揭秘通用汽車在中國的成功奇跡
????下面這個基本問題的答案將為整整一代商學院的學子們提供一個很好的案例:為什么一家公司——像通用汽車(General Motors)——會在一個大陸慘遭滑鐵盧的同時卻能在另一個大陸一路突飛猛進? ????這是一個十分奇妙的悖論。過去的30年中,曾一度叱咤西方汽車市場的通用汽車公司如今雄風不再;然而在中國,通用花了不到20年的時間就一躍成為汽車生產(chǎn)領(lǐng)域的領(lǐng)頭羊。 ????答案對北美和亞洲兩個大陸的購車者們都具有巨大的影響。中國是世界最大的汽車市場,業(yè)已成為通用汽車最大的市場。2010年,通用汽車在中國市場的銷售量一舉超過了美國,今后幾年這一銷售額上的差距還將進一步擴大。 ????盡管中國市場目前的利潤貢獻率仍然相對較低,但中國客戶對車型的偏好已經(jīng)被帶到了美國市場。有些首次推出的別克(Buick)車型和雪佛蘭(Chevys)緊湊車型是專門針對中國市場設(shè)計的。業(yè)界認為中國已經(jīng)在蓄電池和電動車領(lǐng)域處于領(lǐng)先地位。但是通用汽車中國何時才能成為通用汽車全球的主力? ????沒有人比邁克?鄧恩更有資格來回答這個問題了。他在新書《美國車,中國路:通用汽車的中國故事》(American Wheels, Chinese Roads: The story of General Motors in China)中給出了答案。鄧恩已經(jīng)在亞洲生活多年,目前在香港成立了自己的Dunne & Co.公司,主要為汽車公司提供投資咨詢服務(wù)。之前,他一直在上海打理美國權(quán)威汽車調(diào)研咨詢機構(gòu)J.D. Power and Associates公司在中國的業(yè)務(wù)。鄧恩是知名汽車諜照攝影師吉姆?鄧恩的兒子。他在底特律長大,目前居住在印尼雅加達郊外。 ????鄧恩生性好奇而且敢于冒險,是天生的記者,同時也是嫻熟的寫手。亞洲的經(jīng)歷使他深諳當?shù)?、尤其是中國的人情世故?/p> ????鄧恩記載過一則軼事,很能說明問題。文中用大量筆墨詳盡描述了通用汽車總裁們在第一次與國有企業(yè)上海汽車工業(yè)集團(SAIC)商談建立合資工廠協(xié)議時所遇到的各種棘手的問題。 ????“在中國確定會議時間是一件非常困難的事,然而與中國人簽合同更難,而且老是反復無常??偛啃枰鞔_的答復,但中方就是不給,這著實讓人頭疼不已。盡管大家誠意十足,且已就所有合同條款達成協(xié)議,但簽約的時間總是中方說了算。而且,中方對此諱莫如深?!?/p> ????通用汽車首席執(zhí)行官杰克?史密斯已經(jīng)登上了底特律飛往北京的飛機,但中方還未確定舉行簽約儀式的地點。鄧恩繼續(xù)寫道:“外國公司駐中國的總裁一般都被委以經(jīng)濟重任。然而在現(xiàn)實當中,他們需要負責的遠不止這些——他們還需應付那些令人寢食難安、坐臥不寧的突發(fā)事件。然而,職務(wù)說明中對此卻只字未提。每當首席執(zhí)行官問及會議是否已經(jīng)確定時,駐華高管們無不血壓飆升、心如刀絞。 ????那為什么通用汽車在美國失利卻在中國取得了成功? ????來到中國,通用汽車必須重新創(chuàng)業(yè)。由于在中國市場沒有發(fā)展歷史和可供借鑒的經(jīng)驗,通用公司進入中國后不得不做到事事靈活處理、處處見機行事。和中國人打交道必須具備這兩種素質(zhì)。這種策略在總部那邊是行不通的,因為總部的監(jiān)管更加嚴格,一切都得按章程辦事。 ????驕兵必敗,哀兵必勝。90年代,當通用汽車北美業(yè)務(wù)已經(jīng)開始走下坡路時,該公司仍認為自己是汽車領(lǐng)域的老大。在組裝僅僅幾百輛卡車后,通用汽車中國的首家合資企業(yè)即以倒閉而告終。因此,通用汽車中國對于自己所面臨的挑戰(zhàn)有著異常清醒的認識。而且,其合作方是中國人,他們始終在談判中占有優(yōu)勢。 ????在中國,大家的意見都是一致的。在北美,杰克?史密斯得應付他的董事們、實權(quán)在握的老板們和美國聯(lián)合汽車工會(UAW)。可謂是眾口難調(diào)。在中國,管理結(jié)構(gòu)要簡單得多,而且公司的目標也非常明確:達成協(xié)議,生產(chǎn)汽車。 ????期間,通用汽車也得到了幸運之神的眷顧:大眾(Volkswagen),通用汽車在中國的頭號競爭對手,心不在焉;福特(Ford)的主要精力沒放在中國;豐田(Toyota)則長時間受累于民族主義仇恨。結(jié)果,中國人對別克鐘愛有加,通用汽車也因此開始了在中國的茁壯成長歷程。 ????鄧恩記錄了通用在中國的每一個足跡并以當事人的視角向讀者來講述這些故事。讀者讀來親臨其境,感同身受。與中國其他的合資企業(yè)——例如北京吉普(Beijing Jeep)——不同,通用中國的結(jié)局可謂皆大歡喜。 ????通用汽車北美的同行們已然因大型公司的通病——官僚病而倒下。令人感興趣的是,不知道通用汽車中國公司對此還能免疫多久。公司越大,官僚氣必然更加嚴重。隨著通用汽車對全球各大市場產(chǎn)品運營和平臺的整合,這一問題越來越讓人擔憂。中國消費者是否愿意為凱迪拉克CTS-V或科邁羅敞篷車(Camaro convertible)買單?美國買家對三缸、四缸動力的車會有什么樣的反應?翹首以盼這本書的續(xù)作。 |
????Here's a fundamental question whose answer should generate case studies for a generation of business school students: How could one company -- General Motors -- meet disaster on one continent and achieve explosive growth on another at the very same time? ????It is a fascinating paradox. GM (GM, Fortune 500) slid from domination of the Western automotive world in three decades, yet made itself into a leading automotive producer in China in less than two. ????The answer has enormous consequences for car buyers on both continents. China, the world's single largest auto market, has become GM's largest market, too. GM sold more cars in China in 2010 than it did in the U.S., and the difference will only grow in coming years. ????Although China's profit contribution is relatively small, Chinese customers' product preferences are already showing up in cars for American buyers. Some Buick models and some small Chevys are designed for the China market first. China is already thought to have a lead in battery development and electric vehicles. How long will it be before the tail begins to wag the dog? ????No one is better qualified to answer this question than Michael Dunne in his new book, American Wheels, Chinese Roads: The story of General Motors in China. He's a longtime Asia hand who ran the China business for J.D. Power and Associates in Shanghai before forming Dunne & Co., an investment advisory company specializing in auto markets, in Hong Kong. Dunne, the son of renowned auto spy photographer Jim Dunne, grew up in Detroit and currently lives outside Jakarta, Indonesia. ????Curious and enterprising, Dunne is a natural journalist and a deft writer. His years in Asia have left him an instinctive understanding of local folkways, especially China's. ????In one telling anecdote, he describes in gripping detail the headaches suffered by GM executives in finalizing their pioneering joint venture agreement with government-run SAIC. ????"Confirming a meeting in China is almost never an easy thing. Signing a contract in China is never, ever, ever easy. And never, ever certain. It is a source of tremendous angst when headquarters demands certainty where none exists. In spite of all of the genuine goodwill and the fact that all the terms had been agreed on, China still had the final say about when the signing would take place. And China wasn't talking." ????GM CEO Jack Smith was already in the air flying from Detroit to Beijing before the Chinese would confirm the location of the signing ceremony. Dunne goes on: "Presidents of foreign companies operating in China, are given enormous economic accountability. But in reality, they are responsible for so much more -- ulcer-inducing, anxiety-making responsibility for managing the unforeseen. This task appears nowhere in the job description. When the CEO asks whether the meeting is confirmed, the blood pressure goes up and the stomach goes haywire." ????So why did GM succeed in China while it was failing in North America? ????By necessity, it was entrepreneurial in China. With no history and no established procedures to fall back on, GM was forced to be nimble and to be able to improvise. Both qualities were needed in dealing with the Chinese. That kind of initiative was impossible closer to headquarters where supervision was tighter and bureaucratic rules were enforced. ????There was none of the arrogance that comes with success. Even though GM North America was already well into its downhill slide in the 1990s, it still acted as if it were king of the world. But when GM China's first venture collapsed after assembling just a few hundred trucks, the unit was under no illusions about the challenges it faced. Plus it was working with the Chinese, who held the upper hand in all the negotiations. ????And in China everybody was on the same page. In North America, Jack Smith had to deal with his directors, powerful functional bosses, and the UAW. The result was many mixed messages. In China, layers of management were much fewer, and corporate goals were abundantly clear: Make a deal, then make cars. ????GM also got some lucky breaks: Volkswagen, its number one China competitor, was inattentive; Ford (F, Fortune 500) was occupied elsewhere; and Toyota (TM) was frustrated by longtime nationalistic animosities. Buicks are beloved by the Chinese, and the market was in the early stages of its incredible growth. ????Dunne follows every step and tells his story through the eyes of the participants who were actually on the ground. The reader feels the angst right along side of them as they traverse unknown territory. Unlike other tales of Chinese joint ventures, like Beijing Jeep, this one has a happy ending. ????It will be interesting to see how long GM China can resist the big company disease that felled its North American counterpart. As it gets larger, it will inevitably become more bureaucratic. And as GM integrates its global operations, product development for individual markets will become more fraught. What's the appeal to Chinese customers for a Cadillac CTS-V or a Camaro convertible? And how will American customers react to a succession of three and four-cylinder cars? One hopes that Dunne is already working on a sequel. |