????歐洲債務(wù)危機(jī)逐漸失控，觸動(dòng)了投資者的“恐慌”按鈕。世界各國(guó)銀行正試圖安撫客戶的恐慌情緒，例如召開(kāi)電話會(huì)議，進(jìn)行一對(duì)一說(shuō)服等。但此時(shí)此刻，他們似乎無(wú)法阻止客戶們尋找退路的急切步伐。

????分析人士承認(rèn)目前的問(wèn)題十分嚴(yán)重，但他們?nèi)韵嘈沤鉀Q危機(jī)的辦法總會(huì)有的，有些人將其稱為大規(guī)模歐洲救助金計(jì)劃，這與美國(guó)在金融危機(jī)巔峰時(shí)所提出的計(jì)劃類似。大多數(shù)人認(rèn)為歐洲政府需要盡快采取聯(lián)合行動(dòng)來(lái)防止債務(wù)瘟疫對(duì)歐洲經(jīng)濟(jì)體系造成毀滅性打擊。

????每一天，歐洲大陸都是噩耗不斷。上周一，投資者的拋售使得10年期意大利主權(quán)債券由4%上升至6%。穆迪評(píng)級(jí)（Moody’s）隨后下調(diào)了愛(ài)爾蘭主權(quán)債務(wù)的級(jí)別至不推薦投資級(jí)別或垃圾投資，這直接將其10年期國(guó)債收益率拉升至歷史新高14%。

????經(jīng)紀(jì)人和投資顧問(wèn)正試圖緩和客戶的焦慮，但是大部分投資組合經(jīng)理都希望拋掉所有與歐洲國(guó)家相關(guān)的證券?？紤]到目前每況愈下的態(tài)勢(shì)，使用信用違約互換投保葡萄牙和愛(ài)爾蘭的主權(quán)債務(wù)比投保委內(nèi)瑞拉債務(wù)的成本更

????債務(wù)瘟疫已經(jīng)為歐洲固定收益市場(chǎng)帶來(lái)了“實(shí)實(shí)在在，顯而易見(jiàn)的危險(xiǎn)”，瑞士信貸（Credit Suisse）的一位高級(jí)經(jīng)理周三在固定收益電話會(huì)上對(duì)客戶說(shuō)道，“我們的意見(jiàn)是，官方必須盡快采取有效措施，避免其對(duì)全球金融穩(wěn)定和增長(zhǎng)構(gòu)成實(shí)質(zhì)性威脅”。

創(chuàng)可貼式解決辦法

????過(guò)去的一年中，歐洲各國(guó)一直都在努力控制主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)，但是收效甚微。這些針對(duì)債務(wù)瘟疫的政策往往只是治標(biāo)不治本。如果只是用來(lái)救助希臘、葡萄牙和愛(ài)爾蘭，這些政策的作用還能持續(xù)幾年。但目前債務(wù)危機(jī)已然蔓延至意大利，該國(guó)1.8萬(wàn)億歐元（2.6萬(wàn)億美元）的債務(wù)危如累卵。歐洲各國(guó)需要一個(gè)更加長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)的解決辦法。

????分析人士和投資者認(rèn)為，歐洲各國(guó)現(xiàn)今需勇敢面對(duì)困境，向世人展示其保護(hù)歐洲貨幣及政治聯(lián)盟的決心。

????歐洲到底會(huì)選擇更強(qiáng)勢(shì)的政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)聯(lián)盟或選擇各自為政？當(dāng)前的危機(jī)局勢(shì)要求各國(guó)財(cái)政預(yù)算決策必須與歐洲中央銀行的貨幣政策保持步調(diào)一致。為達(dá)到這一平衡，歐元區(qū)各國(guó)需要讓渡其對(duì)本國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的大部分控制權(quán)——這在過(guò)去是不可想象的。

????但是針對(duì)歐元區(qū)國(guó)家的救助計(jì)劃的精髓正是如此。如果想要得到貸款，希臘和葡萄牙必須通過(guò)削減預(yù)算和變賣資產(chǎn)達(dá)到預(yù)定的財(cái)政目標(biāo)。歐洲“核心”國(guó)家，如法國(guó)和德國(guó)【包括國(guó)際貨幣基金組織（IMF）】，正對(duì)周邊國(guó)家發(fā)號(hào)施令，這種做法無(wú)異于暫時(shí)讓渡主權(quán)。投資者希望這一臨時(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)策略成為永久性措施，這樣歐元區(qū)將成為一個(gè)更加強(qiáng)大的政治及財(cái)政聯(lián)盟——但是談何容易。

????這意味著希臘和葡萄牙的相關(guān)國(guó)策將由布魯塞爾和法蘭克福的當(dāng)權(quán)者制定，但是希臘人和葡萄牙人并不一定甘愿接受外國(guó)人的長(zhǎng)期管制。同樣，德國(guó)和法國(guó)也不一定愿意和周邊國(guó)家合并資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表。

投資歐元債券

????現(xiàn)在，政府應(yīng)大幅度增加歐洲救助基金的放貸數(shù)量和規(guī)模。

????目前，由法蘭克福醞釀的這個(gè)計(jì)劃要求歐洲強(qiáng)國(guó)，諸如德國(guó)和法國(guó)，發(fā)行聯(lián)合債券來(lái)幫助周邊國(guó)家償還債務(wù)。

????歐洲金融穩(wěn)定機(jī)制（European Financial Stability Facility，簡(jiǎn)稱EFSF）于去年危機(jī)爆發(fā)伊始成立，目前正通過(guò)發(fā)行債券來(lái)幫助向周邊國(guó)家提供救助基金，但是并未在二級(jí)市場(chǎng)購(gòu)買這些國(guó)家的現(xiàn)有債務(wù)。如果要執(zhí)行新的方案，歐洲需要賦予歐洲金融穩(wěn)定機(jī)制更多的權(quán)利并大幅增加其7，500億歐元的歐元授權(quán)額度。本周，德國(guó)勉強(qiáng)表示這一做法將有可能得到實(shí)施。

????瑞士信貸（CS）稱，歐洲穩(wěn)定金融機(jī)制將創(chuàng)造一個(gè)新的“歐元債券”，以幫助融資贖回由私人投資者所持有的周邊國(guó)家?guī)资畠|歐元的主權(quán)債務(wù)。希望拋售主權(quán)債務(wù)的投資者們終于迎來(lái)了歐洲穩(wěn)定金融機(jī)制這位意向買家。

????這個(gè)融資機(jī)制的工作模式與美國(guó)在金融危機(jī)頂峰時(shí)所實(shí)施的不良資產(chǎn)救助計(jì)劃（Troubled Asset Relief Program，簡(jiǎn)稱TARP）相似。但是歐洲金融穩(wěn)定機(jī)制買的是不良主權(quán)債務(wù)，不是問(wèn)題銀行的不良抵押資產(chǎn)。人們對(duì)于歐洲金融穩(wěn)定機(jī)制贖回主權(quán)債務(wù)的價(jià)格還存在爭(zhēng)議，但是大部分認(rèn)為該價(jià)格會(huì)向當(dāng)前已然低于面值的市場(chǎng)價(jià)看齊。贖回之后，歐洲金融穩(wěn)定機(jī)制將不再計(jì)較債券的價(jià)格差額，并最終削減周邊國(guó)家的債務(wù)，藉此讓他們贏得喘息之機(jī)。

????所有這些在理論上都十分可行，但在實(shí)踐中卻不盡然。投資者可能因?yàn)檫^(guò)低的市場(chǎng)價(jià)而不愿拋售手中的債券。與此同時(shí)，誰(shuí)也不敢保證新的歐元債券就能吸引到足夠多的投資者來(lái)為贖回注資。如果投資者確信周邊國(guó)家向核心國(guó)家進(jìn)行的債務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)移將成為歐洲新的規(guī)范，他們將更愿意掏腰包。要成就此事，歐洲必須空前團(tuán)結(jié)。

????Investors are pushing the panic button as the European debt crisis spins out of control. Banks around the world are trying to calm their clients' fears, setting up special conference calls and one-on-one sessions, but there seems to be nothing they can do at this point to prevent a rush for the exits.

????While analysts acknowledge that the problem is severe, they also believe that there could be a way out of this mess, with some calling for a massive European bailout mechanism, similar to the one set up in the U.S. at the height of the financial crisis. Most agree that European governments need to act collectively and in short order, before this contagion causes irreparable damage to the economic fabric of the continent.

????Each passing day seems to bring more sour news out of Europe. On Monday the yield on 10-year Italian sovereign bonds jumped from around 4% to 6% as investors dumped Italian debt. Moody's later downgraded Ireland's sovereign debt to below investment grade, or junk, sending yields on their 10-year bond to a record 14%.

????Brokers and investment advisors are trying to assuage their clients' fears, but most portfolio managers just want to dump anything associated with the peripheral countries of Europe. Things have gotten so bad that it now costs more to insure the sovereign debt of Portugal and Ireland using credit-default swaps than it does to insure the debt of Venezuela.

????The threat of contagion has emerged as a "clear and present danger" in the European fixed income market, a senior manager at Credit Suisse told investors on a special fixed income conference call Wednesday. "Our view is that this issue needs to be tackled aggressively and soon by authorities to avoid a real threat to global financial stability and growth."

Band-Aid solutions

????The Europeans have been trying to manage the sovereign debt crisis for over a year now with only marginal success. The policy has been to treat the symptoms of the contagion rather than to find a cure for it. That methodology might have worked for a few years if they only had to contend with bailing out Greece, Portugal and Ireland. But now that the crisis threatens to take down Italy and its 1.8 trillion euros ($2.6 trillion) debt pile, the Europeans need a more lasting solution.

????Analysts and investors feel that the time has come for the Europeans to face the music and decide how far they are willing to go to preserve their monetary and political union.

????Will Europe choose stronger political and economic integration or will it choose disorderly disintegration? The current crisis illustrates that fiscal decisions made at the state level need to be in harmony with monetary decisions made by the EU central bank. To achieve this balance, nations in the eurozone would need to give up sovereign control over much of their economy – something that in the past was unthinkable.

????But the bailout packages for the peripheral eurozone nations have in essence done just that. To get the loans, Greece and Portugal had to meet certain fiscal targets by cutting spending and selling off assets. The "core" European nations, namely France and Germany (along with the IMF), are now essentially calling the shots in the peripheral nations, which is tantamount to a temporary transfer of sovereignty. Investors would like this temporary economic arrangement to become more permanent, thus requiring the eurozone to come together in a much stronger political and fiscal union – no easy task.

????But it's unclear if the Greeks and Portuguese are willing to have nearly all their state-level decisions made by foreigners in Brussels and Frankfurt forever. And it's equally unclear if the Germans and French are willing to permanently merge their balance sheets with those of the peripheral countries.

Investing in eurobonds

????For now, the current European bailout fund needs to be greatly expanded in both size and scope.

????The plan being floated around the halls of Frankfurt at the moment calls for the rich countries in Europe, namely Germany and France, to issue some sort of collective bond to help pay off the debt of the peripheral countries.

????The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), set up last year when the crisis first flared up, currently issues debt to help fund the bailouts of the peripheral countries, but doesn't buy up their existing debt in the secondary markets. For this new plan to work, the EFSF's role and its 750 billion euro mandate would need to be greatly expanded, something the Germans this week reluctantly acknowledged could happen.

????The EFSF would create a new "Eurobond," as Credit Suisse (CS) is calling it, to help finance the acquisition of billions of euros worth of peripheral sovereign debt held by private investors. Those investors looking to get rid of their peripheral sovereign paper would now have a willing buyer in the EFSF.

????Such a funding mechanism would work similar to how the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, worked in the U.S. at the height of the financial crisis. But instead of buying bad mortgages off the books of crippled banks, the EFSF would buy bad sovereign paper. The price at which the EFSF would pay for the debt is controversial, but most see it paying the current market price for the bonds, which is below face value. The EFSF would then forgive the difference in the value of those bonds, essentially giving the peripheral nations a haircut on their debt, allowing them time to get back on their feet.

????All this sounds good in theory, but it may not work in practice. Investors may be reluctant to give up their bonds at distressed market prices. Meanwhile, there is no guarantee that the new eurobonds would attract enough investors to fund the buybacks. Investors would be more willing to fund this new debt transfer from the periphery to the core if they knew with certainty that fiscal discipline was the new norm in Europe. For that to happen, Europe will need to get closer than ever.