私募為什么要為Skype的貸款提供擔(dān)保?
????這或許聽起來(lái)有違直覺,但私募股權(quán)離不開貸款。通常,私募股權(quán)公司的一筆投資額有超過(guò)30%為銀行貸款,然后利用杠桿提高回報(bào)率。當(dāng)貸款供應(yīng)大減——如2009年時(shí)——私募股權(quán)公司會(huì)放緩?fù)顿Y步伐,不管他們已募集了多少“私募股本”。 ????但杠桿融資的真正關(guān)鍵在于它極大地保障了下行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。這些貸款出現(xiàn)在獲風(fēng)投企業(yè)(而非私募股權(quán)公司)的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上。如果出現(xiàn)貸款違約,私募股權(quán)公司只須按股權(quán)比例承擔(dān)貸款銀行或任何購(gòu)買相關(guān)貸款的金融機(jī)構(gòu)發(fā)生的貸款損失。 ????因此,當(dāng)上周了解到Silver Lake Partners及其投資合作伙伴在2009年底以19億美元從eBay手中收購(gòu)Skype時(shí),曾為相關(guān)貸款提供“擔(dān)?!睍r(shí),我很感興趣。 ????我的初步想法有三個(gè): ????1. 哇,他們當(dāng)時(shí)一定很有信心。 ????2. 可能當(dāng)時(shí)沒有銀行愿意為這筆交易提供貸款。 ????3. 為什么這么做? ????1. 是的,他們當(dāng)時(shí)真的信心十足。這是Silver Lake有史以來(lái)最大的一筆投資,新成立的投資合作伙伴Andreessen Horowitz一下子用足了“單筆投資金額5萬(wàn)美元至5,000萬(wàn)美元”的限額也令其聲譽(yù)受到考驗(yàn)。即便Skype創(chuàng)始人真的贏了知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)訴訟案——他們最終達(dá)成了和解,換取部分股權(quán)——這些投資人可能也相信他們能重寫所需的代碼。 ????2. 交易宣布時(shí)正逢信貸危機(jī),但已開始好轉(zhuǎn)。 ????3. 這是最重要的問題:據(jù)接近交易的消息人士告訴我,擔(dān)保是為了讓貸款更便宜一些。這顯然與1有關(guān)(投資人的信心),但感覺仍是承擔(dān)了不必要的高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。每項(xiàng)投資都有一定的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)——正如Skype自己在IPO文件中所指——假如風(fēng)險(xiǎn)爆發(fā),之后Silver Lake的投資者可能就不會(huì)再提供支持(不妨問問Parthenon Capital或Forstmann Little,當(dāng)一筆超大規(guī)模投資出問題時(shí)會(huì)發(fā)生什么)。似乎是不必要的高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。 ????要說(shuō)清楚的是,我并不是說(shuō)Silver Lake無(wú)權(quán)為Skype貸款擔(dān)保。大多數(shù)私募股權(quán)基金的協(xié)議中都有這樣的條款,允許他們?yōu)椴怀^(guò)基金資金一定百分比的貸款提供擔(dān)保。而且,過(guò)去也有過(guò)幾宗擔(dān)保案例,只不過(guò)大多都是收購(gòu)價(jià)基本無(wú)關(guān)股權(quán)的扭虧為盈交易 (比如,TPG就曾為一筆僅涉及6.00美元股權(quán)的交易貸款提供擔(dān)保)。而且,為貸款提供擔(dān)保,也能帶來(lái)一些組合管理優(yōu)勢(shì),比如讓投資彈藥保存的時(shí)間更長(zhǎng)一點(diǎn)(因?yàn)楹苌儆谢鹉苓M(jìn)行資金的反復(fù)投資)。 ????但僅僅因?yàn)橛袡?quán)這樣做,并不說(shuō)明這樣做就是明智的。 ????我知道由于微軟(Microsoft)已同意以85億美元收購(gòu)Skype,對(duì)當(dāng)初Skype投資交易的任何方面提出質(zhì)疑似乎都有些怪。Silver Lake的信心已得到回報(bào),它的投資者永遠(yuǎn)都不會(huì)被要求為貸款擔(dān)保支付一毛錢。 ????但有一個(gè)根本原因可以解釋為何私募股權(quán)的表現(xiàn)通常好于其他資產(chǎn)類別,就是很多風(fēng)險(xiǎn)都輸出到了華爾街。為幾個(gè)基點(diǎn)修正模式似乎是不必要的冒險(xiǎn)之舉。Skype應(yīng)被視為例外,而并非新的常態(tài)。 |
????It may sound counterintuitive, but private equity is all about debt. Private equity firms typically borrow more than 30% of a deal's value from banks, and then use that leverage to juice returns. And when credit dries up -- as it did in 2009 -- PE firms slow their investment pace, no matter how much "equity" they've got lying around. ????But the real key of leveraged financing is that it seriously protects down-side risk. The loans are carried on a portfolio company's balance sheet, not on the private equity firm's balance sheet. If a default occurs, the private equity firm is only out its equity -- but the debt losses are incurred by banks or whoever else has bought the loans. ????So it was interesting to learn last week that Silver Lake Partners and its investment partners had "guaranteed" the debt for their $1.9 billion purchase of Skype from eBay (EBAY) in late 2009. ????My initial thoughts were threefold: ????1. Wow, they must have been really confident. ????2. Maybe no bank must have been willing to lend money for this deal. ????3. Why do this? ????1. Yes, they were really confident.This was the largest check Silver Lake had ever written, and infant investment partner Andreessen Horowitz was putting its nascent reputation on the line by pushing the limits of its "$50,000 to $50 million" investment strategy. Even if Skype's founders had won their legal IP claims -- they eventually settled, in exchange for an ownership piece -- the buyers likely believed they could rewrite the necessary code. ????2. The deal was announcedaround in the midst of a credit crunch, but it was easing. ????3. This is the most salient question:Sources close to the deal tell me that the guarantee was made in order to make the debt cheaper. This obviously ties into #1 (buyer confidence), but still feels like an needlessly large risk to take. Every investment carries certain risks -- as Skype itself laid out in its IPO filing -- and a blowup could have caused Silver Lake's investors to bail on subsequent support (just ask Parthenon Capital or Forstmann Little what happens when an out-sized bet goes bad). Seems like a needlessly large risk. ????To be clear, I'm not suggesting that Silver Lake didn't have the right to guarantee Skype's debt. Most PE fund agreements include provisions that allow them to guarantee debt up to a certain percentage of fund capital. And it has happened a few times before, albeit usually on turnaround transactions where the purchase price includes virtually no equity (e.g., TPG once guaranteed debt on a deal that included just $6.00 in equity). Moreover, there are some portfolio management advantages to guaranteeing debt, such as keeping dry powder drier longer (since few funds are permitted to recycle capital ????But just because you have the right to do something doesn't make it wise. ????I know that questioning any aspect of the original Skype investment seems strange in light of Microsoft's (MSFT) agreement to buy the company for $8.5 billion. Silver Lake's confidence has been rewarded, and its investors will never be asked to pay for a dime of the guaranteed debt. ????But there is a fundamental reason why private equity usually outperforms other asset classes, and it's that much of the risk is outsourced to Wall Street. Altering the model for the sake of a few basis points seems needlessly risky. Skype should be viewed as an outlier, not the new status quo. |
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