????從黃金到信貸

????此時(shí)，銀行開(kāi)始登場(chǎng)。當(dāng)前比較流行的做法是，國(guó)家通過(guò)中央銀行【英格蘭銀行、美國(guó)聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備系統(tǒng)（Federal Reserve System）等】管理其財(cái)政，中央銀行可能由政府擁有并控制，或政府在其中具有較大影響力，它們與國(guó)內(nèi)的私營(yíng)銀行進(jìn)行交易。中央銀行是黃金供應(yīng)（除了可能由國(guó)庫(kù)持有的部分）的保管機(jī)構(gòu)，并負(fù)責(zé)嚴(yán)格按照黃金比率發(fā)行該國(guó)的貨幣。私營(yíng)銀行則可以發(fā)放信貸（假定可兌換貨幣），而為控制私營(yíng)銀行的這一活動(dòng)，私營(yíng)銀行必須在中央銀行存有或習(xí)慣性存入一定比例的資金（存款）——國(guó)際慣例是10%到15%。因此，如果中央銀行持有1美元等價(jià)黃金，便可以向下級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)發(fā)行2.50美元信貸，而從理論上來(lái)講，下級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)又可以將其擴(kuò)大到25美元的信貸，并向消費(fèi)者發(fā)放，但這依然符合法律規(guī)定，且嚴(yán)格遵守了金本位制度。金本位制度規(guī)定，每一張紙幣都可以兌換成黃金！

????可能影響這種靈活性的方式有很多。美國(guó)聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備系統(tǒng)共有十二家中央銀行，每家銀行都向會(huì)員銀行提供借貸。目前，1.00美元等價(jià)黃金可支持約14美元信貸。在英國(guó)，1英鎊可支持19英鎊等價(jià)期票和信貸。發(fā)展程度較低的信貸機(jī)制允許的擴(kuò)展性也較低。

????但在所有機(jī)制背后，都有一個(gè)核心事實(shí)，即每種機(jī)制都有黃金供應(yīng)（或如在金匯兌本位制的國(guó)家，基于黃金的貨幣）作為支撐。通過(guò)這一點(diǎn)可以清楚地看出，去掉一般供應(yīng)之后，世界上可能存在多余的黃金，而某個(gè)國(guó)家則可能存在黃金不足的情況。關(guān)于這個(gè)因素，我們希望讀者能夠記住，以便未來(lái)參考（將在之后進(jìn)行討論），首先來(lái)考慮一下能夠?qū)?美元擴(kuò)大到25美元的杠桿機(jī)制的重要性。項(xiàng)目：從本質(zhì)上來(lái)看，這是一種全新的發(fā)明，可以在衡量?jī)r(jià)值時(shí)，用紙幣代替黃金（紙幣被定義為可以兌換黃金，但由于沒(méi)有足夠的黃金可供兌換，因此實(shí)際上使用紙幣需要維持一種平衡）。項(xiàng)目：紙幣極其便利。除了方便之外，使用紙幣可以加快黃金貨幣的流通速度（貨幣流通速度是本文提出的另外一個(gè)因素，將在依次討論），使其更加有效。項(xiàng)目：通過(guò)隨機(jī)觀察可以發(fā)現(xiàn)，紙幣應(yīng)該是黃金短缺憂慮的解決方案。如果黃金產(chǎn)量跟不上商品的生產(chǎn)速度，各國(guó)必須允許小幅增加信貸。美國(guó)法律允許1.00美元等價(jià)黃金最高支持25美元信貸，但實(shí)際美國(guó)僅達(dá)到14美元；如果達(dá)到了25美元的限制水平，還可以通過(guò)修改法律將上限提高到50美元。但這樣做存在一個(gè)問(wèn)題，不論哪個(gè)國(guó)家在何時(shí)允許增加信貸，都可能面臨失去信貸的危險(xiǎn)。一般而言，保持30%至40%黃金儲(chǔ)備的基本比例屬于法律規(guī)定。但如果明天法律被廢止，大部分國(guó)家可能不會(huì)利用這一暫緩期采取任何行動(dòng)。如果有國(guó)家貿(mào)然行事，可能會(huì)將自己置身于喪失信貸的危機(jī)中。如果一國(guó)將金匯兌從1美元擴(kuò)大到14美元，那它也能擴(kuò)大到25美元。如果該國(guó)將限定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)提高到16美元或17美元（依然未超出法律規(guī)定的限制），則會(huì)有人驚呼，通貨膨脹來(lái)了。此時(shí)，我們會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)“公眾信心”發(fā)生了轉(zhuǎn)變。全世界都在低聲嘟囔，自稱“對(duì)于通貨膨脹有豐富的應(yīng)對(duì)經(jīng)驗(yàn)”。確實(shí)，所有貨幣都出現(xiàn)了膨脹。但它再次膨脹就會(huì)引發(fā)國(guó)民的不滿。但這并非一種絕對(duì)的關(guān)系。美國(guó)擴(kuò)大信貸的幅度高于巴西，但它的信用卻更穩(wěn)定；而且現(xiàn)在甚至比十九世紀(jì)中期更加穩(wěn)定。當(dāng)時(shí)，美國(guó)只是從1.00美元擴(kuò)大到4.00美元或5.00美元。無(wú)論如何，各國(guó)政府對(duì)紙幣代替黃金流通的問(wèn)題都是非常慎重的。

????這一部分主要是從機(jī)制的角度討論了一個(gè)問(wèn)題——機(jī)制如何影響信貸。當(dāng)然，如果反過(guò)來(lái)便是一個(gè)更大的概念。從根本上來(lái)說(shuō)，一個(gè)人之所以擴(kuò)大他的信貸，主要源于他的自信和對(duì)未來(lái)的信心。機(jī)制畢竟是人創(chuàng)造的。因此，從信貸角度來(lái)解讀，可以說(shuō)是人的自信（轉(zhuǎn)化之后就是信貸）統(tǒng)領(lǐng)著這種機(jī)制。信心、信念以及其他與人對(duì)自己的信任有關(guān)的因素所起的作用怎么強(qiáng)調(diào)都不為過(guò)。

????在機(jī)制中還有一個(gè)非常活躍的部分，這是政府和國(guó)際委員會(huì)無(wú)法控制的，即貿(mào)易中的信貸擴(kuò)展。商人、制造商、經(jīng)紀(jì)人或零售商如果給客戶的支付留出了一定的時(shí)間，實(shí)際上就是在向客戶提供信貸。在這種情況下，客戶從商人那里獲得信貸，而不是通過(guò)銀行借貸或支付現(xiàn)金。

????到這里，我們最好暫停一下，來(lái)研究機(jī)制中最不可控制、同時(shí)也是最不可思議的一個(gè)因素：貨幣流通速度。在此處討論這個(gè)主題恰到好處，因?yàn)樵谏厦孀詈筇岬降膹V泛存在的個(gè)人信貸擴(kuò)展中，貨幣流通性是最強(qiáng)的。其實(shí)原理非常簡(jiǎn)單：同樣一張一美元鈔票，使用兩次之后，便具有相當(dāng)于兩張一美元的效力；相同數(shù)量的黃金儲(chǔ)備發(fā)揮了兩倍的作用。如果你借給我的10美元，提供給我的信貸，這種信貸透過(guò)千絲萬(wàn)縷微妙的復(fù)雜關(guān)系，最終與深埋于地下的黃金相關(guān)聯(lián)；但財(cái)富的數(shù)量與10美元流通的次數(shù)并無(wú)聯(lián)系。如果我用支票償還這10美元，而你從同一家銀行將其兌現(xiàn)，則同樣一筆錢在銀行中通過(guò)支票兌現(xiàn)的次數(shù)與財(cái)富的數(shù)量也沒(méi)有聯(lián)系。眾多研究和理論都提到了這個(gè)問(wèn)題。流通速度似乎陷入一個(gè)“親商業(yè)”循環(huán)，而在一次上升過(guò)程中，流動(dòng)量可能增加兩倍。有一點(diǎn)非常確定：隨著文明的進(jìn)步，流通速度將保持上升的趨勢(shì)。

????快速回顧：將黃金作為工具衡量商品價(jià)值的機(jī)制以黃金作為基點(diǎn)呈扇形擴(kuò)展。中央銀行、發(fā)行銀行等發(fā)放信貸（紙幣等），但信貸數(shù)量不超過(guò)其黃金儲(chǔ)備的2.5倍；私營(yíng)銀行、信貸接受者在此基礎(chǔ)上再發(fā)放信貸；個(gè)人按其配置情況的比例和財(cái)政安全情況，在最后一關(guān)發(fā)力，為那些在守衛(wèi)森嚴(yán)的金庫(kù)中的珍貴金屬又增添了一筆價(jià)值。在整個(gè)過(guò)程中，“貨幣流通速度”發(fā)揮了作用，但沒(méi)有人能夠確定，這些金屬最終能夠產(chǎn)生多大的效果。

????關(guān)于各國(guó)根據(jù)黃金儲(chǔ)備已經(jīng)創(chuàng)建的實(shí)際信貸的擴(kuò)展，我們的研究先到此為止。下面，我們將回到之前提到的話題，即與黃金短缺問(wèn)題相同，如果我們所持有的黃金進(jìn)行流動(dòng)，也容易引發(fā)問(wèn)題。前文提到，采用金本位制的國(guó)家必須儲(chǔ)備足夠的黃金，作為該國(guó)貨幣的準(zhǔn)備金。但在進(jìn)行國(guó)際結(jié)算時(shí)，通用的金本位制將導(dǎo)致黃金在國(guó)家之間自由流通，以穩(wěn)定各國(guó)貨幣與黃金的兌換比例。如果債權(quán)國(guó)要求，債務(wù)國(guó)必須用黃金償還債務(wù)，而如果允許自由流通，黃金通常會(huì)流向（1）最安全的國(guó)家，和（2）最有利可圖的國(guó)家。如果一個(gè)國(guó)家的商業(yè)出現(xiàn)問(wèn)題，這意味著該國(guó)部分黃金可能會(huì)向其認(rèn)為更有利可圖或更安全的地方流失——或者用于支付該國(guó)所欠的外債。

????【此處，我們通過(guò)一個(gè)理論，采用最淺顯的方式描述了機(jī)制，并概述了其中一小部分（黃金流動(dòng)的原因），雖然這一理論非常通俗易懂，但依然不失為一種理論。關(guān)于黃金流動(dòng)的原因，還有許多解釋，并且更加詳細(xì)。不論哪種解釋是正確的，但有一點(diǎn)毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)，黃金確實(shí)在不同國(guó)家之間流動(dòng)。】

????目前，并沒(méi)有什么靈丹妙藥可以阻止黃金儲(chǔ)備的日漸萎縮——這通常是經(jīng)濟(jì)不景氣的癥狀，但確實(shí)無(wú)藥可醫(yī)。截止到目前，要想將黃金留在國(guó)內(nèi)，最有效的方法就是比周邊國(guó)家更加繁榮。如果心有余而力不足，一個(gè)國(guó)家可能禁不住誘惑，采取人為的（也是臨時(shí)的）權(quán)宜之計(jì)。在發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家中，為了保住黃金儲(chǔ)備，約有六個(gè)國(guó)家采取了提高再貼現(xiàn)率的人為措施。這一措施的原理是：中央銀行宣布將提高貸款利率（“再貼現(xiàn)”款項(xiàng)），因此其他銀行必須收取更高的利息，于是，整個(gè)國(guó)家貨幣的價(jià)值被抬高。之前一分鐘還渴望流向其他國(guó)家的黃金，此時(shí)會(huì)更傾向于留在本國(guó)，從高利率中獲益。這一機(jī)制的缺點(diǎn)在于，它將增加本國(guó)國(guó)民的貸款成本，阻礙他們的發(fā)展，最終可能降低他們的生活水平。而且，也有可能出價(jià)過(guò)高，導(dǎo)致不得不再次提高利率。如果一個(gè)國(guó)家不想提高再貼現(xiàn)率，也可以對(duì)金稅出口資本執(zhí)行禁令，或僅以一種不可接受的方式提供黃金，例如，限制該金屬的出口，減緩黃金流失的過(guò)程——甚至可以通過(guò)立法禁止黃金出口，這一措施通常被用于戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)時(shí)期，而在和平時(shí)期則可能引發(fā)商界的不安，因?yàn)檫@意味著，該國(guó)取消了黃金兌換的保證，至少是禁止國(guó)外兌換。

????另外一種擴(kuò)大和縮減信貸的方法也頗有價(jià)值，這種方法被稱為“中央銀行開(kāi)放市場(chǎng)操作”，主要見(jiàn)于美國(guó)和英格蘭。這種方法非常有創(chuàng)意。如果中央銀行希望使人們更輕松獲得貨幣，它可以進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)，買入證券。而中央銀行用支票支付證券，很快支票又會(huì)作為存款進(jìn)入中央銀行，并記入同一家會(huì)員銀行的賬戶。結(jié)果是，會(huì)員銀行在中央銀行的存款數(shù)額增加，使會(huì)員銀行可以將信貸擴(kuò)大十倍之多。而中央銀行只需要按照慣例保留存款背后的黃金比例即可。因此，用很少的黃金便可以實(shí)現(xiàn)大規(guī)模的信貸，準(zhǔn)確地說(shuō)是把大量信貸強(qiáng)加給了市場(chǎng)。如果是相反的情況，中央銀行可以賣出證券，減少會(huì)員銀行的存款，收緊信貸。

????雖然文章的描述比較簡(jiǎn)單，但千萬(wàn)不要被它迷惑。實(shí)際操作非常復(fù)雜，所涉及的問(wèn)題也非常難以捉摸，而且，對(duì)開(kāi)放市場(chǎng)操作的使用或?yàn)E用也一直存在激烈的爭(zhēng)議。

????Gold Into Credit

????Here banking enters the picture. The fashion of today is for a country to organize its finances by means of a central bank (Bank of England, Federal Reserve System, etc.) either owned, controlled, or largely influenced by its government and doing business with the private banks of the country. This central bank is the custodian of the gold supply (except what part might be held by the Treasury) and issues the country's currency, governed strictly by the gold ratio. The private banks of the country, however, may issue their own credit (presumably redeemable in currency), and to control this, each is required to keep, or has made a habit of keeping, an amount equivalent to a percentage of the money it owes (its deposits) with the central bank -- 10 to 15 per cent is the rule. Thus for the possession of $1.00 of gold, the central bank may issue $2.50 of credit to a lesser institution which, in turn may, theoretically, extend $25 worth of credit to a customer and still be within the law, abiding strictly by the gold standard which says that each and every paper dollar may be redeemed in grains of gold!

????The exact methods of effecting this elasticity vary widely. In the U. S., we have our Federal Reserve System's twelve central banks, each lending money to member banks. At present, $1.00 of gold supports about $14 of credit. In Great Britain, ￡1 supports ￡19 of notes and credit. Less developed credit machinery allows less expansion.

????Underlying all systems, however, is the central fact that each must have its supply of gold to support it (or currency based on gold, as in the Gold Exchange Standard). From which it becomes immediately apparent that, having split up the common supply, there may be a plethora of gold in the world and a shortage of it in one country. Which factor we would like you to file away for future reference (it will be discussed presently) and consider first the significance of this involved system of levers whereby $1.00 may be stretched to $25. Item: it is essentially a contrivance which substitutes paper for gold in the process of weighing values (the paper is defined as being exchangeable for gold but there isn't enough gold to exchange for it, hence paper is really used in the balance). Item: it is immensely convenient. Besides being handy, it accelerates the speed with which gold money changes hands (the velocity of money is another factor suggested here, to be taken up in turn), which makes it more effective. Item: observed casually, it appears the answer to gold famine alarmists. If gold production doesn't keep pace with commodity production, all the world has to do is to allow itself a little more credit. The U. S. only stretches $1.00 into $14 when its laws allow it to reach to $25; when it reaches $25, change the laws to let it touch $50. One catch is that whenever the world, or any part of it, does allow itself more credit, it may lose its self-confidence. The basic ratios of around 30 per cent to 40 per cent gold in reserve are, generally, fixed by law. But if the laws were repealed tomorrow, most of the nations of the world would make no move to take advantage of the respite, and any that did would be in danger of finding their credit vanishing. This country stretches $1.00 to $14, can stretch to $25. Yet if it raised the mark to $16 or $17 (still well within the legal limits), the cry of inflation might be raised. Herein we observe the cogwheel "public confidence" turning. Collectively, the world mutters in its beard that it "has had a lot of experience with inflated currency." Yet, obviously, all its currency is inflated. It's inflating it any more which bothers our people. The relation is, patently, far from absolute. The U. S. extends more credit than Brazil, yet its credit is better; it is better now than when in mid-19th century, it only stretched $1.00 to $4.00 or $5.00. Still, governments have given a good deal of concern to the problem of palming off paper for gold in a genteel way.

????This section has dealt, characteristically, with the problem from the mechanical viewpoint -- how the machine might influence the credit. The converse is, of course, the larger conception. It is, essentially, man's confidence in himself and in his future that permits him, to extend himself credit. The machine is only a machine, man-made. Hence it would be quite proper to say that man's self-confidence, interpreted in credit, governs it. The part played by confidence, faith, or whatever you wish to label man's belief in himself, cannot be overemphasized.

????There is still another, and very active, part of the machine over which governments and international committees have no direct control, and that is the extension of credit in trade. Every merchant, manufacturer, broker, or tradesman who gives a customer time to pay is really loaning his customer the money. The customer gets credit from the merchant instead of borrowing from his bank and paying cash.

????At this point we had better pause to examine that least controllable and most mysterious of all elements in the machine, the velocity of money. The subject is apropos, for it is in the above last far-flung extension of credit by individuals that the velocity factor is especially potent. The principle advanced is simple: the same dollar bill, used twice, is as effective as two individual dollar bills; the same amount of gold reserve has done twice the work. The credit you extend to me in loaning me $10 is, far away across a sea of subtlety, linked to buried gold; but there is no link between that treasure and the number of times that $10 bill will be used. Nor the number of times the same amount of money in a bank may be checked against, if I pay you back with a check and you deposit it in the same bank and draw against it again. There has been much research done, and many theories have been advanced on the subject. The velocity seems to indulge in cycles "sympathetic to business," and the circulation may, in a single upswing, treble. This much is certain: the tendency is upward with the march of civilization, toward a higher velocity.

????To review rapidly: the machinery for the use of gold as an instrument for valuing commodities spreads fan-wise from a base of gold. Central banks, banks of issue, etc., grant credit (paper money, etc.) up to not more than two and one-half times their gold reserve; private banks, recipients of this credit, grant further credit based on it; individuals, in proportion to their dispositions and financial security, give one last-and powerful-fling to the value of those precious grains in the closely guarded vault. Through all of which the "velocity of circulation" factor enters, and no man knows, for certain, just how much work those same grains may eventually accomplish.

????Leaving the consideration of the extension of the total actual credit already created on the world's gold, let us return, as we promised, to the proposition that ills may arise as readily from shifting the gold we have as from any general shortage. It is written that each country committed to a gold standard must have its own gold to back up its own bank notes. But the idea of a common gold standard entails the free passage of gold from country to country in settlement of international balances, in stabilizing the world's moneys in terms of gold. Nations must pay their debts in gold (if asked) and, allowed to choose its home, free gold will always go where (1) it will be safest and (2) make the most money. A run of commercial bad luck, then, means a tendency on the part of a nation's gold to run where it can make more money or feel safer -- and in payment of the money the nation owes.

????(Here we have taken the easiest course in describing the machine and sketched in a part [the reason for gold movements] by the use of a theory, a popular one, but still a theory. Many and elaborate are the explanations advanced for why gold moves. Whichever is right, gold does move, from nation to nation, wandering.)

????Now there is no panacea for diminishing gold reserves -- no handy cure-all for what is often a symptom of economic distress. By far the happiest way to keep gold at home is to be more prosperous than your neighbor. But if, as a nation, you can't manage this, you may be tempted to resort to artificial (and temporary) expedients. And a common artificial respirator of gold reserves among perhaps half-dozen leading countries is the raised rediscount rate. It works thus: the central bank announces that it will charge more interest for the money it loans (in "rediscounting" obligations), hence other banks must charge higher rates, and money throughout the land becomes dear. The gold which was so anxious a minute before to get somewhere else now may prefer to stay at home to benefit by these higher rates. The disadvantages of this system are that it entails charging your own countrymen more money for their loans, handicaps them, and may eventually lower their scale of living. Also, you may be overbid and have to raise again. If you don't care to raise your rediscount rate, you may place some kind of an embargo on outgoing gold-tax exported capital, or only deliver gold metal in an unacceptable form, i.e., make it inconvenient for export and so slow the process -- or you can up and make it against the law to export gold, a drastic step almost always taken in war but extremely disturbing to peace-time commerce because it removes the guarantee of gold redemption, at least in foreign parts.

????Another method of expanding and n contracting credit which is worth your knowing about might be titled "Open Market Operations of Central Banks," and it is used, principally, by the U. S. and England. The idea is ingenious. When the central bank wants to make money easier to get, it goes out into the market and buys securities. For them, the bank gives a check which soon finds its way back to the central institution as a deposit, credited to the account of some member bank. The result is an increase in the member bank deposits with the central bank, which allows the former to extend some ten times as much credit. The central bank has only to maintain its customary percentage of gold behind the deposit. Thus large credit is made available with little metal, is literally forced on the market. Reverse the process, and you have the central bank selling securities, lowering member bank balances, and tightening credit.

????Do not let the comparative simplicity of this exposition deceive you. The physical operation is complicated, the issues involved are subtle, and the use or abuse of open market operations is hotly disputed.