幾年前，亞馬遜還沒有成為互聯(lián)網(wǎng)上的重量級選手時，許多華爾街分析師和記者都對它報以極度懷疑的態(tài)度。當(dāng)時我為《財富》雜志工作，我們也不怎么看好它。

理由很充分。亞馬遜最初的那些產(chǎn)品——書籍、電影和視頻的收入正在下滑。跟亞馬遜做生意的幾家公司都以關(guān)門歇業(yè)收場。甚至是在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫破裂以后，按傳統(tǒng)指標來看亞馬遜的估值仍然過高。最主要的是，由于創(chuàng)始人兼首席執(zhí)行官杰夫·貝佐斯是如此執(zhí)著于把每一分閑置資金都重新用于公司運營，亞馬遜手里一點兒錢也沒有。2001年，在一篇特別尖銳的文章中，我們下結(jié)論說亞馬遜“永遠也不會成為高速增長、大筆盈利而且超級有效率的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)傳奇公司。”哎。

讓我想起這些的是新一期《巴倫周刊》的封面文章。它談?wù)摰氖荖etflix，而且《巴倫周刊》對這家公司的態(tài)度是，嗯，極度懷疑。文章提要這樣說：“隨著迪士尼離它而去，亞馬遜高歌猛進，以及Facebook在視頻領(lǐng)域大舉擴張，燒錢的Netflix處于被動地位，其股價可能下跌50%?！?/p>

和《財富》對亞馬遜的分析一樣，《巴倫周刊》在剖析數(shù)據(jù)之后得出了結(jié)論。文章的作者杰克·霍夫認為，Netflix今年要燒掉20-25億美元資金，而且它還要在債券被評為垃圾級的情況下為支出籌集資金。171美元的股價非常高，盡管這家公司有了些許利潤。今年Netflix用于獲得授權(quán)和制作內(nèi)容的支出將高達60億美元左右（與之相比，HBO今年在內(nèi)容上將花費約20億美元）。盡管Netflix目前的全球用戶數(shù)量已經(jīng)超過1億，但收視費并不能彌補它的所有成本，這就帶來一個問題：如果它大幅提價會出現(xiàn)什么樣的局面？用戶會因此停止收看Netflix的節(jié)目嗎？這樣的話它的股價就可能下跌，從而使Netflix更難進行它賴以生存的債務(wù)融資。

同時，華特迪士尼最近宣布，明年以后將把目前授權(quán)給Netflix的影視作品轉(zhuǎn)移到自己的流媒體業(yè)務(wù)中，其中包括《海洋奇緣》和《海底總動員2》這樣的熱門電影。亞馬遜繼續(xù)做大自己的流媒體業(yè)務(wù)，目前的內(nèi)容預(yù)算在45億美元上下。Facebook則推出了新的視頻服務(wù)。這些都是令人畏懼的競爭對手，而且收入都是Netflix的好多倍。

最后，霍夫提醒《巴倫周刊》的讀者說，就Netflix引起關(guān)注的內(nèi)容而言，其中大多數(shù)影視作品都來自其他內(nèi)容提供商的授權(quán)。Netflix讓其中很多公司感到害怕，它們希望自己從未授權(quán)給Netflix，這樣就不會“賦予它能力”。這些內(nèi)容提供商可能效仿迪士尼，做出不再為Netflix提供內(nèi)容的決定（探索傳播等公司已經(jīng)這樣做了）?；蛘撸绻鸑etflix無法爭取到新用戶，而且也不能再如此隨意地花錢，內(nèi)容就有可能干脆變成過于昂貴之物。

霍夫?qū)懙溃骸凹逼鹊耐顿Y者會關(guān)心用戶增速是否放慢甚至陷入停滯。增長靠的是內(nèi)容，而對自身沒多少內(nèi)容的公司來說，內(nèi)容就需要資金。Netflix的風(fēng)險在于，如果它的購買力減弱，今后幾年就有可能和吸引人的內(nèi)容絕緣?！币虼?，霍夫認為Netflix的股價可能會下跌50%。

我得說，《巴倫周刊》這篇文章中能被輕易駁倒的東西不多?；舴蛄_列的情況絕對都有可能，而且有充分理由相信一些華爾街最聰明的投資者正在做空Netflix。但我覺得實際情況將證明這些懷疑都是錯的，就像此前人們懷疑亞馬遜那樣。

亞馬遜的批評者忽略的關(guān)鍵因素是貝佐斯的能力和決心。雖然還不清楚亞馬遜最終的經(jīng)營模式會是什么樣，也許就連貝佐斯也說不清，但我們現(xiàn)在都看到了，貝佐斯帶來的動力、他的獨創(chuàng)性和對消費者的明確關(guān)注幫助亞馬遜度過了各種各樣的難關(guān)，并最終成為其他零售商都懼怕的零售巨頭，而且今年的收入有望接近1700億美元。懷疑者把注意力集中在亞馬遜的資產(chǎn)負債表上，這讓他們忽略了貝佐斯賦予亞馬遜的文化屬性，而正是這樣的文化屬性讓亞馬遜變得不可阻擋。

Netflix首席執(zhí)行官里德·黑斯廷斯有著類似于貝佐斯的專注力。56歲的黑斯廷斯在20年前跟別人一起創(chuàng)立了Netflix，隨后一直經(jīng)營至今。剛剛起步時，通過郵件把DVD寄給用戶的Netflix就戰(zhàn)勝了Blockbuster，一個比自己大得多的競爭對手。2007年，就在Netflix的DVD業(yè)務(wù)很賺錢時，黑斯廷斯推出了流媒體服務(wù)，這有可能奪走DVD業(yè)務(wù)的利潤。雖然最初只有電影，但黑斯廷斯和公司二號人物泰德·薩蘭多斯意識到播放時長一小時的電視劇才是真正的機會所在，這樣做實際上讓網(wǎng)絡(luò)和制作方都能播出這些電視劇，就像以前雙雙播出半小時長的喜劇那樣。

雖然那些把影視作品授權(quán)給Netflix的公司通過所謂的“流媒體視頻點播”權(quán)獲得了高額收入，但其中許多公司漸漸對Netflix的實力感到怨恨，而且將它視為有線電視的威脅，而有線電視仍是這些公司最大的利潤來源。為了確保自己的命運依然掌握在自己手里，Netflix開始自行制作內(nèi)容，比如2013年2月播出第一季的《紙牌屋》和五個月后上線的《女子監(jiān)獄》。換句話說，每次遇上岔道，黑斯廷斯都選擇了正確的路線，盡管那是風(fēng)險最高的做法。

2015年秋，我有幸到Netflix一窺究竟。當(dāng)時Netflix正準備進行另一場豪賭:把業(yè)務(wù)擴展到除中國以外的世界其他地區(qū)。雖然已經(jīng)進入了60個國家和地區(qū)，但每個地方的業(yè)務(wù)都各自為營，影視作品通常都用當(dāng)?shù)卣Z言播出，而且有大量營銷噱頭。這次兩種情況都會變得非常少，至少一開始是這樣。當(dāng)時很多人都認為這樣的想法是誤入歧途，將帶來虧損和混亂。而今，也就是不到兩年后，Netflix已經(jīng)擁有5600萬國際用戶，超過了5300萬的國內(nèi)用戶數(shù)量。

我總覺得無論電視的進化帶來什么樣的改變，Netflix都將和HBO、亞馬遜等幾家公司一起成為勝利者。我這樣說不僅僅是因為黑斯廷斯以及Netflix已經(jīng)取得的成績。

同時也是出于我在Netflix的所見所聞。黑斯廷斯已經(jīng)建立了一種卓越文化，它鼓勵“文明”分歧，而內(nèi)部拉幫結(jié)派是遭解雇的最“保險”途徑。它帶有安迪·格魯夫很久以前為英特爾注入的良性偏執(zhí)——總是左右掃視，評估局勢和競爭狀況。迪士尼宣布終止合作幾天后，Netflix就發(fā)起反擊，跟制作人珊達·萊梅斯簽約，后者曾為迪士尼旗下的ABC打造了電視劇《實習(xí)醫(yī)生格蕾》和《丑聞》。最后，黑斯廷斯也許是我見過的最聰明的CEO。

要點在于，我看到的東西讓我相信Netflix會成為贏家，但這些東西無法在資產(chǎn)負債表或者損益表里找到?！栋蛡愔芸分赋龅乃袧撛趩栴}確實都是事實。但有時候，對有些公司來說數(shù)字并不能代表一切。我相信Netflix就是其中之一。

就像多年以前的亞馬遜一樣。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

本專欄文章并不代表編輯團隊或彭博及其所有者的觀點。

譯者：Charlie

?

Years ago, before Amazon had become the internet’s 800-pound gorilla, there were many Wall Street analysts and journalists who viewed the company with extreme skepticism. I worked for Fortune magazine at the time, and we were among the doubters.

Our rationale was sound. Amazon's earliest product categories—books, movies and videos—were seeing a decline in revenue. It cut deals with a handful of companies that wound up going out of business. Even after the dot-com bust, its stock was overvalued by traditional measures. And most telling of all, because founder and chief executive Jeff Bezos was so insistent on plowing every spare penny back into the business, the company made no money. In one particularly biting 2001 story, we concluded that Amazon “will never be the high-growth, wildly profitable, super-efficient company of Internet lore.” Ouch.

What brings this to mind is the cover story in the new issue of Barron’s. The subject is Netflix, a company that Barron’s views with, well, extreme skepticism. The headline reads: “Cash-burning Netflix is vulnerable as Disney shies away, Amazon looms, and Facebook muscles into video. Shares could fall 50%.”

Like Fortune’s analysis of Amazon, Barron’s came to its conclusions after a forensic examination of its numbers. The author, Jack Hough, noted that Netflix’s cash burn this year would be between $2 billion and $2.5 billion, and that it is financing its spending “with junk-rated debt.” At $171 a share, its stock price is very high, even though its profits are minimal. It is spending an enormous sum this year—$6 billion or so—licensing and creating content. (By comparison, HBO will spend about $2 billion this year on content.) Although Netflix now has over 100 million subscribers worldwide, its subscriptions don’t cover all of its costs, which raises the question of what will happen if the company ever raises its prices significantly. Would that cause subscribers to abandon the service, which would cause the stock to drop, which would make it harder to get the debt-financing it relies on?

Meanwhile, The Walt Disney Co. recently announced that it would move the movies and TV shows it currently licenses to Netflix to its own streaming service after next year, movies that include such hits as Moana and Finding Dory. Amazon continues to ramp up its own streaming service; its content budget is now in the range of $4.5 billion. And Facebook is playing around with a new video service. These are all fearsome competitors, with geometrically more revenue than Netflix.

Finally, Hough reminded Barron’s readers that, for all the attention Netflix’s own content gets, most of the movies and TV shows it streams are licensed from other content providers. Other companies, many of which fear Netflix and wish they had never “enabled” the company by licensing its shows, could follow Disney’s lead and decide to stop making content available to Netflix. (Some, like Discovery Communications Inc., already have.) Or content could simply become too expensive if Netflix stops gaining new subscribers and can no longer spend so freely.

“Investors will care in a hurry if membership gains slow or stall,” Hough wrote. “Growth depends on content, and for companies that don’t own much of it, content requires cash. Netflix runs the risk of getting shut out of attractive content in coming years if its buying power wanes.” Hence his view that the stock could drop 50 percent.

I have to say, there is not much in the Barron’s story that you can easily refute. The scenarios Hough lays out are definite possibilities; there is good reason some of the smartest investors on Wall Street are short Netflix’s stock. Nonetheless, I think the skeptics are going to turn out to be wrong, just as they were with Amazon.

The key factor that the critics overlooked with Amazon was the skill and determination of Bezos. Though it wasn’t yet clear—perhaps not even to Bezos—what Amazon’s ultimate business model was going to be, we know now that his drive, his ingenuity and his clear-eyed focus on customers saw Amazon through various rough patches until the company emerged as the retailer every other retailer fears, on pace to generate nearly $170 billion in revenue this year. The skeptics’ focus on Amazon’s balance sheet caused them to overlook the cultural attributes that Bezos instilled in Amazon that made it unstoppable.

In Reed Hastings, Netflix has a similarly focused CEO. Hastings, 56, has been running Netflix since he co-founded it 20 years ago. In its earliest incarnation, sending DVDs to customers through the mail, Netflix vanquished a much bigger competitor, Blockbuster. In 2007, at a time when Netflix’s DVD business was highly profitable, Hastings began the company’s streaming service, potentially cannibalizing its DVD profits. Though it streamed only movies at first, Hastings and his number two, Ted Sarandos, realized that the real opportunity lay in streaming hour-long television dramas—thus allowing the networks and studios to, in effect, syndicate hour-long shows just as they traditionally did with half-hour comedies.

Although so-called “video streaming on demand” rights generated significant revenue for the companies that licensed their shows to Netflix, many of them came to resent Netflix’s power, and see it as a threat to the cable bundle, which remained the largest source of their profits. To help ensure that it remained in control of its own destiny, Netflix began creating its own content with shows like “House of Cards,” which streamed its first season in February 2013, and “Orange is the New Black,” which followed five months later. In other words, every time Hastings reached a fork in the road, he took the right path, even if it was the riskiest.

In the fall of 2015, I got a peek inside Netflix as the company prepared for another big Hastings-inspired gamble: a plan to expand the service to the entire world (aside from China). Although Netflix was already in 60 countries, each had had its own rollout, usually with shows in the native language, and lots of marketing hoopla. This time, there would be very little of either, at least at first, and there were plenty of people who thought this was a misguided idea that would lead to losses and chaos. Yet today, less than two years later, Netflix’s international subscribers have overtaken its domestic ones, 56 million to 53 million.

I wound up thinking that no matter what happens as television evolves, Netflix will be one of the winners, along with HBO, Amazon, and a handful of others. I say that not just because of what Hastings and the company have already accomplished.

It is also because of what I saw at Netflix. Hastings has created a culture of excellence, where civil disagreement is encouraged and internal politicking is the surest way to get fired. It has the kind of healthy paranoia that Andy Grove instilled long ago at Intel—it is constantly looking over its shoulder, assessing the landscape and the competition. Days after Disney said it would end its relationship with Netflix, the company fired back by signing Shonda Rhimes, who created “Grey’s Anatomy” and “Scandal” for Disney’s ABC unit. Finally, Hastings may be the smartest CEO I’ve ever met.

The point is, the things I saw that caused me to believe Netflix is going to come out a winner are not things that you can find in a balance sheet or an income statement. All the potential issues aired by Barron’s are real. But sometimes there are companies where the numbers don’t tell the full picture. Netflix, I believe, is one of those companies.

Just as Amazon was long ago.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.