微軟的收購回報率差是出了名的。2007年買下在線廣告公司aQuantive，2014年買下手機制造商諾基亞，一共給它造成了139億美元的資產(chǎn)減記。2011年收購Skype花了它85億美元，雖說至今沒有做減記，但它也未能證明這筆收購物有所值。

當(dāng)然，搞這些不賺錢的并購的，是前CEO史蒂夫?巴爾默?？扇缃瘢睦^任者薩特亞?納德拉拿出262億美元買下社交媒體公司LinkedIn，吹響了微軟這個并購專業(yè)戶的新時代號角。

這是微軟歷史上最大的一筆交易，也是科技史上最昂貴的收購之一。也許，收購LinkedIn可以讓微軟提供差異化的體驗，從而擴(kuò)大潛在市的規(guī)模。但對股東來說，這些都是浮云，重要的是數(shù)據(jù)。而數(shù)據(jù)表明，要讓這筆交易取得財務(wù)上的成功，微軟要么大幅提升LinkedIn的利潤，要么讓LinkedIn的上億用戶都來使用它的產(chǎn)品。它成功的機會很小。

為什么呢？讓我們來看看到微軟目前給投資者創(chuàng)造的收益率，再看看它必須做些什么，才能讓資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上因為收購LinkedIn而增加的新資產(chǎn)創(chuàng)造出同樣高的收益率。今年第一季度末，LinkedIn的股東權(quán)益（也叫資產(chǎn)凈值，即資產(chǎn)價格減去負(fù)債和未付款）為46億美元，微軟為了這點凈資產(chǎn)花262億美元，還承擔(dān)了其他雜七雜八的26億美元債務(wù)。也就是說，微軟了賬目上多出了288億美元的LinkedIn資產(chǎn)。

為了做分析，我們要用到《分析師會計觀察》一書的作者杰克?切謝爾斯基（Jack Ciesielski）提出一個指標(biāo)，叫“資產(chǎn)的現(xiàn)金運營回報率”，簡稱COROA，即公司每年創(chuàng)造的全部現(xiàn)金（含息稅）除以為創(chuàng)造這些現(xiàn)金而對軟件、營運資金、客戶清單等其他資產(chǎn)的投入。去年，LinkedIn的營運資產(chǎn)基數(shù)是69億美元（基于當(dāng)年的平均資產(chǎn)額得出），創(chuàng)造的營運現(xiàn)金流是8.27億美元。COROA達(dá)到了12%，相當(dāng)不錯。

但對于新東家來微軟說，讓LinkedIn達(dá)標(biāo)的門檻大幅提高了，因為它支付了超高的溢價，被納入微軟旗下的LinkedIn的收益率就不再以69億美元進(jìn)行測算，但是而微軟要支付的價格，即288億美元來測算。LinkedIn的盈利能力其實不如比它大得多的微軟。LinkedIn的COROA是12%，微軟則高達(dá)15.2%。也就是說，微軟在每一美元資產(chǎn)上創(chuàng)造了15美分以上的現(xiàn)金。

所以，如果微軟想把LinkedIn的業(yè)績提升到自己的水平，就得創(chuàng)造44億的運營現(xiàn)金流，也就是288億美元的15.2%，這可是LinkedIn目前能創(chuàng)造的現(xiàn)金的5倍啊！

這個難度實在太大了，難怪微軟在公告后面的文件里只是泛泛地宣揚LinikedIn的影響力，閉口不提公司會追加多少投入，以及新的投入會給股東帶來怎樣的回報。

這不是說，LinkedIn是另一個諾基亞，也不是說這筆交易注定要失敗。微軟也許能控制住LinkedIn無度的開銷（比如高額的股權(quán)獎勵），說不定會利用LinkedIn的用戶推動自己的服務(wù)。

和以前一樣，我們不知道微軟會做些什么，但我們知道，如果讓股東獲益，微軟必須做些什么。因為這次交易，LinkedIn的股價在6月13日大漲50%，投資者大發(fā)橫財。但他們的收益極可能成為微軟投資者的損失。 (財富中文網(wǎng))

作者：Shawn Tully

譯者：天逸

Microsoft has a poor record of making acquisitions pay. The software giant took a combined $13.9 billion in writedowns on its acquisitions of online ad company aQuantive (2007) and phone maker Nokia (2014). What’s more, Mr. Softy has little to show for its $8.5 billion purchase of Skype (2011), though it doesn’t appear to have ever taken a writedown for that acquisition.

Of course, it was former CEO Steve Ballmer who spearheaded those mergers, and failed to make them profitable. Now, his successor Satya Nadella is effectively trumpeting a new era of Microsoft MSFT -0.62% as an expert acquirer and integrator by announcing the purchase of social media icon Linkedin LNKD -0.37% for $26.2 billion in cash.

It’s the biggest deal in Microsoft’s history. It’s also one of the most expensive transactions in the annals of technology. What matters to shareholders isn’t the happy talk about how “the likelihood of seizing more of the TAM (total addressable market) will increase through differentiated experiences,” but the numbers. And those numbers show that Microsoft will need to either generate gigantic improvements in Linkedin’s profits, or steer many millions of Linkedin customers to its own products, to make the deal a financial success. The chances are slim.

To see why, let’s examine the returns Microsoft generates today, and what it must do to generate the same margins on all the new assets its piling on its balance sheet via the purchase of Linkedin. At the end of the first quarter, Linkedin had shareholders’ equity or net worth—the difference between what it paid for its assets and what it owes to lenders and suppliers—of $4.6 billion. Microsoft is paying $26.2 billion for that equity, and assuming another $2.6 billion for miscellaneous liabilities not included in that number. Hence, it’s piling a total of $28.8 billion in new Linkedin assets on its books.

For this analysis, we’ll use a measure developed by Jack Ciesielski, author of The Analyst’s Accounting Observer, called “cash operating return on assets,” or COROA. It’s essentially the total cash a company generates each year before taxes and interest, divided by dollars invested in the software, working capital, customer lists, and all the other assets that produce that cash. Last year, Linkedin produced operating cash flows of $827 million on its then asset base of $6.9 billion (based on average assets for the year). That’s a decent return, or COROA, of 12%.

But for the new acquirer, the bar just rose enormously. Because it’s paying a super-rich price, Microsoft’s returns on LinkedIn, once it becomes a unit of the software giant, will be measured not on $6.9 billion in assets, but on what Microsoft is paying for all those new assets, that $28.8 billion. LinkedIn is actually running its business less profitably than the far larger Microsoft. Linkedin’s COROA is 12%, while Microsoft’s is 15.2%, meaning it generates just over $0.15 in cash on each dollar of assets.

So for Microsoft to lift Linkedin’s performance to match its own, Linkedin’s basic business, or that business plus the improvement it brings to Microsoft, would need to generate operating cash flows of $4.4 billion, or 15.2% of $28.8 billion. The problem: That’s more than five times the cash that Linkedin is making right now.

Given the size of these hurdles, it’s unsurprising that the slide deck that accompanied the announcement is long on generalities extolling the power of social media, and short on disclosing what Microsoft is adding in new capital, and what it takes to make that load of new capital pay for its shareholders.

That’s not to say the deal is another Nokia, or necessarily destined for failure. Microsoft may tame what looks like undisciplined spending at Linkedin, including huge equity awards, and could use Linkedin’s customer list to boost sales of its own services.

As usual, we don’t know what Microsoft will do, but we do know what Microsoft needs to do, if shareholders are to benefit. The deal is a gigantic windfall for Linkedin’s investors, who watched their shares jump 50% on June 13. The best bet is that their gain will be Microsoft investors’ loss.