????是什么導(dǎo)致了落后？一個(gè)原因可能是eBay讓基金管理人感到困惑。eBay的收入分為兩部分，其市場(chǎng)業(yè)務(wù)以百分之十幾的速度增長(zhǎng)，另一部分貝寶業(yè)務(wù)增長(zhǎng)速度則快得多，超過(guò)了20%。當(dāng)一個(gè)公司下有兩種不太相干的業(yè)務(wù)以不同速度增長(zhǎng)時(shí)，一般尋找“專(zhuān)營(yíng)”公司的投資者們很容易被嚇跑。作為一個(gè)投資組合，eBay究竟更看重電子商務(wù)，還是更看重在線(xiàn)支付業(yè)務(wù)？應(yīng)當(dāng)把它看成價(jià)值型股票，還是高增長(zhǎng)型的股票？以上所有問(wèn)題的答案都可以是肯定的，這就意味著許多投資者不太可能將易趣列入投資組合。持有eBay的股票沒(méi)什么必要，這也許可以解釋為何它落后于同行。

????貝寶是eBay的一部分，管理者是技術(shù)和銷(xiāo)售專(zhuān)家，而不是在線(xiàn)支付業(yè)務(wù)的專(zhuān)家。正因如此，假如貝寶的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者曾就職于美國(guó)運(yùn)通（American Express）這樣的信用卡公司，或First Data Resources這樣的全球支付運(yùn)營(yíng)商，它在網(wǎng)絡(luò)之外的發(fā)展也許就不會(huì)如此成功。

????比如，盡eBay順利地讓網(wǎng)絡(luò)用戶(hù)接受了貝寶，卻在實(shí)體店復(fù)制這個(gè)成功時(shí)遇上了麻煩。貝寶有著1億會(huì)員，按理說(shuō)商家應(yīng)該爭(zhēng)先恐后地與貝寶合作。然而到目前為止，只有很少的一部分商家愿意接受貝寶。原因是因?yàn)椋趯?shí)體店中使用貝寶支付比較復(fù)雜，要經(jīng)過(guò)一些額外的手續(xù)，這首先就給使用貝寶造成了障礙。線(xiàn)上支付服務(wù)與線(xiàn)下支付大為不同，貝寶的管理層似乎并沒(méi)有意識(shí)到這一點(diǎn)。此外，eBay使用了發(fā)現(xiàn)金融服務(wù)公司（Discover）的支付網(wǎng)絡(luò)來(lái)授權(quán)交易，這意味著其放棄了一大筆收入。貝寶有能力自己提供支付網(wǎng)絡(luò)，也應(yīng)當(dāng)被允許追求這個(gè)目標(biāo)。而在eBay旗下，這一切都變得很復(fù)雜。

????然而，eBay的管理層認(rèn)為對(duì)貝寶可以放手不管。他們的觀(guān)點(diǎn)有一定道理。比如盡管貝寶只有30%的收入來(lái)自eBay，卻有半數(shù)利潤(rùn)卻仍然依靠后者。此外，eBay積極地進(jìn)行國(guó)際擴(kuò)張，這也幫助增加了貝寶的全球曝光率，尤其是在巴西和俄羅斯這種貝寶正在開(kāi)拓市場(chǎng)的國(guó)家。如果馬上切斷兩者之間的聯(lián)系，貝寶在國(guó)際上的發(fā)展恐怕會(huì)止步不前。

????此外，eBay有著良好的信用檔案，這讓貝寶開(kāi)展轉(zhuǎn)移支付業(yè)務(wù)時(shí)顯得可靠和可信。貝寶一旦獨(dú)立，一些銀行，尤其是跨國(guó)銀行，也許就會(huì)禁止貝寶訪(fǎng)問(wèn)其賬戶(hù)。eBay的良好信用和現(xiàn)金儲(chǔ)備還能讓貝寶獲得低成本的資金，從而進(jìn)行關(guān)鍵收購(gòu)。比如，eBay去年花費(fèi)8億美元收購(gòu)了Braintree，有望提高貝寶在關(guān)鍵的移動(dòng)支付領(lǐng)域的業(yè)務(wù)表現(xiàn)。

????不過(guò)，盡管貝寶與eBay聯(lián)系緊密，卻不能排除它獨(dú)自運(yùn)營(yíng)時(shí)能夠生存和發(fā)展的可能性。如果它們真的分開(kāi)，也會(huì)愿意成為彼此的親密合作伙伴。eBay甚至可以擁有貝寶的大量股權(quán)，就像它在2009年出售Skype后仍保留了30%股份一樣。不過(guò)作為一家獨(dú)立公司，貝寶的管理層可以把支付網(wǎng)絡(luò)的需求放在所有其他考慮之前，從而讓公司的發(fā)展沖破eBay的束縛。隨后，貝寶不僅能夠在eBay流行的地區(qū)進(jìn)行擴(kuò)張，還能開(kāi)拓eBay不夠流行的市場(chǎng)，比如中國(guó)。貝寶誕生于eBay，卻并不意味著它應(yīng)當(dāng)永遠(yuǎn)和eBay綁在一起。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

????譯者：嚴(yán)匡正

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????So what's with the lag? One reason may be that eBay confuses fund managers. Its revenue is divided between its marketplace business, which is growing at in the low teens, and its PayPal business, which is growing much faster at over 20%. When you have two disparate businesses growing at two different rates under one roof, you tend to scare away investors who usually look for more "pure play" businesses. Should eBay be part of a portfolio that focuses on e-commerce, or should it be in one that focuses on payment networks? Would it be considered a value stock or a high growth stock? The answer for all of those questions could be "yes," which means that eBay is likely being left out of many investors' portfolios. This lack of demand to own eBay stock may explain why it is lagging its peers.

????As a part of eBay, Paypal is run by people who know tech and know retail, not by people who necessarily know payment networks. As such, Paypal's growth beyond the web may not be as successful as it could be if it was led by people who worked at a credit card company like American Express (AXP) or a global payment provider like First Data Resources.

????For example, while eBay has been successful in getting Paypal accepted online it has had trouble replicating that success at brick-and-mortar stores. With 100 million members, merchants should be jumping up and down to get Paypal, but so far, only a few have agreed to accept it. That's because checking out with Paypal at a store is a bit complicated and requires extra steps, which defeats the point of using Paypal in the first place. Being an online payment service is far different than being one offline, something that appears to have been lost on PayPal's management. Furthermore, eBay is using Discover's (DFS) payment network to authorize transactions, meaning that it is giving up a great deal of revenue. PayPal has the capability to become its own payment network and should be allowed to pursue that objective -- all of which is complicated within the confines of eBay.

????eBay's management, though, thinks PayPal is best left alone. Their arguments have merit to some degree. For one, while PayPal derives just 30% of its revenue from eBay, it is still dependent on it for half of its profits. Also, eBay's aggressive international expansion is helping to grow PayPal's global presence, especially in countries like Brazil and Russia, where eBay is taking off. If the cord is cut too early the fear is that PayPal's international growth may stall.

????Furthermore, eBay's stellar credit profile gives PayPal legitimacy as a reliable and trustworthy way to conduct payment transfers. Some banks, especially international ones, may not be as forthcoming in allowing a stand-alone PayPal to access its accounts. And eBay's credit profile and cash reserves gives PayPal access to low cost capital, allowing for critical acquisitions, like eBay's $800 million purchase of Braintree last year, which is expected to boost PayPal's presence in the critical mobile payment space.

????But while PayPal is closely aligned with eBay, that doesn't preclude the possibility of it being able to survive and grow as a separate entity. Indeed, if the two do split, it will be in both of their interests to remain close partners. eBay could even own a large chunk of PayPal, similar to the 30% it retained in Skype after selling that unit off in 2009. But as an independent entity, PayPal's management would put the needs of the payment network above all other considerations, allowing the company to grow outside the eBay construct. PayPal could then concentrate expansion efforts not just where eBay is popular but also in places where it isn't, like China. PayPal owes its life to eBay, but that doesn't mean it should be imprisoned in it forever.