????隨著更多中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢(shì)不好的消息不斷傳來(lái)，大多數(shù)人的視線一直都放在A股的劇烈震蕩，以及可能波及美國(guó)和歐洲的各種溢出效應(yīng)上。

????經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)放緩導(dǎo)致了股市暴跌的出現(xiàn)，在一波波下跌中，中國(guó)新興的投資階層屢屢蒙受巨額損失，而這會(huì)給國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題帶來(lái)一系列化合反應(yīng)。但務(wù)必要記住的是，雖然股市波動(dòng)可能占據(jù)新聞?lì)^條，但真正決定一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體命運(yùn)的，是債務(wù)市場(chǎng)。

????在美國(guó)，金融體系曾幾乎崩潰，只因那些最具系統(tǒng)重要性的金融機(jī)構(gòu)曾押注房地產(chǎn)價(jià)格會(huì)永遠(yuǎn)上漲，或者即使價(jià)格最終下跌，金融工程也能拯救他們。在中國(guó)，雖然房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)的運(yùn)行與美國(guó)顯著不同，但它同樣是導(dǎo)致巨量債務(wù)激增、正在威脅整體經(jīng)濟(jì)的幕后推手。

????在美國(guó)，擔(dān)保債務(wù)憑證（CDO）曾經(jīng)助長(zhǎng)了對(duì)住宅抵押貸款、以及一些發(fā)行給房屋業(yè)主的債務(wù)的投資需求，在泡沫破滅后，許多這類債務(wù)最終都無(wú)法償還。在中國(guó)，由于業(yè)主沒(méi)有私人土地所有權(quán)，所以中國(guó)不存在普通民眾將無(wú)力償還的債務(wù)作為抵押品的問(wèn)題。反而是地方政府，由于征稅困難，已經(jīng)越來(lái)越依賴地方政府融資平臺(tái)（LGFVs）為基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目融資。情況正如中國(guó)社會(huì)科學(xué)院研究員廖凡曾經(jīng)所寫到的：

????盡管地方政府融資平臺(tái)披著企業(yè)法人的外衣，但它們一直以來(lái)卻更像是變相的地方政府分支機(jī)構(gòu)。其最主要、甚至可以說(shuō)唯一可依賴的資產(chǎn)就是土地。它們常常由地方政府授權(quán)充當(dāng)土地銀行，利用土地作為主要抵押品向國(guó)家開發(fā)銀行獲取長(zhǎng)期貸款，后者起初是一家政策性銀行，但這些年來(lái)業(yè)務(wù)已經(jīng)遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出了原有范圍。有了國(guó)家開發(fā)銀行的初始融資，地方政府融資平臺(tái)就能啟動(dòng)業(yè)務(wù)，尋求國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行的短期貸款，或者在銀行間債券市場(chǎng)發(fā)債，用這些方式進(jìn)一步借貸。既然出售或者開發(fā)土地所得是償還這類債務(wù)的主要收入源，支持LGFV的地方政府就完全有理由和動(dòng)力征用更多的土地，讓房產(chǎn)價(jià)格維持高位，這樣才能持續(xù)循環(huán)下去。

????一直以來(lái)，地方政府在中央政府保駕護(hù)航下都能借到款。事實(shí)上，2008年中國(guó)政府備受贊譽(yù)的4萬(wàn)億經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激方案大部分由地方政府債務(wù)提供資金。從刺激金額占各國(guó)GDP的比重看，和中國(guó)相比，美國(guó)為應(yīng)對(duì)危機(jī)祭出的刺激簡(jiǎn)直小巫見大巫。這一救市方案給中國(guó)2008年以來(lái)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)帶來(lái)了助力，但刺激的紅利正在耗盡。隨著中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)放緩，中央政府對(duì)地方政府的融資還債能力憂心忡忡。

????如果緊急救助無(wú)力償債的地方政府，問(wèn)題可能會(huì)繼續(xù)拖延下去。但這會(huì)有違中央高層的努力，國(guó)家主席習(xí)近平正致力于抑制地方官員權(quán)力，同時(shí)將增長(zhǎng)模式由投資驅(qū)動(dòng)轉(zhuǎn)為消費(fèi)驅(qū)動(dòng)。上周，中央將2015年地方政府債務(wù)限額鎖定在16萬(wàn)億元人民幣，較去年設(shè)定的限額上調(diào)6億元。在此之前，中國(guó)財(cái)政部已批準(zhǔn)地方政府債務(wù)置換計(jì)劃，通過(guò)允許地方政府發(fā)行新債券，置換此前由房地產(chǎn)提供融資的存量地方債務(wù)。

????美國(guó)銀行分析師崔偉指出，這種策略可能導(dǎo)致“有理由預(yù)計(jì)，很快會(huì)……發(fā)生一些違約”，因?yàn)檫@一債務(wù)限額會(huì)導(dǎo)致某些地方政府無(wú)法將目前無(wú)力償還的債務(wù)展期。中央政府顯然不愿再給予地方政府更多貸款，讓2008年刺激方案的批評(píng)者抓到把柄。批評(píng)人士認(rèn)為，當(dāng)年的刺激可能短期內(nèi)推動(dòng)了中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展，可長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，它對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)有不利影響，因?yàn)榈胤秸疀](méi)有投資那些真正創(chuàng)造經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值的項(xiàng)目。

????要搞清楚中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)下滑“震級(jí)”到底有多嚴(yán)重，我們唯有等時(shí)間來(lái)揭示。但如果說(shuō)這個(gè)全球第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體正在靠近金融危機(jī)的深淵，那么債市將是第一個(gè)爆發(fā)的定時(shí)炸彈。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

????譯者：Charlie

????校對(duì)：詹妮

????As more bad economic news continues to filter out of China, most eyes have been fixated on the volatile fluctuations of the nation’s equity markets and the potential spillover effects reverberating throughout the United States and Europe.

????China’s crashing stock market comes as the result of its slowing economy, and it will compound thenation’s problems as its incipient investing class has been losing a lot of money with each successive market tumble. But it’s important to remember that while stock market shifts may grab headlines, it is the debt markets that truly determine the fate of an economy.

????In the United States, the financial system nearly collapsed after the nation’s most systemically important financial institutions bet on the idea that real estate prices would continue to rise forever, or that financial engineering would save them when prices finally did fall. In China, the real estate market works much differently, but it remains the driving force behind a massive debt explosion that now threatens its entire economy.

????In the U.S., it was collateralized debt obligations that helped create the demand to invest in residential mortgages, with debt being issued to homeowners, many of whom would end up not being able to repay after the bubble burst. In China, there is no private land ownership like there is in the United States, and so there isn’t a problem of average citizens taking out mortgages they can’t pay back. Instead, local governments, motivated by their inability to levy taxes, have increasingly relied on “l(fā)ocal government financing vehicles” (LGFVs) to finance infrastructure projects. As Liao Fan, a professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has written:

????Though dressed up as business corporations, LGFVs have been more of a disguised arm of local governments. Their most—or even only—reliable asset is land. Often empowered by local governments as land banks, they use land as the main collateral to secure long-term loans from China Development Bank (CDB), originally a policy bank but has gone far beyond that over the years. With this initial funding, LGFVs are able to start operation and borrow further by seeking short-term loans from the state-owned commercial banks or selling bonds on the inter-bank bond market. Since the proceeds from selling or developing land are the main source to repay such debts, local governments behind LGFVs have all the reason and incentive to expropriate more land and keep the property price at a high level, so as to continue the cycle.

????Local governments have borrowed this money with the blessing of China’s central government. In fact, China’s much-lauded $570 billion stimulus package in 2008, which dwarfed the American response to its crisis relative to each country’s respective GDP was funded mostly by local government debt. That program helped power China’s economic growth since 2008, but the dividends are now drying up. As Chinese growth slows, the central government is worried about the local governments’ abilities to finance the debt.

????China could continue to kick the can down the road by bailing out its insolvent local governments. But this would run counter to President Xi Jinping’s efforts to curb the power of local officials and shift China’s growth model from investment led to consumption led. Last week, Beijing placed a $16 trillion yuan capon Chinese government debt, up $600 million yuan from a cap it set last year. And this is after the government has been swapping debt with local governments, buying up real estate-financed local debt in place of government debt officially backed by the Chinese government.

????As Bank of America’s David Cui points out, this strategy could lead to “some defaults … reasonably soon,” since this cap will effectively prevent some local governments from rolling over debt it can’t currently repay. And the central government’s apparent unwillingness to extend more credit to local municipalities is lending credence to critics of the 2008 stimulus package, who argued that while it may have given a short-term boost to the economy, the long-term effects to the Chinese economy would be deleterious because these local governments weren’t investing in projects that made economic sense.

????Only time will reveal the full magnitude of China’s economic slowdown. But if we are nearing a financial crisis in the world’s second largest economy, the debt markets will be the first to crash.