帶著2017年的慘淡低迷，通用電氣（General Electric）邁入了2018年。本周三，公司發(fā)布了第四季度財(cái)報(bào)，結(jié)果低于分析師預(yù)期。以下是凄涼的細(xì)節(jié)：調(diào)整后每股收益0.27美元，低于華爾街預(yù)期的0.29美元；收入314億美元，低于預(yù)期值340億美元。這些數(shù)字，來自一家曾因?yàn)闃I(yè)績從未低于華爾街預(yù)期而聞名的公司。通用電氣是道瓊斯去年表現(xiàn)最差的股票，而公司股價(jià)還在2018年持續(xù)下跌。

不過，通用電氣的崩潰對(duì)公司而言可能是最好的情況。它可以迫使管理層提出一個(gè)長期以來難以啟齒的建議：公司解體。事實(shí)上，它早就應(yīng)該解體了。如今情況十分糟糕，除此之外很難有其他辦法來大幅改善這種一團(tuán)亂麻的境況。

通用電氣的問題是簡單而全局性的。這是一家典型的糟糕的綜合企業(yè)。他們向綜合企業(yè)的轉(zhuǎn)型始于二戰(zhàn)之后，公司業(yè)務(wù)拓展到了與電力不相干，彼此之間也沒有關(guān)聯(lián)的領(lǐng)域——導(dǎo)彈、計(jì)算機(jī)、衛(wèi)星、采煤等等。綜合企業(yè)在20世紀(jì)60年代風(fēng)靡一時(shí)，但由于他們的表現(xiàn)往往低于市場(chǎng)水平，國際電話電報(bào)公司（ITT）、Litton、LTV等大部分綜合企業(yè)最終解體了。只是其中不包括通用電氣。20世紀(jì)70年代是股市慘淡的十年，而通用電氣的情況甚至比股市平均水平還要糟糕，公司解體的呼聲日益高漲。

隨后事情出現(xiàn)了轉(zhuǎn)機(jī)。1981年，杰克·韋爾奇出任公司的首席執(zhí)行官，在他20年的任期中，公司的表現(xiàn)遠(yuǎn)超市場(chǎng)水平，討論拆分的聲音漸漸停歇了。沒錯(cuò)，那段時(shí)期是歷史上數(shù)一數(shù)二的牛市。但通用電氣的股價(jià)還要出彩得多。之后，韋爾奇卸任，公司又回到了拖市場(chǎng)后腿的狀態(tài)，再一次暴露出了糟糕綜合企業(yè)的本性。

通用電氣的表現(xiàn)有多糟糕？如果你在1945年向標(biāo)普500指數(shù)（S&P 500）投資了100美元，如今你將擁有245,738美元。不過如果你向通用電氣投資了100美元，加上股息在內(nèi)，你擁有的也只有144,478美元，這甚至還包括了韋爾奇掌舵時(shí)期公司股價(jià)飛漲的那一部分。去掉那部分呢？如果通用電氣在韋爾奇任期中，股價(jià)漲幅只有標(biāo)普500指數(shù)的平均水平（這仍然優(yōu)于二戰(zhàn)后公司在韋爾奇之前和之后的首席執(zhí)行官管理下的表現(xiàn)），那你的投資只值43,098美元。

沒錯(cuò)，不是所有的綜合企業(yè)都表現(xiàn)糟糕。最強(qiáng)大的反例是伯克希爾·哈撒韋公司（Berkshire Hathaway）。沃倫·巴非特高興地稱它為“雜亂延伸的綜合企業(yè)”。不過這沒什么說服力。我們最終得出的結(jié)論似乎是，擁有巴菲特或韋爾奇這種天才首席執(zhí)行官的綜合企業(yè)可以有優(yōu)異的表現(xiàn)。但不幸的是，需要天才首席執(zhí)行官坐鎮(zhèn)的戰(zhàn)略，不是一種可持續(xù)發(fā)展的戰(zhàn)略。

一些分析師認(rèn)為通用電氣的業(yè)務(wù)在財(cái)務(wù)上過于糾纏不清，把它們分開的代價(jià)恐怕高于帶來的價(jià)值。不過這種分析忽視了拆分公司釋放的企業(yè)能量。把通用電氣拆分成噴氣發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)、能源系統(tǒng)和醫(yī)療行業(yè)的三家公司，肯定是一次賭博。但是在公司股價(jià)低迷，管理層沒有明確的復(fù)蘇計(jì)劃的當(dāng)下，是時(shí)候面對(duì)現(xiàn)實(shí)了。通用電氣沒有理由繼續(xù)以現(xiàn)在的形式存在下去，公司的各項(xiàng)業(yè)務(wù)應(yīng)當(dāng)獲得解放。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：嚴(yán)匡正?

The Great General Electric Debacle of 2017 continued into 2018 as the company on Wednesday reported fourth-quarter earnings that fell short of analysts’ expectations. The dismal details: earnings per share of $0.27 net of special charges vs. a Wall Street estimate of $0.29; revenue of $31.4 billion vs. an estimate of $34 billion. This from a company once famed for never, ever missing Wall Street earnings estimates. GE was the worst performing stock in the Dow last year, and it has continued to fall in 2018.

Yet GE’s meltdown may be the best thing that could have happened to the company. That’s because it has forced management to propose a long-unutterable possibility: that GE could be broken up. In truth it should have been broken up long ago. Now things are so bad that it’s hard to see a significant improvement of this sorry mess otherwise.

The trouble with GE is simple and systemic. It’s a typical crummy conglomerate. Its transformation into a conglomerate began after World War II, when it expanded into businesses unrelated to electricity or each other—missiles, computers, satellites, coal mining, and many others. Conglomerates were all the rage in the 1960s, but as they reliably underperformed the market, most of them, such as ITT, Litton, and LTV, got taken apart. Not GE. The 1970s were a dismal decade for stocks, yet GE did even worse than the market, amplifying cries to bust up this company.

Then something happened. In 1981 Jack Welch became CEO, and during his 20-year tenure the company outperformed the market so spectacularly that talk of a breakup faded away. Yes, he ran the place during a historically great bull market. But GE performed much, much better than the market. Then, after he stepped down, GE reverted to its usual market-trailing performance. It again revealed its true character as a crummy conglomerate.

How crummy? If you had invested $100 in the S&P 500 in 1945, you’d have $245,738 today. But if you’d invested $100 in GE, you’d have only $144,478 including dividends, even with the rocket boost to the stock contributed by Welch. And without that boost? If GE had merely matched the S&P 500 during his tenure, which would still have beaten GE’s average performance under the post-war CEOs before and after him, then you’d have only $43,098.

It’s true that not all conglomerates perform terribly. The strongest counterexample is Berkshire Hathaway, which Warren Buffett happily calls “a sprawling conglomerate.” But this proves little. The lesson seems to be that a conglomerate with a genius CEO like Buffett or Welch can perform terrifically. Unfortunately, a strategy that requires a genius CEO is not a sustainable strategy.

Some analysts argue that GE’s businesses are so entangled financially that separating them would cost more than it’s worth. That analysis fails to value the entrepreneurial energy that can get unleashed in a breakup. Separating GE into three companies—jet engines, power systems, health care—would be a gamble for sure. But with the stock in a hole and management offering no clear plan for recovery, it’s finally time to face reality. GE has no reason for existing in its present form. Its component businesses should be set free.