????塞浦路斯援助行動(dòng)的拙劣表現(xiàn)不僅表明整個(gè)歐洲在設(shè)計(jì)復(fù)雜的國(guó)家援助方案時(shí)所面臨的困難，它也讓人們意識(shí)到，歐洲的目標(biāo)很多，但手段較為有限，二者并不對(duì)等。它還說明，為什么短期戰(zhàn)術(shù)性折中無法取代恰當(dāng)?shù)膽?zhàn)略決策，當(dāng)然后者的難度要大得多。

????經(jīng)過漫長(zhǎng)協(xié)商，塞浦路斯政府和歐洲官員上周六一早公布了雙方達(dá)成的協(xié)議，結(jié)果卻馬上招致批評(píng)（請(qǐng)參見我的專欄文章A Muddled and Risky Approach to Cyprus）。幾個(gè)小時(shí)之內(nèi)，外界的質(zhì)疑就讓政府官員開始相互指責(zé)起來。

????隨著問罪范圍的擴(kuò)大，幾乎所有參與設(shè)計(jì)這項(xiàng)協(xié)議的人都爭(zhēng)相和它撇清關(guān)系。塞浦路斯人很憤怒。塞浦路斯政府被迫將國(guó)內(nèi)銀行歇業(yè)時(shí)間延長(zhǎng)兩天。塞浦路斯和歐洲方面都再次召開閉門會(huì)議，商討如何修改這項(xiàng)協(xié)議。

????輕描淡寫地把所有這些情形都說成是特別個(gè)案很容易。畢竟，用官方青睞的形容詞來說，塞浦路斯的情況相當(dāng)“獨(dú)特”和“極端”。

????遭遇希臘一系列違約事件重創(chuàng)前，塞浦路斯銀行業(yè)一直在不負(fù)責(zé)任地過度增長(zhǎng)。這些銀行構(gòu)成了一個(gè)離岸金融中心，而且吸引了來歷可疑的資金，一些歐洲官員因此認(rèn)為應(yīng)當(dāng)對(duì)塞浦路斯銀行業(yè)加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管。此外，塞浦路斯政府剛剛完成換屆。

????然而，對(duì)塞浦路斯特殊性的關(guān)注不應(yīng)妨礙我們探討這樣一個(gè)問題，那就是如何通過塞浦路斯局勢(shì)看到在歐洲經(jīng)濟(jì)和金融危機(jī)進(jìn)入第三個(gè)年頭之際，一些普遍存在的問題仍在對(duì)歐洲構(gòu)成侵害。

????按照目前的框架，歐洲官員，不論是債權(quán)方還是債務(wù)方，仍然在使用過于簡(jiǎn)陋的工具來追求過于繁雜的目標(biāo)。他們并沒有改弦更張，做出痛苦但必要的戰(zhàn)略抉擇，而是自然而然地拋出了一系列蹩腳的折中措施。通常，對(duì)某個(gè)、或某些談判方來說，每次折中似乎都有道理。塞浦路斯過去這幾天的情況已經(jīng)非常生動(dòng)地說明了這一點(diǎn)。甚至連國(guó)際貨幣基金組織（IMF）都希望這些折中方案能成功實(shí)施。但總的來說，這些方案構(gòu)成了一個(gè)支離破碎、而且難以為繼的整體。

????通常情況下會(huì)出現(xiàn)這樣的局面：

????? 官方債權(quán)人——以歐洲政府、歐洲央行（ECB）和IMF為首，希望盡可能少地提供資金，并以此換取盡可能強(qiáng)大的政策杠桿。他們提出的限制條件表明，他們不相信債務(wù)國(guó)有能力在現(xiàn)有框架下持續(xù)推進(jìn)改革。

????? 官方債權(quán)人也不愿意背負(fù)過重的資金負(fù)擔(dān)。他們會(huì)適當(dāng)?shù)刈屗綘I(yíng)部門做出貢獻(xiàn)。雖然他們希望后者自愿提供資金，但他們也明白，可能需要施加一定的壓力（之前這種做法被稱為“自救”（bail-in）或“PSI”，即私營(yíng)部門參與（private sector involvement））。

????? 另一方面，債務(wù)國(guó)希望盡可能多地獲得外部資金支持，幫助自己實(shí)施改革，同時(shí)盡量減少本國(guó)公民和既得利益方的負(fù)擔(dān)。它還會(huì)努力消除PSI可能帶來的負(fù)面影響，以保護(hù)國(guó)內(nèi)信心以及自身對(duì)外國(guó)投資的長(zhǎng)期吸引力。

????The botched bailout of Cyprus sheds light on more than just the difficulties Europeans face in collectively designing a complicated country rescue package. It also serves as a reminder of the mismatch between Europe's multiple objectives and its more limited tools. And it illustrates why short-term tactical compromises are no substitute for proper, albeit much more difficult, strategic decision making.

????After long and protracted negotiations, the Cypriot government and European officials announced early on Saturday an agreement only to see it attract immediate criticism. (see my column A Muddled and Risky Approach to Cyprus.) Within hours, outside questioning fueled contradictory finger pointing within the official community.

????As the blame game expanded, virtually everyone involved in the design of the agreement scrambled to disown it. Cypriot citizens expressed outrage. Their government was forced to announce an extraordinary two-day closure of the domestic banking system. And both Cypriot and European officials are now back behind closed doors debating potential modifications.

????It is easy to dismiss all this as idiosyncratic. After all, Cyprus is, to use descriptors favored by the official community, quite "unique" and "exceptional."

????Its banks had grown excessively and irresponsibly before getting whacked by serial defaults in Greece. They constitute an offshore center that some European officials feel should be regulated more tightly as it attracts funds from dubious sources. And the country has just gone through a change of government.

????Yet the focus on Cyprus's peculiarities should not preclude us from discussing how this case sheds light on general ailments that continue to weaken Europe in the third year of its regional economic and financial crisis.

????Under the current framework, European officials -- be they creditors or debtors -- still pursue too many objectives with too few instruments. Rather than alter the context by making painful but necessary strategic decisions, they naturally end up stumbling through a series of messy compromises. Often, and as illustrated most vividly in the last few days by the case of Cyprus, each compromise is deemed to make sense to some negotiating party or parties. It is even blessed by the IMF. In aggregate, however, they risk constituting an incoherent and unsustainable whole.

????Here is the usual pattern:

????? Official creditors -- led by European governments, the ECB, and the IMF -- seek to contribute the smallest possible financing in return for maximum policy leverage. And their quest for conditionality reflects the distrust they have in debtor countries' ability to sustain reform efforts within the established framework.

????? Official creditors are also hesitant to carry too much of the financing burden. They appropriately seek contributions from the private sector. While hoping for voluntary contributions, they know that a certain amount of coercion is likely to be needed (formally known as a bail-in or "PSI," for private sector involvement).

????? On its part, the debtor country wishes to maximize external financial support in order to facilitate the implementation of reforms and minimize the burden borne by citizens and vested interests. It also struggles with the adverse impact that PSI could have on domestic confidence and the longer-term attractiveness for foreign investment.