初夏一個(gè)潮濕的夜晚，一千多人涌入雅典的一處廣場(chǎng)，為左翼政治領(lǐng)袖阿萊克斯·齊普拉斯歡呼。齊普拉斯已經(jīng)到了他總理生涯的末期，在大選中也落后于一位重商派的競(jìng)選對(duì)手。

他跳上一個(gè)臨時(shí)搭建的演講臺(tái)，身后的旗幟上寫(xiě)著“我們有能力”。他對(duì)著人群大聲說(shuō)道：“這是一場(chǎng)兩個(gè)世界之間的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，是精英與大眾的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)！”隨后他把話題轉(zhuǎn)到了那些瞄準(zhǔn)希臘投資機(jī)會(huì)的外國(guó)公司，在歐洲漫長(zhǎng)的金融危機(jī)期間，希臘是受傷最深的國(guó)家之一?！霸谶B續(xù)8年的蕭條后，我們成功地回到了增長(zhǎng)通道?！饼R普拉斯喊著，“電力、健康、教育、水和能源，這些東西是不能賣的！”

把國(guó)有的財(cái)產(chǎn)保留在希臘人的手中，這樣的承諾引來(lái)了民眾震耳欲聾的歡呼。但是，齊普拉斯并沒(méi)有提到希臘財(cái)富中最寶貴的部分：比雷埃夫斯港。該港口就在雅典的邊上——是通往中東和非洲的捷徑——2500年來(lái)這個(gè)港口一直是戰(zhàn)略寶地，最早可以追溯到雅典和斯巴達(dá)為了地中海的霸權(quán)，在附近海域的一場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)斗中擊敗了波斯國(guó)王。盡管如此，廣場(chǎng)集會(huì)的人群明白，正是齊普拉斯的政府多年前賣掉了比雷埃夫斯港，賣給中國(guó)。

當(dāng)中國(guó)國(guó)家主席習(xí)近平在2013年首次提出雄心勃勃的一帶一路倡議（簡(jiǎn)稱BRI）時(shí)，他腦中想的是商貿(mào)，而不是征服。習(xí)近平稱，中國(guó)將在數(shù)千英里的距離內(nèi)，構(gòu)建一個(gè)公路和鐵路（“一帶”）以及海路（“一路”）的網(wǎng)絡(luò)，將亞歐和亞非連接起來(lái)。這個(gè)想法是要重建曾經(jīng)的絲綢之路——一條東西方的商貿(mào)通道，是真正意義上的全球貿(mào)易的基石。而中國(guó)最終的戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)是：擴(kuò)張并穩(wěn)固一個(gè)貿(mào)易關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)，以此來(lái)強(qiáng)化未來(lái)數(shù)十年中國(guó)在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治格局中的主導(dǎo)地位。

比雷埃夫斯港成為了一帶一路開(kāi)發(fā)的展示窗口——這個(gè)港口項(xiàng)目不但會(huì)改造港口本身，也可能會(huì)改造整個(gè)希臘經(jīng)濟(jì)。這也是中國(guó)最大的公司執(zhí)行一帶一路項(xiàng)目并從中獲益的一個(gè)范例。自2016年以來(lái)，該港口的大股東就是中國(guó)的中遠(yuǎn)集團(tuán)（實(shí)際運(yùn)營(yíng)始于2009年）

中遠(yuǎn)進(jìn)入時(shí)，比雷埃夫斯港“只是一個(gè)沒(méi)人認(rèn)真關(guān)注的落后的集裝箱裝卸區(qū)。”說(shuō)這話的是奧拉夫·默克，他是經(jīng)合組織（OECD）國(guó)際運(yùn)輸論壇的港口和海運(yùn)專家?！爸袊?guó)看到了一個(gè)未被開(kāi)發(fā)的機(jī)會(huì)?！毙碌墓芾韺訋?lái)了令人炫目的各種變化：據(jù)港口管理機(jī)構(gòu)稱，今年這個(gè)港口的貨物吞吐量將是2010年的5倍。比雷埃夫斯港也正在成為地中海最大的集裝箱港口，或許在今年就能夠超越西班牙的瓦倫西亞港。

與此同時(shí)，中遠(yuǎn)集團(tuán)自身也獲得了迅猛發(fā)展，這主要?dú)w功于一帶一路計(jì)劃和中國(guó)政府的堅(jiān)實(shí)支持。在合并了幾家運(yùn)輸公司后，按運(yùn)輸量排，中遠(yuǎn)已經(jīng)成為世界第三大的海運(yùn)公司，年收入達(dá)430億美元，并在環(huán)繞歐洲的其他港口也有不少股份。

近幾年，中國(guó)一直把比雷埃夫斯港宣傳成一帶一路成就的樣板。這種影響力在雅典隨處可見(jiàn)：港口提供了更多的就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)，當(dāng)?shù)胤康禺a(chǎn)的中文廣告，以及要把比雷埃夫斯港再造成一個(gè)旅游目的地，讓中國(guó)的旅客蜂擁而來(lái)。

On a steamy night earlier this summer, about a thousand people poured into a public square in Athens to cheer on Greece’s leading left-wing politician, Alexis Tsipras. Tsipras was in the waning weeks of his term as Prime Minister—and trailing in a race against a pro-business opponent.

Leaping onto a makeshift stage in front of a banner reading “We have the power,” Tsipras shouted over the crowd. “This is a battle between two worlds, the elites against the many!” Then he took aim at foreign companies eyeing investment prospects in Greece, one of the countries hardest hit by Europe’s long financial crisis. “We have managed to get back to growth after eight straight years of recession,” Tsipras said. “Electricity, health, education, water, energy—they are not for sale!”

The promise to keep the country’s state-owned assets in Greek hands elicited a deafening roar. And yet Tsipras didn’t mention the most prized Greek asset of all: the port of Piraeus. Situated at the edge of Athens—a short sail from the Middle East and Africa—the port has been a strategic jewel for nearly 2,500 years, ever since the Athenians and Spartans defeated the Persian emperor in a nearby sea battle for Mediterranean supremacy. But as the crowd in the square knew, Tsipras’s own government had sold off Piraeus, years earlier, to a modern-day empire intent on expanding its own power: China.

When Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled the ambitious vision he called the Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI, in 2013, he had commerce, not conquest, in mind. Xi announced that China would build a network of highways and rail lines (the “belt”) and sea routes (the “road”) across thousands of miles, linking Asia to Europe and Africa. The idea was to re-create the old Silk Road—the trade routes between East and West that were the foundations of the world’s first truly global commerce. The ultimate strategic goal: to expand and solidify a web of trading relationships that would cement China’s position as a dominant economic and political power for decades to come.

Piraeus has become a showcase display of the BRI in action—a project capable of transforming not just one port but perhaps an entire economy. It’s also an object lesson in the ways China’s biggest companies both execute and benefit from the BRI. The port has been majority-owned since 2016 (and operated since 2009) by China Cosco Shipping.

When Cosco stepped in, Piraeus “was a pretty backward container terminal that nobody took seriously,” says Olaf Merk, the ports and shipping expert at the International Transport Forum at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). “China saw an opportunity that was underdeveloped.” New management has brought dizzying change: This year, the port will handle five times as much cargo volume as it did in 2010, according to the Piraeus Port Authority. And it’s on track to become the biggest container port in the Mediterranean, perhaps as soon as this year, overtaking Valencia in Spain.

Cosco, meanwhile, has undergone its own rapid growth, thanks in large part to the BRI and to substantial Chinese government support. After several mergers with other transport companies, Cosco is now the third-biggest shipping company in the world by volume, with $43 billion in revenue—and significant stakes in other ports that ring Europe.

In recent years, China has trumpeted Piraeus as a model for what the BRI can achieve. And its impact is visible throughout Athens: in more jobs at the port, in Chinese-language advertisements for local real estate, and in plans to remake Piraeus as a tourist destination for the burgeoning Chinese upper classes.

當(dāng)西方人談到與中國(guó)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，話題常常是先進(jìn)科技——比如人工智能或者5G互聯(lián)網(wǎng)。但其實(shí)一帶一路計(jì)劃特別強(qiáng)調(diào)貿(mào)易基礎(chǔ)建設(shè)的重要性：鐵路、公路和港口。而在這個(gè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中，或許最重要的銜接點(diǎn)是港口。大約90%的國(guó)際貨物貿(mào)易是通過(guò)海路完成的。控制了海運(yùn)航道和港口，就能夠在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)中掌握極大的影響力?！傲?xí)近平主席會(huì)想，‘我的政治遺產(chǎn)會(huì)是什么？’”提出這個(gè)設(shè)問(wèn)的是尼古拉斯·維尼科斯，一位第四代的希臘船主，也是總部位于中國(guó)的絲綢之路國(guó)際商會(huì)的副主席?！八麤Q意成為21世紀(jì)的馬可波羅?！?/p>

一旦成功，一帶一路將是史上最大的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)工程。中國(guó)的公司早已行動(dòng)，鋪設(shè)公路、運(yùn)作碼頭、建設(shè)鐵路線，這些工程覆蓋60多個(gè)國(guó)家比如斯里蘭卡、馬來(lái)西亞和哈薩克斯坦。中國(guó)政府的支出和補(bǔ)貼讓這些工程不斷開(kāi)工。美國(guó)外交關(guān)系委員會(huì)預(yù)計(jì)，中國(guó)已經(jīng)在一帶一路項(xiàng)目上的投入達(dá)2000億美元，而據(jù)摩根士丹利預(yù)測(cè)，到2027年總投資額將達(dá)1.2萬(wàn)億美元。習(xí)近平在2015年說(shuō)過(guò)，一帶一路最終將帶來(lái)“所有沿線國(guó)家的真正的大合唱，而不是中國(guó)的獨(dú)角戲。”

在這曲大合唱中，歐洲還只發(fā)出了一點(diǎn)微弱的聲音：最大的一帶一路項(xiàng)目都在亞洲和非洲。但一帶一路之外，中國(guó)在歐洲的投資也在快速增長(zhǎng)。金融危機(jī)后歐盟國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)停滯不前，沉重的債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)束縛了政府開(kāi)支，中國(guó)公司于是來(lái)填補(bǔ)了真空。

事實(shí)上，由于中美貿(mào)易關(guān)系緊張影響了中國(guó)對(duì)美的投資，現(xiàn)在中國(guó)的直接投資約有四分之一是去歐洲——據(jù)律所貝克·麥堅(jiān)時(shí)統(tǒng)計(jì)，2018年上半年投資額達(dá)220億美元。國(guó)有的中國(guó)化工集團(tuán)在2017年以431億美元的價(jià)格收購(gòu)了瑞士農(nóng)業(yè)巨頭先正達(dá)。2016年中國(guó)的美的集團(tuán)出資53億美元收購(gòu)了德國(guó)機(jī)器人廠商庫(kù)卡，這事讓大眾汽車耿耿于懷。被特朗普政府認(rèn)為是國(guó)家安全威脅的科技企業(yè)華為，在中國(guó)之外最大的物流中心就設(shè)在匈牙利，那里雇傭了2000名員工。

When Westerners think about competition with China, the conversation often involves advanced technology—think artificial intelligence or 5G Internet. But the BRI underscores the importance of the infrastructure of trade itself: railways, roads, harbors. Ports may be the most vital link in that network. Roughly 90% of goods traded internationally makes its way around the world by sea. Control the shipping lanes and ports, and you wield great power over the global economy. “Xi thought, ‘What will my legacy be?’?” says Nicolas Vernicos, a fourth-generation Greek shipowner and vice chairman of the Silk Road Chamber of International Commerce, a trade organization headquartered in China. “He decided to be the Marco Polo of the 21st century.”

If completed, the BRI will be one of history’s biggest infrastructure projects. Already Chinese companies are laying highways, operating ports, and creating railway networks in as many as 60 countries as varied as Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Kazakhstan. Chinese government spending and subsidies keep the shovels moving. The Council on Foreign Relations estimates that China has spent about $200 billion on BRI projects so far; that investment could reach $1.2 trillion by 2027, according to Morgan Stanley. The result, Xi said in 2015, will bring “a real chorus comprising all countries along the route, not a solo for China.”

European voices make up only a small share of the chorus so far: The biggest BRI projects are underway in Asia and Africa. But outside of the BRI, Europe has seen Chinese investment rise quickly. With most EU economies still sluggish in the aftermath of the financial crisis, and heavy debt loads restraining government spending, Chinese companies have filled a void.

Indeed, as trade tensions impair China’s ability to invest in the U.S., Europe now accounts for almost a quarter of China’s direct foreign investment—about $22 billion in the first half of 2018, according to law firm Baker McKenzie. State-owned ChemChina bought Swiss agribusiness giant Syngenta in 2017, for $43.1 billion. In 2016, China’s Midea spent $5.3 billion to buy German robotics manufacturer Kuka—which, among other things, keeps Volkswagen’s factories ticking. Technology player Huawei, which the Trump administration has branded as a national-security threat, maintains its largest logistics center outside China in Hungary, where it employs 2,000 people.

前財(cái)政部部長(zhǎng)、希臘左翼人士揚(yáng)尼斯·瓦魯法基斯說(shuō)：“金錢不喜歡真空?！睋P(yáng)尼斯曾經(jīng)參與2015年國(guó)際貨幣基金組織和歐盟救助希臘的談判，他批評(píng)歐盟領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，把希臘的公司搞得很脆弱導(dǎo)致被收購(gòu)。他說(shuō)：“歐盟的決策者把投資弄到歷史最低水平，讓中國(guó)公司進(jìn)來(lái)后發(fā)現(xiàn)沒(méi)有其他競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手?！?/p>

中遠(yuǎn)就悄悄地成為了這些投資者中最忙碌的一個(gè)。在一帶一路倡議提出前，中遠(yuǎn)就已經(jīng)開(kāi)始在多個(gè)主要港口進(jìn)行股權(quán)收購(gòu)，環(huán)繞歐洲編織一個(gè)終端網(wǎng)絡(luò)。（中遠(yuǎn)與當(dāng)?shù)卣炇痖L(zhǎng)期的特許權(quán)；比雷埃夫斯港是其唯一擁有控股權(quán)的歐洲港口。）中遠(yuǎn)的布局包括擁有荷蘭鹿特丹巨大的Euromax終點(diǎn)港47.5%的股權(quán)；100%控股比利時(shí)澤布呂赫集裝箱港；占股西班牙瓦倫西亞和畢爾巴鄂終點(diǎn)港。在歐洲之巔以色列，中國(guó)正在海法和阿什杜德修建港口。

中遠(yuǎn)的崛起也顯示出，國(guó)資公司把自己的發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略納入政府的宏大計(jì)劃，將獲益甚多。增長(zhǎng)和利潤(rùn)幾乎可以確保——這樣的優(yōu)勢(shì)沒(méi)有一家美國(guó)或歐洲的公司可以與之并肩?！爸羞h(yuǎn)的運(yùn)營(yíng)虧損可以由政府補(bǔ)貼彌補(bǔ)，而信貸的寬松讓大額投資成為可能?！苯?jīng)合組織的分析師默克解釋道。

中遠(yuǎn)派駐比雷埃夫斯港的主管傅成秋拒絕了多次的采訪請(qǐng)求；中遠(yuǎn)在歐洲和中國(guó)的高管也沒(méi)有回應(yīng)采訪請(qǐng)求。但在公開(kāi)場(chǎng)合，公司的高管并不諱言其全球擴(kuò)張的計(jì)劃。今年4月，中遠(yuǎn)的港口部執(zhí)行總裁張偉說(shuō)：“擴(kuò)大規(guī)模將仍然是我們這個(gè)行業(yè)的長(zhǎng)期趨勢(shì)?！?/p>

“Money does not like a vacuum,” says Yanis Varoufakis, Greece’s left-wing former finance minister, who helped negotiate the country’s bailout with the International Monetary Fund and the EU in 2015. Varoufakis blames EU leaders for leaving companies vulnerable to takeovers. “European decision-makers [are] keeping investment at the slowest level in history and leaving the Chinese to come in as the only investors,” he says.

Cosco has quietly become one of the busiest of those investors. Even before the BRI was unveiled, it began acquiring stakes in numerous key ports, piecing together a network of terminals around Europe. (The company signs long-term concessions with local governments; Piraeus is the only European port where it owns outright a controlling stake.) Its holdings include 47.5% of the huge Euromax terminal in the Dutch city of Rotterdam; 100% of the container port in Zeebrugge, Belgium; and stakes in terminals in Valencia and Bilbao, Spain. In Israel, on Europe’s edge, it’s building ports in Haifa and Ashdod.

Cosco’s rise also shows how state-owned companies benefit when they subsume their strategy to the government’s grand plans. Growth and profitability are virtually assured—an advantage no U.S. or European company can match. “Operational losses of Cosco are compensated by state subsidies, and capital investments are made possible by generous credit lines,” explains Merk, the OECD analyst.

Cosco’s Chinese executive in Piraeus, Capt. Fu Cheng Qiu, declined multiple requests for interviews; Cosco officials elsewhere in Europe and China did not respond to interview requests. But publicly, the company’s officials aren’t shy about their plans for global growth. “Scale-up will still be the long-term trend for our industry,” Zhang Wei, executive director of Cosco’s port arm, said in April.

如果你從雅典市區(qū)驅(qū)車5英里進(jìn)入比雷埃夫斯港，途徑一些汽車修理店和小咖啡館，你不會(huì)感覺(jué)到你進(jìn)入的是一個(gè)爭(zhēng)議焦點(diǎn)區(qū)。盡管鎮(zhèn)上及周邊住著45萬(wàn)人，比雷埃夫斯港給人的感覺(jué)是這個(gè)郊區(qū)也曾經(jīng)過(guò)過(guò)好日子。午餐時(shí)間，港口咖啡店的塑料桌邊坐滿了碼頭工人，抽著香煙討論著5美元的沙丁魚(yú)餐，這正是他們所經(jīng)歷的十年艱苦歲月的縮影。

一位64歲的留著胡須的強(qiáng)壯男子吉奧格斯·阿萊維索普勒斯說(shuō)起了他的經(jīng)歷，他17歲就在港口開(kāi)始工作，那是1972年，當(dāng)時(shí)造船業(yè)是希臘的強(qiáng)國(guó)產(chǎn)業(yè)。他最終成為一名焊工，在干船塢和浮船塢的船只上進(jìn)行維修工作，數(shù)十家小公司在那里干著一些零工。

但到了本世紀(jì)初，比雷埃夫斯港的工作量急劇下降，因?yàn)樵S多公司在其他國(guó)家尋求更低的維修價(jià)格，或者去光顧更現(xiàn)代化的碼頭。多年的勞工運(yùn)動(dòng)也削減了港口的吸引力。阿萊維索普勒斯說(shuō)，在2005至2014年間，他每年只工作約50天?！拔业恼麄€(gè)生活都變了，我的人生觀也變了。我甚至想過(guò)自殺?！彼f(shuō)，“有些日子里，我們只吃點(diǎn)面包。今天該吃點(diǎn)什么這個(gè)問(wèn)題，答案永遠(yuǎn)都是什么最便宜吃什么?！?/p>

多年來(lái)，希臘政府似乎滿足于將比雷埃夫斯港運(yùn)營(yíng)為一個(gè)通勤港，渡船送數(shù)百萬(wàn)當(dāng)?shù)厝撕陀慰屯涤趷?ài)琴海的島嶼間。但這里的船塢和貨物港的狀況，一年不如一年。由于債務(wù)纏身，又受制于政治分裂和官僚叢生，政府忽視了港口的升級(jí)改造，它本可以讓比雷埃夫斯港適應(yīng)快速發(fā)展的大型集裝箱船運(yùn)業(yè)。到了2010年，用20尺柜這一衡量集裝箱吞吐量的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)方法算，港口的年貨物吞吐量跌到只剩88萬(wàn)——是歐洲最大型港口吞吐量的零頭。

2008年時(shí)中國(guó)行動(dòng)了。中遠(yuǎn)，全稱是中國(guó)遠(yuǎn)洋運(yùn)輸公司，與希臘政府簽署了特許證，獲得了比雷埃夫斯集裝箱裝卸港35年的運(yùn)營(yíng)權(quán)，這份協(xié)議價(jià)值12億歐元（約合14億美元），包括租金和設(shè)備升級(jí)，以及另外27億歐元的收入共享。頗有分量的碼頭工人工會(huì)，對(duì)于被外資控制的前景表示擔(dān)憂，他們舉行了長(zhǎng)達(dá)6周的罷工。在中國(guó)公司正式入駐那天，他們?cè)诒壤装７蛩垢鄣陌哆厴?shù)起了旗幟，上面寫(xiě)著“中遠(yuǎn)滾回去！”然而，彼時(shí)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退正值谷底，希臘沒(méi)有更多的選擇，罷工人群很快就回去工作了。

中遠(yuǎn)快速地對(duì)比雷埃夫斯港的其中一個(gè)碼頭進(jìn)行了大修，并對(duì)吊機(jī)進(jìn)行了重大設(shè)備升級(jí)。這極大地?cái)U(kuò)展了比雷埃夫斯港的吞吐能力，幾乎一夜之間將該港變成了對(duì)集裝箱船只富有吸引力的目的港。中遠(yuǎn)對(duì)港口的運(yùn)營(yíng)也更有效率?！耙郧?，員工都是公務(wù)員?！贝骶S尼科斯說(shuō)，“每天工作8小時(shí)都不到，大部分時(shí)間在釣魚(yú)。”

更重要的是，中遠(yuǎn)現(xiàn)在把自己公司的巨量集裝箱船只導(dǎo)向比雷埃夫斯港。古希臘人就已經(jīng)明白，比雷埃夫斯港的地理位置讓其價(jià)值連城。對(duì)于從蘇伊士運(yùn)河出發(fā)來(lái)歐洲大陸的船只，這是最近的主要集裝箱港口，也是通往廣闊的東南歐地區(qū)的門戶。“中遠(yuǎn)到來(lái)之前，中國(guó)貨物需要去漢堡或者英國(guó)，然后才能進(jìn)入比如巴爾干地區(qū)，而現(xiàn)在可以縮減10天航程。”《希臘中國(guó)時(shí)報(bào)》的所有人吳海龍告訴我們。他的報(bào)紙主要面向在雅典的約1萬(wàn)中國(guó)讀者。

When you drive into Piraeus, five miles from downtown Athens, past auto-body repair shops and small cafés, there is no sense that you’re entering a flash point of controversy. Though some 450,000 people live in the town and its surrounding neighborhoods, Piraeus has the feel of a suburb that has seen better days. At lunchtime, the plastic tables at the café on the pier fill with dockworkers, smoking cigarettes and discussing their lives over $5 plates of sardines—offering a window into the tumultuous decade they have endured.

Giorgos Alevizopoulos, a burly man of 64 with a mustache and beard, says he began working in the port at 17, in 1972—when shipbuilding was Greece’s powerhouse industry. He ultimately became a welder, working on vessels under repair or maintenance on dry and floating docks where dozens of small companies operate on piecemeal jobs.

But by early this century, work in Piraeus had slowed to a crawl, as companies sought cheaper repairs in other nations or patronized more modern shipyards. Years of labor strife also reduced the port’s appeal. Alevizopoulos says he worked only about 50 days a year between 2005 and 2014. “My entire life changed, and my outlook on life changed. I even contemplated suicide,” he says. “Some days we just ate bread. If there was a question about what we eat that day, the answer was always whatever is cheapest.”

For years, the Greek government seemed content to run Piraeus largely as a commuter port for the ferryboats that take millions of locals and tourists to islands in the Aegean Sea. The shipyards and cargo port, meanwhile, deteriorated year by year. Laden with debt and bogged down by political schisms and bureaucracy, the government neglected the upgrades that could have retrofitted Piraeus to serve the rapidly growing large-container shipping industry. By 2010, yearly cargo traffic had fallen to 880,000 TEUs, or twenty-foot equivalent units, the standard measurement for container throughput—a paltry fraction of the capacity of Europe’s biggest ports.

In 2008, China made its move. Cosco, then known as the China Ocean Shipping Group, signed a concession with the Greek government to operate Piraeus’s container terminal for 35 years, in a deal worth about 1.2 billion euros ($1.4 billion) in rent and facility upgrades and another 2.7 billion euros in revenue sharing. The powerful dockworker unions, anxious at the prospect of foreign ownership, went on strike for six weeks. They hung a banner on Piraeus’s waterfront on the day the Chinese company took over that read “Cosco go home!” But with the global recession at its nadir, and few other options, the strikers soon returned to work.

Cosco quickly overhauled one of Piraeus’s piers and implemented a major upgrade of its loading cranes. That vastly expanded Piraeus’s capacity, turning the port almost overnight into an attractive destination for container vessels. Cosco also ran the port more efficiently. “Before, the employees were public servants,” says Vernicos, the shipowner. “They were working less than eight hours a day and fishing most of the time.”

Most important, Cosco now directs more of its own huge container-vessel traffic to Piraeus. As the ancient Greeks understood, Piraeus’s location makes it potentially invaluable. It is the closest major container terminal on the European mainland for ships emerging from the Suez Canal—and a gateway to a huge swath of southeastern Europe. “Before Cosco arrived, Chinese products had to go to Hamburg or Britain, and then they would go perhaps to the Balkans,” says Wu Hailong, owner of the Greece China Times, a newspaper catering to the 10,000 or so Chinese residents of Athens. “Now it saves about 10 days on the route.”

即便比雷埃夫斯港運(yùn)作得不錯(cuò)，希臘仍然在債主設(shè)置的嚴(yán)峻緊縮條件下艱難前行。債主們要求希臘政府大幅縮減公共開(kāi)支——導(dǎo)致成百數(shù)千早已深受緊縮之苦的希臘人走上街頭抗議。阿萊克斯·齊普拉斯和他的激進(jìn)左翼聯(lián)盟贏得了2015年的大選，在競(jìng)選中他們承諾絕不售賣某些公共資產(chǎn)。但最終，為了符合國(guó)際貨幣基金組織和歐盟的救助條件，他們還是不得不賣了一些家當(dāng)?？纯窗桑合ＥD把鐵路線賣給了意大利國(guó)有鐵路公司，售價(jià)僅僅是微不足道的4300萬(wàn)歐元，比有些體育明星一年賺的都少。天然氣的控股權(quán)賣給了一個(gè)私有集團(tuán)；另一家國(guó)有公司中國(guó)電網(wǎng)，收購(gòu)了希臘國(guó)家公用事業(yè)的部分股權(quán)。曾經(jīng)主管希臘議會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家帕納吉奧蒂斯·里亞格瓦斯說(shuō)：“希臘有幾個(gè)選擇，但希臘沒(méi)有選擇破產(chǎn)?！?/p>

2016年希臘同意將比雷埃夫斯港的51%的股權(quán)賣給中遠(yuǎn)，包括其集裝箱裝卸港100%的股權(quán)，協(xié)議價(jià)格是3.685億歐元，另加7.6億歐元的升級(jí)改造費(fèi)和收入共享。比雷埃夫斯港實(shí)際上成為了中國(guó)永久擁有的港口了。2018年該港口的吞吐量是490萬(wàn)個(gè)20尺柜，成為了歐洲第六大的貨物港。

焊工阿萊維索普勒斯說(shuō)，從那以后他的生活急速好轉(zhuǎn)。他說(shuō)去年他賺了差不多2萬(wàn)歐元——是政府賣出港口前他收入的4倍。即便如此，希臘經(jīng)濟(jì)的苦難歷程還是留下了一些疤痕。“心理上，我們還沒(méi)有復(fù)原。”他說(shuō)，“像其他人一樣，我們還是有擔(dān)憂?！?/p>

Even as Piraeus got healthier, Greece labored under heavy austerity conditions imposed by its creditors. Its lenders demanded that the government make deep cuts to public spending—prompting hundreds of thousands of already-suffering Greeks to flood the streets in protest. Alexis Tsipras and Syriza won elections in 2015, campaigning on promises never to sell certain public assets. In the end, however, Greece had to do just that as a condition of a bailout by the EU and the IMF. Consider this: It sold its rail lines to Italy’s state-owned railway company for a tiny 43 million euros, less than some pro athletes earn in a year. Its natural-gas holdings were sold off to a private group; China State Grid, another state-owned company, bought a stake in Greece’s national utility. “Greece had choices, and it did not choose bankruptcy,” says Panagiotis Liargovas, an economist who headed the Greek Parliament’s budget office at the time.

In 2016, Greece agreed to sell 51% of Piraeus to Cosco, including 100% of its container terminal, for a bargain price of 368.5 million euros, plus 760 million euros in upgrades and revenue sharing. Piraeus became Chinese-owned, effectively in perpetuity. And in 2018, it processed 4.9 million TEUs, making it Europe’s sixth-largest cargo port.

Alevizopoulos, the welder, says his life has drastically changed for the better since then. He says he made nearly 20,000 euros last year—about four times as much as his earnings before the government sold the port. Even so, Greece’s economic ordeal has left its mark. “Psychologically, we have not recovered,” he says. “Like the rest of the people, we are still afraid.”

到了2018年8月，希臘終于擺脫了長(zhǎng)達(dá)8年的緊縮計(jì)劃。盡管2017年希臘經(jīng)濟(jì)獲得了增長(zhǎng)，但在2008至2016年間希臘的GDP令人瞠目地縮減了45%——這是和平時(shí)期對(duì)一個(gè)國(guó)家最大的經(jīng)濟(jì)打擊。希臘的項(xiàng)目融資要讓投資人有信心，還需要更多的時(shí)間，希臘銀行行長(zhǎng)雅尼斯·斯托納拉斯認(rèn)為，“所以我們需要股權(quán)投資。”這些資金的進(jìn)入，不僅是為了提升經(jīng)濟(jì)，也是為了在實(shí)質(zhì)上重振希臘，行長(zhǎng)解釋說(shuō)。金融危機(jī)期間成千上萬(wàn)的受過(guò)教育的年青人離開(kāi)了希臘，留下來(lái)的也不愿意組建家庭?！爸挥刑峁┖玫墓ぷ鲘徫唬贻p夫婦才會(huì)愿意生小孩。”斯托納拉斯說(shuō)。

中遠(yuǎn)說(shuō)它正在創(chuàng)造這些就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)。許多希臘人擔(dān)憂中國(guó)控制了港口，意味著很多中國(guó)工人會(huì)進(jìn)來(lái)取代希臘員工，可實(shí)際上港口的中國(guó)員工數(shù)量很少，都是一些經(jīng)理層的人，也很少在船只和集裝箱堆場(chǎng)上見(jiàn)到他們。中遠(yuǎn)的董事長(zhǎng)許立榮最近對(duì)中國(guó)媒體說(shuō)，中遠(yuǎn)為希臘創(chuàng)造了3100個(gè)工作崗位，為希臘經(jīng)濟(jì)提供了3.37億美元的產(chǎn)值——對(duì)于GDP約為2000億美元的希臘來(lái)說(shuō)，這個(gè)數(shù)目是有價(jià)值的。去年該港口的收入約為1.51億美元，比2017年上漲19.2%，中遠(yuǎn)稱其目標(biāo)是將比雷埃夫斯港的吞吐量再翻一番。

中資擁護(hù)者們，還看到了中國(guó)資金在經(jīng)濟(jì)低迷時(shí)支撐了其他行業(yè)。希臘最大的房地產(chǎn)開(kāi)發(fā)商之一V2總裁瓦吉利斯·克特尼亞蒂斯稱，過(guò)去10年他在雅典的海邊高檔物業(yè)，只有5個(gè)希臘買家?？颂啬醽喌偎箙f(xié)助說(shuō)服了希臘政府在2013年啟動(dòng)了一項(xiàng)“黃金簽證”項(xiàng)目，外國(guó)人只要在希臘投資25萬(wàn)歐元的房產(chǎn)，就能獲得希臘居民身份。

克特尼亞蒂斯估算，從那時(shí)起中國(guó)買家在雅典搶購(gòu)了超過(guò)4000套住宅和公寓，而僅經(jīng)他手賣出的就有450套，買家一般是用作第二套房或者短期租賃。如今V2的中文廣告遍布雅典機(jī)場(chǎng)的取行李區(qū)，買房就能快速獲取歐盟居民資格——這對(duì)生意人來(lái)說(shuō)是極大的優(yōu)勢(shì)?！爸袊?guó)人拯救了希臘房地產(chǎn)?！笨颂啬醽喌偎拐f(shuō)，而他也在四個(gè)中國(guó)城市設(shè)立了辦公室。

僅憑中國(guó)資金，就能重塑比雷埃夫斯的房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)。某個(gè)下午，比雷埃夫斯港管理局的發(fā)言人奈卡塔里奧斯·德門諾普洛斯帶著記者繞了港口一圈，他指向一片巨大的廢棄大麥筒倉(cāng)地，說(shuō)中遠(yuǎn)想要把它變成其計(jì)劃中的五家高端酒店之一；中遠(yuǎn)還計(jì)劃建立一個(gè)奢侈品商場(chǎng)。中遠(yuǎn)的想法是要投資約6億歐元，把這個(gè)沉睡中的小鎮(zhèn)變成一個(gè)旅游港口，服務(wù)于把比雷埃夫斯作為一站的巡洋船只（包括中國(guó)船只）。目前在這個(gè)小鎮(zhèn)無(wú)事可做，游客如果在這下船，只會(huì)蜂擁而去6.5英里外的雅典衛(wèi)城?！爸袊?guó)人對(duì)古希臘文化是有敬意的?！钡麻T諾普洛斯說(shuō)，“但在成千上萬(wàn)的中國(guó)富有人群中，來(lái)我們這兒的還是少數(shù)。”

In August 2018, Greece finally exited the eight-year austerity program imposed by its creditors. Although the economy returned to growth in 2017, Greece’s GDP had shrunk an astonishing 45% between 2008 and 2016—the largest depression ever to strike a country in peacetime. It will take years more for outside lenders to feel secure about financing projects in Greece, says Yannis Stournaras, governor of the Bank of Greece, “so we hope for equity investment.” Such an influx is needed not just to boost the economy but also to literally rejuvenate Greece, the governor explains. Thousands of educated young people fled during the crash, and those who stayed have been reluctant to start families. “Only by producing good jobs will young couples produce more children,” Stournaras says.

Cosco says it is generating such jobs. While many Greeks worried that Chinese control would mean that imported workers would displace Athenians, only a handful of the port’s staff is Chinese, and those are managers, rarely seen amid the ships and stacks of containers. Cosco’s chairman, Xu Lirong, recently told Chinese media that the company has created 3,100 jobs for Greeks and added about $337 million a year to the Greek economy—a meaningful sum in a country with GDP of about $200 billion. The port’s revenues were about $151 million last year, up 19.2% from 2017, and Cosco says it is aiming to more than double the container volume Piraeus handles.

Boosters see Chinese money also bolstering other sectors that suffered during the dark years. Vaggelis Kteniadis, president of V2, one of Greece’s biggest real estate development companies, says he has had only five Greek buyers for his properties in Athens’s upscale seaside suburbs during the past 10 years. Kteni?adis helped persuade Greece’s government to launch a “golden visa” program in 2013, offering foreigners resident status in exchange for investing 250,000 euros in Greek property.

Kteniadis estimates that Chinese buyers since then have snapped up more than 4,000 houses and apartments in Athens, about 450 from him alone, bought as second homes or short-term rental properties. Today, V2’s advertisements, in Chinese, are plastered across the baggage-claim area in Athens’s airport, offering home ownership as a rapid path to EU residency—an invaluable advantage for businesspeople. “The Chinese have saved Greek real estate,” says Kteniadis, who now has offices in four Chinese cities.

Chinese money could reshape the real estate of Piraeus itself. Guiding a reporter around the port one afternoon, Nektarios Demenopoulos, spokesman for the Piraeus Port Authority, points out a large abandoned wheat silo, which Cosco wants to convert into one of five high-end hotels; the company also envisions building a luxury shopping mall. The idea is to invest some 600 million euros to transform the sleepy town into a tourist hub, catering to cruise ships (some Chinese-owned) for which Piraeus is a stop. There is little to do in town currently, and passengers, if they disembark at all, make a beeline for the Acropolis 6.5 miles away. “The Chinese already have respect for ancient Greek culture,” Demenopoulos says. “But we still have a very small number of Chinese tourists compared to the thousands of Chinese millionaires.”

2017年，中國(guó)在歐洲更是急劇地?cái)U(kuò)大影響力。今年3月，習(xí)近平主席到達(dá)羅馬，對(duì)意大利進(jìn)行國(guó)事訪問(wèn)，意大利的總統(tǒng)衛(wèi)隊(duì)馬背列隊(duì)歡迎他，如同歡迎教皇。之后，男高音安德烈·波切利在正式宴會(huì)上為他高歌一曲。意大利的公司與中國(guó)簽署了價(jià)值28億美元的協(xié)議，而且意大利原則上同意加入一帶一路計(jì)劃，成為西方主要經(jīng)濟(jì)體G7集團(tuán)中首個(gè)加入的國(guó)家。在意大利，如同在比雷埃夫斯，中國(guó)的海洋雄心發(fā)揮了作用：意大利有四個(gè)港口在尋求中國(guó)投資，包括的里雅斯特，其鐵路直通比利時(shí)和德國(guó)，代表著歐洲最有價(jià)值的貿(mào)易線路。

在希臘，局勢(shì)發(fā)展也對(duì)中遠(yuǎn)有利。齊普拉斯的激進(jìn)左翼聯(lián)盟在7月初的大選中敗北。飽受多年增稅和勒緊腰帶之苦的選民，選擇了新民主黨。新民主黨黨魁基里亞科斯·米佐塔基斯成為了新任總理，他現(xiàn)年51歲，哈佛畢業(yè)，曾經(jīng)是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家，他承諾為希臘吸引大投資者。大選前幾周在雅典舉行的一帶一路會(huì)議上，新民主黨的副主席阿多尼斯·吉奧吉亞蒂斯說(shuō)，新民主黨“歡迎中國(guó)公司來(lái)希臘投資和發(fā)展”。

走在比雷埃夫斯的港口，碼頭上堆積如山的集裝箱讓人覺(jué)得這個(gè)國(guó)家的繁榮可期。在十年的衰退和苦日子后，比雷埃夫斯的碼頭工人感知到了收入增長(zhǎng)的機(jī)會(huì)。當(dāng)?shù)卮a頭工人工會(huì)的秘書(shū)長(zhǎng)吉奧格斯·高格斯說(shuō)：“我們不想總是這么掙扎著過(guò)日子，我們需要平靜的生活。眼下，對(duì)和平的渴望超越了民族自尊?！?span>（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

本文另一版本登載于《財(cái)富》雜志2019年8月刊，標(biāo)題為《碼頭上的集裝箱》。

譯者：Min

This year, the stakes rose dramatically. In March, when President Xi landed in Rome for a state visit, Italy’s presidential guards lined up on horseback to greet him, as they do for the Pope. Later, tenor Andrea Bocelli serenaded Xi at a formal dinner. Italian companies signed deals with China worth $2.8 billion, and Italy agreed, in principle, to join the BRI, becoming the first member of the G7 group of major Western economies to sign on. Here, as in Piraeus, China’s maritime ambitions play a role: Italy is courting Chinese investment in four of its ports, including Trieste, a city whose direct-rail connections to Belgium and Germany represent some of Europe’s most valuable trade routes.

It was Xi’s splashy Italy visit that jolted EU officials into issuing their warning about China as a “systemic rival.” The EU plans to more rigorously monitor investments by state-owned companies like Cosco. It has begun rolling out guidelines to prevent countries from ceding control of strategic infrastructure or sensitive technology—an attempt to mirror the U.S. Treasury’s Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., or CFIUS, which examines deals involving American companies. Closer examination of security threats and unfair competition “could severely affect China’s investment footprint in Europe,” concludes a recent report by the Rhodium Group and the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin. Indeed, data on Chinese investment in Europe shows that its pace is already slowing.

On a walk through Piraeus, worries about China’s influence seem dwarfed by the towers of containers on the dockside—bulky symbols of the port’s prosperity. Giorgos Gogos, general secretary of the local Dockworkers Union, says the era of strikes and protests is over—for now. That harmony could end if Cosco threatens union workers’ incomes. Still, after a decade of recession and pain, Piraeus’s dockworkers sense the chance for growth—or, at least, stability. “We are tired of struggling all the time,” Gogos says. “We need a period of peace.” For now, that desire for peace seems to outweigh national pride.

A version of this article appears in the August 2019 issue of Fortune with the headline “Boxed in at the Docks.”