????身居上海，大多數(shù)時候，每到夜晚，我都會聽到消費者新聞與財經頻道（CNBC）里那些遠在美國的、面目模糊的專家們絮叨著中國經濟的天就要塌了，于是我很快便會睡眼惺忪。我已經開始習慣這些有線電視網(wǎng)的愚昧無知，要不然肯定早就發(fā)瘋了。在對全球經濟超級擔憂的當下（提醒一句，這種擔憂合情合理，畢竟歐美經濟危機仍在不斷升級），我們不妨深吸一口氣，將目前中國的經濟放緩置于一定背景下來看待。

????過去一年中國經濟的放緩是有必要的。前十年大多數(shù)時候，中國的實際GDP增速都保持在10%以上，引發(fā)了普遍的通貨膨脹和經濟結構的嚴重扭曲（過度依賴固定資產投資作為經濟增長動力）。為此，政府收緊了政策，特別嚴加調控住宅市場。住宅建設過熱，但絕大多數(shù)中國人還是買不起房，從而導致社會矛盾升級。（建設過熱和房價過高顯然是一對經濟悖論，我們稍后將做解釋。）

????宏觀調控政策已經奏效，效果或許甚至有點超出政府的預想，因為很明顯，今年前兩個季度中國經濟增速正在快速放緩。3月份，中國國務院總理溫家寶正式將2012年的官方GDP增長目標調低到了7.5%，但就算達到這個目標都還需要點運氣。中國近來的工業(yè)產值、用電量等數(shù)據(jù)都非常差。全球大宗商品價格下跌，從煤炭、鐵礦石到原油的庫存都在不斷攀升，顯然都與中國經濟的放緩緊密相關。受中國需求推動的大宗商品市場長達十年的牛市正在接近尾聲。

????造成中國經濟放緩的部分原因是歐洲危機——經濟學家委婉地稱其“經濟衰退”，但老實說，希臘、西班牙等國的情況已經比大蕭條好不了多少。歐洲是中國最大的貿易伙伴國，歐洲危機加深，中國自然不能全身而退。同時，美國是中國第二大貿易伙伴國，美國經濟疲弱自然也無益于中國。

????中國政府主導的這輪經濟放緩完全有必要，但它恰好趕上了外部需求疲弱，所以結果自然不太美妙。特別是那些相信中國經濟將永遠保持10%的年增長、持續(xù)進行相應產能擴張的公司。預計中國業(yè)務比重高的跨國公司業(yè)績不及預期的情況將越來越多。

????不過，話雖如此，也不能夸大當前中國經濟的放緩。中國經濟沒有出現(xiàn)自由落體式的下滑。它面臨的宏觀問題也遠不及歐美眼前的問題。要知道，首先，將中國歸為“出口型”經濟已不再準確，因此外部需求的沖擊可能有限。中國的經常項目順差在國民經濟中的比率已略低于3%，遠低于八年前的10%。發(fā)達世界上演的經濟危機已經波及中國，但還沒有嚴重到扼殺中國經濟的增長勢頭。

????Some of the last words I hear before nodding off to sleep most nights here in Shanghai are uttered by a pasty-faced guy in the United States, nattering on CNBC about how the sky is falling (economically speaking) in China. I've become somewhat inured to the inanities of cable television -- you'd go insane if it were otherwise -- but in these days of hyper-concern about the global economy (quite legitimate concern mind you, given the unfolding debacles in Europe and the United States), it's useful for everyone to take a deep breath and put China's current slowdown in some context.

????China's economy for the past year has been slowing out of necessity. Its consistent 10%-plus real GDP growth rates for most of the past decade had contributed to a broad inflation, as well as severe distortions in the economy's composition (a significant over reliance on fixed asset investment as the driver of growth). The government tightened policy as a result, and put shackles in particular on the residential housing market, which was at once overbuilt and still unaffordable for the vast majority of Chinese, thus contributing to social tensions here. (Overbuiltand overpriced is, to be sure, an economic oxymoron, but we'll leave the explanation for that for later.)

????The tightening measures worked, arguably a bit more than the government intended, as it became clear in the first two quarters of this year that China was decelerating rapidly. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in March officially lowered the government's growth target for 2012 to 7.5%, and that should be considered a target that Beijing will be lucky to hit this year. The data these days -- industrial production, electricity consumption -- are weak, and the global slump in commodity prices, with inventories piling up in everything from coal to iron ore to crude oil, is obviously closely tied to macro weakness in China. It's the unwinding of the decade-long, China-driven bull market in commodities that is now over.

????Part of the China slow-down is driven by the disaster in Europe -- what polite economists call a "recession," but which is, let's face it, nothing less than a depression in countries like Greece and Spain. Europe is China's biggest trading partner, and China is plainly not immune to its deepening pain. The U.S. is China's second-largest trading partner, and its weakening economy is obviously not helping China's growth, either.

????So a government-led deceleration, which was necessary, now has weakness in external demand added to it, and the result is not pretty. That's particularly true for companies the world over that convinced themselves that China would grow at 10% per year forever, and scaled up capacity accordingly. Expect earnings disappointments from multinationals everywhere with big China businesses to increase.

????But, having said all that, it's critical not to exaggerate the current weakness. China is not in free fall. The macro issues it confronts pale in comparison with those now front and center in Europe and the U.S. Remember, first, that China can no longer accurately be characterized as an "export led" economy, so the damage the outside world can do is limited. Beijing's current account surplus as a share of its economy is now slightly less than 3%. That's down from 10% eight years ago. The unfolding economic debacle in the developed world is wounding China, but not killing it.