla)訂單時,他們能夠用自己的賬戶購買特斯拉的股票,在下一波訂單到來之時,推高其給客戶提供的價格?!坝唵瘟骶褪且磺?,告訴你市場的下一步走向。這相當(dāng)于給了高頻做市商一個‘預(yù)言’,讓小投資者處于巨大的信息劣勢。把所有的訂單流了如指掌,能夠向做市商提供公眾所不知道的信息?!?/p>
貝爾福特堅持認(rèn)為,小投資者不了解這種零傭金制度的真實成本。“他們只是單純知道,不用付傭金了。但他們不明白,經(jīng)紀(jì)商和做市商在交易中大肆得利。”他說。貝爾福特從個人經(jīng)歷說起:“在Stratton Oakmont,傭金從來都不是重點。我們曾經(jīng)開玩笑說,傭金可以一直為零,因為我們幾乎所有的錢都是通過交易‘價差’賺來的。我對股票的市場走向從來都是了然于胸,如今處理GameStop指令的高頻交易員也是如此?!?/p>
貝爾福特指出,判斷價格走勢是交易員“撈錢”的兩種方式之一,另外一種則是盡可能接近“買入價”買進(jìn)股票,盡可能接近“賣出價”賣出股票,這樣做市商就能夠賺到很大的“價差”。假設(shè)XYZ股票的出價為50.00美元,要價為50.10美元。那就以50.00美元或接近這一價格買進(jìn),然后以盡可能接近50.10美元的價格賣出。中間地帶的差價就是賺到的錢。”貝爾福特說。
在他給出的例子中,如果做市商以50.01美元的價格買入XYZ,以50.09美元的價格賣出,就會產(chǎn)生8美分的巨額差價。但是,如果這家公司通過尋找愿意多花一點錢的買家來“處理訂單”,可以代表客戶以50.05美元的價格買進(jìn),以50.06美元的價格賣出,那么賣家就能夠多賺4美分,買家少花3美分,交易成本由8美分降為1美分。“交易員給出的定價取決于交易加價和較大價差的保持?!彼f,“除非你是特蕾莎修女,否則你肯定會落入這一誘惑當(dāng)中。”
貝爾福特說,總而言之,與支付傭金相比,普通投資者承擔(dān)了更多的總成本,而經(jīng)紀(jì)商們?yōu)樗麄冏约籂幦〉搅俗詈玫慕灰讬C(jī)會?!白鍪猩滩粦?yīng)該一邊為訂單流買單,一邊執(zhí)行散戶交易?!彼硎?,“這對小投資者來說很危險。”
最后,貝爾福特指出,在新冠疫情爆發(fā)前,他一直在全球各地發(fā)表勵志演講,現(xiàn)在他希望可以盡快“返崗”。在過去的一年里,他主要從事在線咨詢工作?!霸萍夹g(shù)讓創(chuàng)業(yè)成本降低,變得更加容易?!彼f,“我喜歡已經(jīng)做得很好的公司,但也希望有更多擴(kuò)張前景的公司?!?/p>
貝爾福特的網(wǎng)站上展示了對這位演講者的諸多敬意。迪卡普里奧寫道:“他賦予年輕企業(yè)家力量的能力,是雄心壯志、努力工作等種種變革性力量的光輝典范?!绷钊梭@訝的是,貝爾福特很少為證券公司做咨詢。但是,他對這個他曾經(jīng)為之奮斗、一時成功、最終落入失敗的行業(yè)的洞察,是透視這個小人物和他所看到的種種新風(fēng)險的一個窗口。(財富中文網(wǎng))
編譯:陳聰聰、楊二一
Jordan Belfort always knew how to push the hot buttons that got regular folks to crave what he was selling—in the old days, as a maestro of penny stocks. The self-proclaimed “The Wolf of Wall Street” (from his 2011 book and the 2013 Martin Scorsese movie of the same name) was a boiler-room impresario. He fleeced small investors out of $200 million, a scam that in 1999 landed him in prison for nearly two years. But Belfort reinvented himself as a motivational speaker and consultant to the likes of car dealerships and vacation rental outfits, and he takes pride in being able to discern the real deal from the crowd-pleasers and con jobs. Who better than Belfort to opine on whether hordes of Gen Xers teaming to buy beaten-down stocks and online brokers selling order flow are good or bad for the little guy?
When I recently received a blast email from a PR firm representing Belfort, offering his "expert opinion" on such issues as "Reddit vs. Robinhood," I leaped at the opportunity to interview the reformed huckster. Does this past master of starting crazes see the Reddit phenomenon as a long-overdue democratization of the stock market, or a frenzy detached from the fundamentals of investing? I also wanted to get his view—as someone who knows how the money is really made in trading—on whether the “zero-commissions” offering that rallied the retail crowd is a boon or a rip-off.
After all, I'd just done a piece on PFOF (payment for order flow) detailing the legacy of another flimflammer, Bernie Madoff. Amazingly, it was Madoff who launched the controversial system that the Reddit revolution brought front and center for regulators and Congress: payment for order flow. The future Ponzi schemer was the first market maker to pay brokers for routing their orders to his firm for processing.
In that story, I relate that Doug Atkin, former CEO of Instinet, the first electronic equity trading platform, got into a screaming match with Madoff in the SEC's Washington, D.C. offices over whether the practice should be allowed or barred. Madoff bellowed, "I'm just trying to get more business!" Why should the SEC stop me from giving brokers the cash they want, he argued. Atkin riposted, "If it's so great for investors, why are your brokers keeping it a secret?" Atkin maintained, and still believes, that the practice bilks small investors and should be outlawed. What does the Wolf think of the edifice crooked Bernie helped build?
Belfort delivered his ideas in the thickest of thick Bronx accents. If Leonardo DiCaprio, his portrayer, had tried to imitate Belfort's patois in the 2013 hit The Wolf of Wall Street, he might have needed subtitles. Belfort now talks less like a flamboyant promoter than a former trader who's seen it all and harbors strong views on how to fix what's gone wrong on Wall Street.
Dangerous for small investors
At Stratton Oakmont, the notorious Long Island boiler room he founded, Belfort and his brokers robbed mom-and-pop clients by orchestrating "pump and dump" schemes. Brokers would tout penny stocks to inflate their value, buying for their own account as prices soared, then foisting the shares on their investors at the peak. That big, sudden "dump" often sent stocks to near zero. Belfort is amazed that the folks joining hands to boost such names as GameStop and AMC on Reddit are turning the practice on its head. "They're collectively pumping up these stocks," he says. "But there's no ‘dump.’ I didn't think it was possible to get that many people to buy a stock effectively together, then keep holding it when the price goes way up. In pump and dump, once investors raise the value, they dump. That's not happening."
Instead, he says, the Reddit crowd eschews the traditional rules of investing—even the regular course of pump and dump. "Their motivations aren't evil, as in old-fashioned manipulation," he says. "They really believe that selling is betraying the cause. And it is a cause. It's ‘story stocks’ on steroids. They have an emotional attachment to GameStop because they remember watching its video games as kids."
The crusade, he says, is both new to Wall Street and anti–Wall Street. "These small investors are seething with anger at mainstream financial institutions and want to get back at them," says Belfort. "They want to show that they have a voice too. It's more about being right than the actual money, because they don't cash out when the stocks go up. Usually, when a stock goes up, people take profits, creating selling pressure. My fear is that the little guy can't hold these stocks up forever." Many of the stocks they're buying, he says, are greatly overvalued. He's mystified by young investors' loyalty to American names that are heavily shorted and, according to Wall Street analysts, harbor the poorest prospects of a comeback.
Bitcoin’s rise
For Belfort, the shock that will send the Reddit crowd's pet stocks tumbling is looming dilution. "If a stock stays up too long, the company keeps printing shares," he says. That gambit can take the form of new offerings or using an overpriced stock to overpay for acquisitions. "If a stock is selling at $400, and its underlying value is $200, the company has a fiduciary responsibility to sell shares and put cash in its coffers," he observes. "You can't pump up a stock forever, and often what sends it down is issuing all those new shares."
America's new infatuation with Bitcoin, Belfort reckons, is partly to blame for the young investors' apparent belief that a mass rush can keep fallen angels elevated for a long time. "People are spoiled by Bitcoin," he says. "Bitcoin has a fixed, finite supply. With stocks, you have an infinite number of shares that can be issued." Bitcoin, he says, is more about "pure supply and demand," free from the distortion of effectively printing more of your own corporate currency. The flagship cryptocurrency doesn't have the equities' problem that high prices tend to bring on more supply, turning the surge into a swoon.
Belfort admits to being a super bear in Bitcoin in the past, and to being wrong. "When it was hitting $19,000 in late 2017, I was on a TV show, and I told the audience that it would crash," he says. "I was right then, but I also thought Bitcoin would go away forever. It was hard to sell and easy to buy, all the things that make for manipulation." His view was that regulators would nix the coins. "Bitcoin looked like the perfect storm for money laundering," he says. "I thought that Bitcoin accounts in Switzerland and the Caymans would be exposed. I thought Bitcoin would initially take hold, then be regulated out of business."
From the start, however, Belfort liked Bitcoin for "its elegant design" as a currency whose value couldn't be eroded by issuing more of it. He now believes it's here to stay since a fatal regulatory onslaught hasn't happened. "Bitcoin now has a much bigger base of buyers than ever before," he says. Its price has plenty of room to run, says Belfort, principally because its fixed supply provides an advantage over stocks: New investors will keep pumping the price, but the rush of new shares that deflates a soaring stock can't happen. He sees the flagship cryptocurrency rising 80% from current levels to $100,000.
Don’t fall for “free” trades
Belfort agrees wholeheartedly with Charlie Munger of Berkshire Hathaway that retail investors get a raw deal from commission-free online brokers that sell their order flow. The practice consists of brokers' getting orders online from retail clients, and handing the trades to giant high-frequency trading houses such as Citadel Securities, Jane Street, and Virtu to execute the trades. Belfort insists that the practice is costing customers a lot more than if they paid commissions, and the brokers themselves paid market makers according to their records in generating the lowest possible trading costs. Instead, he suspects that the brokers are selling their orders to the highest bidders, and that the more a market maker pays them, the higher the hidden cost to the Main Street investors. Only the little guy doesn't see it.
"It's the most expensive 'free trade' you can have," says Belfort. "I saw a a marketing demo from one of the big 'free trades' players advertising how they were 'helping the little guy,' and they're hand in hand with the big guys. It was like a betrayal of trust." He says that market makers pay so much for order flow because it gives them an exclusive window into where the market is moving. When firms see tons of orders coming in for Tesla, they can purchase shares for their own account, pushing up the EV-maker's prices for their clients when the next flood of orders arrives. "Order flow is everything," he says. "It tells you where the market is going next. It gives the high-frequency market makers a crystal ball and puts the small investor at a big information disadvantage. Seeing all that order flow gives a market maker information that the public doesn't have."
He insists that small investors don't understand the true costs of the commission-free regime. "They think it's all about not paying commissions, but they don't understand that the brokers and market makers are killing it on trading," he says. Belfort speaks from personal experience. "At Stratton Oakmont, it was never about commissions. We used to joke that commissions kept the lights on. We made almost all our money on the trading 'spreads.' There was never a time when I didn't know where the market in our stocks was going. It's the same with the high-frequency traders today handling GameStop orders."
Gauging the direction of prices is one of two ways traders clean up, he noted. The other is buying shares as close as possible to the "bid," and selling as close as possible to the "ask," so that the market maker pockets a big "spread." "Say XYZ stock has a bid of $50.00 and an ask of $50.10. The game is to buy at $50.00 or close to it, and sell as close to $50.10 as possible. The money is made in that middle ground," says Belfort.
In his example, if the market maker buys XYZ at $50.01 and sells at $50.09, it makes a fat, 8¢ spread. But if the firm "worked the order" by seeking buyers willing to pay a bit more, it could purchase for on behalf of its client at $50.05, and sell at $50.06. The seller gets 4¢ more, the buyer gets 3¢ off, and the trade costs the little guy just 1¢ instead of 8¢. "Traders' compensation depends on marking up trades and keeping wide spreads," he says. "You'd have to be Mother Teresa not to fall for that temptation."
All told, says Belfort, Main Street investors is shouldering more in total costs than if they paid commissions, and the brokers got them the best possible deal on trades. "Market makers shouldn't be paying for order flow and executing retail trades at the same time," he says. "That's dangerous for small investors."
In closing, Belfort said that he'd been circling the globe giving motivational speeches before the COVID lockdown hit and hopes to get back on the road soon. For the past year, he's been working mainly as an online consultant. "The cloud has made it so much easier to start a business cheaply," he declares. "I like companies already doing well, but also want to scale rapidly."
Belfort's website displays a tribute from the performer who immortalized him. "His ability to empower young entrepreneurs is a shining example of the transformative powers of ambition and hard work," writes DiCaprio. Surprisingly, Belfort seldom consults for securities firms. But his insight into the business where he hustled, thrived, and crashed is a primer in recognizing the new and lingering dangers facing the little guy.