“僵尸銀行”成歐洲最新經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激行動(dòng)中的定時(shí)炸彈
????歐洲銀行為這些做好準(zhǔn)備了嗎? ????有些銀行準(zhǔn)備好了,但很多銀行并沒(méi)有。它們?nèi)耘f有數(shù)十億歐元的未確認(rèn)損失在蠶食它們的資本金。這是銀行不進(jìn)行放貸的真實(shí)原因——它們沒(méi)法放貸。試圖通過(guò)設(shè)置阻礙迫使它們這么做,看來(lái)不會(huì)起多大作用。如果有什么作用的話(huà),可能也事與愿違,因?yàn)檫@會(huì)暴露這些僵尸銀行。沒(méi)有比銀行紛紛倒閉更能打擊市場(chǎng)信心的事了。 ????歐洲央行是否會(huì)袖手旁觀,看著這些銀行倒閉,這一點(diǎn)令人懷疑;歐洲央行隨時(shí)可以收回這些政策。但所有這些都凸顯了,讓歐洲走回經(jīng)濟(jì)真正復(fù)蘇的正軌有多么困難。 ????如果歐洲央行真的想讓歐洲經(jīng)濟(jì)繼續(xù)發(fā)展,它應(yīng)當(dāng)從下而上,逐步實(shí)施。第一步是僵尸銀行資本重整。向這些機(jī)構(gòu)短期借貸現(xiàn)金并不解決問(wèn)題——它們需要股本。這意味著這些銀行實(shí)際上切實(shí)承認(rèn)它們多年來(lái)承擔(dān)的損失,以便能在公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)籌集股本。它們不能在公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)上籌集的資本,不論是多少,都可以從歐洲央行或一些國(guó)家政府獲得,也許是德國(guó)(無(wú)所謂)。 ????這并不是什么經(jīng)濟(jì)火箭科學(xué)。這就是美國(guó)政府在信貸危機(jī)之后為美國(guó)的銀行系統(tǒng)所做的事情。這項(xiàng)問(wèn)題資產(chǎn)救助計(jì)劃(TARP)最終成功地讓銀行回到了起點(diǎn),讓它們有時(shí)間愈合傷口,并從內(nèi)部開(kāi)始再次進(jìn)行放貸。最終,美國(guó)政府將手頭持有的銀行股份賣(mài)給公眾(且大多盈利)。雖然需要幾年的時(shí)間來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn),但它們最終還是實(shí)現(xiàn)了。如今,美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率是歐元區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率的4倍。 ????但我們?cè)谶@里也要為德拉吉說(shuō)幾句。在欠缺某種銀行聯(lián)盟的情況下要實(shí)施這樣的計(jì)劃很困難,歐洲政界一些人近兩年來(lái)一直在拖后腿。不幸的是,除非出現(xiàn)危機(jī),政客們很少會(huì)采取行動(dòng)。歐洲央行的新放貸計(jì)劃可能給了他們采取行動(dòng)所需要的一個(gè)危機(jī)契機(jī)。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)) ????譯者:早稻米 |
????Are European banks ready for this? ????Some are, but many are not. They still have billions of euros in unrecognized losses sucking up all their capital. That’s the real reason why banks aren’t lending — they can’t. Trying to force them to do so by creating disincentives doesn’t seem like it is going to do much. If anything, it could backfire as it would expose the zombies. Nothing kills confidence like a rash of bank failures. ????It is doubtful the ECB will stand by and watch banks collapse; it can pull these policies at any time. But all this highlights just how difficult it has become to get Europe back on the road to real economic recovery. ????If the ECB really wants to get the economy going, it needs to start from the bottom and build its way back up. The first step would be to recapitalize its zombie banks. Lending cash to these institutions on a short-term basis just isn’t cutting it–they need equity. That means allowing the banks to actually recognize the losses they have carried for years so that they can raise equity on the open markets. Whatever capital the banks can’t raise in the open markets, they could receive from the ECB or some national government, perhaps Germany (it doesn’t matter). ????This isn’t economic rocket science. It’s what the U.S. government did with its banks following the credit crisis. This policy (TARP) successfully reset the banks back to zero, giving them time to lick their wounds and organically start lending again. Eventually, the government sold their stakes in the banks back to the public (mostly at a profit), but it took several years to get there–but they got there. Now the U.S. has a growth rate that is three times greater than that of the eurozone. ????In Draghi’s defense, it would be difficult to implement such a plan without some sort of banking union, something European politicians have been dragging their feet on for nearly two years. Unfortunately, politicians seldom act unless there is a crisis. The ECB’s new lending plan might just give them the crisis they need to get in gear. |