說起如何讓美國的制造業(yè)、軍事乃至道德水平恢復(fù)昔日的榮光，很多人都能說得頭頭是道，但美國造船業(yè)面臨的危機(jī)卻很少有人關(guān)注。

在這方面，首先不能不談美國國力的衰弱。美國告別了插著星條旗的商船遍布五大洋的時(shí)代，這不僅影響了美國人的民族自豪感，更重要的是其地緣戰(zhàn)略影響。世界上90%的國際貿(mào)易是通過海運(yùn)完成的，健康的商業(yè)海運(yùn)能力關(guān)乎一個(gè)國家的經(jīng)濟(jì)命脈，同時(shí)它也是建設(shè)強(qiáng)大海軍和海防的基礎(chǔ)。

僅僅75年前，也就是第二次世界大戰(zhàn)剛結(jié)束時(shí)，美國還擁有世界上規(guī)模最為龐大的商業(yè)船隊(duì)，占全球商船總噸位的60%。時(shí)至今日，全球三大海運(yùn)強(qiáng)國分別是希臘、中國和日本，其中任意一國擁有的商船噸位都比美國大出三倍。

美國人發(fā)明了高速帆船，發(fā)明了蒸汽機(jī)輪船，發(fā)明了船用集裝箱，然而時(shí)至今日，美國在海洋創(chuàng)新的幾乎所有方面都落在了后頭。美國的海運(yùn)仍然在使用過時(shí)的技術(shù)，比如在近海貿(mào)易中，能用的船基本上都是上了歲數(shù)的。例如從美國西海岸向夏威夷運(yùn)送貨幣的馬特蘇尼亞號(hào)已經(jīng)46歲了，比夏威夷居民的中位年齡還要老。

大家只需看看，在卡特里娜風(fēng)災(zāi)過后，美國各地不斷要求就《瓊斯法案》做出豁免，就不難想到美國海運(yùn)行業(yè)的可悲境地（《瓊斯法案》要求，運(yùn)送國內(nèi)貨物的船只必須為美國所有，在美國制造，配備美國船員，懸掛美國國旗）。

波多黎各、阿拉斯加和夏威夷等美國海外領(lǐng)土現(xiàn)在都成了《瓊斯法案》的受害者。當(dāng)然其他受害者也有不少。比如美國在墨西哥灣區(qū)根本找不到堪用的懸掛美國國旗的天然氣運(yùn)輸船，導(dǎo)致大量頁巖氣只能白白躺在那里，無法運(yùn)到本土的消費(fèi)者手中。同時(shí)由于《瓊斯法案》導(dǎo)致的海運(yùn)價(jià)格畸高以及船只質(zhì)量老舊，夏威夷的一些農(nóng)場主只能用飛機(jī)將牛羊空運(yùn)到美國大陸。

既得利益集團(tuán)通過這種經(jīng)濟(jì)尋租，更加鞏固了既得利益。同時(shí)由于他們的強(qiáng)勢(shì)游說，使得《瓊斯法案》成了華盛頓的政治正確，更加說不得碰不得。長此以往，美國已經(jīng)從全球最大海運(yùn)國滑落成了一個(gè)二流海運(yùn)強(qiáng)國。

曾幾何時(shí)，美國對(duì)海運(yùn)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施進(jìn)行過大量投資。在二戰(zhàn)最激烈的時(shí)期，布魯克林海軍造船廠雇傭了7.5萬多名工人。伯利恒鋼鐵公司在超大型油輪的建造上一度領(lǐng)先世界。然而《瓊斯法案》卻令美國造船企業(yè)喪失了競爭力。在陸地上，美國本土的造船行業(yè)，包括那些鋼鐵工人、管道工、電焊工，幾乎全部遭到滅頂之災(zāi)。而在海上，擁有美國海員的美國船只也同樣越來越少。最近有報(bào)道稱，費(fèi)城造船廠目前再一次到了難以為繼的地步?！董偹狗ò浮肥沟迷诿绹煲粭l商船的成本比任何其他國家都高出了三至五倍。事實(shí)上，如今的美國各個(gè)造船廠，只能造出僅適用于近海航行的小型拖船和駁船，至于那些更大、能跑國際航線的遠(yuǎn)洋集裝箱船、油輪和散裝貨輪，則主要由亞洲的競爭對(duì)手建造。

在美國海運(yùn)貿(mào)易的全盛時(shí)期，美國各大海港就是高效的典范。而現(xiàn)在，港口成了美國安全部門緊盯的重點(diǎn)場所。在“9·11”事件后，美國國會(huì)通過了一項(xiàng)法律，要求對(duì)所有進(jìn)口集裝箱100%地進(jìn)行大規(guī)模殺傷性武器檢查。根據(jù)2016年國會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室的一份報(bào)告，美國對(duì)大約5%的所謂“高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”的進(jìn)口集裝箱進(jìn)行了掃描檢查。不難看出，從港口運(yùn)營到海運(yùn)行業(yè)的就業(yè)，再到造船工業(yè)，美國的整個(gè)航運(yùn)業(yè)都陷入了嚴(yán)重的困境。

隨著商業(yè)船隊(duì)的日益萎縮，美國海軍和海岸警衛(wèi)隊(duì)也成了泥菩薩過江。他們的命門被捏在一個(gè)由軍工企業(yè)組成的既得利益聯(lián)盟手中，漫天要價(jià)，而且總是不能按時(shí)交貨。比如最近，一家以前從沒有造過破冰船的造船廠剛剛拿到了一份7.5億美元的大單，要在密西西比州建造一艘海軍急需的新型極地破冰船。問題是，靠近北極的那幾個(gè)北約盟國明明有更先進(jìn)的技術(shù)，美國卻偏偏寧可多花四倍的錢，多等上幾年的時(shí)間，也要在國內(nèi)建造。對(duì)于這些挾持了海軍造船訂單的軍工既得利益聯(lián)盟，人們理應(yīng)感到憤怒。同時(shí)，人們也應(yīng)該反思美國的航海事業(yè)何以變得如此充滿銅臭味，同時(shí)這個(gè)國家卻偏偏很少意識(shí)到這一點(diǎn)。

政府官員應(yīng)該清醒認(rèn)識(shí)到美國航運(yùn)業(yè)面臨的可怕處境。重振美國航海事業(yè)，雖然任重道遠(yuǎn)，但至少有三項(xiàng)易于執(zhí)行的政策可以馬上搞起來，以使事情朝著正確的方向發(fā)展。

首先，美國應(yīng)該廢除《瓊斯法案》。該法案是一項(xiàng)失敗的試驗(yàn)，它扼殺了在美國領(lǐng)海內(nèi)的航運(yùn)創(chuàng)新，同時(shí)幾乎葬送了整個(gè)美國航運(yùn)業(yè)。

廢除《瓊斯法案》，不僅有助于提震美國近海運(yùn)輸，同時(shí)也對(duì)環(huán)境有利。通過“海上高速公路”運(yùn)輸貨物要比在擁堵的公路上運(yùn)輸更加高效，同時(shí)也有助于緩解美國各大主要交通干道的交通壓力。明年恰逢《瓊斯法案》立法100周年，正是廢除這一蠶食公共利益、充當(dāng)資本家?guī)蛢吹摹皭悍ā钡淖詈脵C(jī)會(huì)。

第二，美國應(yīng)該加入1982年的《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》，這其實(shí)只需要參議院的建議和同意。加入《公約》將使美國在北極事務(wù)上真正有了一席之地，同時(shí)也使美國在刻赤海峽問題上與俄羅斯的對(duì)峙有了法理依據(jù)，更能使美國在維護(hù)所謂“國際航行自由”問題上獲得領(lǐng)導(dǎo)權(quán)地位。加入《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》，也能讓美國人再次想起自己是一個(gè)海權(quán)國家。

第三，正如手機(jī)讓發(fā)展中國家跨過了過時(shí)的有線通訊網(wǎng)絡(luò)一樣，美國企業(yè)現(xiàn)在也面臨著將航運(yùn)事業(yè)數(shù)字化的好機(jī)會(huì)（比如我的公司CargoMetrics Technologies就是一家收集和分析航運(yùn)大數(shù)據(jù)的公司）。美國創(chuàng)業(yè)公司已經(jīng)利用互聯(lián)網(wǎng)改造了很多行業(yè)，利用美國人的聰明才智，他們也能將這個(gè)完全依賴手工操作和語音喊話的行業(yè)徹底革新，讓美國航運(yùn)事業(yè)再次振興。

六個(gè)世紀(jì)以前，在歐洲人的船還不敢開到看不見陸地的地方時(shí)，一位名叫鄭和的中國將軍已經(jīng)在率領(lǐng)當(dāng)時(shí)世界上最強(qiáng)大的艦隊(duì)遠(yuǎn)征大洋。不過不久后，中國犯了一個(gè)戰(zhàn)略錯(cuò)誤，放棄了海洋，將重心放在陸地上。結(jié)果在隨后的幾個(gè)世紀(jì)里，中國遭遇了一系列屈辱的侵略，而侵略它的，正是那些造船而非燒船的國家。

今天，復(fù)興的中國正在推動(dòng)建上“21世紀(jì)海上絲綢之路”，南沙群島、西沙群島擴(kuò)大戰(zhàn)略存在，并優(yōu)先發(fā)展造船工業(yè)。中國在航海事業(yè)上的積極進(jìn)取，不由得讓人聯(lián)想起當(dāng)年鄭和寶船艦隊(duì)的遠(yuǎn)征精神。

那么，美國又該怎么做？歷史已經(jīng)給我們上了清楚的一課。如果不正視海洋，美國的命運(yùn)將無異于當(dāng)年放棄航海事業(yè)的其他國家，在各大洋上失去其重要地位，最次降格成世界舞臺(tái)上的一個(gè)次要角色。如果你遇見一個(gè)英國人，你不妨問問他，對(duì)他們?cè)?jīng)引以為豪的日不落帝國艦隊(duì)，以及現(xiàn)在這個(gè)島國的現(xiàn)狀作何感想。

如果美國的航運(yùn)事業(yè)再次振興，結(jié)果就不一樣了，尤其是對(duì)于美國的外交戰(zhàn)略。美國其實(shí)有很多相對(duì)易行的政策決定，能夠輸通美國的海上貿(mào)易大動(dòng)脈，給美國經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來新的活力——這不僅可以刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)增長，在戰(zhàn)時(shí)也可以大大增加美國的海軍實(shí)力。

現(xiàn)在，美國政客們的注意力都集中在南方的陸地邊界上，但他們卻忽略了一個(gè)至關(guān)重要的問題：美國航運(yùn)的長期衰落。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

本文作者斯科特·博格森是前美國海岸警衛(wèi)隊(duì)官員、美國對(duì)外關(guān)系委員會(huì)委員，現(xiàn)任CargoMetrics Technologies公司首席執(zhí)行官。

譯者：樸成奎

While debates rage about how to restore America’s manufacturing, military, and even moral foundations to periods of perceived glory, little attention is being given to the crisis in shipping.

This aspect of national decline is a grave issue for more than the pinch to patriotic pride that comes from the loss of the stars and stripes on the world’s oceans, but also for crucial geostrategic reasons. When 90% of international trade measured by volume is transported on ships, a healthy merchant marine is in the country’s vital economic interests and, as has always been the case, it is the foundation for a strong coast guard and navy.

Just 75 years ago, at the end of World War II, the U.S. boasted the world’s largest commercial fleet, owning 60% of total tonnage. Today, the top three fleets in the world are Greek, Chinese, and Japanese, each of which are three times larger than the shrinking American fleet.

The nation that invented the clipper ship, the application of the steam engine at sea, and the venerable shipping container has become a laggard in virtually every aspect of marine innovation, still using outmoded technologies, for example, on coastwise and ferry trades with what decrepit vessels are left. One of the ships that transports goods from the West Coast to Hawaii for example, the 46-year-old Matsonia, is older than the median age of residents of Hawaii.

One need look no further than the constant need for waivers to the Jones Act—the law requiring domestic goods to be transported on ships owned, flagged, crewed, and built in the U.S.—on the heels of hurricanes to appreciate the dire condition of the American fleet.

Puerto Rico, Alaska, and Hawaii have become Jones Act hostages. Countless other examples of the rot abound, such as the fact that there are no American-flagged liquefied natural gas carriers, leaving American shale gas stranded on the Gulf Coast and unable to get to American consumers on the Atlantic seaboard. Hawaiian ranchers are flying cattle to the mainland because of the expense and substandard quality of Jones Act ships.

Because of the sharp lobby of entrenched interests quietly enriching themselves from this economic rent, the topic of the Jones Act has become a third rail in Washington, D.C. Along the way, the U.S. has slipped from the world’s greatest seafaring nation to a second-rate shipping power.

Our nation once invested in vibrant marine infrastructure: During its peak in World War II, the Brooklyn Naval Yard employed 75,000 people. Bethlehem Steel was once a world leader in building supertankers. The Jones Act has caused the nation’s shipbuilders to become uncompetitive and has nearly totally wiped out labor onshore—including steelworkers, pipe fitters, and welders—and offshore, leaving fewer American ships to crew with American sailors. As recently reported, the Philadelphia Shipyard is on death watch—again. The law has made the cost to produce an American merchant vessel three to five times more expensive than what it takes to build a comparable hull in any other country. The reality is American yards today can really only construct relatively small tugs and barges capable of steaming near the coast, leaving larger oceangoing container ships, oil tankers, and dry bulkers—which can carry much greater amounts of cargo—to be constructed by Asian competitors for international routes.

American seaports also used to be models of efficiency humming with trade; now the creaky waterfront is a vulnerable spot in a brittle supply chain. In the wake of 9/11, for example, Congress passed legislation requiring 100% of imported containers to be checked for weapons of mass destruction. According to a 2016 Congressional Budget Office report, the U.S. scans the roughly 5% of incoming containers that are deemed high risk. From port operations to labor and shipbuilding, the U.S. maritime sector is in serious trouble.

As a result of the decimation of the American merchant marine, the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy are left to fend for themselves, captive to a military industrial complex selling overly expensive ships always over schedule and over budget. In the latest head scratcher, a yard that has never launched an icebreaker before was just awarded a $750 million contract to try its hand building a desperately needed new polar security cutter in Mississippi. This ship will be at least four times more expensive and take years longer to build than more advanced icebreaking technology offered to us by our Scandinavian NATO allies. The military industrial complex hijacking naval shipbuilding should cause outrage and soul-searching about how our maritime sector has gotten into such a funk, but as a nation we barely notice.

Government officials need to wake up to the dire predicament facing our shipping sector. While the journey to reclaim the country’s maritime heritage will be a long one, there are three relatively easy policy actions that can be taken immediately to kickstart things in the right direction.

First, the U.S. should posthaste repeal the Jones Act, a failed experiment which has choked innovation in domestic waters with the consequence of killing American shipping across the board.

This would not only provide a needed jolt to American cabotage, it would be good for the environment: Putting cargo on a marine highway and taking it off of clogged roads is a more efficient mode of transportation, and it will reduce highway traffic along the Interstate 5 and 95 corridors. The centennial of the Jones Act next year is the perfect anniversary to end this crony capitalist policy feeds like a parasite off of the public interest.

Next, and requiring simply the Senate’s advice and consent, the U.S. should finally join the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This will give the nation a literal seat at the table in the delineation of the Arctic, a legal bulwark against Russian encroachments in the Kerch Strait, and needed leadership to protect international freedom of navigation. The treaty’s ratification might also get Americans thinking about their country as a seafaring nation again.

Third, and similar to how cellphones have let developing countries leapfrog antiquated communication networks, there is an extraordinary opportunity for American companies to digitize shipping. (My company, CargoMetrics Technologies, collects and analyzes big shipping data.) American startups have harnessed the Internet to remake other analog industries, and the nation can become relevant in shipping again by using Yankee ingenuity to disrupt what remains a completely manual and voice-brokered business.

Six centuries ago, a Chinese admiral named Zheng He led the greatest fleet then ever assembled at a time when Europeans could barely navigate out of sight of land. China made a strategic blunder soon after, however, in abandoning the sea, choosing to face inward instead. As a result, in the centuries that followed, China suffered a series of humiliating invasions by nations that built boats instead of burning them.

Today, a resurgent China is pursuing a maritime Silk Road, expanding its strategic presence around the Spratly and Paracel Islands, making its shipbuilding industry a priority, and otherwise pursuing a number of maritime endeavors reminiscent of the spirit that initially launched Zheng He’s treasure fleet.

What will America do? History teaches us a clear lesson. Fail to face the sea, and the U.S. will suffer the fate of other nations that have before abandoned shipping: a fate of losing relevance on the world’s oceans, and ultimately becoming relegated to a lesser role on the world stage. Ask a Brit how they feel about their once-proud fleet and the current state of their island nation.

But a different outcome is possible if the U.S. revitalizes its shipping, especially if it is part of a broader foreign policy strategy. There are a number of relatively easy policy decisions that can nourish the American economy with renewed seaborne arteries pumping with trade—and this could stimulate economic growth while simultaneously restoring the core nucleus around which naval might is anchored in times of war.

While American politicians are fixated on the southern land border, they are ignoring a vitally important issue: reversing the long decline of American shipping.

Scott Borgerson, a former Coast Guard officer and fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the CEO of CargoMetrics Technologies.