????3.在評估備選方案時，拷問自己如何面對截然不同的環(huán)境：就在我們達(dá)成和惠普的交易之前幾天，道瓊斯指數(shù)升至歷史最高點14,087。之后幾個月內(nèi)，對沖基金和按揭公司紛紛倒閉，我們進(jìn)入大蕭條以來最嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退。僅僅三個月后，要以每股8美元的價格出售公司都已經(jīng)不可能了。

????4.如果你決定出售公司，細(xì)心執(zhí)行的競價流程是成功并購的關(guān)鍵：向SEC提交的委托聲明書詳細(xì)描述了我們和10家公司的討論，長達(dá)9頁。每個接洽過程都經(jīng)過縝密思考仔細(xì)安排以獲得最終成功。

????5.創(chuàng)造并引導(dǎo)收購者的適當(dāng)心態(tài)至關(guān)重要：巧妙地說服收購者，除了收購你的公司，他們別無選擇，而你還有多個誘人選項。不管每次進(jìn)步有多小，一定要通過每次接觸不斷強(qiáng)化這個印象，直至最終達(dá)成交易。

????“最佳出口可能在你身后”

????如同我在之前的文章里所討論的，最好的CEO利用戰(zhàn)略性業(yè)務(wù)開發(fā)來保護(hù)薄弱的關(guān)鍵側(cè)翼，比如幫助公司渡過難關(guān)、推動收購和戰(zhàn)略合作、推進(jìn)國際擴(kuò)張。偉大企業(yè)家創(chuàng)業(yè)的目的從來都不是為了被收購，但隨著公司不斷成長，擁有更多出路并真正了解這些選項是非常重要的。 戰(zhàn)略性業(yè)務(wù)開發(fā)的最重要作用也許在于：主動積極地確保公司有其它選擇，CEO和董事會知曉出路何在。在飛機(jī)上你會被告知“最佳出口可能在你身后”，但那不是你在商業(yè)運作里想聽到的，（因為那意味著你并未看到那個出口）。

????戰(zhàn)略評估：2005年11月

????在Opsware，90%的時候董事會討論的當(dāng)然只是建設(shè)一家偉大公司所需的那些日常運作：比如季度訂單、盈利和損失、產(chǎn)品計劃和挑戰(zhàn)、財務(wù)等等。然而，每年我們都會堅持跳出日常爭論，對公司現(xiàn)狀做一次戰(zhàn)略評估。作為評估的一部分，我們將思考一些更基本的問題。比如：

????? 我們?nèi)绾慰创镜氖袌觯?/p>

????? 我們處于何種競爭位置？

????? 公司有哪些潛在收購者，他們目前對收購的態(tài)度如何？

????? 我們面臨的主要機(jī)會和風(fēng)險是什么？

????? 底線：相對于通過收購來退出，繼續(xù)運營的價值何在？

????在董事會討論之前，我們都會正式拜訪惠普（HP）、BMC、甲骨文（Oracle）、EMC這類大型公司，通報公司業(yè)務(wù)的進(jìn)展。雖然公開目的是為了探討可能的合作機(jī)會，我們其實想去了解（或刺探）他們對公司業(yè)務(wù)的興趣，以保證一旦我們決定出售公司時不會吃閉門羹。

????3. In evaluating your alternatives, ask yourself how you would feel if the environment were to change radically: Days before we signed the HP deal, the Dow hit 14,087—its highest level ever. Within months, hedge funds and mortgage companies started imploding and we entered the worst recession since the great depression. Just three months later, a sale at even $8/share would not likely have been achievable.

????4. If you do decide to sell, a meticulously executed competitive process is key to a successful M&A outcome: This SEC proxy statement description of Opsware's process details discussions with 10 companies, stretching over nine pages. Every one of those contacts was tightly scripted and carefully orchestrated to drive to the ultimate successful outcome.

????5. Creating and managing the acquirer's psychology is critical: The key is subtly to convince the acquirer that they have no option but to acquire you, but that you have multiple attractive alternatives—and to reinforce that impression in every interaction, no matter how small, until the deal is definitively done.

????"Your best exit may be behind you"

????As I've discussed in previous posts, the best CEOs leverage strategic BD to cover critical flanks not well covered by other functions—helping to navigate crises, driving acquisitions and strategic partnerships, leading international expansion. No great entrepreneur sets out to build a company to be acquired, but as the company grows, it's important to have options and to understand them well. Perhaps the most important role of a strategic BD exec is proactively to make sure the company always has options and that the CEO and board always know where the exits are. They tell you on an airplane that "your best exit may be behind you", but that's not something you ever want to hear in business.

????Stepping back from the fray: November 2005

????At Opsware, 90% of our board discussions were naturally about the day-by-day work of building a great company: quarterly bookings, wins and losses, product plans and challenges, financials and so on. However, about once a year we would make a point of stepping back from the daily battle for a more strategic review of our situation. As part of this review, we would address more fundamental questions. For example:

????? How do we feel about our market?

????? How is our competitive position?

????? Who are potential acquirers of the company, and what's their current state of mind?

????? What are the major opportunities and risks facing us?

????? Bottom line: What's the likely value of staying the course versus exiting?

????Prior to these board discussions, we would make a round of senior visits to HP, BMC, Oracle, EMC and other behemoths to give them an update on the business. While our ostensible purpose was to explore the potential for a partnership, our real objective was to understand (and pique) their interest in our space and to make sure we'd have an open door if we should ever decide to explore selling.