????但是斯坦福大學(xué)的研究顯示，這些杰出人物的職業(yè)命運(yùn)取決于公司倒閉或陷入困境的原因是管理問題，還是治理問題。

????斯坦福大學(xué)商學(xué)院（Stanford Graduate School of Business）教授兼“公司治理研究項(xiàng)目”（Corporate Governance Research Program）總監(jiān)戴維?拉克爾稱：“公司聘用高管的目的非常明確，即承擔(dān)戰(zhàn)略風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，增加股東價(jià)值，但許多人最終無法達(dá)到預(yù)期。而公司監(jiān)管人員則恰恰相反，公司聘用他們的目的是希望他們能夠及時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)瀆職行為。”

????但斯坦福大學(xué)近期的調(diào)查發(fā)現(xiàn)，受訪的高管與董事中，有三分之二的人相信，倒閉公司的董事依然可以在其他公司的董事會(huì)獲得成功。

CEO永遠(yuǎn)不缺少追逐者

????但只有三分之一的受訪者認(rèn)為，倒閉公司前任首席執(zhí)行官能夠在其他公司成為優(yōu)秀的董事。此外，高管獵頭公司海德思哲公司（Heidrick & Struggles）與斯坦福大學(xué)洛克公司治理中心（Rock Center for Corporate Governance）合作進(jìn)行的2011年公司董事會(huì)調(diào)查（2011 Corporate Board of Directors Survey）顯示，業(yè)界對(duì)CEO的問責(zé)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)更高。

????最近，風(fēng)雨飄搖的科技公司雅虎公司毫不客氣地辭退了卡羅爾?巴茨，她也辭去了在雅虎公司董事會(huì)的職務(wù)。但即便如此，她依然是思科（Cisco）董事會(huì)成員。而且，鑒于經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的CEO人才如此稀缺，她要想另找一份肥缺也不無可能。

????加州大學(xué)洛杉磯分校法學(xué)院（UCLA School of Law）公司與證券法教授林恩?斯陶特稱：“隨著公司與員工彼此之間忠誠度的下降，高管跳槽的頻率越來越高。因此，董事會(huì)很難從公司內(nèi)部挑選一位知根知底的、才干優(yōu)長(zhǎng)的CEO候選人，迫使他們只能從外部尋找候選人?！?/p>

????而且，她說，如果董事會(huì)從外部尋找候選人，“很自然地就會(huì)偏向于聘用在其他公司擔(dān)任過CEO的人選，而不是冒險(xiǎn)從外部聘用一位從未擔(dān)任過這一職務(wù)的新手?！?/p>

公司董事會(huì)“一家親”

????公司經(jīng)營不善，為何董事不會(huì)受到牽連？密歇根大學(xué)羅斯商學(xué)院（University of Michigan's Ross School of Business）教授尼爾?迪馳認(rèn)為，原因之一是由于公司在選擇董事人選時(shí)，主要還是依靠高管社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)，因?yàn)椤爱?dāng)出現(xiàn)職位空缺時(shí)，翻來覆去地不過就那么幾個(gè)人選?！?/p>

????“有時(shí)，公司管理層會(huì)想‘既然我哥們對(duì)這個(gè)職務(wù)輕車熟路，誰還會(huì)愿意去培訓(xùn)一個(gè)菜鳥？’”

????實(shí)際上，許多高管同時(shí)在多家公司董事會(huì)任職，這只會(huì)讓商業(yè)領(lǐng)袖的人才庫日益枯竭。例如，新聞集團(tuán)（News Corp.）近期公布的董事候選人詹姆斯?布萊爾，他不僅是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司Accel Partners的合伙人，同時(shí)還在戴爾（Dell）、沃爾瑪（Wal-Mart）和Facebook，以及網(wǎng)絡(luò)購物平臺(tái)Etsy等公司擔(dān)任董事。

????迪馳對(duì)此提出質(zhì)疑：“這些人已經(jīng)身兼數(shù)職，不堪重負(fù)，再給他們一個(gè)董事會(huì)成員的職位意義何在？畢竟這一職務(wù)涉及大量的工作，并且還要參加董事會(huì)議。”迪馳曾出版多本關(guān)于領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力的作品，包括《判斷力：成功領(lǐng)袖怎樣做出偉大的決斷》（Judgment: How Winning Leaders Make Great Calls）。他還說：“身兼多職還會(huì)造成利益沖突，而CEO已然從日常工作獲得了報(bào)酬?！?

????But the Stanford study shows that the professional fates of such luminaries can pivot on whether a company's failure or failings were due to management or governance problems.

????"Executives are hired with the express purpose of taking strategic risk to increase shareholder value, some of which might not work out as hoped," says David Larcker, a professor of corporate governance at Stanford Graduate School of Business and director of its Corporate Governance Research Program. "Corporate monitors, by contrast," says Larcker, "are hired with the express purpose of detecting malfeasance."

????Yet a recent Stanford survey found that two-thirds of executives and directors questioned believe that directors who served on the board of a failed company can succeed as board members elsewhere.

CEOs get less of a break

????Only one-third agreed that a former chief executive of a failed company could be a good director at another company. And CEOs were held to a higher standard of accountability in the 2011 Corporate Board of Directors Survey conducted by executive recruiter Heidrick and Struggles and the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford.

????Even so, Carol Bartz, who was unceremoniously ousted from struggling Yahoo recently and resigned from the tech company's board, remains on Cisco's (CSCO) board of directors. And she may yet land another plum position given the small pool of experienced CEOs.

????"As firm loyalty toward employees and employee loyalty towards firms declines, executives change jobs more frequently," says Lynn Stout, a professor of corporate and securities law at the UCLA School of Law. "This makes it harder for boards to find strong 'home grown' CEO candidates from within the firm and whom they know well, and forces them to look for outside candidates."

????Also, boards looking at outside candidates, she says, "will naturally be biased toward hiring someone who has already been a CEO elsewhere, rather than taking a chance on an outside candidate who has not held that position."

All in the corporate board family

????Why do directors so often escape without a scarlet letter? One reason is that the executive social network "still reigns" in selecting directors, says Noel Tichy, professor at University of Michigan's Ross School of Business, because "the same names are passed around when there are openings.

????"In some cases, the executive thinks 'Who wants to train a neophyte when I've got a buddy who already understands what the job is?'"

????The fact that many executives serve on multiple boards only reinforces the narrowness of the business leader pool. For example, News Corp.'s (NWSA) latest director nominee, James Breyer, is a partner at venture capital firm Accel Partners and a director at Dell (DELL), Wal-Mart (WMT), and Facebook as well as others like Etsy, Inc.

????"These are people who are already overloaded so what is the point of board membership, which involves a lot of work and attending meetings?" asks Tichy, who has written several books on leadership, including Judgment: How Winning Leaders Make Great Calls. Also, he says, "it can create conflicts of interest, and the CEOs are already being paid for their day jobs."

????