如果經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢(shì)大好,為何GDP增速如此之低?
當(dāng)今所謂放眼歷史都堪稱強(qiáng)勁的經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢(shì),缺少了一個(gè)關(guān)鍵因素:井噴的GDP數(shù)據(jù)。 在上個(gè)世紀(jì)的后半葉,美國(guó)商務(wù)部發(fā)布的一些GDP報(bào)告令人印象深刻。從1950年到2000年,每個(gè)十年里最高的年度真實(shí)GDP增速如下:8.7%(1950年)、6.6%(1966年)、5.6%(1973年和1978年)、7.3%(1984年)和4.7%(1999年)。與21世紀(jì)的情況相比,這些數(shù)據(jù)高得夸張。2001年至2010年間,美國(guó)最高的真實(shí)GDP增速為3.8%(2004年);從2011年至今,最高的增速為2.9%,發(fā)生過(guò)兩次(2015年和2018年)。 像美國(guó)這樣復(fù)雜的經(jīng)濟(jì)體,絕非一個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)所能概括,不過(guò)以下一些因素有助于解釋為什么GDP增速不如從前。 經(jīng)濟(jì)已經(jīng)成熟 Bannockburn Global Forex的首席市場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)略官馬克·錢德勒表示:“我們是一個(gè)成熟的經(jīng)濟(jì)體,我們有65%的消費(fèi)貢獻(xiàn)給了服務(wù)業(yè)。對(duì)比中國(guó),他們?cè)谶^(guò)去20年里消費(fèi)的水泥量比美國(guó)過(guò)去200年里還多?!边@可以引申出一個(gè)模式:經(jīng)濟(jì)體會(huì)優(yōu)先投入固定資產(chǎn),它們對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)具有強(qiáng)大的促進(jìn)作用。固定資產(chǎn)包括道路、高速公路和樓房?!凹僭O(shè)你要建立一個(gè)家庭。首先,你得買房,隨后購(gòu)置家具和電視。在此之后你會(huì)購(gòu)買服務(wù)?!卑凑者@種模式,我們走到了今天,成為了一個(gè)以服務(wù)業(yè)為主的經(jīng)濟(jì)體。 錢德勒表示:“技術(shù)正在改變一切。通用汽車(GM)如今可以在20個(gè)工時(shí)內(nèi)造出一輛汽車。如今在裝配線上的工人制造幾輛汽車的耗時(shí)只是他祖父的零頭。他觸碰的也是電腦屏幕,而不是汽車部件?!?/p> 他指出,新技術(shù)——想想互聯(lián)網(wǎng)和高科技——節(jié)省了資本與人力?!八栽谶^(guò)去,你可能需要買臺(tái)電腦來(lái)代替打字機(jī)(后者曾經(jīng)取代了鋼筆或鉛筆),但如今你可以購(gòu)買新的應(yīng)用,而不必再買新電腦了?!蹦阌辛烁嗟挠?jì)算能力,但你不再需要花費(fèi)那么多錢。 負(fù)債水平過(guò)高 Charles Schwab and Co.的首席市場(chǎng)策略師利茲·安·桑德斯認(rèn)為大蕭條后的高負(fù)債水平也是原因之一?!斑@個(gè)循環(huán)不僅是后債務(wù)泡沫循環(huán)——它通常需要十多年來(lái)恢復(fù)——而且更廣泛地說(shuō),負(fù)債水平,尤其是聯(lián)邦政府和企業(yè)的負(fù)債水平,已經(jīng)處于最高級(jí)別。隨著債務(wù)越積越高,經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)會(huì)漸漸走低?!?/p> 高負(fù)債影響經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的部分原因在于個(gè)人、公司和政府償還債務(wù)會(huì)產(chǎn)生“擠出效應(yīng)”。她表示:“高負(fù)債壓縮了對(duì)于生產(chǎn)資料的投資,減少了經(jīng)濟(jì)支出和其他支出?!痹S多家庭過(guò)去十年里都在償付金融危機(jī)后留下的債務(wù),“這就意味著貢獻(xiàn)給GDP的支出會(huì)有所減少。” 勞動(dòng)力老化 房利美(Fannie Mae)的高級(jí)副總裁和首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家道格·鄧肯觀察到,第二次世界大戰(zhàn)之后的經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)張受到了“嬰兒潮一代”成長(zhǎng)為勞動(dòng)力和組建家庭的推動(dòng)。其中包括女性參加工作的人數(shù)增多,并在2000年達(dá)到頂峰。更多的女性成為勞動(dòng)力,就有了更多可以掙錢的人,也就產(chǎn)生了更多消費(fèi)者,從而推動(dòng)了真實(shí)GDP的增長(zhǎng)。但是如今,隨著嬰兒潮一代的男男女女以每天1萬(wàn)人的速度跨過(guò)65歲大關(guān),由此導(dǎo)致的勞動(dòng)力減少并不能夠被完全彌補(bǔ)。 此外,鄧肯表示:“遷入美國(guó)的移民速度有所降低,這也減緩了勞動(dòng)力的增長(zhǎng)。”這也部分解釋了為什么如今美國(guó)空缺工作崗位的數(shù)量(按照美國(guó)勞工統(tǒng)計(jì)局發(fā)布的工作崗位報(bào)告,為740萬(wàn)個(gè))比能夠參加工作的人數(shù)(按照就業(yè)形勢(shì)報(bào)告,目前美國(guó)的失業(yè)人口是590萬(wàn)人)要多出150萬(wàn)。 政府監(jiān)管 鄧肯還認(rèn)為,近年來(lái)的政府監(jiān)管也抑制了商業(yè)投資,直到特朗普當(dāng)局大幅放緩了監(jiān)管法規(guī)的發(fā)布速度并削減了稅率。他表示:“此舉導(dǎo)致小型企業(yè)的信心出現(xiàn)了有記載以來(lái)最大幅度的增長(zhǎng)。不過(guò)當(dāng)局也在增加支出,已經(jīng)處于高水平的債務(wù)與GDP的比率又有攀升。此外,關(guān)于關(guān)稅的討論每天都在變化,這又給企業(yè)投資計(jì)劃平添了幾分不確定性,你只能做好減緩增長(zhǎng)的準(zhǔn)備?!?/p> 無(wú)論近年來(lái)GDP增速放緩的原因是什么,特朗普當(dāng)局對(duì)未來(lái)幾年GDP年均增速的預(yù)測(cè)還是高達(dá)4%。有些人認(rèn)為,更高的真實(shí)GDP增速會(huì)導(dǎo)致進(jìn)入繁榮與蕭條循環(huán)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)加大。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)也在經(jīng)濟(jì)有復(fù)蘇跡象的第一時(shí)間開(kāi)始權(quán)衡降低利率以促進(jìn)增長(zhǎng)的做法,結(jié)論可能最快會(huì)在下一次美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)會(huì)議(7月30日和31日)上確定。高速增長(zhǎng)的前景或許只是存在于我們國(guó)家年輕時(shí)期的美好回憶。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)) 譯者:嚴(yán)匡正 |
There’s something missing in today’s so-called historically strong economy: blowout GDP numbers. During the last half of the past century, the Department of Commerce released some pretty impressive GDP reports. Here are the highest annual real GDP readings during each decade from 1950 until 2000: 8.7% (1950), 6.6% (1966), 5.6% (1973 and 1978), 7.3% (1984), and 4.7% (1999). Those are hefty numbers compared to the 21st century. Between 2001 and 2010, the highest real GDP recorded was 3.8% (2004), and from 2011 until today the highest yearly rate was 2.9%, which happened twice (2015 and 2018). With an economy as complex as the United States, it’s never one thing, but here are a few elements contributing to tamer numbers on the GDP front. Economic maturity “As we’ve matured as an economy, we consume 65% services,” says Marc Chandler, Chief Market Strategist with Bannockburn Global Forex. “Compare that to China, which has consumed more cement in the last 20 years than the U.S. has for the last 200 years.” That follows a pattern where economies will spend money on fixed capital first, which is a strong stimulus for growth. That includes roads, highways—and houses. “Let’s say you’re starting a family. First, you buy a house, then you buy furniture and TV’s. After that, you buy services.” And that brings us up to today: a largely service economy. “Technology is changing everything,” Chandler says. “GM can now make a car in less than 20 man hours. A guy on the assembly line today is making multiple cars in a fraction of the time his grandfather did. And his hands are touching a computer screen, not touching parts of a car.” He points out that new technology—think the internet and high-tech—saves capital and labor. “So while in the past you might have bought a computer to take the place of a typewriter (which took the place a pen or pencil) now, instead of buying a new computer you can buy new apps.” You get more computing power, but you don’t have to spend as much money. High debt levels Liz Ann Sonders, Chief Market Strategist for Charles Schwab and Co., also blames high levels of debt following the Great Recession. “Not only is this cycle a post-debt bubble cycle—it usually takes a good decade to work out of these—but more broadly, debt levels, especially federal government and business, are in the stratosphere. As debt moves higher and higher, economic growth tends to move lower.” Part of the reason for that is the “crowding out” effect as individuals, companies and the government make payments on the debt. “The higher debt crowds out investment in capital goods,” she says, “reducing economic output relative to what it would be otherwise.” And as many households have spent the past ten years paying down their debt following the financial crisis, “that means spending, which contributes to GDP, lessens.” Changes in the labor force Doug Duncan, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist at Fannie Mae observes that the post-World War II economic expansion was powered by the the movement of ‘Baby Boomers’ into the workforce, as well as household formation. That included the rise of women into the workforce, which peaked around the year 2000. More women entering the labor force created more wage earners, as well as more consumers, and played a role in increasing real GDP. But now, with Boomers turning 65-years-old at the rate of 10,000 each day—male and female—their departure from the workforce is not being fully replaced. Additionally, “immigration has been slowed,” says Duncan, “thus slowing the growth of the workforce as well.” That’s part of the reason why there can be a million and-a-half more job openings (7.4 million according to the BLS Job Openings), significantly more than the number of people who could fill them (there are 5.9 million unemployed people according to Employment Situation). Government regulation Duncan also believes government regulation has put a damper on business investment in recent years, that is until the Trump Administration dramatically slowed regulatory issuance and cut taxes. “That generated the largest ever recorded increase of optimism of small business,” he says, “but the administration also increased spending, adding to an already very high level of debt to GDP. Add to that the uncertainty faced by business investment plans when tariff discussions, which change daily,” and you have a recipe for slowing growth. Whatever the reasons for the slower GDP rates of recent years, not even the Trump Administration predicts GDP on an annual basis as high as 4% in the coming years. And there are some who would argue that higher real GDP rates would increase the risk of a boom and bust cycle anyway. So as the Fed weighs the benefits of lowering interest rates to stimulate growth at the first signs of economic weakening—which may come as soon as the next Fed meeting (July 30th and 31st)—the prospect of blockbuster numbers may remain a fond memory from our country’s younger days. |