????美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的整個(gè)復(fù)蘇過程中，我們看著經(jīng)濟(jì)數(shù)據(jù)不斷地創(chuàng)下新高或者新低。全球金融危機(jī)以來(lái)，美國(guó)實(shí)際GDP同比增長(zhǎng)率最高接近5%，最低為零。我認(rèn)為，今后幾年美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)仍將緩慢復(fù)蘇，震蕩前行。原因何在？四個(gè)字：去杠桿化。

????目前美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)中的去杠桿化規(guī)模為大蕭條以來(lái)所未見。大蕭條期間，美國(guó)的總債務(wù)是GDP的300%。在接下來(lái)的20年里，這個(gè)數(shù)字曾一路下探到150%，隨后在20世紀(jì)50年代初才開始再次上升。

????大蕭條期間，和去杠桿化相伴的是居民壓縮開支，通貨膨脹和政府的刺激措施。居民支出下降的原因是儲(chǔ)蓄率上升以及20世紀(jì)30年代人們只能部分償還債務(wù)或者逃債，戰(zhàn)時(shí)配給制則在20世紀(jì)40年產(chǎn)生了同樣的影響。此外，廢除金本位制有助于提高物價(jià)，進(jìn)而降低了美國(guó)債務(wù)的實(shí)際價(jià)值。最后，羅斯福新政的各項(xiàng)措施和二戰(zhàn)期間的大規(guī)模動(dòng)員帶來(lái)了政府支出，為保持GDP總量正增長(zhǎng)做出了貢獻(xiàn)。

????現(xiàn)在我們所經(jīng)歷的去杠桿化遠(yuǎn)好于大蕭條時(shí)期經(jīng)濟(jì)的劇烈波動(dòng)。大蕭條以來(lái)，大多數(shù)去杠桿化都發(fā)生在個(gè)人領(lǐng)域，而且以按揭貸款（它占美國(guó)GDP的比例從2008年的73%降到了目前的55%）為主；整個(gè)美國(guó)金融業(yè)也在去杠桿化（金融業(yè)債務(wù)占美國(guó)GDP 的比例從2008年的118%降到了現(xiàn)在的82%）。

????與之相反，美國(guó)聯(lián)邦政府通過提高負(fù)債率（其債務(wù)占美國(guó)GDP的比例從2008年的72%升至目前的102%）來(lái)抵消居民和金融業(yè)借貸的萎縮。和全球金融危機(jī)時(shí)的水平相比，其他主要債務(wù)來(lái)源（非金融公司、州政府和其他地方政府、消費(fèi)信貸以及對(duì)外借款）基本上都保持不變。所以，整體而言美國(guó)債務(wù)/GDP比例到目前為止的降幅一直比較小，只是從2008年的409%降到了現(xiàn)在的392%。

????不過，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢(shì)越來(lái)越好，特別是和歐洲以及日本相比，原因是美國(guó)一直盡可能地讓緊縮、通脹和違約處于平衡狀態(tài)，同時(shí)一直讓名義GDP增長(zhǎng)率高于經(jīng)濟(jì)中的普通利率。名義GDP增速高于平均利率是把握好去杠桿化進(jìn)程的前提條件，也是美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)雖起伏不定但一直好于許多同類工業(yè)化國(guó)家的原因之一。舉例來(lái)說，近年來(lái)歐洲GDP增長(zhǎng)率不斷下降，但在許多時(shí)候，歐洲的基準(zhǔn)貸款利率都處于上升狀態(tài)。這就造成2008年以來(lái)，歐洲許多地區(qū)的債務(wù)/GDP比例實(shí)際上一直在持續(xù)攀升。20世紀(jì)90年代初至今，盡管日本的利率在發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家里處于最低水平，但它的債務(wù)/GDP比例依然在不斷上揚(yáng)。出現(xiàn)這種局面的原因是，通縮造成日本的名義GDP增長(zhǎng)率甚至趕不上已經(jīng)極低的利率。

????歐洲經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)低迷的部分原因是貨幣政策和財(cái)政政策脫節(jié)。馬斯特里赫特條約（Maastricht Treaty）限制了歐洲的聯(lián)邦預(yù)算赤字；財(cái)政部門未能實(shí)現(xiàn)一體化則造成貨幣政策（特別是量化寬松政策）難以管理。最近歐洲方面表示，如有必要，將采取更為寬松的政策。為歐洲（和美國(guó)）的利益著想，但愿他們能言出必行。

????金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)以來(lái)，債臺(tái)高筑的日本也一直在采取錯(cuò)誤的應(yīng)對(duì)政策。雖然日本擁有和美國(guó)一樣（但跟歐洲不同）的貨幣和財(cái)政政策工具，但在20世紀(jì)90年代初，也就是日本陷入危機(jī)后的最初幾年，總的來(lái)說日本政府在予以應(yīng)對(duì)時(shí)缺乏緊迫感。他們采取的政策就好像日本經(jīng)濟(jì)是在經(jīng)歷一場(chǎng)普通的周期性衰退，其實(shí)真是大錯(cuò)特錯(cuò)。多年來(lái)，日本經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率一直低于平均水平。隨后，“安倍經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)”——首相安倍晉三為激活日本經(jīng)濟(jì)而采取三管齊下的措施——可能成為日本經(jīng)濟(jì)的轉(zhuǎn)折點(diǎn)。時(shí)間會(huì)告訴我們，這些大膽的政策能否讓日本經(jīng)濟(jì)重新實(shí)現(xiàn)持續(xù)增長(zhǎng)，并最終讓日本的經(jīng)濟(jì)增速超過利率。

????那么，我們是不是就可以完全無(wú)視經(jīng)濟(jì)數(shù)據(jù)呢？當(dāng)然不能。我們只需要做好準(zhǔn)備來(lái)繼續(xù)迎接那些看起來(lái)不是那么糟糕或者不是那么強(qiáng)勁的經(jīng)濟(jì)數(shù)據(jù)。不要因?yàn)槟硞€(gè)月或者某個(gè)季度經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)較差而坐立不安。我們中的大多數(shù)人在自己的職業(yè)生涯中都越來(lái)越熟悉經(jīng)濟(jì)周期，但當(dāng)前我們所處的環(huán)境和前者不同。雖然短期內(nèi)不太可能實(shí)現(xiàn)高增長(zhǎng)，但我們確信，政策也不太可能造成經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退。只要不出現(xiàn)某些外部沖擊，今后幾年我們就有可能繼續(xù)蹣跚前行。感謝我們的決策者，特別是美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)（Federal Reserve），他們準(zhǔn)確地找到了美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的毛病，而且正在盡自己的最大努力來(lái)適應(yīng)當(dāng)前這個(gè)去杠桿化階段。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

????本文作者是達(dá)拉斯咨詢機(jī)構(gòu)Ashford Hospitality Advisors首席執(zhí)行官。該公司是房地產(chǎn)信托投資企業(yè)Ashford Hospitality Trust Inc.的子公司，后者的業(yè)務(wù)集中在美國(guó)酒店行業(yè)。他還在投資咨詢公司Ashford Investment Management擔(dān)任首席投資官。

????譯者：Charlie

????Throughout the U.S. recovery we've seen economic data bounce in peaked highs and lows. Real GDP growth since the financial crisis has been as high as nearly 5% year over year and as low as 0%. I expect the sluggish and volatile recovery to continue for years to come. Why? In one word: deleveraging.

????The U.S. economy has been going through a deleveraging not seen since the Great Depression. Back then, total debt reached 300% of GDP. It continued to drop over the next two decades to 150% of GDP before rising again in the early 1950s.

????The deleveraging of the Great Depression was accomplished thanks to a combination of household austerity, inflation, and government stimulus. Household austerity occurred thanks to elevated savings rates along with pay-downs and defaults on debt during the 1930s while rationing to support the war effort had similar effects in the 1940s. Additionally, breaking away from the gold standard helped raise prices and therefore reduced the real value of America's debt. Lastly, the government spending from various New Deal schemes to the vast mobilization during WWII contributed to keeping total GDP growth positive.

????The deleveraging that we are going through today is much improved from the volatile economic outcomes experienced during the Depression. Most of the deleveraging since the Great Recession has occurred in households, mostly in the form of mortgages (which fell from 73% of GDP in 2008 to 55% of GDP today), and across the U.S. financial (where debtfell from 118% of GDP in 2008 to 82% of GDP today).

????Conversely, the federal government leveraged up (with debts rising from 72% of GDP in 2008 to 102% of GDP today) to offset this decline in borrowing from households and the financial sector. The other major sources of debt (non-financial corporate, state & local government, consumer credit, and foreign borrowing) have remained largely unchanged from crisis levels. So overall, the decline in debt-to-GDP has been relatively muted so far, falling from 409% of GDP in 2008 to 392% of GDP today.

????Nonetheless, the U.S. has experienced better outcomes, especially when compared to Europe and Japan because it is keeping the combination of austerity, inflation, and defaults as balanced as possible, while keeping nominal GDP growth above the general interest rates in the economy. The fact that nominal GDP growth is greater than average interest rates is a prerequisite for a well-handled deleveraging, and it is one reason why U.S. economic performance, while choppy, has outperformed many of its industrialized peers.

????Europe, for example, has seen its GDP growth contract in recent years while in many cases the benchmark lending rates exploded higher. This has resulted in debt-to-GDP ratios actually continuing to climb since 2008 in much of the Euro area. Japan has also seen its debt-to-GDP ratios climb consistently since the early 1990s despite having the lowest interest rates in the developed world. This has occurred because deflation has kept nominal GDP growth below even their extremely low interest rates.

????Europe's poor economic results have occurred thanks in part to a disjointed relationship between monetary and fiscal policy. The Maastricht Treaty puts limits on federal budget deficits in Europe while the absence of a unified treasury makes monetary policy (QE policies in particular) difficult to administer. Let's hope for their sake (and ours) that they follow through with their recent statements about being more accommodative if necessary.

????Japan has also gotten its policy responses incorrect following their debt build-up and financial crisis. While Japan had the same monetary and fiscal policy tools as the U.S. government (but not the Europeans), they generally lacked a sense of urgency to their policy responses in the early years after their crisis in the early 1990s. Japan's government, in error, delivered policies as if its economy was in a typical business cycle slump. After years of languishing with sub-par growth, "Abenomics," Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's three-pronged approach to jump-starting the economy, could represent a turning point for Japan's economy. Time will tell if these bold policies will restore consistent growth and ultimately push nominal GDP growth above their interest rates.

????So should we just ignore the economic data? Of course not. Just be prepared for continued economic reports that don't look that bad or that great. Don't get worked up over one month or one quarter of soft data. The environment we are going through today is unlike the business cycles that most of us have grown familiar with over our careers. While robust growth is unlikely to materialize in the near future, we can be confident that a policy-driven recession is also unlikely to occur. Absent some external shock, we are likely to continue to muddle through for the next several years. Be thankful that our policymakers, especially at the Federal Reserve, have accurately diagnosed the patient and are doing their best to accommodate this deleveraging process.

????Monty Bennett is CEO of Dallas-based Ashford Hospitality Advisors, an affiliate of Ashford Hospitality Trust Inc., a real estate investment trust focused primarily on the U.S. hospitality industry. He is also CIO of Ashford Investment Management.