今年7月，德意志銀行砍掉了全球股票交易業(yè)務(wù)并同時裁員約五分之一，消息一出，整個銀行界深受震動。

就這家陷入困境的德國銀行巨頭根深蒂固的問題而言，此番業(yè)務(wù)縮減的巨大幅度實屬罕見。但實際情況是，面對富有魅力的交易業(yè)務(wù)，越來越多的大銀行都開始發(fā)現(xiàn)無法從中盈利，進而相應(yīng)地壓縮規(guī)模。

一個很好的例證就是，上周彭博報道稱，花旗集團正準備在交易部門裁員數(shù)百人，其中股票交易業(yè)務(wù)至少將砍掉100個職位。而今年上半年，花旗的股票交易收入同比下降了17%。其他銀行也在近幾個月采取了類似措施——今年4月，總部設(shè)在巴黎的法國興業(yè)銀行宣布在交易部門裁員1200人。

總體而言，主要投資銀行都在竭盡全力地削減成本，無論是年初高盛壓縮曾經(jīng)引以為傲的大宗商品交易業(yè)務(wù)，還是巴克萊在今年第二季度“全面”裁員3000人。

最受傷的看來是交易員，一系列因素削弱了大銀行在股票和固定收益產(chǎn)品領(lǐng)域里的競爭能力，讓他們成了受害者。原因有哪些呢？一是自動化，另外還有更小、更靈活的華爾街機構(gòu)帶來的激烈競爭，包括那些不受大衰退后銀行資本金要求約束的非銀行實體。

“人員變少”

毫無疑問，股票和債券交易“電子化”降低了交易部門的人員需求。雖然衍生產(chǎn)品和高收益信貸等領(lǐng)域仍然經(jīng)常需要人力互動，但傳統(tǒng)的股票和固定收益現(xiàn)金交易正在越來越自動化。

投資銀行Sandler O’Neill的銀行板塊分析師杰夫·哈特說：“我們看到的是人類交易員需求的下降以及部分業(yè)務(wù)的整合?！?/p>

哈特指的是花旗決定將股票、主經(jīng)紀商以及證券服務(wù)業(yè)務(wù)整合成一個部門，這是它“為提高交易業(yè)務(wù)效率所采取措施”的一部分，而這“將使員工數(shù)量全面下降”。

他還說，面對壓低利潤率的不利因素，花旗等現(xiàn)在開始裁減交易員的銀行普遍“反應(yīng)遲緩”，而且這樣的趨勢只會延續(xù)下去，“我覺得華爾街的交易員數(shù)量將持續(xù)減少。”

對花旗來說，這樣做尤其痛苦，原因是近年來該行下了很大力氣來建設(shè)自己的交易業(yè)務(wù)，并將業(yè)務(wù)范圍擴展到了為自己爭得很大一部分聲譽的消費者零售產(chǎn)品以外。同時，盡管花旗表現(xiàn)強勁的消費業(yè)務(wù)確實緩和了投行業(yè)受到挑戰(zhàn)的沖擊，但壓縮交易部門規(guī)模依然表明就連最大的銀行如今也覺得步履維艱。

金融服務(wù)咨詢公司W(wǎng)halen Global Advisors的董事長克里斯托弗·惠倫曾經(jīng)在貝爾斯登從事投行業(yè)務(wù)，他認為和摩根大通、摩根士丹利和高盛等股市重磅選手相比，花旗、德意志銀行等公司已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)自己屬于“二流”選手。

惠倫指出：“現(xiàn)在的局面和我剛?cè)胄袝r相比已經(jīng)發(fā)生了變化，現(xiàn)金[交易]已經(jīng)很難做了。衍生產(chǎn)品的情況不一樣，但現(xiàn)金股票和現(xiàn)金債券——不行了。”他還說，較小的精品投行的業(yè)務(wù)模式更傾向于以傭金為導向，“有什么就吃什么，大公司則仍然采取基于工資和獎金的策略，但這確實已經(jīng)行不通了?！?/p>

花旗等銀行把精力集中在消費銀行等領(lǐng)域反而更好，就連高盛這樣傳統(tǒng)上以投行為主的公司也在越來越多的發(fā)展此類業(yè)務(wù)。

惠倫說：“看看花旗的業(yè)績就會發(fā)現(xiàn)，消費[銀行]是他們最有價值的部門，而且比其他業(yè)務(wù)有價值得多。如果要在消費[銀行]和資本市場之間進行選擇，你一定會選前者，它要穩(wěn)定的多。在資本市場上，你把人放在那兒，然后期待他們能夠賺到錢。所有的二線[交易]機構(gòu)都被干掉了?！?/p>

環(huán)境已變

總的來說，現(xiàn)在銀行發(fā)現(xiàn)在大衰退至今的10年里，自己所處的競爭環(huán)境已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)了巨大變化。私募公司和債務(wù)基金等非銀行實體掌握了規(guī)?？涨暗馁Y產(chǎn)，而且不受銀行的資本金要求約束——資產(chǎn)負債表已經(jīng)不像以前那么強健，銀行也發(fā)現(xiàn)自己無法再像以前那樣參與到那些高風險、高收益的市場中。

資本市場咨詢機構(gòu)MRV Associates的負責人維拉·羅德里格斯·瓦拉達雷斯認為：“黑石和Citadel這樣的非銀行機構(gòu)不受銀行資本金要求限制；它們更靈活，可以雇傭許多人，還能夠從事風險較大的業(yè)務(wù)?！?/p>

哈特持同樣觀點，他還指出，如今銀行基于自身交易倉位所需要持有的資金數(shù)額“絕對已經(jīng)改變了這個行業(yè)。你已經(jīng)無法像危機前那樣加那么多的杠桿?！?/p>

哈特認為，這一點，再加上投資者的風險偏好遠未回到危機前的水平，迫使銀行做出相應(yīng)調(diào)整。同時，雖然壓縮交易業(yè)務(wù)規(guī)?？赡転樗鼈児?jié)省短期成本，但考慮到這個市場是發(fā)展客戶關(guān)系并開展其他“較高利潤率”業(yè)務(wù)的非常關(guān)鍵的渠道，長期而言它們可能為此付出沉重代價。

哈特指出：“對其他許多投行業(yè)務(wù)來說交易部門都很重要。如果像德意志銀行那樣放棄美國股市交易，在下一個大型IPO中擔任主承銷商的難度就會顯著上升，因為你不再交易股票了。這樣的決定會影響到其他收入?！?/p>

當前壓縮交易業(yè)務(wù)的趨勢是謹慎的財務(wù)決定，還是一項長期機會成本呢？時間會給我們答案。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：Charlie

審校：夏林

The news last month that Deutsche Bank was axing its global equities trading operations—and cutting roughly one-fifth of its total workforce in the process—shook the banking world to its core.

Yes, the sheer extent of Deutsche’s cutbacks may be unique to the beleaguered German giant’s deep-seated issues. But the reality is that when it comes to the glamorous world of trading, more and more big banks are finding it an unprofitable proposition—and scaling back accordingly.

Case in point: last week’s revelation that Citigroup is bracing to cut hundreds of jobs across its trading division, including at least 100 positions in its equities-trading unit, according to Bloomberg. That comes as Citi's equities trading revenues declined 17% year-on-year through the first six months of 2019. Other banks have taken similar measures in recent months; Paris-based Société Générale announced 1,200 layoffs in the division that houses its trading activities in April.

And more broadly, major investment banks are doing whatever necessary to cut costs, whether it’s Goldman Sachs pulling back at its once-vaunted commodities trading desk earlier this year, or Barclays laying off 3,000 employees “across the board” in the second quarter.

Yet it is traders that seem to be paying the steepest price, having fallen victim to a confluence of factors that have hurt big banks’ ability to compete in the world of equities and fixed-income products. Among the culprits? Automation, but also fierce competition from smaller, more nimble players on Wall Street—including non-bank entities that don’t have the capital requirement regulations imposed on banks following the Great Recession.

“Fewer heads”

Without a doubt, the “electronification” of stock and bond trading has lessened the need for headcount at trading desks. While products like derivatives and high-yield credit still often require the need for human interaction, traditional cash equities and fixed-income trading has become an increasingly automated proposition.

“What we’re seeing is less need for human traders, and we’re also seeing some businesses be consolidated,” according to Sandler O’Neill anaylst Jeff Harte, who covers the banking sector.

Harte points to Citi’s decision to consolidate its equities, prime brokerage and securities services units into one division as part of an “ongoing effort to make trading businesses more efficient,” and one that is “l(fā)eading to a general decline in heads.”

He adds that Citi and other banks that are now reducing their trader counts have generally been “slow to the punch” in addressing headwinds that have impacted their profit margins—and only expects the trend to continue. “I think we’ll keep seeing trader counts ratchet their way down across Wall Street,” Harte says.

For Citi, it is a particularly painful development given the extent to which the bank has sought to build up its trading business in recent years, extending its reach beyond the consumer-facing retail offerings that give it much of its name recognition. And though Citi’s robust consumer business does soften the blow when it comes to a challenged investment banking sector, the pullback in its trading operations is a testament to how hard even the largest banks are finding things these days.

Compared to equities heavyweights like JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, the likes of Citi and formerly Deutsche Bank have found themselves “second-tier players,” according to Christopher Whalen, a former Bear Stearns banker and chairman of financial services consultancy Whalen Global Advisors.

“It’s a different world than when I first got into the business, and it’s hard to get people to do this cash [trading] stuff,” Whalen notes. “Derivatives are different, but cash stocks and cash bonds—no.” He adds that while smaller, boutique investment banking players have a more commission-oriented, “eat what you kill” approach to the business, “the big shops still have this strategy of salaries and bonuses, and you just can’t do that anymore.”

Instead, the likes of Citi are better off focusing on segments like consumer banking, which even traditionally investment banking-focused players like Goldman Sachs increasingly getting into.

“If you look at what Citi’s got, consumer [banking] is far and away the most valuable part of their book,” Whalen says. "If you have a choice between consumer [banking] and capital markets, you’re going to do the former—it’s much more stable. With capital markets, you put people at desks and hope they make money. All of the second-tier [trading] players are getting culled.”

A changed environment

In general, the banks now find themselves competing in an environment that has changed drastically in the decade since the Great Recession. With non-banking entities like private equity firms and debt funds now holding an unprecedented amount of assets—and those players not subject to the same capital requirement regulations that banks are—balance sheets aren’t as robust as they once were and banks find themselves unable to play in the same high-risk, high-reward markets that they once were.

“The non-banks like Blackstone and Citadel, they don’t have the capital requirements that the banks do; they’re more nimble, they can hire a lot of people and take on riskier transactions,” according to Mayra Rodriguez Valladares, managing principal at capital markets consultancy MRV Associates.

Harte echoed that sentiment, adding that the amount of capital that banks now have to hold against many of their trading positions “has definitely changed the industry. You can’t lever up as much as you could pre-crisis.”

That, coupled with investor risk-appetites that Harte says have yet to return anywhere near pre-recession levels, have forced the banks to adjust accordingly. And while they may be saving money in the near-term by scaling down their trading operations, it could costly them dearly in the long-term—given how the market is a vital gateway toward developing client relationships and procuring other, “higher-margin” business.

“Having a trading desk is important to a lot of other investment banking businesses,” Harte notes. “If you were to exit U.S. equities trading like Deutsche Bank did, it’s going to be a lot harder to be the lead underwriter on the next big IPO if you’re not trading stocks. Other revenues are impacted by these decisions.”

Only time will tell if the current trend of trading austerity proves a prudent financial decision, or a long-term opportunity cost.